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PART 40.

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING THE

AFFAIRS OF MOROCCO.

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1909.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

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ERRATA.

Page 179, No. 235, line 4.—For "telegram No. 39" read "telegram No. 38."
Page 205, No. 270, line 7.—For "embéts" read "embété."
Page 206, No. 271, line 4.—For "12th instant" read "11th instant."
Page 237, No. 307.—For "No. 148, Telegraphic" read "No. 48, Telegraphic."

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CONFIDENTIAL.

Further Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Morocco.

Part 40.

[351] No. 1.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 4, 1909.)

(No. 196. Confidential.)

Sir, *Madrid, December* 31, 1908.

M. REVOIL, French Ambassador, spoke to me long and earnestly yesterday on the relations between France and Spain in Morocco. His Excellency is not satisfied with what he hears of the attitude of Señor Merry del Val, Spanish Minister at Tangier. Though this gentleman was thoroughly loyal to the French understanding when he took up his post last summer, he would seem to have yielded to the anti-French influences by which he is now surrounded. The Spanish Colony at Tangier, numbering many thousands, was always hostile to the policy of co-operation with France. The Spanish Minister had not unnaturally wished to make himself agreeable to his countrymen. He had also been too deferential to Herr von Rosen, German Minister at Tangier. It had reached M. Révoil's ears that Señor Merry del Val was taking great credit at the German Legation for the part which he said Spain had played in lowering the tone of the notes drawn up in Paris in connection with the recognition of Mulai Hafid. M. Padilla, Secretary to the Spanish Legation, was hand-in-glove with the Germans. There was good ground to believe that the Spanish Minister was also actively promoting a scheme for setting up a Spanish Military Mission at Fez, side by side with the French Military Mission. This was a most dangerous project. If once the *status quo* existing at the time of the Algeciras Conference in regard to these Missions was disturbed, there was nothing to prevent the Germans from establishing a Military Mission themselves. Spain had no business to take any such step without previously conferring with France. Her proceedings in the Riff country showed an equal disregard of French opinion. The Governor of Melilla had objected to all the French proposals for co-operation as regards the mining interests of the two countries in the Beni-bu-fruor region, and the means of conveying the ore to the sea.

At Madrid the French Ambassador complained of the lukewarmness, not to say active hostility, with which both press and general public regarded the avowed Government policy of united action with France. He spoke seriously to the Foreign Minister on the subject a few days ago. He remarked to him that in Spain only three persons, setting aside the King, were loyally furthering that policy, namely, Señor Maura, the Prime Minister, Señor Allendesalazar, and the Ambassador himself. No effort was made to educate public opinion. The Madrid papers reflected the anti-French ravings of the Spanish organs published at Tangier, when they were not directly inspired by the German Embassy, which was setting up a regular information bureau as a department of the Chancery. The "Correspondencia" was in daily touch with this new institution, as was apparent from the tone of its articles. The Government organ, the "Epoca," rarely mentioned Morocco, and since January 1908, when it inserted, under pressure from M. Révoil, an orthodox statement of Spanish

policy, it had done nothing to keep the public informed of the true state of affairs in Morocco.

M. Révoil touched on M. Regnault's proposed visit to Fez, and thought it would be very unwise if Señor Merry del Val went there at the same time. It would look too much like a demonstration. He had mentioned his fears on this point to Señor Allendesalazar, who remarked that M. Llaberia, late Spanish Minister at Tangier, had been at Rabat simultaneously with the French Minister last January to see Muley Abdul Aziz, without any exception being taken to the arrangement. M. Révoil replied that in any case it was very desirable that there should be an agreement between the two Ministers on the language to be held to the Sultan.

His Excellency is evidently somewhat uneasy owing to the recent arrival of Count Tattenbach as German Ambassador at Madrid and to the rumours which attribute to the latter an intention to play an active part in drawing Spain away from the French connection, beginning with a negotiation for a commercial Treaty. He thought it advisable that I should speak to the Spanish Government in the sense of his own representations. I promised to renew the advice which I have frequently given before, to the effect that the true interest of Spain, in view of her own special position in Northern Morocco, lies in a cordial understanding with France.

I have, &c.
(Signed) MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[1045] No. 2.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 9.)

(No. 1.)
Sir, *Tangier, January* 1, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to report that the French Military Mission, composed of Captain Mangin, Lieutenant Bremont, and three non-commissioned officers, left Tangier on the 28th ultimo, and is expected to arrive at Fez on the 3rd of this month. Captain Mangin, who was previously employed in the organization of the Tangier police, has already shown himself to be a man of great ability.

The Mission has gone up on the invitation of the Sultan.

I learn from the French Legation and also other sources that Benghabrit has succeeded in obtaining the ear of the Sultan, and the invitation was no doubt inspired by him. It is true that past experience has shown that the French are inclined to be optimistic in Morocco, and that their optimism has received some severe shocks, but in this instance their opinion is shared by Menebhi.

I have, &c.
(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

[1046] No. 3.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 9.)

(No. 2.)
Sir, *Tangier, January* 1, 1909.

WITH reference to previous correspondence on the subject of the possible appointment of Raisuli to the post of Governor of the Fahz, I have the honour to report that Menebhi told Mr. Irwin the other day that he had received a letter from Raisuli asking him on what grounds he had always maintained that it was out of the question for him to think of the post. If, Raisuli said, it was on account of the Europeans, nobody, he could assure him, had more consideration for them than he. Menebhi said the letter placed him in a very difficult position, and then, to Mr. Irwin's amazement, proceeded to strongly advocate Raisuli's candidature. His arguments were that Raisuli were appointed Governor of all the tribes now allotted to him by rumour, he would be in a position to make things most uncomfortable for the Government at Tangier. The situation was rendered all the more critical by the uncertainty which shrouded the intentions of the great southern Kaïds. Were they to throw off their allegiance in the south, and were Raisuli, furious at being baulked of the Fahz, to start a campaign against order in the north, the outlook would indeed be a bad one. It would really be far better to have him on the side of the Government. Moreover, if he intended to make trouble in the Fahz, in any case far greater pressure could be

[720] No. 1*.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 6.)

(No. 2.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, January* 6, 1909.

MY telegram No. 78.

The ex-Sultan has confessed to Menebhi that he signed an agreement with France ceding territory up to Moulouia River to her. If this meant whole course of river, it would be very serious ; but possibly it only refers to portion of river bounding Beni Snassen district. Since December 1907 the French have been in occupation of the latter.

Menebhi does not like to press Abdul Aziz to show him the documents, as the latter is suspicious that they may be communicated to Mulai Hafid.

As the German dragoman mentioned matter to Menebhi, it is clear that the Germans have some information on the subject.

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brought to bear on him if he were Governor of the province, residing, as he probably would, at Tangier.

Mr. Irwin remarked that the appointment would create a deplorable impression, and would certainly be opposed by the foreign Representatives; but Menebhi denied this, and said that, on the contrary, both Ben Ghabrit and Dr. Vassel, by instruction of their respective Legations, were strongly supporting Raisuli at Fez. I wished to test the accuracy of this assertion, and went round to see the French Chargé d'Affaires, who told me that his Government could not admit of Raisuli being appointed Governor of the Fahz, as it would stultify their previous attitude and give the Germans an opportunity to blaspheme. At the same time he admitted that at present they were pleased with Raisuli, and did not wish openly to oppose his desire. He had come spontaneously to M. Regnault in the summer and had made satisfactory declarations as to his feeling and attitude towards France. If the question of his appointment came up the French would discourage it on the ground of convenience, representing that the Fahz should be under the Basha of Tangier. Menebhi maintains that the protests made by the Fahz people mentioned in my despatch No. 304 was a got-up thing, and that a large number of Notables of the province had now gone up to Fez to support Raisuli. This latter statement, however, as far as I can gather, is an exaggeration, to say the least of it.

The new development is a curious one, and Menebhi's attitude, after all he said on previous occasions, is perplexing. He possibly may be afraid for his own position, as, from all the reports which reach me from Fez, it would appear that Raisuli is in high favour. Menebhi has, however, received a satisfactory though vague reply from the Sultan to the letter which he sent up to him in connection with the rebuke administered to him through Raisuli with regard to the attentions shown by him to Abd-el-Aziz. (See my despatch No. 308 of the 12th ultimo.)

The situation for the Representative of His Majesty's Government is a delicate one, and I am of opinion that it would be a mistake for me to take a strong line in the matter. We are by way of looking upon Raisuli as a reformed character, and he has given pledges for his good behaviour; moreover, if we opposed the appointment and he was nominated all the same, our position would be undignified and we should incur all the odium. If he succeeds in obtaining the post, I cannot help thinking that he will do all he can to keep in with the Europeans and that the natives will be the chief sufferers; this may not be a bad thing in the long run, as he will lose his popularity and thus diminish his power for mischief. It is of course to be hoped that the matter may be allowed to drop, though Menebhi repeated only yesterday that he considered the appointment a certainty. He, at all events, acting on my advice, has refrained from sending any reply to Raisuli's letter.

I am informed that Raisuli's agent in Tangier expects him to leave Fez for Tangier a few days after the feast, *i.e.*, in the course of the next few days.

I have, &c.
(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

[1047] No. 4.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 9.)

(No. 3.)
Sir, *Tangier, January* 2, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to transmit the usual summary of events in Morocco for the past week.

I have, &c.
(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

Inclosure in No. 4.

Weekly Report.

NOTHING definite has yet transpired in regard to the attitude of the southern Kaïds, but considerable comment has been aroused by the departure from Fez of the wives and family of the Grand Vizier, El Glawi. It is generally believed that Moulai Hafid viewed with some apprehension this move on the part of his principal supporter, as he was inclined to see in it a proof of his desire to cut himself from Fez in order to

definitely associate himself with Kaïds Aissa and 'Mtougui. The doings of these Kaïds are still wrapped in mystery, but their attitude certainly gives occasion for some uneasiness on the part of the Sultan. The explanation given of their prolonged absence from Marakesh is that they were engaged on a vast hunting expedition. There is, however, little doubt that their attention was not solely occupied in hunting. Others interpret the departure of El Glawi's family from Fez as due to a belief on the part of Moulai Hafid that the presence of the Grand Vizier is necessary for the maintenance of order in the Haouz.

It is reported that the column operating against the Pretender, El Roghi, has taken possession of Selouane, the stronghold from which the latter was recently driven out. The General in command of the force, Si Mezian, has caused Moulai Hafid to be proclaimed throughout the district, and, as a proof of his zeal towards the new Sultan, is collecting taxes in his name from the tribes. It is doubtful whether this will conduce to the popularity of the latter in that region. Reinforcements are due to arrive shortly at Selouane under the command of Bushta Bagdadi, who, it will be remembered, was intrusted with the ill-fated expedition to release Kaïd Maclean. No doubt a reconciliation has been effected between him and his former enemy, Raisuli, who is alleged to be at the present moment all-powerful in the councils of Moulai Hafid. Upon the arrival of this force an advance will be made against the Pretender, who was last heard of at Oued Za, in the territory of the Beni Bou Zeggou. Nothing is known as to the latter's plans, but if he wishes to continue the struggle against Moulai Hafid his one chance is to identify himself with the anti-European party, when he will doubtless attract to his standard the numerous firebrands who are disgusted with the moderation of Moulai Hafid.

It is reported from Casa Blanca that a force of 1,200 Shawia Goum is being raised, composed of 300 cavalry and 900 infantry. Mr. Madden learns that an average of three applications are being received for each unit required, which would point to the success of this experiment.

Considerable inconvenience has been caused to commerce in Casa Blanca by the destruction of lighters in a recent gale. Pending the report of the "Comité des Douanes," who are examining into the question of the Moroccan lighter service, with a view to its improvement and extension, two lighters have been sent to Casa Blanca from Laraiche, while further assistance has been rendered by the French authorities.

Orders have been received here from Fez to charter a steamer to convey to Laraiche 800 troops who are shortly expected to reach Mazagan from Morocco City. Other orders have been received here and at Tetuan to send all spare artillery to Mazagan and Saffi.

(Initialled) F. R.

[1048] No. 5.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 9.)

(No. 4.) *Tangier, January 3, 1909.*

Sir,

AS I had the honour to report in my telegram No. 78 of the 30th ultimo, Mr. Harris, before leaving for Paris, told me that he had reason to believe that M. Regnault, when at Rabat, had succeeded in inducing Abd-el-Aziz to sign a number of Conventions, which up till now had remained secret. At the time of telegraphing I had no official confirmation of this report, but I desired Mr. Irwin to sound Menebhi on the subject, and from what the latter has told him it is evidently well founded.

Menebhi has had interviews with the ex-Sutan yesterday and the day before, and the latter admitted that he signed various Agreements relating principally to the Alger-Moroccan frontier, and that he promised amongst other things to cede to France any place or places on that frontier which she might require. He is much upset at what he has done, and maintains that the Concessions were wrung from him by Ben Sliman and Ben Ghabrit at a moment when he was in a state bordering upon despair, deserted by all the tribes and even by his own officials. In return for the Agreements he was promised help from France, and at the same time he was given to understand that without that help he could never reach Morocco City.

He now says "would to God" he had never allowed matters to take their course, for personally he could not be in a worse position than he is, and he would not have

left this fatal legacy to his brother. He wept over the thought of the situation created for the Sultan and the Government by the Concessions he had made, and says he can never forgive the French for what they have driven him into doing. He is, moreover, much perturbed at the thought that he would have to answer before God for having disposed of territory under Mahommedan rule in favour of Christians.

Menebhi wishes to warn Moulai Hafid of the surprises which M. Regnault has in store for him, but he dares not make such a communication in writing, and thinks of sending a confidential man to Cid Hamed Jaai at Fez, who might convey it to the Sultan. Hadj Dris Benjelun, who, I gather, is much perturbed as to what will be the effect of the Concessions, is urging Menebhi to invent a pretext for sending him up to Fez to warn the Sultan, but Menebhi is afraid that such a course might both himself and Benjelun into hot water with the French.

In the meantime it appears that El Glawi has sent a special messenger to Menebhi to say that he is furious at the appointment of no less than seven partisans of the ex-Sultan to important posts in the Government, and that when he goes to Fez after the feast he will insist upon their removal. This intention on the part of El Glawi to go up to Fez is in opposition to all the rumours which have been circulating in Tangier, according to which he had sent for a portion of his harem which had remained at Fez, and was accumulating stores, money, aud animals in his castle in the Atlas, where he could defy all the Sultans of Morocco. Menebhi admits that the situation is most perplexing, but he personally believes that El Glawi intends to act fairly by the Sultan and go up to Fez. He is, in any case, anxious that he should do so, for he fears that Moulai Hafid, who has little experience of diplomacy, when suddenly confronted by the Agreements signed by his predecessor, may lose his head and give way on important points in order to gain others of relatively small importance. At the moment of the arrival of the French Mission at Fez, more than at any other, he will require to have his Viziers about him to act as buffers, and give him time to weigh the real import of his deeds and words. I would add that Mr. Irwin was informed by El Glawi's messenger yesterday that his master had made all his preparations for going to Fez after the feast.

I understand that M. Regnault intends to start for Fez as soon as possible after his return here on the 10th or 12th January, and that Ben Ghabrit is trying to obtain an undertaking from the Sultan that no other Mission should be received so long as he is there. This, if obtained, will no doubt cause considerable annoyance to the Spaniards and also to the Germans, if, as Menebhi believes, they intend, as in in 1900, to be there at the same time as the French. The German Minister has, I am told informed the Makhzen that he proposes going up to Fez, but without stating a time and Menebhi's opinion gives significance to a remark which Dr. Rosen made to me yesterday, to the effect that if he went he would choose his own time, regardless of any political construction which might be placed on his action.

I cannot help thinking that the disclosure of the Agreements mentioned above will reflect unfavourably upon French policy in Morocco and will produce an unpleasant impression of something like sharp practice, which the Germans will not be slow to seize upon and make the most of. Up till now the French have behaved with the greatest loyalty towards Moors and Europeans Powers alike, but it will require all M. Regnault's skill to explain away these Concessions wrung from a Monarch in the last stage of desperation. It is very possibly on this account that he is so anxious to be at Fez alone, and have plenty of time to arrange matters in the way in which he would have them presented. Perhaps he may only make use of them to strengthen his hand with Mulai Hafid and thus extort better terms from him.

Abd-el-Aziz maintains that M. Regnault promised him that the Concessions would not be enforced "during his time," an enigmatic phrase which is susceptible of very different interpretations.

Mr. Irwin is to see Menebhi again to-morrow, who expects by that time to have seen the various documents signed by Moulai Abd-el-Aziz. The latter was in such a pitiable state of depression yesterday at the thought of what he had done that Menebhi had not the heart to press him to produce them. It is to be hoped that they may prove to be of less importance than Menebhi is inclined to think.

In the midst of this intrigue, when we are exerting all our ingenuity to discover whether Ministers and Viziers are or are not going up to Fez, comes the startling news that on the 26th December a letter from the Sultan was read in the Karouin Mosque to the effect that he was about to depart peaceably for Rabat. That he should really do so appears to me almost impossible, in view of the arrangements made

for the reception of M. Regnault, the amount of business to be transacted with him, and the information received by Menebhi as to El Glawi's intentions, but he may have taken fright at the number of Missions which have been announced and at the very great expense which they entail.

The French Chargé d'Affaires believes the announcement to be bluff on the part of the Sultan to impose upon the Southern Kaïds, and also possibly to make M. Regnault hasten his departure for Fez. He considers, it appears, that the latter has not shown sufficient *empressement*.

I have, &c.
(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

[1049] No. 6.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 9.)

(No. 5.)
Sir, *Tangier, January* 4, 1909.

MR. IRWIN learns from what he considers a trustworthy source that Kaïd Aissa-ben-Omar has obtained French protection, the arrangements having been made by his son during his Mission to Paris.

His desire for protection is probably explained by the position of his province, which lies in the plains. He is thus exposed to attack by the Government. He is reputed to be very rich, and he must be adding very considerably to his wealth to judge by the heavy tribute which he is extorting from the tribes in his jurisdiction.

I have, &c.
(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

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[720] No. 7.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

My dear Bertie, *Foreign Office, January* 11, 1909.

YOU will have seen from Lister's telegram No. 2 of the 6th instant that the French Government are alleged to have signed an Agreement with Abdul Aziz under which certain territory in Morocco is ceded to France.

It is difficult to believe that the French Government have signed or intend to press an Agreement of this kind, thus putting themselves in the wrong as regards the Algeciras Act and giving the Germans a handle which they will not be slow to use; but, on the other hand, there seems no reason why Abdul Aziz or Menebhi should have invented the story.

If it is not true it would certainly be an advantage to have it disavowed by the French Government and to be able to contradict it. If it is true the subject is a delicate one to touch on, but in the present state of our relations with France, and as a loyal supporter of her Moroccan policy, I think we should be justified in letting her know that this story is being spread about, and pointing out the inconvenience that may result from it.

You can use your discretion as to the best means of ascertaining from the French Government the truth of these rumours. I do not want to appear to be the first to take objection to anything which the French have done in Morocco, and my only object in writing to you about it is to avoid the embarrassment of seeing France challenged by other Powers on a point in which it would be difficult for us to defend or support their action, a course which I always desire to pursue in the Morocco controversies.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. GREY.

[1611] No. 8.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 12.)

(No. 1. Confidential.)
Sir, *Madrid, January* 2, 1909.

THE King of Spain, in the course of an audience with which he honoured me yesterday, touched, among other topics, on the Morocco question. His Majesty this time had no specific complaint to make against the French. No irritating incidents had lately been reported to him. The relations between the troops of the two countries at Casa Blanca seemed to have improved. In outward demeanour the French officers and officials were now perfectly "correct." But the King still regarded the situation as fraught with danger for the future. The French were buying up property in and about Tangier to an alarming extent. They were always trying to take the lead in the Spanish sphere. They were multiplying schools at Tangier with the evident intention of making them the focus of a French revolutionary propaganda, destined to spread over the whole of Northern Morocco and even across the straits into the regions of Southern Spain.

In the Riff country they held fast to their mining property, though Spain had made the most advantageous proposals for purchasing it. Why could they not confine their activity to their own southern sphere in Morocco? Spain had never interfered with them there. The King wished they would leave Spain to go ahead alone in the northern sphere. The growth of this abnormal growth of French interests along the northern coast would some day be that, if Spain ever had to take defensive measures there, French troops would be landed on the pretext that French citizens required protection. What the King had in view was a possible European war. His Military Attaché at Vienna had reported that Servia was actively preparing for an outbreak of hostilities in the spring. His Majesty was happy to think that Spain would escape being involved in the conflict between the Powers more directly concerned; but she would have to guard against a possible attack on Morocco. Some Power or other might adopt this means of striking a blow at France. Of course the existing Spanish stations on the north coast, of which King Alfonso said there were nine, would have to be occupied in force. They would also have to be at least doubled in number, so that the whole coast from the Algerian frontier to beyond Tangier should be dotted with little Spanish strongholds. France must understand that Spain could tolerate no interference with necessary measures of this kind.

I mentioned the words *status quo*, by which the policy of Spain, as well as France and England, is defined in the notes exchanged in 1907. The King said he desired to keep the *status quo*, but then the French must keep it also, and cease poaching on Spanish preserves.

His Majesty's remarks reflected, no doubt, as usual, rather the opinions and aspirations of the Spanish army than the well-considered policy of his Government.

The King was glad to feel that there was a British Minister at Tangier who had taken advantage of his short stay at Madrid to make himself acquainted with the nature of the Spanish claims in Morocco. He had been at pains to explain the position to Mr. Lister.

In my part of the conversation I hinted that the French had lately been a little shaken in their belief that Spain was loyally co-operating with them in Morocco, and I expressed my belief that a frank understanding with France was never more necessary than at the present moment. The King said there had been no falling off in the observance by Spain of her engagements with France. If the Spanish population of the Morocco coast towns did not love their French neighbours, neither did the French love the Spaniards. Nothing could prevent this innate antipathy. But it could not fairly be said that the Spanish Government had been moved thereby from their fundamental policy of acting with France on the lines laid down at Algeciras.

I have, &c.
(Signed) MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

P.S. *January* 3.—To-day's papers announce that the Marquis of Casa Riera, a Spanish millionaire residing in Paris, has given 12,000*l.* towards the establishment of Spanish schools in Tangier. In speaking of French activity in this field, the King mentioned that Spanish schools would be set up to counteract the revolutionary and anti-Spanish aims of the French schools.

M. DE B.

[1614] No. 9.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 12.)

(No. 8.)
Sir, *Madrid, January 9, 1909.*

I ALLUDED in my Confidential despatch No. 196 of the 31st ultimo to the rumour that Spain is contemplating the establishment of a Military Mission in Fez, side by side with the existing French Mission, and I stated that this was one of the causes of the dissatisfaction with which the French Ambassador regards the present attitude of Spain with regard to affairs in Morocco.

From a Notice which appeared last night in the "Epoca," a Government organ, it would appear that the powder factory at Fez, formerly worked by Italian officers, is to be taken over, at the special request of Sultan Mulai Hafid, by a Spanish artillery officer. It is added that two other Spanish artillery officers, namely, a Captain and a Lieutenant, will be charged with the instruction of the Moorish army in this arm.

This morning's papers also publish a telegram from Tangier stating that the Spanish Minister is preparing to pay an official visit to the Sultan at Fez, and that he will be accompanied by the new Spanish Military Mission, consisting of four Captains of artillery and two engineer officers, besides Señor Belenguer, an army surgeon.

I have, &c.
(Signed) M. DE BUNSEN.

[1991] No. 10.

*Memorandum communicated by the French Embassy, January 12, 1909.**

L'APPLICATION de l'entente conclue après consultation des Puissances avec le Gouvernement chérifien en vue de la surveillance de la contrebande de guerre sur les côtes du Maroc par les croiseurs français et espagnols avait été prévue provisoirement pour la durée de l'année 1908.

Dans l'état encore incertain de la situation du pays il a paru aux Gouvernements français et espagnol qu'il serait sage de ne pas interrompre dès maintenant l'exercice des mesures de sécurité intéressant les résidents de toutes nationalités au Maroc.

En conséquence, le Gouvernement de la République, d'accord avec le Gouvernement espagnol, se propose de demander le renouvellement pour une période d'une année du mandat qui avait été confié aux deux Puissances, et d'intervenir à cet effet auprès du Maghzen pour obtenir une nouvelle délégation de pouvoirs que Moulai Hafid a d'ailleurs déjà admise en principe lorsqu'il a accepté les termes de la note franco-espagnole relative à sa reconnaissance.

L'exercice éventuel de cette surveillance ne doit entraîner de la part du Gouvernement français aucune demande d'indemnité particulière.

En soumettant ces considérations à son Excellence le Secrétaire d'Etat pour les Affaires Étrangères, le Chargé d'Affaires de France croit devoir rappeler que les conditions d'application de la surveillance dont il s'agit ont fait l'objet d'une note concertée remise au Foreign Office le 30 décembre, 1907.

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 12 janvier, 1909.

[1780] No. 11.

Mr. Lister to Sir Eaward Grey.—(Received January 13.)

(No. 3.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, January 13, 1909.*

THE "Times," in a private telegram to Mr. Harris, state that they understand a *détente* has set in between France and Germany regarding Morocco, and have instructed him to make inquiry, and, should this prove to be the case, to frame his telegrams accordingly.

Mr. Harris has seen the German Minister and the French Chargé d'Affaires. The former told him that during the last few weeks the French Legation had undoubtedly

* Similar communication made by Spanish Embassy.

been more conciliatory, and his Government had instructed him to endeavour to promote this better feeling to the best of his ability.

The French Chargé d'Affaires, while at first not admitting that any important change had taken place in Franco-German relations, eventually acknowledged to Mr. Harris that the occupation of Skrirat had been taken in a very satisfactory manner by Germany. It is undoubtedly outside the French zone, and he admitted to him that he had been anxious as to what might be said at Berlin.

The above is interesting in connection with a remark made to me in a private letter by Mr. Tyrrell to the effect that M. Clemenceau apprehended a German *coup*.

[1046] No. 12.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Lister.

(No. 2.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, January 13, 1909.*

APPOINTMENT of Raisuli as Governor of Fahz. Your despatch No. 2 of 1st January.

I agree that it is unnecessary to oppose appointment.

[1894] No. 13.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 14.)

(No. 4.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, January 14, 1909.*

RUMOURED cession of territory to France by Abdul Aziz.

On receipt of your telegram No. 1 of the 13th instant, I caused Menebhi to be informed that I understood that the French denied the existence of any Agreement. He maintained that it did exist, but I pointed out that if any arrangement of the sort had been come to it had probably been much exaggerated, and that in any case the French evidently did not intend to make use of it. He has promised me to let the matter drop.

Mr. Irwin gathers from Menebhi that Abdul Aziz continues to be haunted by the thought of what he has done, which reduces him to a state of nerves in which he is unable to restrain his confidences. To avoid risk of indiscretions on his part, were he questioned by the Germans, would it not be better for Menebhi to set his mind at rest?

[1896] No. 14.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 15.)

(No. 23. Confidential.)
Sir, *Paris, January 12, 1909.*

YOUR instructions of yesterday relative to a secret Agreement which the French Government is said to have made with Abdul Aziz reached me this evening by the messenger from London just as I was going to the Quai d'Orsay to see the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the subject of the amount which the Bulgarian Government should be advised to offer to the Porte in satisfaction of Turkish claims.

At the close of my conversation with M. Pichon regarding Bulgaria I stated to his Excellency that I was about to say something which he need not necessarily treat as a direct question but as a warning of a danger. It was, I said, alleged that the French Government had entered into some secret Agreement with Abdul Aziz. The suspicions of the Germans had, you heard, been aroused, and you wished me to point out the danger which would arise if France put herself in the wrong by going behind the Algeciras Act. You were anxious to continue to loyally support, as in the past, the Moroccan policy of France, but a secret Agreement such as it was alleged had been entered into would put His Majesty's Government in a very invidious and difficult position when objection was, as it would be, taken to it by Germany or any other Power.

M. Pichon at once said that the French Government had not made any secret Agreement with Abdul Aziz, and he sent for M. Louis, the Political Director, and told

him of the report which I had mentioned, and asked whether he could think what could have given rise to it. He also asked me whether I could tell him to what subject the Agreement was supposed to relate, and on my saying that it was understood to deal with the Algerian frontier and to territory in the vicinity of the Moulouia River, M. Louis, who has stated that no secret Agreement had been entered into with Abdul Aziz, observed that the report must have been put about by the Germans in order to excite the susceptibilities of the Spaniards. M. Pichon then authorized me to assure you that there had been no secret Agreement or negotiations with Abdul Aziz regarding the Algerian frontier or any other question ("autre sujet quelconque"). I had the honour of so informing you by telegraph this evening.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

[1899] No. 15.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 15.)

(No. 27. Confidential.)

Paris, January 14, 1909.

Sir,

I HAD occasion to call on the President of the Council yesterday, and I mentioned to him the report respecting which I had spoken to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 12th instant that a secret Agreement had been made with Abdul Aziz by the French Government in regard to the Algerian frontier in the vicinity of the Moulouia River.

M. Clemenceau said that there was no foundation for such a report. No secret Agreement whatever had been made with Abdul Aziz.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

[2028] No. 16.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 16.)

(No. 9.)

Tangier, January 10, 1909.

Sir,

AS I had the honour to report in my telegram No. 1 of the 5th instant, the note recognizing Moulai Hafid as Sultan of Morocco was handed that morning to his representative at Tangier by the doyen of the Diplomatic Body.

On the following day I addressed a note to Cid Guebbas, recalling to his memory the advance of 20,000*l.* made by His Majesty's Government to enable the Maghzen to fulfil the terms of the agreement with Raisuli for the release of Kaïd Maclean. I pointed out that this advance constituted a primary obligation on the Shereefian Government, who, by a Dahir given under the Sultan's seal, undertook to repay the sum when they had the money; and I requested him to be good enough to take the necessary steps for its immediate repayment, as I was aware that important sums were now at the disposal of the Shereefian Government.

I sent Mr. Irwin to present the note in person to Guebbas, and instructed him to impress upon his Excellency the importance which His Majesty's Government attached to the immediate discharge of this debt.

When carrying out these instructions Mr. Irwin learnt from Guebbas that the Spanish Minister had addressed to him a note of congratulation on the recognition of the Sultan. It appeared to me that the tone of such a communication could not be otherwise than patronizing, and I must say I was surprised at M. Merry del Val's action. I mentioned the matter to my French colleague, and he fully shared my opinion. He said that the idea had never entered his head of writing a "congratulatory" letter, in view of the circumstances which had delayed the Sultan's recognition. He had, however, by chance, called somewhat officially upon Guebbas the previous day, in order to present the French Admiral, and Guebbas had mentioned the Spanish note to him, and had asked whether, in reporting his visit to the Sultan, he might describe it as one of congratulation. M. de Saint-Aulaire replied that the visit had not been paid with that idea, but that he would be very glad if Guebbas would convey to the Sultan the compliments of his Government. Under these circumstances I thought it advisable that I should lose no time in calling myself on Guebbas, and I went to the Ministry by appointment this morning. His Excellency told me of the note of the Spanish Minister

and of the visit of the French Chargé d'Affaires, and equally asked me whether he could describe my visit to the Sultan as one of congratulation.

I said that I had not presumed to address a letter of congratulation to the Sultan on his recognition, but that I felt sure I was interpreting the wishes and views of my Government when I assured him of the great interest which they felt in the welfare of Morocco, and of their earnest hope that the present reign might prove prosperous and conduce to the happiness of the country. I need not, I said, point out to him that the traditional policy of Great Britain had been one of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other countries; once a nation had decided to change a Ruler or a régime, His Majesty's Government felt bound to acknowledge that change. Consequently, when it was clear that the country was unanimously in favour of Moulai Hafid, they had advocated his early recognition. That recognition had only been delayed on account of the very legitimate desire of the Powers to obtain from him at the outset certain guarantees without which their relations with him would have been impossible.

I then alluded to Mr. Irwin's visit last Wednesday, and to the communication which he had left with him. I pointed out that the payment of the 20,000*l.* was for Morocco a political rather than an economic matter. The capture of Kaïd Maclean had produced a painful impression throughout England; the Maghzen at the moment had been without funds, and His Majesty's Government had come to their assistance and advanced the money. If, now that the Government had funds at their disposal the loan was not repaid immediately, the effect in England would be deplorable. As I had said, His Majesty's Government were actuated by feelings of interest and friendship for Morocco, but these feelings would be greatly modified if the Moorish Government, at the outset of the new reign, failed to discharge a debt of honour, contracted under such exceptional circumstances.

Guebbas said that he fully realized the situation; that already on receipt of my note he had written very strongly on the subject to Fez, and that he hoped the Sultan would be guided by his counsels. He feared, however, that he was at this moment surrounded by men who had little knowledge of foreign affairs. I replied that it was for him to guide them. He promised to do all in his power, more especially as the three years he had passed in England had made him love the English. I said that I had only been a short time in Morocco, but that I was inspired by similar feelings for his country, and desired to do all I could with my Government to further the interests of the Moors. It was for that reason that I begged him to use all his influence to induce the Sultan to lose no time in taking a step which would produce an excellent impression and greatly facilitate my endeavours, and the neglect of which would render the relations between our two countries very much more difficult. I understand that at the present moment the Treasury is rather empty, but the financial situation is distinctly healthy; the 4,000,000 pesetas required for the coupon and sinking fund of the loan have already been set aside (at the end of the seventh month of the financial year), and during the remaining five months the Government will dispose of the total revenue, amounting to some 7,000,000 pesetas (250,000*l.*).

Before leaving Guebbas I handed to him a rough list of the various claims of British subjects against the Moorish Government, all of which, of course, were already familiar to him, but I took care to lay stress on the fact that His Majesty's Government considered that the advance of 20,000*l.* for Kaïd Maclean's release took precedence of them all.

I intended to call on Menebhi to-day, and beg him to write to his influential friends at Fez which I had spoken to Guebbas, but he was away on the mountain; I shall, however, make a point of seeing him to-morrow. Guebbas, I believe, is in terror of Raisuli, and it is to be hoped that the latter, as reported, is leaving or has already left the capital.

I have, &c.
(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

[2029] No. 17.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 16.)

(No. 10.)

Tangier, January 11, 1909.

Sir,

SINCE dispatching my telegram No. 2 of the 6th instant, I have not been able to obtain any more precise information with regard to the Conventions signed by Abd-el-

Aziz in favour of the French at Rabat, nor has Menebhi been able to see the actual documents.

It appears that Maroum the German Dragoman had been to see the latter the day before, and had told him that he and his Government were blind, that the French were slowly creeping on, that they had now reached the Moulouia, and that before very long they would make a dash upon Fez. Menebhi had poohpoohed the idea, but he admitted to Mr. Irwin that the statement with regard to the Moulouia was correct, and that the territory had been ceded by Abd-el-Aziz. He was at a loss to understand how the Germans could have come by the information.

As I said in my above-mentioned telegram, all depends on whether the whole course of the river is meant or only that portion which bounds the Beni Snassen district, and which is already to some extent in the hands of the French. If the former, the territory lost to Morocco is very large. Mr. Irwin gathers that Menebhi considers the matter to be very serious, and the depth of Abd-el-Aziz's depression and remorse at what he had done inclines one to the view that the Concessions wrung from him were pretty considerable.

I have, &c.
(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

[2030] No. 18.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 16.)

(No. 11.) *Tangier, January* 11, 1909.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the usual summary of events in Morocco during the past week.

I have, &c.
(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

Inclosure in No. 18.

Weekly Report.

MR. MADDEN reports from Casa Blanca that on the 2nd instant the town of Srirat, a small place some 15 miles from Rabat, was occupied by a French column. The object of this measure is declared to be the protection of the postal and other communications between Casa Blanca and Rabat. It is true that several couriers have recently been robbed in this neighbourhood. Doubtless it is especially necessary in winter, when the bar at Rabat is frequently impassable, to assure communication between that port and Casa Blanca overland.

Letters have been received from two British missionaries who have returned to Marakesh, to the effect that the city is very quiet, and that they have been well received by the people, who seem surprised to see them moving about freely amongst them.

There appears to be little doubt that the Pretender, El Roghi, has advanced on Tazza with a considerable force. This place, it will be remembered, was his former stronghold, from which he was dislodged by the Government troops under the command of Menebhi. This move on the part of El Roghi will doubtless prevent the Sultan from carrying out his alleged intention of proceeding in the near future to Rabat in order to receive the Foreign Missions.

Herr Luderitz, the German Consul, left Casa Blanca to-day for Germany to recuperate from a recent serious illness. Every civility was shown to him by the French authorities, who placed a fully-manned boat at his disposal. Officers were sent down to the quay by the General to see to the arrangements for his embarkation, while a military doctor accompanied him on board the vessel, to which he was towed out by a French Government steam launch. Mr. Madden understands that the French authorities offered, in case of necessity, to convey Herr Luderitz to Tangier in a cruiser. These amenities would point to the fact that friendly relations have been re-established at Casa Blanca between the authorities of the two countries.

(Initialled) F. R.

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[720] No. 19*.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Lister.

(No. 3.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, January* 17, 1909.

YOUR telegram No. 4: Rumoured cession of territory to France by Abdul Aziz.

Have you informed M. Regnault of what Menebhi says, and, if not, do you see any objection to doing so? It could then be left to him to calm Abdul Aziz in whatever way he thought best.

[2137] No. 19.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 16.)

(No. 5.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, January* 16, 1909.

INFORMATION has reached me privately to the effect that Guebbas has received orders from Fez to arrange for the immediate purchase of a number of cannon at present unspecified, 2,000 carbines, 30,000 rifles, and 30,000 uniforms for Government troops. Half of this order is to be placed in Germany and half in France. The bearer of the order is a high official of the Court, and he has been accompanied here by the Second Officer of the French Military Mission, by whom the models are to be selected.

The French and German Legations are in communication with the Commissioner or Foreign Affairs, but until now profound secrecy has been observed in the matter.

As the articles in question obviously come under the head of "fournitures d'État," the order, in my opinion, clearly contravenes Article 107 of the Act of Algeciras to the detriment of British trade. The situation is a delicate one, as if we raise objections we shall unite Germany and France in opposition against us.

M. Regnault is expected at Tangier to-morrow, and will remain here for two days before proceeding to Fez. Should you desire me to broach the subject to him, I should be glad to receive your instructions as to the attitude I should adopt.

[2442] No. 20.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 18.)

(No. 6.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, January* 18, 1909.

IT would, in my opinion, be a great pity that the French should know that it was Menebhi who informed me of the Secret Agreements referred to in your telegram No. 3, and that the ex-Sultan had definitely told him it existed. Menebhi's position with the French would be thereby compromised, which would be most undesirable, and another probable result would be that I should lose him as a source of information. I adhere to my original view, that the best course would be for Menebhi to be authorized to give a hint to Abd-el-Aziz, who would be only too pleased to think he had no further cause for worry. As soon as I received your telegram No. 1, I called on the French Chargé d'Affaires, with the ostensible object of discussing other matters, and mentioned, in the course of conversation that I had heard from Mr. Harris, a rumour that the ex-Sultan had signed Agreements with the French affecting territory on the Algerian frontier.

I said that I had informed you of the rumour by telegraph, as Harris was on his way to Paris, where he might be expected to mention it. It appeared to me better that you should be acquainted with it, as you might very possibly wish to refer it to the French Government without loss of time, more especially as M. Regnault was at that moment in Paris.

This was, in fact, what had been done, and Sir F. Bertie had been assured by M. Pichon that no Secret Agreement existed.

M. de Sainte-Aulaire expressed his thanks to me for mentioning the matter, and our conversation then turned to other subjects.

[2689] No. 21.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 18.)

(No. 7.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, January* 18, 1909.

I CALLED yesterday on M. Regnault, and referred to the report relative to the order for arms and ammunition, which formed the subject of your telegram No. 4. He stated that he had reason to believe that it was correct, although he had not so far received anything in writing. I said I should be glad to know, for my own personal information, whether the intention of the Sultan if true did not constitute an infraction of Article 107 of the Algeciras Act. He replied in the negative. By a special arrangement, he said, which could be found in the *procès-verbaux*, the Moorish Government had reserved entire freedom of action in regard to the issue of orders for

arms and ammunition. He quoted, as a precedent, the purchase of the rifles for the police, which had been effected by private contract. Orders of this nature, he said, were never submitted in any country to public tender; each State had complete liberty to choose the model which it preferred, and, as the price of that model was a fixed one, it could not be lowered by competition.

The order for the uniforms would, on the other hand, be offered for tender.

M. Regnault then told me, in confidence, that the Sultan's original intention had been to give the whole order for the arms to Germany, but he had been so favourably impressed by the opportune arrival of the French Military Mission, the day after his recognition, that he had given Captain Mangin a promise that the order should be divided and half given to the French. So far, however, the promise had remained verbal.

[2452] No. 22.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 19.)

(No. 32.)

Sir, *Paris, January 16, 1909.*

I HAD the honour to report to you in my despatch No. 520 of the 24th ultimo that the debate on Morocean affairs desired by M. Jaurès was, at the request of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, postponed until the Chamber met in January for the Session of 1909. Parliament reassembled on the 14th instant, and the debate began yesterday.

The first interpellation was in the name of M. Delafosse, a prominent Deputy on the Right of the House.

He reviewed in the course of a lengthy speech the past history of the action of France in Morocco and the circumstances leading to the accession of Mulai Hafid to the throne, which he said had been neither foreseen nor desired by French diplomacy. Mulai Hafid represented in his opinion a foreign cause, and was the candidate of a foreign Power, for he considered that the Moroccan question as such was in reality only a question of rivalry between France and Germany. He did not desire that France should remain for ever in Morocco, but he considered that she should not withdraw until she had accomplished the task of re-establishing order and had obtained the compensation which was due to her.

M. Lucien Hubert (Radical), the author of a second interpellation, dwelt upon the faults committed in the past by the Government, who, he said, had played into the hands of their opponents, and he inquired what attitude they proposed to adopt towards the new Sultan. He recommended a generous policy, which would conciliate Mulai Hafid and render him a valuable ally.

The interest on the discussion centred as usual on M. Jaurès, who spoke next. The debates on the Moroccan question in the Chamber have now for a long time practically resolved themselves into a duel between the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Socialist leader, whose remarkable speeches command the attention of the House.

The point emphasized by M. Jaurès in the present debate was the necessity for France to follow a clear and loyal policy with regard to Morocco in order to place relations with the new Sultan on a cordial and normal basis. Abd-el-Aziz had been ruined in the eyes of his people by the action of the French Government. The present Sultan should not be humiliated by the constant menace of foreign intervention, nor must his rising authority be hindered by the fact of his having to endure a prolonged or permanent military occupation of his country. M. Jaurès asked what the French Government were waiting for, why did the evacuation of the Chaouia district in the west and the Oujda district in the east not proceed more rapidly? Such evacuation would be a proof of the sincerity of French policy towards the Sultan, and would facilitate the organization of the police in the ports. Since the accession to power of Mulai Hafid there had neither been cases of serious violence to foreigners nor menaces proffered against their lives. It was desirable that the Report of General Lyautey respecting the plans for action in Eastern Morocco should be submitted to the Chamber. He declared that a project existed for establishing a French military organization in Eastern Morocco up to the Moulouia River and even beyond.

At this point a sharp argument took place between M. Jaurès and M. Pichon, the former pressing for the publication of the Report and the latter refusing with some heat to do so, and denying at the same time the accuracy of M. Jaurès' assertions.

[2137] No. 21*.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Lister.

(No. 4.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, January 18, 1909.*

PURCHASE of war supplies. Your telegram No. 5.

Please enquire from M. Regnault if report is correct, and, if so, you can express your own personal doubts as to legality of action of Moorish Government.

[2442] No. 24 A.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Lister.

(No. 5.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, January* 20, 1909.

RUMOURED cession of territory to France by Abdul Aziz. Your telegram No. 6.

I consider that it would be best to let matter drop. If we gave Abdul Aziz a hint such as you suggest, we should then be responsible either that no agreement exists, or, if it does, that it will not be pressed.

[2137] No. 24 B.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 31.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, January* 20, 1909.

TANGIER telegram No. 5: Purchase of war supplies by Moorish Government.

You should enquire from French Government whether report is correct, and in that event whether they are of opinion that action of Moorish Government is in accordance with article 107 of Algeciras Act.

M. Jaurès repeated his question with insistence as to the reasons for delaying the evacuation of Moroccan territory. Why did French troops continue to hold Oujda, the "harkas" had been crushed long ago? What was the meaning of the action of the French military chiefs in the east of Morocco? If the French Government were not careful they would compromise the prestige of the new Sultan by their proceedings in the east of his dominions, as they had done elsewhere in the case of his predecessor. The Government must explain to the House the meaning and the limits of the network of operations in Eastern Morocco. Oujda was a Moorish not a French town. What became of the provisions of the Algeciras Act respecting the integrity of Morocco if Oujda was to be retained?

The debate was not concluded yesterday, and will be resumed on the 18th instant.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

[1991] No. 23.

Sir Edward Grey to M. Daeschner.

Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 19, 1909.

WITH reference to the Memorandum which you were good enough to communicate to Sir Charles Hardinge on the 13th instant, I have the honour to inform you that His Majesty's Government agree to the proposal that the mandate given to the French and Spanish Governments to exercise the right of search off the Moorish coast for contraband arms and ammunition should be renewed for another year.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. GREY.

[1991] No. 24.

Sir Edward Grey to Señor de Villa Urrutia.

Your Excellency, *Foreign Office, January* 19, 1909.

WITH reference to the communication which your Excellency was good enough to make to Sir Charles Hardinge on the 13th instant, I have the honour to state that His Majesty's Government agree to the proposal that the mandate given to the Spanish and French Governments to exercise the right of search off the Moorish coast for contraband arms and ammunition should be renewed for another year.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. GREY.

[2701] No. 25.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 21.)

(No. 15. Confidential.)
Sir, *Madrid, January* 17, 1909.

BY private arrangement with the French Ambassador, I met M. Regnault, French Minister at Tangier, at the French Embassy yesterday afternoon. M. Regnault was only spending a few hours in Madrid on his way back to Tangier, whence he will proceed immediately to Fez.

I gathered that there were several reasons rendering it advisable that no time should be lost by M. Regnault in reaching the Sultan's capital, the chief ones being Mulai Hafid's expressed wish to see the French Minister as soon as possible, the expediency of forestalling the Spanish Minister, with whose present attitude the French are not quite satisfied, and the feeling that Mulai Hafid's position at Fez is not at this moment over secure, and that he may soon be compelled to move southwards in order to overawe the Sheikhs in the region of Morocco city, whose loyalty is not above suspicion.

On the subjects of the efforts which Spain is making to assert her own preponderance in Northern Morocco, M. Regnault did little more than repeat the

language already held to me by M. Révoil and reported in my Confidential despatch No. 196 of the 31st December, 1908. The French complain that, in much of her action, Spain is behaving as if Morocco had already fallen into two distinct spheres, the northern for Spain and the southern for France. In all that affects the northern coast districts, including Tangier, Señor Merry del Val, Spanish Minister, inclines to adopt either an independent line or one showing agreement with his German rather than with his French colleague. As an instance, M. Regnault quoted Señor Merry del Val's determination on every possible occasion to treat the Spanish Assistant Engineer, appointed under Article 66 of the Algeciras Act, as if his position were on a par with that of the French Chief Engineer, each being at liberty to work independently of the other. A suggestion had even been made that each of the two Engineer officers should deal only with matters affecting the sphere of influence claimed by his own country. The German Minister naturally supported a division of this kind which tended to weaken the joint action of France and Spain.

But even if the theory of separate spheres be conceded, Spain is accused by France of seeking to extend her influence to a quarter which would lie undoubtedly within the French sphere. M. Regnault alluded to the alleged intention of this Government to set up a military mission at Fez. This had no doubt been the object of two distinct journeys of Dr. Balaguer, a Spanish army surgeon, to Fez some months ago. Señor Merry del Val said they were undertaken for private purposes, but it was a clear case. If this unwise project were now really to be carried out, it would still further accentuate the divergence of French and Spanish interests in Morocco. The French Government resented having been left entirely in the dark by the Spanish Government in this matter. It was most impolitic to give a lead in the establishment of fresh military missions, thus making it easier for another Power, such as Germany, to follow suit.

I may mention that, in the course of a private audience with which the King of Spain honoured me on the 15th instant, His Majesty spoke rather strongly about the proposed employment of Spanish officers by Mulai Hafid, claiming that Spain had precisely the same right as France to take a hand in instructing the army of Morocco, and arguing that there was no invasion of French sphere, inasmuch as the Moorish troops might be sent to serve in any part of the country and their instructors must necessarily be attached to head-quarters which happened, it was true, to lie in the French sphere. I expressed to His Majesty my fear that the scheme would render co-operation with France more difficult, and my hope that Spain would proceed in the matter very cautiously.

M. Regnault further said that Señor Merry del Val had proposed a simultaneous arrival at Fez of the Spanish and French Missions, but that the French Government had discouraged the idea, not wishing to take a step which might be regarded in the light of a provocative demonstration. It is now intended to copy the precedent of the Missions to Sultan Abdul Aziz a year ago, when the Spanish Minister arrived at Rabat after the French Minister and stayed on some time after his colleague had left.

M. Regnault spoke hopefully of the plan which is on foot for dealing with conflicting claims to Mining Concessions in Morocco by means of an international Syndicate representing the principal interests concerned, and prepared to put forward a proposal for the equitable distribution of the coveted areas.

I have, &c.

(Signed) MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[2694] No. 26.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 21.)

(No. 36.)

Sir, *Paris, January* 19, 1909.

THE discussion of the Moroccan interpellations was resumed in the Chamber of Deputies yesterday, when M. Jaurès concluded the speech, on the first part of which I had the honour to report in my despatch No. 32 of the 16th instant. On this occasion M. Jaurès urged at some length the necessity and possibility of a European *détente* which would be facilitated by the adoption of a conciliatory and disinterested policy in Morocco. As regards the relations of France and Germany, two recent circumstances had, he said, shown that a reconciliation was possible, one was the acceptance by France and Germany of the proposal to refer to arbitration the Casa Blanca incident

and the other was the fact of the co-operation of the two countries in the work of pacification in the Balkans, though such co-operation was limited by the necessity on the one hand for Germany to respect the susceptibilities of Austria, and on the other hand for France to respect those of Russia and of England. But though the symptoms were favourable the future was not free from danger, and France must make an effort to dispel such misunderstandings as still existed. In undertaking this great work of civilization and of peace France need not be afraid of wounding or disquieting her good friends in England. In spite of the attitude of a portion of the press, the English people were animated as a whole by a desire for a peace and realized that the existence of better relations between England and Germany was an essential condition of the peace of Europe. An improvement in these relations was, he said, desired by the immense majority in England of all classes.

In pursuance of this policy, France should make it clear that she had no intention of going beyond the spirit of her international obligations in regard to Morocco. In this connection he expressed some disquietude as to the rumoured intentions of the Government to establish military posts in Morocco in the districts bordering on the Algerian frontier, and he called upon M. Pichon to make a definite statement as to the policy which they proposed to adopt in that quarter and the proposals which M. Regnault was instructed to submit to Mulai Hafid on his approaching visit to Fez.

M. Denys Cochin, who spoke next, criticized the policy of the Government in Morocco, where, he said, the result of their action was insignificant in comparison with the efforts which had been made, and he deplored the vacillation which had characterized the instructions sent from Paris to the army in Morocco. It was time, he said, to make Mulai Hafid realize that France was to be reckoned with and that she was determined to assert her authority.

M. Pichon then rose to reply. He began by saying that he could not pursue the arguments employed by M. Jaurès in support of his scheme of conciliation. The present discussion must be limited to the question of Morocco.

In this question the Government were accused on the one hand of having achieved results incommensurate with the efforts made, and on the other hand of pursuing a policy of military intervention which might lead to dangerous complications from an international point of view. Neither of these criticisms was justified. The policy of the Government, which had been repeatedly explained to the Chamber, was a straightforward one in harmony with international Agreements.

His Excellency reviewed the events leading up to the present state of things in Morocco, and read out to the House the conditions which the Powers had agreed to be the necessary preliminaries to the recognition of Mulai Hafid. The last of these conditions was the right reserved to all the Powers to negotiate directly with the Sultan a settlement of questions particularly concerning any of them. It was in virtue of this right that France and Spain would deal directly with the Makhzen respecting the repayment of the expenses of the military expeditions which it had been necessary to send to Morocco, and respecting the indemnities for the murders of their nationals.

M. Pichon then made a statement as to the journey of the French Minister to Fez. He would be instructed to discuss with Mulai Hafid questions concerning the two countries with a view to establishing an Agreement between them. He would take no action contrary to the international Agreements respecting Morocco or to the declarations made by the Government to the Chamber in the sense that the independence of Morocco would be respected and that no attempt would be made to proclaim a French Protectorate over that country. The French Minister would take no steps to infringe the commercial equality of all nations, but he would see that the special interests of France resulting from her geographical and political situation would be safeguarded, as well as the rights of France arising out of special Treaty engagements. He would lay stress on the necessity of the Sultan giving instructions to the Moorish Frontier Commissioner similar to those received by General Lyautey, the French Commissioner. Finally, M. Regnault would endeavour to come to an agreement with the Sultan as to the indemnity due to France and as to the evacuation of the Chaouia district.

M. Pichon next gave explanations respecting the operations in Eastern Morocco, and as to the instructions given to General Lyautey. The organization of bodies of Franco-Moorish police was contemplated to protect markets already in existence, and the routes leading to them, and to open new markets. There was also the question of finding the necessary financial resources for this work.

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of this portion of M. Pichon's speech, which appears to me of importance, in view of questions which may arise in the future as to French action in the east of Morocco.*

M. Pichon declared that certain allegations of M. Jaurès, with regard to the distance to which General Lyautey had penetrated into the heart of Morocco, were inaccurate. He had said, among other things, that the General had marched with 1,000 men to Kasbah-el-Makhzen, and thus had found himself within 150 kilom. of Fez. This was not the case; he had not advanced further than a point situated at 150 kilom. east of Kasbah-el-Makhzen.

M. Pichon concluded his statement about Moroccan affairs by declaring once more the desire of the French Government to pursue a policy of conciliation towards the Moorish Government, whom they were anxious to strengthen in such a manner as to prevent the recurrence of acts similar to those which had rendered necessary military intervention in Morocco.

His Excellency mentioned at the end of his speech the peaceful aims of France in the wider sphere of European relations, and alluded to the efforts of England and Russia in the same direction. As regards England, whose pacific intentions were indisputable, he declared that, in the daily contact brought about by the *entente cordiale*, he had never found anything but the desire to avoid complications.

After M. Pichon had spoken, M. Jaurès called the attention of the Chamber to one or two points in his speech. He remarked that the Minister for Foreign Affairs had undertaken that, in all the operations of pacific penetration, the organization of police, and the gradual institution of markets on the eastern frontier of Morocco, nothing should be done without the preliminary assent of Parliament on the one hand, and the explicit consent of the Sultan on the other. The Agreement of the 20th April, 1902, laid down that the authority of the Makhzen extended to the west of Algeria, beginning at the frontier, so that, at any rate, this included Figuig. But, on her march into the heart of Morocco, France had gone far beyond Figuig. If she could do nothing without the Sultan's consent at Figuig, still less could she do anything at points further from the frontier. The Minister for Foreign Affairs had announced that it would be contrary to Treaty, contrary to the interests of France, and to the good relations which the French Government wished to establish with the new Sultan, to establish even a pacific organization of police and of business without the assent of the Sultan himself.

M. Pichon remarked that there were markets which were expressly provided for by the Agreements, and that if their creation was arranged with the Makhzen, there would be necessity to come before Parliament with regard to them. He allowed that, in the matter of this organization, nothing could be done in a general way without the Sultan on the one hand and Parliament on the other.

M. Jaurès concluded with the following words:—

"Allow me to point out to you, not in any spirit of controversy, the elasticity of the task which you have undertaken, and how, according to the way it is carried out, it may become a genuine effort towards peace and conciliation, or the clever disguise of an illicit and dangerous scheme of penetration.

"You have spoken of markets. These markets are being established far into Morocco. Among the markets which you propose to establish is that of El-Aïoun-Sidi-Mellouk, which is close to the Moulouia. There are others which are very far advanced.

"To defend these markets you will be obliged to establish military posts, open up roads, and raise funds. And you realize how dangerous it would be, with these markets 60, 80, and 100 kilom. from the Algerian frontier, to collect tolls and raise taxes on the tribes, if it were not done in strict and amicable agreement with these tribes and with the Sultan himself. We note the engagements of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and we warn him of the dangers which this work may conceal. We hope that the Government will vigilantly control its execution."

At the end of the debate the following order of the day was put to the Chamber:—

"The Chamber, confident in the intention of the Government to pursue in Morocco the policy of collaboration and civilization imposed upon it by its traditions, its interests,

* Not printed

its Agreements, and the engagements undertaken at Algeciras, passes to the order of the day."

The Resolution was carried by 380 votes to 98.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

[2822] No. 27.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 21.)

(No. 15.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Paris, January* 21, 1909.

YOUR telegram No. 31 of yesterday.

I should be glad to know whether, in view of Mr. Lister's telegram No. 7 of yesterday, you still desire me to make inquiries in regard to the purchase of arms and ammunition by the Moorish Government.

[2935] No. 28.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 23.)

(No. 12.) *Tangier, January* 15, 1909.

Sir,

I CANNOT help thinking for a number of reasons, unimportant perhaps in themselves, but all pointing to the same direction, that the desire of Germany for the moment is for a *détente* in her relations with France in Morocco.

I had a long talk to the French Chargé d'Affaires on the 13th instant, and mentioned to him what Mr. Harris had told me, as reported in my telegram No. 3 of that date. He said that he had certainly been struck by the attitude of Germany with regard to the occupation of the Kasbah of Skrirat by French troops. It was undoubtedly outside the French zone, and he had personally been anxious as to the manner in which the news would be taken in Berlin. He had happened to be on board one of the French men-of-war when the wireless telegram from the German Consul at Casa Blanca to Dr. Rosen reporting the incident in alarmist and exaggerated terms had been intercepted. He had consequently been prepared for an outburst, and his surprise had been great when he heard that the German press had been informed at the Wilhelmstrasse that the German Government knew nothing of the incident, and that in any case it did not regard them in any sort of way. He had himself seen the text of the telegram, so that there was no doubt that the incident was known at Berlin, and Dr. Rosen was not the man to minimize it when reporting it. This fact, taken with what Dr. Rosen told Mr. Harris that his instructions were to do all in his power to promote the friendlier feelings which, he believed, existed between the two Legations, seems to indicate that for the moment Germany does not wish to create difficulties for France in Morocco. It appears to me possible that the instructions to which Dr. Rosen alluded may have been conveyed in the answer sent to his report announcing the occupation of Skrirat.

The account, too, given by His Majesty's Consul at Casa Blanca of the attentions shown by the French authorities to Herr Luderitz, the German Consul there, on the occasion of his departure from that port, which was reported in my despatch No. 11 of the 11th instant, is significant. I also learn that General d'Amade has been entertained by M. Brandt, the German merchant who acts as Austro-Hungarian Consul, and that the greatest cordiality reigned at the entertainment.

This morning Mr. Harris came to see me again, and told me he had had another talk with Dr. Rosen on the subject, who had repeated with even greater emphasis what he had said on Wednesday, and had expressed satisfaction at the change which had taken place in the tone of the "Temps," as evidenced by M. Tardieu's last articles. He had deplored the fact that his strained personal relations with M. Regnault rendered a *rapprochement* between the two Legations more difficult, but expressed the hope that what the two Ministers had failed in bringing about might be effected by commercial co-operation between the two countries. In this respect the International Mining Syndicate, in which Mr. Harris is taking a prominent part, and which would have his whole-hearted support, might render the greatest service to the two countries. (Mr. Harris' personal feelings may possibly have added colour to Dr. Rosen's remarks.)

Mr. Harris then inquired as to the truth of a report that two engineers of the German firm of Mannesmann, who have been trying for some time to obtain Mining Concessions in Morocco, were leaving to-day for Fez. Dr. Rosen admitted that the report was correct. He said, however, that he did not consider that M. Mannesmann constituted a danger to the prospects of the Syndicate. He would not conceal from Mr. Harris that he had telegraphed to his Government recommending that the claims of the firm should be fully considered by the German group, but that their inclusion would not modify the proportion of participation of the various nationalities. He also authorized Mr. Harris to telegraph to the Syndicate renewing his promise of entire assistance.

I have, &c.
(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

[2936] No. 29.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 23.)

(No. 13.)
Sir, *Tangier, January* 16, 1909.

I AM informed that orders have been issued by the Sultan for the immediate dispatch of reinforcements to Fez. Only 500 troops are to be left in Tangier, while at Mogador and Mazagan the garrisons are to be reduced to 200, and at all other ports to 100, the remainder to be dispatched to Fez without delay.

These movements of troops, as also more indirectly the orders received by Guebbas for the immediate purchase of arms, reported in my telegram No. 5 of yesterday's date, are due to the situation existing at Fez and in the neighbourhood.

It appears certain that the Pretender has occupied Tazza, and is advancing on the capital; the tribes of the intervening district are all more or less disaffected, and it is feared that they will go over to the Pretender at the first opportunity. Fighting has already broken out near Fez, where the Ait Yussi twice repelled a Government punitive force, capturing two guns, and were not finally dispersed until reinforcements had been received from Fez, including a detachment of artillery under the Algerian officer, Ben Sedira.

Moreover, there is little doubt that the Pretender can rely upon a large and influential following in the capital itself, headed by the Shereef-el-Kittani, who, in the event of an initial success, would almost certainly make an attempt to gain possession of the city for him.

In view of the doubtful loyalty of the southern Kaïds, the situation is no doubt very serious for Moulai Hafid. His conciliatory attitude towards the French has certainly lost him the support of many of his most enthusiastic and influential adherents, who are now attracted by the well-known xenophobe views of el-Roghi. Further, the Sultan's policy of complete centralization is much resented by the official classes, who have been used to receiving large profits as middlemen in all Government transactions.

With regard to the order for guns, Guebbas has informed the interpreter of the German Legation that the German share of the artillery is to be three batteries of guns capable of being transported on mule back. The Sultan has expressed a wish, through Guebbas, that Mr. Holzmann's agent should be requested by telegraph to undertake the execution of these orders, but he has been informed that this could not be done.

I have, &c.
(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

[2937] No. 30.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 23.)

(No. 14.)
Sir, *Tangier, January* 16, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your telegram No. 1 of the 13th instant, informing me of the assurances given by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs to His Majesty's Ambassador in Paris that no secret Agreement existed between France and Morocco with regard to the territory in the vicinity of the Moulouia River or on any other subject, and that there had not been any secret negotiations.

I was of opinion that no time should be lost in communicating this information to

Menebhi, in order to correct the impression produced on his mind by the statements of Abd-el-Aziz, and to prevent his taking any action which might by any possibility be resented by the French.

Mr. Irwin consequently called upon him the following morning.

Whilst expressing his satisfaction and relief at hearing of the denial given by M. Pichon, Menebhi said that he must adhere to the opinion that an Agreement of some sort did exist, as the document was actually in the possession of Abd-el-Aziz Mr. Irwin pointed out to him that the matter had probably been greatly exaggerated by Abd-el-Aziz, whose sense of proportion must have been warped by nervousness and misfortune; in any case, he said, even if some sort of arrangement had been made, it was evident that the French had no intention of making use of it, and it was advisable to let the matter drop. Menebhi quite agreed to this, and sent me a message to the effect that I could absolutely rely upon his doing so.

As I stated in my telegram No. 4 of the 14th instant, Abd-el-Aziz is still haunted by the idea of what he says he has done, and is at times reduced to a state of nerves, in which he seems unable to restrain his confidences. I think, therefore, that it would be advisable that Menebhi should enlighten him as to the attitude of France in the matter, as there is a considerable risk of his committing some indiscretion should he be questioned by the Germans on the subject. I am awaiting your instructions on this point.

In the course of conversation Mr. Irwin threw out a suggestion to the effect that the report might have been fostered by the Germans with a view to arousing the suspicions and jealousy of the Spanish, but Menebhi would not hear of this; the ex-Sultan's agitation and remorse, he said, when discussing the matter with him had been far too genuine. In this connection Menebhi told Mr. Irwin that from what he could see the hostility of Germany towards France was as nothing compared to that of Spain. The Spanish Minister's jealousy amounted almost to an "obsession," and he seemed to live in terror of the French stealing a march upon him. He also told him in strict confidence that the German interpreter had let out to him the other day that M. Merry del Val consulted Dr. Rosen on every imaginable subject. This statement may be slightly exaggerated, but I fear that it has a considerable foundation on fact.

Mr. Irwin availed himself of an opportunity in the conversation to impress upon Menebhi the necessity of being most careful to write nothing in his letters to Fez which could, however indirectly, be construed into hostility to the French. He assured him that he need have no fear on this score, and reminded him that in the past he had incurred the displeasure of Moulai Hafid for being too friendly to the French.

I thought it advisable to convey a hint in this respect to Menebhi, as Ben Ghabrit, although apparently on the friendliest terms with him, is at heart jealous, and from what M. de Saint-Aulaire said to me the other day, I cannot help thinking that he is inclined to misrepresent Menebhi's actions and words when reporting them to the Legation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

[2938] No. 31.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 23.)

(No. 15.)
Sir, *Tangier, January* 17, 1909.

AN extract from a Madrid newspaper was published in the "Dépêche Marocaine" the other day to the effect that a Spanish Military Mission, consisting of four artillery officers and two engineers, was going up to Fez. There is, I believe, no doubt that the Spanish doctor at Fez, Doctor Belenguer, has been doing all in his power to induce the Sultan to ask for such a Mission, but the French Chargé d'Affaires tells me that they got wind of this and intervened, pointing out that the training of all artillery in Morocco had been confided to France. Menebhi tells me that in any case Moulai Hafid would never have accepted the Spanish Mission.

I have, &c.
(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

[3243] No. 32.

Mr. Rumbold to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 25.)

(No. 11.)
Sir, *Munich, January* 23, 1909.

THE press of this country and that of Würtemberg have not failed to comment on the recent Morocco debate in the French Chamber. The line taken by these papers is much as follows:—

The result of the division taken at the end of the debate shows that the French Government have practically the whole Parliament at their back in their Morocco policy. The declarations made by M. Pichon are unexceptionable, and if only words were followed by deeds, Morocco would soon cease to disturb Franco-German relations. Up till now, however, there has been a great difference between words and deeds. The military operations undertaken by the French Government in Morocco went beyond what was necessary, and France behaved as if she had a mandate from Europe, which was only disputed by Germany. As a matter of fact the Algeciras Act makes no mention of such a mandate, only intrusting France and Spain with certain specific duties, such as the policing of some of the coast towns. If France can persuade Europe that she is not contemplating the occupation or annexation of Morocco, or even the pacific penetration of that country, she will be giving a fresh guarantee for the preservation of peace. Germany asks nothing better than to live on a friendly footing with France in Morocco. But in order to attain this object France must give up all idea of securing economic and commercial privileges in that country. Her policy must be that of the "open door," and Germany must be careful to prevent French diplomatists and military men from considering the Moorish Empire as a French domain. Economic disputes might seriously endanger Franco-German relations. The people in Paris should never forget this, for Germany will never give up her rights in Morocco.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HORACE RUMBOLD.

[3359] No. 33.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 25.)

(No. 8.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, January* 25, 1909.

ORDER for arms.

I am sending home to-day by bag copies of the passages in the *procès-verbaux* quoted in support of his view by M. Regnault. Upon examination they prove to be far from convincing, as the matter does not appear to have been definitely decided. Pending your instructions I do not propose to discuss the matter further.

[3359] No. 34.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Lister.

(No. 10.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 27, 1909.

I HAVE received your telegrams Nos. 7 and 8 of the 20th and 25th instant respecting the contract for the supply of arms to the Moorish Government.

Pending the receipt of your despatch inclosing the *procès-verbaux* of the Algeciras Act to which the French Minister refers, it appears to me that there is force in his contention that a State has the right to choose the model of weapons it prefers; and I consider that it would therefore be best to allow the matter to drop.

I request, however, that you will not lose sight of the question of the uniforms, which are to be submitted for tender.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. GREY.

[2822] No. 33*.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 45.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, January* 25, 1909.

WAR supplies for Moorish Government. Your telegram No. 15.
You need not make enquiries.

[3972]

No. 35.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 30.)

(No. 18.)

Tangier, January 22, 1909.

Sir,

I HAVE learnt confidentially from Cid-el-Menebhi that, before starting for Fez, M. Regnault received a visit from Cid Guebbas, who informed him that he had urgent instructions from the Sultan to obtain the consent of the French Government to the evacuation of Oudjda and Shawia by their forces before the departure of the Mission, as such a measure would greatly tend to tranquillize the people, and would have a very good effect.

M. Regnault answered in harsh terms, observing that Cid Guebbas and the Sultan had adopted a bad line of policy. France was a great Power, and was in occupation of Oudjda and Shawia with the full knowledge of all the Powers. He added that he was not proceeding to Fez on an ordinary mission for the transaction of current business, but merely to put matters plainly before the Sultan in a few words, and His Majesty would be well advised to heed what he had to say, as in that case everything would run smoothly, otherwise Mulai Hafid must judge from the past what he might expect from the future.

Cid Guebbas dared not pursue the matter further for the moment, but reverted to it towards the close of the interview. He again received a very harsh reply from M. Regnault, who requested him not to refer to the matter again.

After the interview Cid Guebbas went to see Cid-el-Menebhi in a state of great perturbation. He was evidently much alarmed, fearing, on the one hand, that he had lost the sympathy of the French; and, on the other, that he would incur Mulai Hafid's severe displeasure at his want of success in treating a matter to which His Majesty naturally attached the highest importance. He has not dared to report to the Sultan M. Regnault's firm refusal to discuss the matter and his failure to remove him from this position, but has thought it more prudent to inform the Sultan that the matter has been left over for discussion at Fez.

At the same interview M. Regnault criticised with considerable asperity the action of the Maghzen in relieving Mulai l'Amin of his functions as Viceroy at Casa Blanca. He inquired what Mulai l'Amin had done to justify this step, and observed that France being in occupation of that district, the Maghzen was wanting in courtesy towards her in making a change of this nature without previously consulting the French officials.

I have, &c.

(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

[3973]

No. 36.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 30.)

(No. 19.)

Tangier, January 23, 1909.

Sir,

DURING an interview which Mr. Irwin had with Cid Guebbas this morning in connection with other matters, his Excellency informed him that he had heard indirectly that the French Minister had not taken with him to Fez the usual gifts for presentation to the Sultan. He considered that it was a great mistake to depart from the usual custom, and it would undoubtedly produce an unfavourable impression on the Sultan and have a bad effect. He said that he had not himself had time to mention the matter to M. Regnault before the departure of the Mission, and asked Mr. Irwin whether I would raise the subject at the French Legation, and use my influence to induce the French Government not to depart from the usual practice in this respect.

I thought that my best course would be to repeat frankly to Count Saint Aulaire, who has remained in charge of the French Legation; this I accordingly did, at the same time making it clear to him that I had no desire to interfere in any way in a matter which was altogether outside my province, nor yet to offer any advice on the point, the French Government having undoubtedly good reasons for adopting the course they were pursuing. My action, I said, was prompted solely by a feeling of loyalty towards the French Legation, and I realized that I might justly be blamed if I left them in ignorance of the opinion expressed to me by Cid Guebbas, and the success of M. Regnault's mission suffered owing to the absence of presents.

Count Saint Aulaire expressed his thanks for this communication, and stated that both M. Regnault and he himself had been in favour of taking up presents, but that

when M. Regnault had mentioned the matter in Paris, M. Pichon had expressed himself as opposed to it, observing that it would be well to break with this custom. If, however, M. Regnault found, on arrival at Fez, that it would be better to offer presents to the Sultan, he could easily ask his Government to send them, and he could explain to Mulai Hafid that the Mission had left in such a hurry that there had not been time to procure suitable objects, and that he had preferred waiting till he had arrived at Fez and learnt His Majesty's tastes. Something suitable could then be procured and presented to the Sultan before the departure of the Mission from Fez.

I have, &c.
(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

[3974] No. 37.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 30.)

(No. 20.) *Tangier, January* 23, 1909.

Sir,

I TOOK advantage of M. Regnault's presence at Tangier during the first days of the week to discuss with him the question of the approximate date of my mission to Fez. I said that I would prefer not to start till the spring, say, end of March or beginning of April, when the weather would be more certain, the rivers fordable, &c. Should he, however, consider that my arrival at any particular moment would facilitate his negotiations, I hold myself personally at his disposal, and would lose no time in reporting his views to you and asking your instructions. I also told him that I understood that the German Minister had notified his desire to go to the Court without specifying a date, and that it was believed in Moorish official circles in Tangier that he intended to arrive at the capital about a week before the French Mission left.

M. Regnault thanked me very much for my communication. He said that he thought the moment I proposed a very good one. He had no idea how long he would be kept at Fez; he counted on two months for certain, but he expected that it would be longer. I might therefore arrive before or after he left, but he considered there were arguments in favour of both. If I arrived before he would have the opportunity of talking matters over with me and explaining what he had done. I should, moreover, be on the spot to support him if necessary. If after, I should be able to keep the Makhzen up to their engagements, and that would be all the more necessary if the German Minister had arrived in the meantime with the firm intention of upsetting all he had arranged. My presence would act to a certain extent as a drag upon the dangerous Dr. Rosen, and I could keep a watch on his doings. In any case, M. Regnault thought it advisable for me to send in a note at once to Guebbas notifying my desire to go to Fez, in order, if possible, to have the precedence of the Germans. This I did, and on the following day M. Regnault told me that, in the course of conversation with Guebbas, he had inquired whether any other Missions were going to Court. His Excellency had replied that he had received a verbal message from Dr. Rosen notifying his desire to wait upon the Sultan, but specifying no date, and a written notification from me expressing the hope that I might have the honour of presenting my credentials at Fez. M. Regnault asked Guebbas what he had done, and he replied that he had at once sent up my notification to the Court, but that he was awaiting something in writing from the German Minister. M. Regnault considered this very satisfactory, and so it is if it is true, but it is impossible to rely absolutely upon the statements of Guebbas.

I should be glad to receive your instructions on the subject as soon as possible, as there are many preparations to be made here, and I must give considerable notice at Fez. I do not, indeed, believe that I could in any case get off much before the end of March. I should also be glad to know your views on the subject of presents for the Sultan, which has been somewhat complicated by the decision of M. Pichon, reported in my despatch No. 19 of to-day's date.

M. Regnault started on the 20th instant, the weather, which had been glorious up till then, having broken the night before. I understand that he is now detained between the two big rivers, both of which are unfordable, so he can go neither backwards nor forwards. Heavy rain continues.

The Spanish Minister left two days ago for Madrid to receive his final instructions, and expects to start for Fez as soon as he returns.

I have, &c.
(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

[3975] No. 38.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 30.)

(No. 21.) *Tangier, January* 24, 1909.

Sir,

AS I had the honour to report in my telegram No. 7 of the 18th instant, I mentioned to M. Regnault the report which had reached me that a large order for arms was to be placed by the Makhzen in France and Germany, and inquired, for my own personal information, whether under Article 107 of the Algeciras Act these arms should not be offered for public tender.

M. Regnault replied that, during the discussions by the foreign Representatives of the Adjudications Regulations, it had been agreed that the Moorish Government had the right to purchase arms by private contract, and that they should be considered outside the scope of Articles 106 and 107 of the Algeciras Act. It was, he added, in consequence of this agreement that the arms and ammunition for the police force had been purchased by private contract, no tenders having been invited.

M. Regnault left the following morning for Fez.

I subsequently asked Count St. Aulaire to be good enough to point out to me the *procès-verbaux* in which the agreement referred to by M. Regnault was recorded. I have the honour to transmit herewith copies of the passages in the *procès-verbaux* of the meetings of the foreign Representatives on the 8th and 10th June, 1907,* when the Police Regulations were considered. It does not, however, appear to me that any definite conclusion on the subject was come to at these meetings; on the contrary, some of the foreign Representatives specially reserved the question for the consideration of their Governments. On the other hand, the matter does not appear to have been discussed again, and the order for the arms and ammunition for the police was placed in France without any objection having been made by any of the Representatives.

Under the circumstances, I do not propose to pursue the matter further without receipt of instructions from you.

I have, &c.
(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

[3976] No. 39.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 30.)

(No. 22.) *Tangier, January* 25, 1909.

Sir,

CONFIDENTIAL information of a disquieting nature reached Menebhi at the end of last week from Fez. It appears that the Pretender's adherents have rendered the country on the Tazza side of the capital unsafe up to the bridge over the Sebu River, within three miles of the city. The neighbouring Hiania tribes have set up their own Chiefs, thus practically throwing off allegiance to the Sultan, and by the ungracious manner in which he received a deputation of Wazzan Shereefs, residing in that district, to beg for help to maintain the Sultan's authority, Mulai Hafid appears to have alienated the latter.

It is also reported that Hashmi, the son of Aissa-ben-Omar, who was at the head of the recent Mission to Paris, has taken sanctuary at the Spanish Consulate at Fez, having been informed privately that Hafid intended to have him arrested. The Sultan has sent him assurances to the contrary, but he refuses to budge, having reason to believe from his own observation and experience that his information was correct.

Another of Aissa-ben-Omar's sons has been superseded as Governor of Saffi, and Menebhi has heard from a source which he considers trustworthy that orders have actually been sent to El Glawi to arrest Aissa-ben-Omar himself. It looks as though Mulai Hafid had determined to crush this powerful family, following the traditional

* Not printed.

policy of the Sultans of making use of one great Kaïd to destroy another. Menebhi feels sure, however, that El Glawi will refuse to obey the order, as he will realize that his own turn may very probably come next. If these reports are correct, the Sultan appears to be acting very clumsily, to say the least of it. Great jealousy originally existed between Aissa-ben-Omar and El Glawi, and they were only brought together by a common fear of Mulai Hafid, inspired by a general attitude after they had raised him to the throne. It will be interesting to note the next move on their part, and Menebhi received a cryptic warning from a friend that unfavourable reports have already reached Fez from Morocco city.

I have, &c.
(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

[3977] No. 40.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 30.)

(No. 23.) *Tangier, January* 25, 1909.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a Memorandum of events of interest which have been reported during the past week.

I have, &c.
(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

Inclosure in No. 40.

Events of the Week.

CONSULAR Agent Lennox reports from Marakesh that a vast religious fair has just been held in the patron saint's sanctuary near the town. It has not been possible to celebrate this fair for thirty-seven years, owing to the violent disturbances it invariably provoked. It was finally put an end to by the Sultan Moulai Hassan. On this occasion the event passed off without disorder of any kind, a fact which speaks well for the strength of the Glawi administration. The fair was attended by all the authorities and Notables of the neighbourhood, as well as a large gathering of Rehamna tribesmen, who in past times have been to a large extent responsible for the rioting which accompanied the celebration.

Letters have been received from Kaïd Glawi stating that the reinforcements ordered by the Sultan have left for Mazagan, whence they are to be conveyed here *en route* for Fez by the steam-ship "Gibel Kebir," specially chartered by the Maghzen for the purpose. It is believed that contingents from the other ports are also on their way.

On his return to Marakesh, Mr. Lennox was accorded an interview by the Grand Vizier, who stated that it was his firm determination to stamp out lawlessness and re-establish order throughout his jurisdiction. He complained that his main difficulty lay in dealing with European protégés, who took advantage of their privileges to make trouble. Mr. Lennox replied that all British Consular officers did everything they could to prevent protégés from abusing their privileges, and that Kaïd Glawi might count upon his sincere endeavour to keep British protégés in order. The Vizier assured Mr. Lennox of his confidence in this regard. Mr. Lennox then called upon the Governor of the town, Kaïd Glawi's brother, who promised him his prompt attention to all matters affecting British subjects or protégés.

News from Fez, which is of a somewhat disquieting nature, has been reported elsewhere.

[4356] No. 41.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 2.)

(No. 52.) *Paris, February* 1, 1909.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that it was announced in the "Temps" of yesterday's date that the Council of Ministers decided on the 30th ultimo that three of the six ships

now stationed off Morocco should be withdrawn, and that the remaining ships should be placed under the command of a "Capitaine de Vaisseau."

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

[4488] No. 42.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 2.)

(No. 9.) *Tangier, February* 2, 1909.
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.*

AN attempt has been made to assassinate the Sultan by a man employed in the Imperial stables. He stated that his object was to rid Morocco of a Sultan who had given himself up to the Christians. He is said to be mad, and the case of a Moor attempting the life of the Sultan is almost unheard of. His Majesty was unhurt.

[4488] No. 43.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Lister.

(No. 10.) *Foreign Office, February* 3, 1909.
(Telegraphic.)

YOUR telegram No. 9 of 3rd February.

Convey congratulations on behalf of His Majesty's Government to Sultan on his fortunate escape.

[4970] No. 44.

Consul MacLeod to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 6.)

(No. 1.) *Fez, January* 22, 1909.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that I arrived here and resumed my usual duties on the 6th instant.

Since then I have visited the principal officials of the new Sultan, have exchanged visits with my colleagues, and have been visited by many Moors and by several European residents here, and on the 20th instant I was presented to the Sultan.

I propose to describe this audience in my next despatch.

The situation in general here seems to be substantially as follows:—

The leading supporters of the new Sultan, Madani Glawi, Grand Vizier, and Aissa Ben Omar, Vizier of Foreign Affairs, are at present in Southern Morocco. No serious doubt is entertained here as to their fidelity to Mulai Hafid, but it is admitted that they expect to enjoy more power and freedom in the south than Moorish Sultans usually allow to their officials.

Their duties here are being performed by Sid-al-Abbas-al-Fessi, and Sid Abdullah-al-Fessi, their respective Chief Secretaries. These two Secretaries are cousins, men under middle age, and belong to a Fez family of considerable distinction. Both of them are well educated, in the Moorish sense of the term, and polite and obliging in their intercourse with Europeans.

The only other official connected with foreign affairs is Hadj Mohammed Mukhri, Minister of Finance, who was one of the Moorish Delegates at the Algeciras Conference.

All posts, from the highest to the lowest, are now procured by means of presents to the Sultan, the nominees recouping themselves in turn by gifts from the people under their rule. On every side one hears of Mulai Hafid's extraordinary capacity for getting and keeping money. He spends nothing avoidable, and appears to have no compunction in not paying for even the ordinary requirements of the Palace, and he squeezes even his own entourage at every opportunity, they having in many cases to give up to him the presents they have received from others. The result is that Mulai Hafid is far from popular with the artizan and trading classes, but is held in real fear by the population in general—greater than has been felt for the Makhzen since the death of Buhamad. There appears to be no danger in this policy so long as he is here, but should he leave

Fez and his officials continue such courses the consequences might be serious. Of course now that he has come into full possession of the ordinary finances of the country Mulai Hafid may begin to modify these practices, but nobody here expects him to do so to any important extent.

In the country I found the people very quiet and more good-humoured and obliging than I have known them for at least six years. The comparative cheapness and plenty have contributed largely to keep the townspeople in better humour than would have been the case had years of scarcity occurred, or had the Makhzen continued to spend money—and thus raise prices—in the lavish way prevalent under Mulai Abdulaziz.

Perhaps I have not been here long enough yet to be able to judge very surely on this point, but, so far, I am much surprised by the attitude of all classes, and particularly of the Palace officials, towards Europeans, and especially towards the French. I expected to have found them in a bitter, defiant mood, whereas their discontent seems much more against their own Government, and the events at Casa Blanca and on the frontier seem now to have impressed them to a marked extent of the hopelessness and folly of continuing on bad terms with France. These days, at any rate, one sees less superciliousness on the part of the upper classes of the Makhzen and less swagger and rudeness on that of the lower classes of officials than often observable in the time of Mulai Abdulaziz. In short, public excitement seems to be steadily subsiding, and is being succeeded by a desire for the return of normal conditions and good trade. For the continuance of this course of things much will depend upon the attitude taken up by the Powers in the immediate future, and particularly on the line followed by the French Minister on his ensuing Mission, and on his success or otherwise in dissipating the Moors' fears that France desires to conquer this country rather than to assist it to reform itself.

In regard to foreign doings at the Court, it will be remembered that the German Acting Consul, Dr. Vassel, came back to Fez in September last, and was followed in a few weeks by M. Cortés, Spanish Consul, and by Sid Kador-ben-Cbabrit, as Acting French Consul.

The two first named found Mulai Hafid eager to see them often and to talk politics, often to a fatiguing and inconvenient extent. Ben Chabrit naturally had many difficulties to meet at first, but he, too, finally succeeded in getting and keeping the Sultan's ear, and now appears to enjoy the confidence of Mulai Hafid and his advisers to a surprising degree. All of them, however, appear to have availed to the uttermost of the informality of the situation and of the Sultan's impulsive temperament. They go to him at all sorts of hours, remain with him for many hours together, conversing on merely personal or general topics, each eager to appear to be in the highest favour. They even hang about the Palace gates at times for hours waiting to see him.

The result of all this, I am inclined to fear, may be (in fact it has already been so to no small extent) to injure Mulai Hafid in the eyes of his subjects, and "cheapen" him regrettably in the eyes of foreigners also; in other words, Mulai Hafid seems to be repeating in this matter the unwise conduct of Mulai Abdulaziz.

As amongst the above Consular Representatives, the main struggle of late has been, and still is, whether the French Mission shall be alone here or whether the Spanish Mission, and possibly a German Mission, shall be here at the same time. So far it looks as if Ben Chabrit's efforts are not likely to be successful. The principle at issue seems to be whether France is to deal with Morocco, as holding a special position, or whether the Sultan is to treat with the Powers jointly.

North and west of Fez the country seems quiet. To the south, *i.e.*, between Fez and Tafilelt, there have been complaints of disturbances, such as pillaging of caravans, and a small Shereefian force has just inflicted considerable punishment on the Ait Yusi tribe, of whom some fifty-seven prisoners were made.

Trade between Tafilelt and Bechar is said to be at a stand-still by reason of the attitude of the Berber tribes thereabouts towards the French, which in turn has led to the French occupying Bu Denib (latitude 32° north; longitude 5° 25′ west of Paris). This action of the French is causing much apprehension here, as it is feared the occupation may prove permanent, and may perhaps lead, before very long, to the occupation of the Oasis of Tafilelt itself.

On the east, the Pretender, Bu Hamara is increasingly active. He appears to have re-asserted his authority at Taza, and is now reported to be at Wad-al-Hader, in the tribe of Dsul, with a following of, perhaps, 1,500 to 2,000 men. With such a following he may easily annoy the tribes between Fez and Dsul, say 35 miles, and even cause some uneasiness at Fez, but his reputation hereabouts is now too far gone to make it at all

probable that he can do anything serious in this neighbourhood in the immediate future at any rate.

With regard to the disinterring and exhibition of the head of Sid Abdulkrim-ben-Sliman, Mulai Abdulaziz's Grand Vizier, the present Government affected to believe that the crime was the act of a nephew of his, who was moved merely by private spite, and that the act was of no political significance. No evidence against the nephew, or any one else, was found, and the accused has been released. It seems most likely that the crime was committed by some heady Berber student at one of the Moslem colleges here.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. M. MACLEOD.

[5053] No. 45.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 6.)

(No. 24. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Paris, February* 6, 1909.

I HAVE been informed to-day by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs that an Agreement has been negotiated between the French and German Governments whereby Germany disinterests herself from Moroccan affairs. The Agreement has not yet been signed, but M. Pichon told me that he had instructed the French Ambassador in London to communicate it to you for your opinion.

In reply to my inquiry, M. Pichon assured me that France had given no *quid pro quo* of any kind.

[5310] No. 46.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 9.)

(No. 62. Confidential.)
Sir, *Paris, February* 8, 1909.

I MET the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 6th instant at a luncheon given by the Japanese Ambassador in honour of Mr. Kato, who is passing through Paris on his way to London to take up his appointment as Ambassador.

M. Pichon told me, as I had the honour to report in my telegram No. 24, Confidential, of the 6th instant, that an Agreement had been negotiated but not yet signed between the French and German Governments whereby Germany disinterests herself from Moroccan affairs. To my inquiry as to what concessions were to be made by France in return, M. Pichon replied that France was making no concessions of any kind. "Not that!" said he, biting his thumb, and he stated that he believed that Germany was animated solely by a desire to be able to point to an Agreement with France in regard to Morocco as evidence of her conciliatory disposition.

The Agreement, which had not yet been signed, had, he said, been negotiated by M. Jules Cambon with M. de Schoen. I inquired whether Prince Bülow might not be opposed to it, but he replied that the Chancellor had already signified his approval, and he stated that the only opposition which was still to be feared was from the Reichstag, to whom it would have to be submitted.

M. Pichon told me that he had instructed M. Paul Cambon to communicate the text of the Agreement to you and to ask for your opinion in regard to it.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

[5484] No. 47.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 9.)

(No. 5. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, February* 9, 1909.

SIR FRANCIS BERTIE'S telegram No. 24 of the 6th instant.

The Franco-German Agreement concerning Morocco which was to be signed to-day

in Berlin was read to me in confidence this afternoon by the French Ambassador. This morning the German Ambassador suggested to M. Revoil that they should jointly communicate the text to Señor Allendesalazar, but his Excellency had done so already yesterday.

Señor Allendesalazar informed M. Revoil to-day that the Spanish Government had instructed their Ambassador in Berlin to propose to the German Government the conclusion of a similar agreement with Spain, and the Spanish Ambassador in Paris had been instructed to inform the French Government in that sense.

Yesterday evening the Minister for Foreign Affairs remarked to me that in his opinion the Agreement, which tended to diminish the existing tension between Germany and France, must be welcomed by the Spanish Government, who would probably wish to associate themselves in some way with it. It seemed to me, however, that the Agreement, which emphasizes the political predominance of France in Morocco, is not altogether agreeable to Señor Allendesalazar.

[5613] No. 48.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 36.)

Foreign Office, February 9, 1909.

Sir,

I TOLD the German Chargé d'Affaires to-day that I had heard a few days ago that Germany and France were coming to an Agreement about Morocco, but that I should not have spoken about it officially yet had it not been that I was told this afternoon that Reuter had received the text of the Agreement from Paris.

I wished to express my satisfaction that an Agreement had been come to. I had always felt the danger of difficulties arising between France and Germany about Morocco, and if I had been asked to name what I most desired in foreign affairs, one of the things would have been that the difficulties between Germany and France about Morocco should be removed. I assumed that this would be done by the Agreement. Our only interest in Morocco was to preserve equal opportunities for commerce, and if these were safeguarded the political effect of the Agreement would be excellent.

The Chargé d'Affaires told me that an Agreement with France about Morocco had been desired in Berlin for some time. He himself had remarked to Herr von Schön, on the occasion of the German Emperor's visit to England, that the relations between England and Germany could never be permanently improved till the Moroccan question was settled. Till then there would always be a danger that England and Germany would find their relations disturbed by disputes between Germany and France about Morocco.

I said this was perfectly true. We had our diplomatic engagements with France. They had come into operation, as he knew, during the Algeciras Conference. As long as difficulties were liable to occur between Germany and France about Morocco these engagements were liable to make difficulties between Germany and us.

This danger was, I hoped, now removed.

I am, &c.

(Signed) E. GREY.

[5715] No. 49.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 75.)

Foreign Office, February 9, 1909.

Sir,

M. CAMBON showed me to-day the declaration which he had shown to Sir Charles Hardinge on Saturday the 6th, and which was to be exchanged with Germany, with regard to Morocco.

I told him I was very glad the sun was shining as regards Morocco. I was very pleased that France and Germany had come to terms, for I had always felt that the question of Morocco was one which might at any moment cause great difficulties, and I now considered that the danger had passed away.

As to the details of the Agreement, I thought there might be some criticism made upon the last sentence, by which France and Germany undertook to seek to associate their nationals in undertakings for which those nationals obtained Concessions. This might be construed to mean that France and Germany would co-operate to secure

Concessions in such a way as to leave a very poor chance for other countries. It ought to be made quite clear that the intention was not that France and Germany would give each other a preference—in other words, that the sentence was not intended to have an exclusive meaning, or to prejudice the open door.

M. Cambon said that, when he was authorized to communicate the declaration to me officially, he would make it clear that the words in question were not open to this criticism. Some years ago, in Algeria, there had been a Concession for mines, which necessitated the making of a railway, and for two years the French Chamber had refused to sanction it, because Germans were associated with the enterprise. He understood that the words in question meant that there would now be no opposition to the association of French and German nationals in undertakings in Morocco.

M. Cambon was evidently somewhat puzzled as to the origin of the Agreement. His brother at Berlin had written to M. Pichon to say that the Germans were pressing for an Agreement. On Friday the 5th he had arrived suddenly with the terms of it, which had not then been seen by M. Clemenceau, and which had been approved subsequently.

M. Cambon's own explanation was that Prince Bülow, being in a difficulty and in danger of losing the support of the Reichstag for his financial proposals, and having lost the confidence of the Emperor, saw the risk of finding himself without a friend in Germany, and of being exposed to the attack that by his policy he had left Germany without a friend. Hence Prince Bülow had wished to present the Reichstag with some such arrangement as this; and M. Cambon thought it might be supplemented by some Colonial arrangement with us.

I said that, in other words, this meant that Prince Bülow wished to erect a *façade* of friendship.

So far as we were concerned, Count Metternich had asked me in a general way what we meant to discuss at Berlin. I had replied that if the Germans wished to discuss Near Eastern affairs Sir Charles Hardinge would of course be ready to discuss them. Naval expenditure seemed to me the most important subject at present; but we would not discuss it unless the Germans desired it. We had our own plans and were ready to proceed with them. I had suggested that Lord Crewe should have a talk with Herr Dernburg, who had lately been in South Africa, and discuss with him the various frontier questions we had there. But I had had no indication from Count Metternich that the Germans wished to make any new proposal. I knew they would like an arrangement about the frontier police in South Africa, but our difficulty about all arrangements of this sort was that they had to be made by, and at the expense of, the Colonial Governments.

I observed to M. Cambon that the Spanish Ambassador had questioned me last night about the Agreement between France and Germany. I had told the Spanish Ambassador that there was something in prospect, but that I was sure it would contain nothing in any way contrary to the Agreement between Spain and France.

The Spanish Ambassador had seemed very hurt that nothing had been said to the Spanish Government, and I had therefore felt unable to tell him that I had had any communication from M. Cambon. I thought it very natural that the Spanish Government who, like us, had an Agreement with France about Morocco, and who, like us, had supported France at the Algeciras Conference, should expect to be treated in the same way as we were.

M. Cambon said he was sure that a communication had been made to the Spanish Government, for his brother at Berlin had spoken to the Spanish Ambassador there.

I have, &c.

(Signed) E. GREY.

[5513] No. 50.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 10.)

(No. 10.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tangier, February 9, 1909.

I LEARN from Count Sainte-Aulaire that the first news of the Franco-German Agreement, which formed the subject of your telegram No. 11, reached him last night by telegraph. His Government instructed him to communicate the declaration in concert with the German Minister to the Makhzen. He accordingly called at the German Legation. Dr. Rosen appeared to know nothing of the Agreement, and had not as yet received any instructions from his Government. He subsequently received

a telegram, and the two proceeded together to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and communicated the Agreement to El Guebbas, who professed great pleasure at the news. I have doubts as to the genuineness of his pleasure, and the person who certainly will not be pleased is the Spanish Minister, who is on the point of starting for Fez, and whose principal trump card was the hostility of Germany to France.

Count Sainte-Aulaire told me that Dr. Rosen had at first received the news of the Agreement between their two Governments with rather a bad grace, but had quickly recovered himself, and said that a complete change would now of necessity take place in the attitude of the German Legation, which would correspond far better with his personal feelings.

[5625] No. 51.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 10.)

(No. 6.) *Madrid, February* 10, 1909.

(Telegraphic.) P.

MOROCCO: Franco-German Agreement. My telegram No. 5.

The Spanish Ambassador at Berlin reports by telegraph that no objection is raised by German Government to the Spanish proposal to negotiate a similar Agreement with Germany. No difficulty is anticipated by Señor Allendesalazar.

M. Revoil would rather that Spain should merely adhere to the Franco-German Agreement, but the Spanish Government prefer to conclude a separate one with Germany, being a little hurt at the omission of any mention of their interests in the present Agreement.

[5945] No. 52.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 80.) *Foreign Office, February* 10, 1909.

Sir,

M. CAMBON handed me to-day the text of the Franco-German Declaration about Morocco, with a covering note, copies of which are inclosed herein.

M. Cambon then said that the reception of the King appeared to be good in Berlin, and the speeches were excellent. He thought Germany would now propose something to us, but he did not know what. Possibly it might be about the Bagdad Railway.

I told him we should be quite willing to discuss the Bagdad Railway, on the terms I had previously indicated. I had been approached recently by one or two British financiers who had been in communication with German financiers. They had asked me whether the British Government were prepared to favour negotiations with Germany about the railway. I had always replied that we were prepared to do so on proper terms, provided there were negotiations *à quatre*, between France, Germany, Russia, and ourselves. The difficulty lay in the Russian Government. I had not, however, had any proposal about anything from Berlin.

M. Cambon said that naval expenditure would be a great difficulty. Did I think the Germans would agree to compare estimates, as I had suggested some time ago, with a view to reduction?

I told him I was afraid the Germans would not do this. We should have to decide what expenditure was necessary to enable us to maintain a sufficient superiority as the German programme of construction advanced, and I thought the Germans ought not to resent this.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. GREY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 52.

M. Cambon to Sir Edward Grey.

Ambassade de France, Londres, le 10 *février*, 1909.

M. le Secrétaire d'État,

J'AI l'honneur de communiquer, ci-joint, à votre Excellence le texte de la Déclaration franco-allemande, en date d'hier, relative au Maroc.

Comme votre Excellence le constatera, cette Déclaration est conforme à l'Acte d'Algésiras, et ne porte aucune atteinte aux droits et aux intérêts des autres nations.

Veuillez, &c.
(Signé) PAUL CAMBON.

Inclosure 2 in No. 52.

Franco-German Declaration respecting Morocco.

LE Gouvernement de la République française et le Gouvernement Impérial allemand, animés d'un égal désir de faciliter l'exécution de l'Acte d'Algésiras, sont convenus de préciser la portée qu'ils attachent à ses clauses en vue d'éviter toute cause de malentendus entre eux dans l'avenir.

En conséquence,

Le Gouvernement de la République française, entièrement attaché au maintien de l'intégrité et de l'indépendance de l'Empire chérifien, résolu à y sauvegarder l'égalité économique et, par suite, à ne pas y entraver les intérêts commerciaux et industriels allemands;

Et le Gouvernement Impérial allemand, ne poursuivant que des intérêts économiques au Maroc, reconnaissant, d'autre part, que les intérêts politiques particuliers de la France y sont étroitement liés à la consolidation de l'ordre et de la paix intérieure et décidé à ne pas entraver ces intérêts;

Déclarent qu'ils ne poursuivent et n'encouragent aucune mesure de nature à créer en leur faveur ou en faveur d'une Puissance quelconque un privilège économique, et qu'ils chercheront à associer leurs nationaux dans les affaires dont ceux-ci pourront obtenir l'entreprise.

[5641] No. 53.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 11.)

(No. 66.) *Paris, February* 10, 1909.

Sir,

THE Franco-German Declaration in regard to Morocco which was signed at Berlin yesterday appears to be welcomed without reserve by the Paris press in general. The "Temps" speaks of it as a "simple, luminous, and sensible" arrangement, and it expresses surprise that it should not have been arrived at sooner. The termination of the Moroccan conflict, it says, may well mark an epoch in European history. For centuries past Europe has been engaged on a struggle to achieve an equilibrium, and she would seem to have reached a point of stability which until now appeared to be unattainable for many years to come. The symmetrical groups which had been formed were apparently on the verge of collision but the hope may now be entertained that they may be able to live henceforward side by side on a footing of confidence and correctness.

The "Temps" pays a tribute to the part played by M. Pichon and M. Cambon in preparing the way for this understanding, and it says that, thanks to the clear-sightedness of M. Pichon, the diplomatic position of France is better than it has ever been before, and it is due to this fact that Germany after much hesitation decided that the time had come for an understanding, and it states that the attitude of the German Cabinet has been much influenced by the policy of moderation pursued by M. Clemenceau and M. Pichon in dealing with the Eastern crisis. Closely united to her Russian allies and her British and Spanish friends, France is henceforward in a position to treat with all Powers on a footing of absolute equality and full moral independence. Though all Governments since 1871 have worked to achieve this end, a special tribute of gratitude is due to the man who for two years has by his acts brought into prominence the two virtues of a strong nation: power of resistance and power of agreement.

I inclose herein a summary* printed in the "Temps" of the course of the negotiations leading up to the present Declaration, in which you will notice that M. Tardieu, the foreign editor of the "Temps," is said to have taken some part in the negotiations which it appears were being conducted in Paris last December.

* Not printed.

I have also the honour to transmit an account of an interview with M. Pichon published in the "Temps" of to-day's date,* in regard to the Declaration.

The "Journal des Débats" speaks in an equally eulogistic strain of the policy of M. Pichon, and it congratulates him unreservedly on the success which he has achieved. The understanding, it says, has been accompanied by no secret concession. Germany has done no more than recognize the position accorded to France by the Act of Algeciras; France has conceded nothing beyond what had been already formally promised. The "Débats" had already been opposed to all negotiations in regard to Morocco which involved any reference to Eastern affairs, and it considers it all the more satisfactory that an understanding should have been reached at a moment when Austria had agreed the necessary sacrifices to Turkey, and when the good faith of France could not be called in question by her friends and allies. France remains as firmly attached as ever to Russia and to England, and will continue to pursue in conjunction with them a policy of peace and universal progress.

I may add that it is stated in an official announcement issued to the press that the Declaration has been communicated by the French Government to the British, Russian, and Spanish Governments, and by the German Government to the Governments of Austria and Italy, and that the French and German Representatives at Tangier communicated it immediately to the Moorish Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

Inclosure in No. 53.

Extract from the "Temps" of February 10, 1909.

L'Accord Franco-Allemand.

UN Accord franco-allemand relatif au Maroc a été signé ce matin à Berlin.
En voici le texte :—

"*Déclaration.*

"Le Gouvernement de la République française et le Gouvernement Impérial allemand, animés d'un égal désir de faciliter l'exécution de l'Acte d'Algésiras, sont convenus de préciser la portée qu'ils attachent à ses clauses, en vue d'éviter toute cause de malentendus entre eux dans l'avenir.

"En conséquence,

"Le Gouvernement de la République française, entièrement attaché au maintien de l'intégrité et de l'indépendance de l'Empire chérifien, résolu à y sauvegarder l'égalité économique, et par suite à ne pas y entraver les intérêts commerciaux et industriels allemands,

"Et le Gouvernement Impérial allemand, ne poursuivant que des intérêts économiques au Maroc, reconnaissant d'autre part que les intérêts politiques particuliers de la France y sont étroitement liés à la consolidation de l'ordre et de la paix intérieure, et décidé à ne pas entraver ces intérêts,

"Déclarent qu'ils ne poursuivront et n'encourageront aucune mesure de nature à créer en leur faveur ou en faveur d'une Puissance quelconque un privilège économique, et qu'ils chercheront à associer leurs nationaux dans les affaires dont ceux-ci pourront obtenir l'entreprise."

[5733] No. 54.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 11.)

(No. 11.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, February* 11, 1909.

THE Russian Minister asked me confidentially in the course of a long conversation I had with him to-day whether Count Saint Aulaire had mentioned the Franco-German

Agreement to me before it became common knowledge. I replied that he informed me that he knew nothing of the matter until he received a telegram last Monday evening. M. Botkine said that it was in his opinion hardly possible to believe that this was really the case, and Count Saint Aulaire's silence had, to say the least, occasioned him considerable surprise, all the more so as he himself had taken part to some extent in the matter.

When in Paris last summer he had discussed at some length with M. Pichon the possibility of France and Germany coming to an agreement as regarded Morocco. M. Pichon had asked him to stop in Berlin on his way to Russia and discuss the matter with the French Ambassador. This he had done, and had gathered that M. Cambon was not without hope that something could be done. Moreover, upon arriving in Russia he had laid his views before the Emperor and M. Isvolsky, stating that it was in his opinion possible for some sort of arrangement to be made. I am given to understand that M. Botkine is apt to exaggerate the importance of the part he has played himself.

He expressed to me the conviction that the Agreement contained clauses which did not appear in the declaration as published.

[5714] No. 55.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 74.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 11, 1909.

THE French Ambassador stated some days ago in conversation with Sir C. Hardinge that repeated advances had been made by the German Government within the preceding fortnight to come to terms with France about Morocco, but that the French Government, while accepting these advances, had replied that it would be difficult to find a formula by which Germany recognized French political interests in Morocco, while France could only recognize the equal economic interests of Germany with those of other Powers as guaranteed by the Act of Algeciras.

M. Cambon called again on the 6th instant, and under instructions from his Government, showed Sir C. Hardinge a copy of a Declaration which the German Minister for Foreign Affairs proposed should be made by the French and German Governments, as well as the drafts of two explanatory letters. The Declaration would be made public, but the letters would be kept secret.

The Declaration was in the following sense :—

"The French Government, being resolved to maintain the independence and integrity of Morocco and the principle of economic equality, and not to impede German commercial and industrial interests; and the German Government, for their part, pursuing only economic interests in Morocco, and recognizing that the special political interests of France are closely bound up with the consolidation of internal peace, and being resolved not to impede those interests;

"The two Governments declare that they will not pursue nor encourage any measure likely to create in their favour or in that of any Power an economic privilege, and that they will endeavour to associate their nationals in affairs for which they are able to obtain a Concession."

The letter to be addressed to Herr von Schoen by the French Ambassador was in the following sense :—

"The 'désintéressement' of Germany will not affect situations already obtained by their nationals, but it implies the non-candidature of Germans to functions of Directors, Technical Councillors of Moorish public works, posts susceptible of having a political character, or as instructors in such services. It is further understood that in matters where French and German interests are associated, French interests in Morocco are more important than the German interests."

Herr von Schoen's draft reply is in the following sense :—

"In acknowledging the French Ambassador's note, he signifies his entire concurrence in the interpretation given therein of the joint Declaration."

On M. Cambon asking Sir C. Hardinge for his opinion on this Agreement, the latter replied that he was much surprised, but that, if there was nothing behind it, it

might be regarded as very satisfactory, as it placed Germany in the same position as Great Britain towards France in Morocco.

Sir C. Hardinge then inquired what the explanation could be, to which M. Cambon replied that he knew the German Chancellor to be in a very bad position in the Reichstag, where he is being strongly attacked as a disturber of the peace. Prince Bülow was anxious, therefore, to do something to show that he is a pacifist. M. Cambon added that he understood that some proposal was to be made, when the King was in Berlin, relating to colonial affairs.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. GREY.

[5734] No. 56.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 12.)

(No. 7.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, February* 12, 1909.

MOROCCO. Franco-German Agreement.

My telegram No. 6 of yesterday.

The apprehensions of the French Ambassador at the possible conclusion of a similar declaration between Germany and Spain are based on the fear that it would probably include the promise that Germany and Spain "will seek to associate their nationals in the enterprises of which they may obtain the concession." Such a partnership, M. Revoil fears, would inevitably lead to the disappearance of the Spanish element, leaving in full possession the wealthier German partners.

I pointed out this possible danger to the Spanish Foreign Minister. His Excellency does not see that the present conditions under which it is open to Spanish concessionnaires to associate themselves with foreign capitalists if they desire to do so would be materially altered.

Further information, however, points to the fact that the Germans are making a great effort to secure a share in the Spanish mining concerns in the district behind Melilla and along the coast as far as Tetuan. Spanish capitalists also are willing to give their proposals full consideration.

I am repeating this telegram to His Majesty's Minister at Tangier.

Details follow by post.

[5869] No. 57.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 13.)

(No. 25. Confidential.)

Sir, *Madrid, February* 9, 1909.

AS reported in my Confidential telegram No. 5 of to-day, the French Ambassador has just read to me in confidence the text of the Agreement concerning the affairs of Morocco which was to be signed to-day between the French and German Governments at Berlin. His Excellency thought it very appropriate that this important understanding, which by relieving the tension between France and Germany in Morocco seemed destined to exert a tranquillizing influence over the general European situation, should coincide with the opening day of King Edward's visit to the German Emperor. He thought it would be welcomed everywhere, but perhaps less enthusiastically in Spain than in other countries. In this respect I had been left under a similar impression by a few remarks which the Spanish Foreign Minister let fall in conversation with me yesterday evening. While expressing pleasure at an arrangement calculated to render more easy a return in Morocco to a more settled state of affairs, Señor Allendesalazar was preoccupied with the idea that Spain had been rather left out in the cold, and he seemed to feel that no time must be lost in adhering in some way to the statement of policy which the Franco-German Agreement contains.

M. Revoil informed me that he intended making an earnest appeal to the Spanish Government, and even to the King of Spain, urging as strongly as he could the interest which Spain could no longer doubt that she had in cultivating not only the superficial and theoretical friendship with France which had hitherto characterized their joint action in Morocco, but a more genuine and practical policy of co-operation calculated to place the relations of the two countries on a solid footing of mutual confidence and good-will. Spain must surely see that she would not be able in future to look for

sympathy to any other quarter than France and England, or to hold out surreptitiously a hand to Germany. France was prepared to deal generously with her, but she would require some practical mark of the friendship which in the past Spain had only proclaimed in empty words. There ought to be no more hesitation in accepting French offers in respect of mining matters in the Riff country. In Tangier the Spanish Minister ought to abandon the half-hearted attitude which left people in doubt whether he was supporting France or her enemies. In their home policy the Spanish Government should cease introducing measures calculated to restrict foreign, and especially French, enterprise in Spain. They would perhaps have cause to regret the impolitic exclusion of the French yards from a share in the task of reconstructing the Spanish navy. When Spain required financial assistance in Paris, as she often did, she would find out that France possessed powerful means of granting or withholding her capital, according to the behaviour of the applicant. The French Government would not hesitate to use this lever if necessary. But M. Revoil hoped Spain would realize that a new situation had been created, and that she must reconsider her position. He added that he wished to make full allowance for the natural aspirations of Spain on the north coast of Morocco, but these were not inconsistent with friendly discussion and agreement with France on important points as they arose.

His Excellency said he would continue to rely on British support in pressing the Spanish Government to play up to the French in Morocco. I replied that, as between France and Spain, I presumed that the Franco-Spanish Agreements of October 1904 would continue to underlie the action of the two countries. M. Revoil thought they would, though it must be remembered that the partition into spheres of influence contemplated by the Secret Agreement was contingent on a change in the political status of Morocco, which was now very unlikely to take place, in view of the fact that the new Agreement between France and Germany had reasserted the principle of the integrity and independence of Morocco.

M. Revoil also remarked that, as regards the period of the operation of the Secret Agreement which must elapse before its provisions take full effect (that is, during fifteen years from its signature, or till the year 1919, or at least till the *status quo* changes), Spain can only exercise the political and administrative action reserved to her under the Agreement subject to the declared concurrence of France, and he claimed that hitherto France had exercised with great moderation her right to demand that Spain should secure her concurrence before taking any important step in Northern Morocco. His Excellency alluded, perhaps, to the failure of Spain to consult France before occupying the Restinga and Cabo del Agua on the coast near Melilla.

M. Revoil called on Count Tattenbach, German Ambassador, this afternoon and found Señor Allendesalazar already in conference with his Excellency. A friendly conversation ensued, in the course of which Señor Allendesalazar, as M. Revoil has since informed me, remarked that he thought the Agreement required rounding off by a similar Agreement between Spain and Germany, and that M. Polo de Bernabe, Spanish Ambassador in Berlin, had been instructed to approach the German Government on the subject. M. Revoil merely expressed the hope that M. Pichon was to be kept informed of the progress of this negotiation. Señor Allendesalazar reassured his Excellency on this point.

The French Ambassador is a little uneasy over this new development of the situation, feeling that Germany may be very glad to recognize the special position claimed by Spain in Northern Morocco, and that Spain will endeavour to define it by some formula which France would find it difficult to accept.

I have, &c.
(Signed) MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[5973] No. 58.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 13.)

(No. 12.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, February* 13, 1909.

IT is almost certain that the Sultan will repudiate the Mining Concessions granted by the Roghi to Spanish Companies, referred to in Sir M. de Bunsen's telegram No. 7. Indeed, according to Article 112 of the Algeciras Act, he is bound to do so.

With the assent of the foreign Representatives, and at the request of the ex-Sultan, a Firman is being drawn up by the State Engineer which, if approved, will regulate the whole question of Mining Concessions in Morocco.

[5991] No. 59.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 13.)

(No. 8.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, February 13, 1909.*

MOROCCO: Franco-German Agreement. My telegram No. 7 of the 11th instant.

It appears that German Government do not view favourably Spanish proposal to conclude a similar Agreement.

[6164] No. 60.

Consul MacLeod to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 15.)

(No. 3.)
Sir, *Fez, January 26, 1909.*

IN the course of interviews I have had with the Sultan's principal officials the last few days, I explained that, as I presumed my first visit to the Sultan was simply in order to be presented to His Majesty, I had gone in uniform, and had refrained from saying anything except the compliments proper to the occasion; but, whenever His Majesty should so wish, I should be happy to be favoured with a private audience, when he could ask me any questions or discuss any matters in which I could be helpful. I added that Mr. Lister had charged me with messages of congratulation and friendship, and had given me his views on certain questions in case the Sultan should wish to be informed of them.

(I was recollecting in particular the high importance Mr. Lister attached to the Sultan coming speedily to a satisfactory understanding with the French, and the best time for the Sultan to take to attain this, and to my supporting Sid-ben-Ghabrit's representations here to those ends. There were, besides, the questions of Dr. Verdon's position and of the repayment of Kaïd Sir H. Maclean's ransom.)

From remarks to me by the Spanish Dr. Belenguer, I had learned that the Makhzen had not actually sent off the transport caravan to fetch the Spanish Minister, but it appeared likely they would do so within two or three days. If this were done, Sid-ben-Ghabrit's efforts to attain the French Mission's being here by itself would not succeed.

When seeing the Acting Grand Vizier last evening with Dr. Verdon, I inquired when the Spanish Mission was coming. He said the transport train had not yet been dispatched, but would be sent soon. I mentioned that His Majesty's Minister had expressed to me his earnest opinion that the Makhzen would do well to try to by themselves come to a settlement with the French. Nothing would so much facilitate a good and dignified settlement as their treating the French with confidence, and directly.

The Acting Grand Vizier agreed with this, but said the Spanish Consul had been very pressing indeed, and had even urged that the Spanish Mission should come first. However, he would mention the matter to the Sultan.

Yesterday afternoon the Sultan sent for me. I went in ordinary attire, of course, and found His Majesty in the same hut as at my first visit. Hadj Mohamed Mukhri and Sid Abdallah-al-Fessi were present.

I said Mr. Lister had asked me to convey his congratulations to the Sultan, to offer every good wish for the success of his reign, and for his own welfare; that, though so recently come to Morocco, Mr. Lister had already become greatly interested in it and attached to its people, and now only hoped that the time would soon come for him to meet His Majesty in person, and to express anew the ancient friendship between our countries, of all which the Sultan expressed earnest reciprocation.

He then said I might speak of any matters in my mind. I then spoke about Dr. Verdon's position, and the Sultan finally said Dr. Verdon was to continue as before in the Makhzen's service. On this matter I have reported in full to His Majesty's Minister at Tangier.

The Sultan then asked whether there was no other matter—for instance, any matter of policy—on which Mr. Lister had asked me to speak.

I thought of the question of the repayment of Kaïd Sir H. Maclean's ransom, but, remembering the Sultan's changeable character and the importance to Dr. Verdon of gaining a little time to resume his duties, and of perhaps soon meeting the Sultan and securing his friendship, I concluded it would be safest not to touch on that matter

to day, and perhaps thus put him into ill-humour. So I said that Mr. Lister had given me his views on some general political questions for His Majesty's information. What was now the matter? The Sultan then, in a troubled tone, said: "This is the question: if the French Minister demands that France keep Chaowia and Oudjdat, will the British Government object and assist us?"

I answered that the question surprised me, for I had never heard that the French Minister was about to ask for Chaowia and Oudjdat to be kept by France.

The Sultan interposed, and was at pains to impress on me that the French Minister had not yet made any demands on those matters, to which I rejoined that, such being the case, there was no need to anticipate them or feel any anxiety; and, in terms such as I thought would reassure him, I pointed out that the French had voluntarily, in the Anglo-French Agreement, declared they had no intention of changing the political status of Morocco. The answer could be kept till—and if—these questions arose, but I thought much would depend on the Sultan's course just now, and this was what Mr. Lister had particularly mentioned to me, namely, that for the interest of Morocco, the wisest and most dignified course both for France and Morocco would be to treat each other with friendship and confidence, and to settle their affairs between themselves independently without being influenced by third parties, and to treat with each other Power in the same way, *i.e.*, separately.

Assuredly, if the French saw the Sultan taking this line, they would be so deeply pleased as to become easy to deal with, and the best results might be expected; but if third parties were invoked, the most probable result would be to arouse different feelings, and to make the French resist to the uttermost on all questions.

I went on to point out very earnestly that on most sides the country seemed calming down after the recent excitements, and we all had observed this markedly in the people between here and Tangier and at Fez, where a desire for quietness and return of trade was general and ever increasing. Why not, therefore, at least try to come to terms with the French by themselves, and not risk re-exciting Moorish feeling by having two or more, perhaps several, Missions to Fez all at once? The old way, which the population understood, and which enhanced the Sultan in their eyes, was for foreign Ministers, on a new reign beginning, to come one by one to visit and congratulate the Sultan.

Hadj Mohamed Mukhri and Abdullah-al-Fessi marked all this with expressions of approval. The Sultan seemed impressed with it, and asked me when I left to thank Mr. Lister for the messages he had sent.

Al-Mukhri, Al-Fessi, and I then left the Sultan, and as I went out of the Palace gate I met Dr. Vassel coming in, apparently for an interview with the Sultan alone.

I have mentioned to Sid-ben-Ghabrit what I have urged towards supporting his efforts, and will inform the French Minister on the matter as soon as he arrives.

Sid Abdullah-al-Fessi told me the French Mission would enter Fez on the morning of Friday, the 29th instant.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. M. MacLEOD.

[6165] No. 61.

Consul MacLeod to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 15.)

(No. 4.)
Sir, *British Consulate, Fez, January 29, 1909.*

YESTERDAY the Sultan was seated outside the palace with Commandant Mangin, head of the French Military Mission. Some town porters carrying wood to a building in construction there were passing the spot, and one of them threw down his load, drew a dagger, and rushed towards the Sultan and Commandant Mangin crying out that all Moslems should "Jehad," *i.e.*, make Holy War. The man was, however, seized by the Sultan's attendants before he could do more. Questioned by the Sultan as to what he meant, he said he wished to kill him for having to do with Christians. The man was then taken away, severely flogged, and put in prison.

The town porters at Fez are tribesmen from remote districts. They work in groups, and are responsible for each other's honesty and good behaviour, and, as a class, are remarkably honest and well-behaved. The other members of the culprit's group, seven in number, have therefore been imprisoned. Subsequent inquiries showed that the culprit had a severe fall on his head two years ago, since when he has had periods of mental aberration.

The incident, however, is not altogether without political significance, especially if taken in conjunction with the recent outrage on the body of Sid Ben Sliman, for such half-cracked people in this country very often incontinently echo and give effect to what they hear others saying, and the populace lately have been commenting very adversely on the unnecessary frequency and too great familiarity of the Sultan's intercourse with Europeans.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. M. MACLEOD.

[6128] No. 62.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 15.)

(No. 30.) *Tangier, February* 4, 1909.

Sir,

ON receiving the confirmation of the news that an attempt had been made to assassinate the Sultan, reported in my telegram No. 9 of the 2nd instant, I at once dispatched Mr. Irwin to the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs to offer him my personal congratulations on His Majesty's fortunate escape. I also instructed His Majesty's Consul at Fez to seize the first opportunity of delivering a similar message to the Sultan. El Guebbas told Mr. Irwin that he was much gratified at my message, and that I was the first of the foreign Representatives who had offered congratulations.

On receipt of your telegram No. 10 of the 3rd instant, I called personally on El Guebbas and told him that I had now received your official instructions to convey to him the congratulations of His Majesty's Government. He begged me to convey to you his best thanks. He would write at once to the Court, and in due time would have the pleasure of conveying to me the thanks of His Majesty.

As I stated in my telegram, an attempt on the life of the Sultan, who is the religious Head, and whose person is sacred, is almost unprecedented, and there appears little doubt that the man was mad.

I have, &c.
(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

[6152] No. 63.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 15.)

(No. 27. Confidential.) *Madrid, February* 11, 1909.

Sir,

THE French Ambassador's nervousness at the prospect of a Declaration similar to the Franco-German one concerning Morocco being signed at Berlin between Spain and Germany does not tend to diminish. His Excellency thinks it very foolish of Spain to complicate her position in Morocco by making any such Agreement. Unlike France, she has no special dispute with Germany over the affairs of Morocco. By simply adhering to the Franco-German Declaration she could secure for herself all the benefits which may be expected to accrue from the pacifying effects of that understanding. And this advantage would be hers without the necessity, to which France was obliged to yield, of promising to encourage partnerships in commercial enterprises between her own subjects and those of Germany. Such partnerships, though inconvenient, would offer no particular danger as between France and Germany, for France is financially the stronger Power. In the case of Spain and Germany the position would be reversed. The German capitalist would soon drive out his Spanish partner and remain in sole possession. What Spain claims as her special sphere of influence would slowly but surely slip from her grasp. It was incredible that Spain should take a step involving such serious possibilities.

In the course of a conversation with the Spanish Foreign Minister yesterday morning I asked him how matters really stood. His Excellency confirmed the information already given me by M. Revoil that negotiations had been opened between the Spanish and German Governments at Berlin. Señor Polo de Bernabé had just telegraphed that Germany had offered no objection. Señor Allendesalazar anticipated no difficulty, and said he expected to hear very shortly that a Declaration had been signed. The Spanish Government had thought it necessary to take this course. Simple adhesion, as suggested by France, to a document defining the relations between

France and Germany in Morocco, without the faintest allusion to any special interest of Spain in that country, would have had no significance whatever. If France possessed a special political interest in Morocco, so did Spain. This had been fully recognized at Algeciras, and Señor Allendesalazar thought it was only natural that Germany should now be called upon to admit it. I asked his Excellency if he did not think there would be some danger to Spanish interests if Spain undertook, as France had done, to endeavour to associate her nationals with those of Germany in any future Concessions that might be secured to them in Morocco. He thought the situation would not be practically affected by any such form of words. It was already open to Spanish concessionnaires to call in foreign capital if they chose. No positive obligation to do so would be created by adopting the French formula.

I believe the Spanish Government to be moved by a sense of wounded pride as much as by any other motive. I gather from various sources that they resented the secret manner in which the Franco-German Declaration was negotiated. It was communicated to them verbally, and in rather an off-hand way, by M. Revoil only twenty-four hours before signature. It contained no reference of any kind to Spanish interests. It seemed to assert a French predominance over the whole of Morocco, which Spain is herself far from being prepared to accept. Spain thinks she sees in it the intention to oust her from the position which for centuries she has occupied on the northern coast.

M. Revoil's fears as to the invasion of Northern Morocco by German capital are confirmed by information which has just been imparted to me by Mr. Macpherson. You are aware of the active part taken by this gentleman in forming a Spanish Company to work the Beni-bu-Fruor mines in the region behind Melilla. Among the Spanish capitalists whom he has interested in this project are Señor Romanones, a well-known and wealthy Liberal leader, and his two brothers, the Duc de Tovar and the Conde de Mejorada. Mr. Macpherson states that the Duc de Tovar signed a few days ago, in the presence of Count Tattenbach, German Ambassador, an Agreement with a German gentleman named Mannesmann, engaging to share with the latter a considerable mining property of which the Duke holds a Concession in the Gomara region south of Tetuan. Herr Mannesmann states that he holds a Concession granted by Muley Abdul Aziz, and since confirmed by Muley Hafid, empowering him to work these and many other important mines, including those of Beni-bu-Fruor, in different parts of Morocco. He seems to have persuaded the German Ambassador that his Concession is genuine and valid. In any case the Duc de Tovar thinks his position would be strengthened by German support. He is also strongly urging his brothers and Mr. Macpherson to accept Herr Mannesmann's offers as regards the region behind Melilla. Mr. Macpherson would prefer that English capital should participate, and he states that he has friends in England ready to find it. All the partners are agreed that they will have nothing to do with French capital.

In conversation with Mr. Macpherson, I expressed my hope that the Company would contrive to keep its head above water without any foreign assistance. He said he feared this would be impossible, and that the German proposals would prove too tempting to resist.

Herr Mannesmann is staying at the same hotel with Mr. Macpherson in Madrid, and they have talked the situation over together.

I know nothing about the matter beyond what Mr. Macpherson has told me. He says he is sure of his facts, and if they are as represented a difficult situation is likely to be created in the Riff country.

I have sent a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Tangier.

I have, &c.
(Signed) M. DE BUNSEN.

[6297] No. 64.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 16.)

(No. 22.) *Vienna, February* 13, 1909.

Sir,

AS might be expected, the visit of King Edward to Berlin has considerably occupied the attention of the Austro-Hungarian press during the past week. In the many articles which have been published here on this subject I have noticed nothing of

an offensive character about the King, and but little which is unfriendly towards Great Britain. A certain amount of scepticism is, however, shown in most of the press comments on the visit as to the possibility of any practical result coming from it, but it is generally recognized that it will tend to calm public nervousness, and perhaps contribute indirectly to the maintenance of peace in Europe, which is so menaced at this moment owing to the situation in the Near East. In some quarters the visit is explained as a confession on the part of Great Britain that her desire to isolate Germany has failed, and stress is laid on the fact that the stability which has been shown to exist in the alliance between the latter Power and Austria-Hungary has convinced England that she must come to terms with Berlin and Vienna if she really has at heart the desire to maintain the peace of Europe. On the whole, the press here has remained calm with regard to the Berlin visit, without, however, showing any enthusiasm for or attaching too much importance to it. I may sum up the chief note sounded by the newspapers of Austria-Hungary in one sentence: the Royal visit to Berlin will produce no visible alteration in the international situation of Europe, and is therefore of little importance in itself; what importance lies in the visit is this, that had it not taken place it would have shown that a strain existed in the relations between Great Britain and Germany which might have proved to be of a very disquieting nature for other European Powers.

Baron von Aehrenthal, in speaking to me a few days ago, expressed himself as highly satisfied at the visit having taken place, and his organ, the Vienna "Fremdenblatt," gives voice to similar sentiments. It says:—

"There are many signs which tend to show that the relations between England and Germany are improving. The fidelity shown by Germany to her ally (Austria-Hungary) in the question of the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina has been fully appreciated in Great Britain, not only as being the result of the natural policy which should be pursued by a Great Power with regard to her engagements, but also as a policy sincerely inspired by a desire to maintain the peace of Europe. Moreover, it is a coincidence which it is pleasant to take note of that quite recently a visible amelioration has taken place in the relations between Germany and France with regard to the Morocco question. The *détente* produced by this has reacted favourably on the relations between Germany and Great Britain, and will tend to draw them closer together for the settlement of the questions which have arisen in the Near East. The crisis in that part of Europe has had the effect of showing that both these Powers have similar interests for desiring to maintain the peace, and has also to a large extent thrown into the background the causes for the divergence of views which exist between them on various points. Austria-Hungary will view with the greatest satisfaction any signs of a growing improvement in the relations between London and Berlin."

The "Neue Freie Presse," always notable for its Anglophobia, writes, it is true, in moderate language about the visit, but still brings out the practical impossibility of convincing the English public that the German fleet is not being built as a menace to Great Britain's domination over the seas.

It is hardly worth while troubling you with extracts from the other newspapers, which are all more or less of a colourless character.

In connection with the Royal visit to Berlin, public attention has here been largely called to the Franco-German Arrangement about Morocco. This gives universal satisfaction, and the Austro-Hungarian press, ever ready under official inspiration to show friendliness towards France, welcomes it without reserve—in fact, an idea prevails here that Austria-Hungary's friendly attitude towards France has exerted an important influence at Berlin, and contributed not a little to the final surrender of Germany's pretensions in Morocco. When I saw Baron von Aehrenthal a few days ago, he asked me what I thought of the new Morocco Arrangement. I replied, "Cela vous fait honneur." He smiled, but made no attempt to repudiate the insinuation that he had had a hand in bringing it about, and I may add that he took it upon himself to send a telegram—which was published—to Prince Bülow and M. Pichon, congratulating them heartily on the conclusion of the new Morocco Arrangement.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FAIRFAX L. CARTWRIGHT.

[6594]

No. 65.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 87.)
Foreign Office, February 16, 1909.

Sir,

IN the course of general conversation to-day, M. Cambon said it had been suggested in some quarters that Germany would now ask France for something as a consequence of the Franco-German Agreement about Morocco, but he did not think she would do so.

It was possible, he thought, that Germany might wish to introduce herself between England and France in commercial matters in Morocco. But, in this case, it would be for England to associate herself with France and Germany in exploiting mines and in other operations of that kind in Morocco.

I told him I quite understood this. I felt that the Franco-German Agreement had removed a stumbling-block between Germany and England; for as long as Germany pursued what M. Cambon had called a policy of *taquinerie* with regard to Morocco, no matter how friendly our relations with Germany might be, they were always liable to be disturbed by disputes between France and Germany about Morocco. But if Germany abandoned this policy, and adopted a smooth one instead, this obstacle was removed.

Political weather, however, was very uncertain, and I thought it desirable to keep the *entente* between France and England as fresh and vigorous in the sunshine as it had been during the storms of the Algeciras Conference and on other occasions. At the same time, there was no reason why we should not enjoy the sun while it shone.

M. Cambon thought that Germany's desire was to consolidate her own internal politics, and to do this she required a friendly foreign policy.

If this was what Germany wished, I thought we should assist her to display a *façade d'amitié*. And for this reason I should be glad, if M. Isvolsky agreed, to see Germany join with us in negotiations at Vienna. I thought it was only if Germany would co-operate with us in advising at Vienna a policy of moderation and peace that our efforts could be made effective.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. GREY.

[6403]

No. 66.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 31.)
Madrid, February 13, 1909.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith an abstract by Mr. E. Grant Duff of the interpellation in the Senate on Thursday last regarding the Franco-German Agreement in respect of Morocco.

I have, &c.
(Signed) MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

Inclosure in No. 66.

Questions asked in the Spanish Senate as to the Franco-German Agreement respecting Morocco.

ON Thursday, the 11th February, the Minister for Foreign Affairs replied to questions put to him in the Senate by Señor Ranero in regard to the Franco-German Agreement respecting Morocco and the influence it might have on Spanish interests in that country.

Señor Allendesalazar stated that, prior to the signature of the Agreement in Berlin, the French and German Ambassadors in Madrid had communicated its precise terms to the Spanish Government, and at the same time the Cabinets of Paris and Berlin had made a similar communication to the Spanish Ambassadors in those capitals.

The Agreement was clearly intended to settle difficulties between the two nations,

and the Spanish Government could not but see with satisfaction that differences of opinion between countries whose interests were so near akin to their own should have been set at rest by pacific means.

As regards the effect which the Agreement might have on Spanish interests, it was hardly necessary to remind the Senate that these interests were secured by the Treaties and Agreements both with the Emperor of Morocco and with those nations who also had interests in that country.

Spanish interests consequently needed no fresh guarantees and could not be placed in jeopardy by the recent Franco-German Agreement. In any case, if the Spanish Government considered it desirable they had always the option of treating with the German Government, with whom they were on cordial terms.

Their relations with the countries in question were patent to all, and, as a further proof of their cordiality, he would mention that that very day King Alfonso had been asked to arbitrate in a boundary dispute which had arisen between England and Germany in South Africa.

Señor Ranero then rose and said that he had only the press and study to depend on as a source of information, but it appeared to him that the new Agreement modified the terms of the Algeciras Act regarding the equal right of all the Signatory Powers to participate in public works in the Shereefian Empire, and he desired to ask whether the new situation created by the Agreement would prejudice Spanish interests. Señor Allendesalazar replied that the Algeciras Act had in no way been modified, and that it was expressly stated in the Franco-German Agreement that the object in view was to facilitate the interpretation and execution of the said Act, in order to avoid misunderstandings in the future between the two parties concerned.

Señor Montero Ríos then addressed the House and said that it would appear from the Agreement that the French Government had offered to German subjects a participation in the Concessions for public works which they had obtained from the Moorish Government. This, however, was not expressly stated, but implied. What he wished to inquire was this, Was there any obligation on the part of the French Government to invite Spanish enterprises or subjects to share in exploiting the various Concessions which France might obtain in Morocco? He did not ask on what occasion the Cabinet of Paris had contracted this obligation, if it existed.

Señor Allendesalazar answered that all matters relating to public works affecting the development of the Shereefian Empire had been settled by the Algeciras Act. As far as private enterprise not affected by the said Act was concerned, the Moorish Government were free to take such steps as they thought fit to increase the national wealth. In these circumstances the Spanish and French Governments were mutually under an obligation to allow their subjects free scope to use their own initiative in business.

Señor Montero Ríos observed that he gathered, although the Minister of Foreign Affairs was not explicit, that there were no reciprocal obligations between Spain and France as regards mercantile, financial, and industrial matters interesting their respective subjects in Morocco.

Señor Labra then inquired whether the negotiations between the Spanish Government and the new Sultan of Morocco were nearly completed; when did the Minister of Foreign Affairs think that a reply would be forthcoming, not only as to the acceptation by the Sultan of the Declaration of the Spanish Government for the ratification of the note presented by Spain and France, but also as regards the recognition of the new Sultan. If a reply was shortly expected he would put off his proposed interpellation respecting not only the recognition of the Sultan, but also concerning the fresh aspect of the Morocco question brought about by the Franco-German Agreement. After the vague question put by Señor Montero Ríos and the equally vague answer of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, he would ask whether any mutual Agreement existed between Spain and France as regards the participation of their respective subjects in public works, financial undertakings, &c. If there were such an Agreement, could Señor Allendesalazar communicate it to the Senate.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs in reply said that Mulai Hafid had been recognized as Sultan of Morocco by all the parties to the Algeciras Act. The only thing now wanting was the presentation by the Spanish Minister of his credentials, and the Spanish Mission was about to proceed to Fez for that purpose, probably about the 15th instant. While at Fez the Spanish Representative would also discuss various matters with the Sultan.

With respect to the economic relations uniting French and Spanish interests in Morocco, he could only answer in general terms.

If a Secret Agreement existed in regard to the matter, Señor Labra knew quite well that the Government could not publish it without the consent of the other Contracting Party.

After some further remarks from Señor Labra and Señor Allendesalazar the matter terminated.

[6476] No. 67.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 17.)

(No. 7.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Berlin, February* 17, 1909.

MOROCCO.

With reference to your telegram No. 30 of the 15th February, I learn from Herr von Schoen that he has informed Spanish Ambassador that as Spanish Government have already signified their adhesion to Anglo-French Agreement of 1904 respecting Morocco, which is similar to Franco-German Declaration, German Government do not see the necessity for a separate Agreement with Spain. To win over the Spanish Ambassador to this view was, his Excellency informed me, at first a work of no little difficulty. He thinks, however, that he has now successfully done so. Herr von Schoen thinks that the Agreement just concluded with Germany would lose in value and importance were a special arrangement made with Spain. In his dealings with the Spanish Ambassador, Minister of Foreign Affairs has had the entire support of the French Ambassador who entirely shares the views expressed to me by Herr von Schoen.

[7379] No. 68.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 45.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 18, 1909.

I TOLD Count Metternich that the visit of the King seemed to us to have passed off very well. I heard from every one that the effect had been excellent, and the King himself was evidently very pleased with the visit.

Count Metternich said that this was certainly the feeling in Berlin.

I said the good effect had been increased by the signature of the Agreement with France about Morocco. I had always felt that even when there were no actual difficulties between Germany and France, the anticipation of possible difficulties about Morocco had been an impediment to good relations between Germany and England. I trusted that this apprehension had now been removed.

Count Metternich said that was the intention and desire of the German Government in making the Agreement.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. GREY.

[6681] No. 69.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 19.)

(No. 32. Confidential.)
Sir, *Madrid, February* 15, 1909.

A GOOD deal of dissatisfaction at the terms of the Franco-German Declaration concerning Morocco, which avoids mentioning Spanish interests in that country, is still felt at Madrid. It does not appear, however, that the Spanish proposal that a similar Declaration should be drawn up at Berlin, as between Spain and Germany, has led as yet to any satisfactory result. Indeed, I rather gather from some remarks made to me by the Spanish Foreign Minister on the 12th instant that this Government is casting about for some other means of reasserting the special political position which Spain, like France, claims in the regions adjoining her possessions.

Having in view the reluctance with which from the first Spain has pursued the policy of co-operation with France in Morocco, it is easy to understand that an Agreement which eliminates Germany from the political arena in that country and leaves

Spain face to face with her powerful partner was not likely to be greeted with enthusiasm by the Spanish Government.

The special political position of Spain in Morocco had, it is true, been fully recognized in three important international instruments, namely, first by England and France in Article 7 of the Declaration of the 8th April, 1904, respecting Egypt and Morocco, which stipulates that, in consideration of the interests which Spain derives from her geographical situation and from her territorial possessions on the Moorish coast of the Mediterranean, the French Government would come to an understanding with the Spanish Government in regard to those interests; secondly, by France, in the Franco-Spanish Declarations of the 6th October, 1904, in which the extent of the respective rights and interests of the two countries in Morocco were defined; and thirdly, by all the principal Powers in the General Act of Algeciras of the 7th April, 1906, which assigned to Spain her special duties in connection with the organization of the police, suppression of contraband, &c., and recognized that contraband and customs questions arising in the Riff country were the special affair of Spain and Morocco, in the same way as they were the special affair of France and Morocco in the region adjacent to Algeria. But, after this triple recognition in international Agreements signed by England, France, and the Powers generally, it seemed strange and a little suspicious that the Spanish position should not be specifically recognized, or even alluded to, in the most recent Agreement dealing with Morocco, namely, that between France and Germany. A reader of that document unacquainted with the previous history of the question would gather from it that, while all foreign Powers were to enjoy in Morocco a position of economic equality, France, and France alone, was to be politically predominant.

The omission of the slightest reference to Spain aroused a suspicion in this country that the similar political position which she claimed was properly ignored, or at least intended to be relegated to an altogether secondary place. Though the Declaration of the 9th February, 1909, ostensibly defines the meaning which France and Germany attach to the Act of Algeciras, it is here read rather as if it abolished the Act of Algeciras in everything except the point of commercial equality, and made entirely new political arrangements which disturb the balance which that Act established between France and Spain by assigning a special position to each of them in the neighbourhood of their respective possessions.

Since the Algeciras Conference Spain has always felt that, when France annoyed her, she could seek sympathy at Berlin. Now this consolation is withdrawn from her. She falls back on the Franco-Spanish Agreements of 1904, in so far as they may be held to survive, and to be compatible with commercial equality.

But those Agreements have never quite satisfied the small group of Spaniards who are aware of their contents. Strictly interpreted they bind Spain hand and foot to France, even in the Spanish sphere extending along the regions of Northern Morocco. In that sphere Spain, under the Secret Convention, and during the first fifteen years of its operation, can only exercise the action necessary to the preservation of order, &c., subject to the concurrence of France while France can do what she pleases subject to a simple notification to Spain of her intention. This provision, if severely enforced, would enable France to check the development of Spanish interests so effectually that, on the expiration of the period mentioned, that is in 1919, Spain would find herself in a situation of hopeless subservience to France in her own Spanish sphere.

The satisfactory working of the Secret Agreement, from a Spanish point of view, would depend, in short, on the benevolence of France. Spain considers, however, that France has hitherto regarded with anything but a benevolent eye the efforts which she has been making to strengthen her position in Northern Morocco. She fears that the Franco-German Declaration will remove the chief restraint by which French action in the Spanish sphere has hitherto kept within bounds, namely a respect for German sympathies with Spain. She feels that in future she will have to stand up unaided against French pressure, unless by any means she can procure a renewal of her investiture as the foreign Power having the predominant position along the Mediterranean coast of Morocco.

The foregoing are the chief reasons which appear to me to account for, if they do not entirely justify, the apprehensions to which the Franco-German Declaration has given rise in the Spanish mind.

I have, &c.
(Signed) MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[6682] No. 70.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 19.)

(No. 33.)
Sir, *Madrid, February 15, 1909.*

THE Spanish newspapers published yesterday an account of the measures taken by order of General Marina, Governor of Melilla, to chastise a portion of the Kebdana tribe, which, in opposition to the friendly sentiments of the majority of the tribesmen, has assumed an attitude of hostility towards the Spanish stations on the Riff coast. Colonel Larrea is reported to have led a small body of troops on the 8th instant into the region behind Cabo de Aguas, opposite the Chafarina Islands. Some disaffected Notables were arrested, and their cattle and horses raided. Other small punitive expeditions were dispatched some 10 or 12 miles into the interior on the following days, the object being to inspire respect for the Spanish flag, and especially to avenge a murderous assault by a native on a Spanish sentry.

I gather from some comments let fall by my French colleague that his Government does not view these Spanish military movements in a region so close to the French frontier with any favour, and that it would prefer that the Spanish troops should keep within the walls of their fortified posts.

I have, &c.
(Signed) M. DE BUNSEN.

[6886] No. 71.

Consul MacLeod to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 20.)

(No. 7.)
Sir, *Fez, February 8, 1909.*

THE French Mission under M. Regnault was received in State by the Sultan on the 3rd instant in the Bûjelûd Gardens of the Palace.

The ceremonial observed was the same as under Mulai Abdel Aziz, with two additions, however. The Sultan, after the usual formal greetings and presentations of the Staff, had a short, informal, impromptu, friendly conversation with the Minister, and thereafter directed the Master of Ceremonies to show the Mission over the Palace gardens. The latter is a revival of a courtesy which used to be shown to Missions on such occasions.

From conversations I have had with the Acting Grand Vizier and the Acting Vizier for Foreign Affairs, I gather that the Sultan and his advisers have been favourably impressed by M. Regnault.

They told me that the Minister's language on the situation was such as to lead them to expect that the existing difficulties would be solved to their mutual satisfaction.

Amongst the members of the French Mission I find a favourable opinion entertained generally of the new Sultan.

The transport animals and escort to fetch the Spanish Mission were dispatched a few days ago. This will result probably in that Mission reaching Fez about the end of this month, and thus M. Regnault will have had a month of the Court's undivided attention in which to advocate his programme.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. M. MACLEOD.

[6846] No. 72.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 20.)

(No. 35. Confidential.)
Sir, *Tangier, February 13, 1909.*

YOUR telegram No. 11, repeating a telegram from His Majesty's Ambassador in Paris to the effect that the French Ambassador in London had been instructed to communicate to you an Agreement which had been negotiated between the French and German Governments with regard to Morocco, reached me on the afternoon of the 8th instant.

On the following morning the Havas Agency quoted extracts from the "Matin" and the "Petite République," professing to give the gist of the Agreement, and a later telegram published the actual text.

So far I had heard nothing from the French Chargé d'Affaires; however, on my return to the Legation in the afternoon I found that he had called, so I went round to see him.

He said that he regretted that he should not have been the person to give me the *primeur* of such an event, and that I should have learnt it from the newspapers. The telegram from his Government had only reached him the evening before at 7 o'clock, and he assured me that it was the first he had heard of the matter. He was instructed to lose no time in approaching his German colleague and in communicating the Agreement to the Moorish Government in concert with him. He had consequently had no time to come round and see me and the Russian Minister, as he would have wished. He had called at once upon Dr. Rosen, who professed complete ignorance of the existence of any Agreement, but said that he would no doubt shortly receive a telegram from his Government. M. de Sainte-Aulaire told me that Dr. Rosen was at first hardly able to disguise the chagrin he felt at the news, but had subsequently recovered himself. His duty, he said, hitherto had been to oppose French policy in Morocco; the signature of the present Agreement, however, would necessitate a complete change in the attitude of the German Legation, and he could only congratulate himself on that change, which would correspond far better with his own personal feelings. This statement must have cost him a considerable effort, as Menebhi tells me that he hears from Herr Jahn, who has been employed for confidential communications during the absence on leave of Maroun, the first dragoman of the German Legation, that the Agreement has been a terrible blow to Dr. Rosen, that he has been as much upset by it as he was by the death of his son, that he says that he is ashamed to show his face outside his garden, and that his one idea is to get away from Tangier. I understand that he considers it to have been the work of Dr. Wangenheim, and I cannot help thinking that Baron Langwerth, who is now employed at the German Foreign Office, had something to do with it. He certainly discussed the possibility of an arrangement with M. de Sainte-Aulaire in 1907, and Dr. Rosen always suspected him of French proclivities, and had him removed from Tangier on that account.

As soon as Dr. Rosen's instructions arrived, he and M. de Sainte-Aulaire proceeded together to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and communicated the Agreement to Guebbas. The latter likewise professed great pleasure at the news, but I have since learned that he, too, is very much upset. From one or two things that Menebhi has said, I gather that he and other thinking Moors realize that, by the signature of this Agreement, their most powerful weapon against foreign encroachment has been taken from them; on the other hand, they have also realized that, by the removal of the friction between the two Great Powers, the position of Spain is considerably weakened, and I fear that the Spanish Minister will find on his arrival at Fez that little attention will be paid to his demands, except when supported by M. Regnault. I very much doubt whether the conclusion of an Agreement between Spain and Germany, as desired by the former, would make much impression on the Moors, or deceive them as to the true state of affairs, although M. Merry del Val is said to have put off his departure for the capital until the Agreement has become a *fait accompli*. The Spanish Government may live to regret the restless and provocative policy of their Representative at Tangier, the only result of which has been to thoroughly irritate the French.

If, as Sir M. de Bunsen states in his telegram No. 7, the Germans are making efforts to obtain a share in the Mining Concessions behind Melilla and along the northern coast, it can only be with a view to acquiring a position there which would help them towards obtaining fresh Concessions, or justify a claim for indemnification. It is practically certain that Moulai Hafid will repudiate the Concessions granted by the Pretender. In fact, he must do so under Article 112 of the Act of Algeciras. I understand that a Shereefian Firman, which, at the request of the late Sultan, and with the acquiescence of the foreign Representatives, the State Engineer has been drawing up, will shortly be submitted to the Sultan. If approved by the Sultan, it will regulate the whole question of Mining Concessions in Morocco.

It seems to me surprising that neither the French nor the German Legations should have been informed of the negotiations proceeding between the two Governments. Of the two, the latter is the more comprehensible, as Dr. Rosen's strong bias would have doubtless caused complications. I am inclined, however, to believe that M. de Sainte-Aulaire spoke the truth when he said he had heard nothing before the telegram of the 8th.

This is not, however, the opinion of my Russian colleague. He is much annoyed, and says that had M. Regnault been here he would certainly have given him some warning, if only twenty-four hours, of what was afoot. His resentment was possibly heightened by the fact that he had played a certain part in the matter himself, having discussed the possibility of an Agreement between the two Powers with regard to Morocco with M. Pichon last summer. The latter had then told him that it would be impossible for the French Government to make the advances, as if their overtures were rejected, and the public in France found out that they had been, their position would be seriously endangered. He had, however, begged M. Botkine to stay at Berlin on his way to St. Petersburgh and discuss the matter with M. Jules Cambon. This M. Botkine had done, and he had found the Ambassador by no means without hope of being able to arrange something which would relieve the tension existing between the two nations. On his arrival at St. Petersburgh M. Botkine had reported his various conversations to M. Isvolsky, and had been confronted with the Russian Ambassador in Paris who happened to be on leave. The latter pooh-poohed the whole idea, and maintained that no Arrangement could be come to between the two Powers, so long as France refused to recognize the Treaty of Frankfort. M. Botkine had, however, maintained his views, and subsequently spoke in the same sense to the Emperor, notwithstanding the opposite opinion held and expressed to His Imperial Majesty by M. de Nélidow.

M. Botkine is, I believe, somewhat given to exaggerate the importance of the part he has played himself in affairs of State.

He is convinced that there must be some secret clause or clauses in the Agreement, and spoke vaguely of the Bagdad Railway. I said that I hardly thought that France would make an Arrangement with Germany on such a matter without previous reference to Great Britain and Russia.

I have, &c.
(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

[6996] No. 73.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 22.)

(No. 56. Confidential.)

Sir, *Berlin, February 18, 1909.*

AT his last official reception I congratulated Herr von Schoen on the successful termination of his negotiations with the French Government on the subject of Morocco. His Excellency said that ever since he had been in office it had been his dream to come to an understanding with France upon Moroccan affairs, and that he was quite delighted that his efforts had now been crowned with success. He added that the Spanish Government had shown some irritation at having been left out of the Arrangement and at not having been apprised from the first that such an Arrangement was in contemplation. They had now proposed that a similar understanding should be negotiated between Germany and Spain. This proposal, however, had not found favour with the Imperial Government for various reasons, the chief one being that they wished the Franco-German Declaration to stand by itself as an event of great political importance, and not to lose its effect by being made one of other similar Agreements. He had explained to the Spanish Ambassador that Spain and France stood on a wholly different footing as regards their relations with Germany. With France Germany had been long at variance on many points in connection with Morocco, and the relations between the two countries had consequently been subjected to an unpleasant strain on more than one occasion, causing considerable anxiety not only to the two countries interested but also to others; whereas with Spain Germany had always been on the best of terms, with no question between them to upset the equanimity of either Government. Therefore the Imperial Government thought a special Arrangement between the two countries at the present moment entirely unnecessary, all the more that by adhering to the Anglo-French Agreement of 1904 Spain might be regarded as practically adhering to the present Franco-German Agreement, which was drawn up on similar lines. Herr von Schoen said that he thought he had finally induced the Spanish Ambassador to share this view. It was, he added, entirely a question of Spanish *amour-propre*, and he thought that the choice of the King of Spain as Arbitrator in the Anglo-German

dispute with regard to Walfisch Bay had gone far towards smoothing down the somewhat ruffled feathers of the Spanish Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. E. GOSCHEN.

[7776] No. 74.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 27.)

(No. 36.)
Sir, *Tangier, February* 18, 1909.

HIS Majesty's Ambassador in Madrid has been good enough to send me a copy of his despatch to you No. 27, Confidential, of the 11th instant. I note that he alludes in it to a Concession which Herr Mannesmann states that he holds granted by Mulai Abd-el-Aziz, and since confirmed by Mulai Hafid, empowering him to work mines in the district south of Tetuan and others, including those of Beni-bu-Freeor, in different parts of Morocco. Sir M. de Bunsen also states that Herr Mannesmann seems to have persuaded the German Ambassador at Madrid that his Concession was genuine and valid.

It has been known at this Legation that ever since 1906 a German firm of the name of Mannesmann has been trying to obtain Mining Concessions in different parts of Morocco, but the information received last autumn by Mr. White (see his despatch No. 272 of the 29th October, 1908) would lead one to suppose that at that moment, at all events, nothing definite had been granted. You will recollect that two engineers of the same firm left for Fez in the middle of last month (see my despatch No. 12 of the 15th ultimo), and that Dr. Rosen, when discussing the question of the proposed International Mining Syndicate with Mr. Harris, stated that he did not consider that M. Mannesmann constituted a danger to their prospects.

In any case, as I stated in my telegram No. 12, the whole question of Mining Concessions in Morocco will be regulated by the Shereefian Firman, which is now being drawn up and will shortly be issued, and all Concessions granted subsequent to the signature of the Algeciras Act will be invalidated. I can hardly believe that Herr Mannesmann can have obtained any Concession before that date.

Mr. Harris wrote to me from Fez that the Minister of Finance, El Mokri, told him the other day that he was authorized by the Sultan to broach the subject of the "International Syndicate." Mr. Harris replied that he could only give his Excellency an outline of the enterprise, as it was not yet in a state in which negotiations could commence, owing to the non-existence at present of mining laws. After a long conversation on the general idea and scope of the Syndicate, El Mokri said that it fell into line with the ideas of the Makhzen, and undertook to urge Mulai Hafid to sign no sort of Concession before the programme of the Syndicate had been considered. Mr. Harris had subsequently seen the French Minister, who approved the line he had taken, and promised to take an early opportunity of impressing the same upon the Makhzen.

Dr. Vassel also informed Mr. Harris that he had received private instructions to support the Syndicate, should his support be needed.

I have, &c.
(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

[7777] No. 75.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 27.)

(No. 37.)
Sir, *Tangier, February* 20, 1909.

THE news which reached me from various sources from Fez all tends to show that the French Minister is more than satisfied with the progress of his negotiations. M. Regnault told His Majesty's Consul that matters had been going on so smoothly that he expected he would be able to finish up about the end of this month.

Cid Guebbas, who called yesterday to pay his respects to Her Royal Highness Princess Henry of Battenberg, who was spending two days at the Legation, fully confirmed these reports. He informed me confidentially that he had every reason to believe that a satisfactory solution had been arrived at with regard to the Shawia, and that the question of the Algerian frontier was now being discussed.

I hear that when M. Regnault announced the signature of the Franco-German

Agreement to the Sultan, His Majesty showed no surprise, but merely remarked that it was quite unnecessary; that his relations with M. Regnault and with his Government were already so satisfactory that it could make no difference: "In any case," he added, "I had decided to place myself entirely in your hands."

Dr. Vassel, I hear, on the other hand is terribly disgusted, and at first denied with oaths that any Agreement had been signed, not having himself heard anything of it from the German Legation.

The movements of the Sultan appear again to be uncertain, and he told His Majesty's Consul the other day that he thought he might be obliged to receive me at Rabat. He appears to be anxious to leave Fez as soon as possible, but the French Minister expressed doubts to Mr. Macleod as to whether the Mehalla sent out to Sefroo to punish the Aityusi tribe would finish its work as quickly as His Majesty expected. Moreover, a certain amount of agitation still exists among the neighbouring tribes on account of the Pretender, and I was also informed that El Glawi had decided to go up to Fez.

The Spanish Mission start for Fez on the 23rd instant.

I have, &c.
(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

[7778] No. 76.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 27.)

(No. 38. Confidential.)
Sir, *Tangier, February* 22, 1909.

THE French Chargé d'Affaires told me in confidence yesterday that the reason for which the Sultan spoke of leaving Fez for Rabat was that he desired, as soon as the arrangements for the evacuation of the Shawia by the French had been made, to proceed there himself and make a tour through the country, thus officially showing that he had reassumed control over it. M. de Sainte-Aulaire added that His Majesty was anxious that M. Regnault should accompany him on this tour, to prove that complete harmony reigned between him and the French. M. de Sainte-Aulaire does not believe that the Sultan can possibly leave Fez as early as he speaks of doing. M. Regnault would in any case return to Tangier before starting with him, and the proposed tour through the Shawia can very well wait. The French, in fact, he said, would be glad to see it put off for a month or two.

M. de Sainte-Aulaire told me that El Glawi and Aissa-ben-Omar were certainly coming up to Fez, and were expected to leave Morocco city about the 8th or 10th March.

I have, &c.
(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

[7940] No. 77.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 28.)

(No. 15.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, February* 28, 1909.

HIS Majesty's Consul at Fez informs me that the Moorish Government have come to the following arrangement with Raisuli:—

1. Thirteen tribes including the Angera have been placed under his Governorship, the Fahs, however, is excluded.
2. Raisuli agrees to transfer to the Sultan the sum of 15,000*l.* placed to his credit at the State Bank of Morocco.
3. His British protection is to be renounced.
4. In its place he is to receive from the French Minister a guarantee that in future the Makhzen will treat him justly and with good faith, while he is to give M. Regnault a promise that order will be maintained in the districts placed under his jurisdiction, and to swear on the Koran that he will obey the commands of the Sultan.

I learn that Raisuli is to surrender to me in person his British protection, and he was expected to leave Fez for Tangier on the 25th instant.

Cid Guebbas, who I saw this morning, evidently thinks that the above information is correct. He told me that it had just been published by the Havas Telegraph Agency. As soon as he receives official confirmation of the arrangement he has promised to inform me.

The support of the French Minister, to whom I had written very strongly on the subject, has no doubt contributed towards the conclusion of this arrangement. It appears to me most satisfactory, as the ransom money should now be repaid without delay.

[7947] No. 78.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 1.)

(No. 72. Confidential.)

Sir, *Berlin, February* 26, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's Consul-General at Frankfort with regard to Prince Bülow's present position and the respective chances of the various candidates for the Chancellorship in the event of his fall.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. E. GOSCHEN.

Inclosure in No. 78.

Consul-General Oppenheimer to Sir E. Goschen.

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Frankfort-on-the-Main, February* 24, 1909.

YOUR Excellency will undoubtedly have seen from the papers that on the 17th instant Prince Bülow delivered an after-dinner speech at the meeting of the "Landwirtschaftsrath" at Berlin, in which he spoke with unusual confidence of his own continuance in office. One of my informants, who had inspired the contents of my despatch of the 16th January, confirms that a decided rally has since then in fact taken place in the present Chancellor's position.

This change is partly due, I am informed, to the entire success of the King's visit to Berlin; partly to the Franco-German Agreement concerning Morocco, the publication of which coincided with the King's visit. The Agreement was well received, not only by politicians, but also by the leading German "industrials." From the first, it would appear, the anxiety on the part of Germany that the open door be preserved in Morocco was due to the knowledge that Morocco was rich in minerals, and chiefly such minerals as are needed by the German iron industry. These minerals the German iron industry has so far obtained from Spain and Sweden; the supplies from the former country are said to be no longer entirely satisfactory, and the supply from the latter has been hampered within recent years owing to Swedish legislation on the subject of its export. Supplies from Morocco have now been secured for the German iron industry by a Mining Arrangement come to between the leading "industrials" interested in France and Germany. Though this combination appears to be a private one only, it enjoys apparently the protection of both the German and French Governments, and at least, as far as Germany is concerned, the leading iron masters, such as Krupp, Stumm Erben, &c., are truly grateful to the Imperial Chancellor. These giant concerns, however, are naturally interested in other industries also, and it is hoped that the working arrangement come to between such important capitalists in France and Germany may gradually extend to other industries also, and thus become the basis of a wider and more thorough economic understanding between the two countries.

If the aforementioned events have worked in favour of Prince Bülow's position, it is still true that Prince Bülow has remained in office owing to the complications of the interior political situation. Prince Bülow's guiding hand was, and is still, necessary to bring about some kind of satisfactory compromise wherewith to carry out the Imperial financial reforms. Nobody could be found whose appointment held out any hope of success had he been called upon to enter upon Prince Bülow's succession. It may be of interest to your Excellency to hear it confirmed from my informant that the following names were actually mentioned in that connection:—

Prince Hatzfeldt: My informant, however, has pointed out to me that the remoteness of Prince Hatzfeldt's chances could best be gathered from the fact that, after an enmity of several years between Prince Hatzfeldt and Prince Bülow, the latter has quite recently not disdained a reconciliation.

Baron Marschall von Bieberstein: This gentleman from the south of Germany has enjoyed great popularity, at least in the south, and his prominent position in Constantinople has appealed to the German people as a whole. At the time of The Hague Conference it was said that he had been appointed First German Delegate because the delicacy of that mission harboured certain dangers, and his popularity had procured him enemies in high political quarters. Not long ago the Emperor is said to have remarked in reference to him that a good Ambassador need not necessarily make a good Chancellor. He does not appear gifted with that easy personal charm which pleases the Emperor. In well-informed circles it is believed that he will eventually succeed Prince Radolin in Paris.

Graf Wedel: He is at present Statthalter of Alsace-Lorraine, and as such holds one of the highest appointments within the Empire. It is not likely that he will ever accept the Chancellorship if he can avoid it. On a certain occasion he told a personal friend of my informant that he was very happy at Strasburg, and that his past experience had been that his personal agreement with the Emperor had a tendency of decreasing in the same ratio in which the distance decreased between them.

Baron von Bethmann-Hollweg: If a Chancellor were required at short notice with an intelligent grasp of the present political needs in Germany, and with sufficient experience to tackle the complicated situation in the Imperial Diet, no better man could be found. His reputation has greatly improved within recent years throughout Germany; he has become a hard worker and a successful orator, and is, moreover, said to be high in the Emperor's favour. It is not likely that at a critical moment the objection would hold good that he was politically too intimately associated with Prince Bülow to survive the latter's downfall. Among all possible combinations his appointment during the recent crisis appeared the most likely.

My informant believes that, to judge from the pointed way in which Prince Bülow referred to Prince Radolin in the speech mentioned in the beginning of this despatch, Prince Radolin's name may possibly have figured among the names which were mooted as those of possible successors. The manner of Prince Bülow's reference was all the more remarkable, as it appears to be officially shown in Berlin that the indiscretion committed in connection with the Emperor's telegram to Prince Radolin on the occasion when the Franco-German Morocco Agreement had been concluded could only very remotely be laid to Prince Radolin's charge; he had apparently communicated the subject matter of what afterwards became the "indiscretion" to the Prince of Monaco, who is his personal friend, and through him it eventually reached the offices of the "Matin."

Though the crisis has for the time being lost its acuteness, the list of candidates seriously discussed by my informant, whom I have found on various occasions particularly well informed, seemed to me of sufficient interest for transmission to your Excellency, even if in the past no incidents have been fuller of surprises than the various selections of Imperial Chancellors.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANCIS OPPENHEIMER.

[7940] No. 79.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Lister.

(No. 18.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, March* 2, 1909.

RAISULI. Your telegram No. 15 of the 28th ultimo.

I agree that proposed arrangement between Raisuli and Sultan is, as far as it goes, most satisfactory, if, as I assume, the latter has acquired rights of Raisuli in 15,000*l.*, with the intention of immediately transferring them to His Majesty's Government, with or without the additional amount of 5,000*l.*, which His Majesty's Government advanced to pay Kaïd Maclean's ransom.

I shall be glad to hear that confirmation of the proposed arrangement has reached Guebbas.

[8763] No. 80.

Consul MacLeod to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 6.)

(No. 8.)

Sir, *Fez, February 15, 1909.*

DURING the last few days negotiations have continued to proceed smoothly between the French Minister and the Sultan. At the outset M. Regnault remarked to me that the Sultan had requested that the particulars of the negotiations be kept secret, and he had agreed to this. So far, this secrecy has been carefully observed on both sides.

On the evening of the 12th instant M. Gaillard, French Consul, informed me confidentially that an accord about Moorish affairs had now been signed between France and Germany, and there was no probability of opposition to the Mission's negotiations.

M. Regnault told me that when I should see the Sultan (which I was to do next day, to present Mr. W. B. Harris, correspondent of the "Times") perhaps His Majesty would have some very interesting news to give.

On the 28th instant Mr. Harris and I were received by the Sultan. His Majesty was in most cheerful spirits, and conversed gaily on general topics. Apparently he had not been at all depressed by the Franco-German Accord; indeed, I understand that the Sultan expressed to M. Regnault hearty approval of it, on the ground that it would simplify his task of getting the country into order. The only remark of a political nature the Sultan offered, however, was that he feared he should be gone from Fez by the time (early in April) Mr. Lister wished to see him, so perhaps it would be at Rabat that he would have to receive the British Mission.

In view (1) of the necessity of settling with the tribes around Sefroo (where a "Mehalla" has been stationed these five weeks); (2) of the uneasiness Buhamara's movements occasion; and (3) of getting the townspeople here into a more contented mood, by abolishing some extra taxes recently imposed, it is not expected by the Court officials that the Sultan will be able to leave before the 30th April or so, at the soonest.

Yesterday Dr. Vassel (Acting German Consul) called, in much agitation, on me, to inquire whether the news of a Franco-German Accord was true? He had been informed of it by the Sultan and Viziers, had vehemently denied it, but was only laughed at by them. He had not heard a word about it from his Legation or from Berlin.

I replied that I did not remember the details, but the news was true. Thereupon Dr. Vassel went on to denounce the Accord in strong terms, said Germany had given everything and got nothing, that the French would assuredly soon, in unfair ways, drive German trade out of Morocco, and, in the meantime, an outburst of anti-European feeling, ruinous to everybody in Morocco, was sure to ensue when the Moors realized the position in which they were now to France.

As for himself, Dr. Vassel said he had now begun to think seriously of leaving the German service and going into commerce, for there would be now nothing for a German official to do in this country. I answered that, as regards Moorish feeling, much would depend on the manner in which the French now proceeded. I anticipated they would use their position very cautiously, and I could not see how, under the Anglo-French Agreement of 1904, the Act of Algeciras, and the present Franco-German Accord, any serious interference with foreigners' rights was possible. On the contrary, I felt sure that the developments which the reforms would induce would assuredly add to the trade of all the Powers with Morocco.

Probably German Consuls might have less diplomatic work to do, but, on the other hand, under the new circumstances, their other duties would become both more numerous and of more tangible value to their countries, and the services of men experienced in the country would be in greater, and not in less, request.

So far the news of the Franco-German Accord has not reached the general public here. It is a matter, however, somewhat beyond the intelligence of the lowest classes, and the middle and upper classes here are at no time predisposed to give trouble, and are plainly becoming more and more sensible of the need of improvements in the Government. If judiciously used, the fact that all the Powers are now in accord with France should itself tend to reassure them that no harm (quite the reverse) is in store for their country.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. M. MACLEOD.

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[8715] No. 81.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 6.)

(No. 41.)

Sir, *Tangier, February 27, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the Spanish Minister, M. Merry del Val, left Tangier on the 23rd instant for Fez to present his credentials to Mulai Hafid. He is accompanied by M. Padilla, First Secretary, two Attachés, two dragomans, a Military Attaché, a military doctor, and a Franciscan Priest. He takes with him various gifts for presentation to the Sultan and principal officials.

M. Merry del Val will reach Fez before the departure of the French Mission, and will be able to join M. Regnault in discussing with the Sultan various matters of general interest. After the departure of the French Mission M. Merry will doubtless turn to matters especially affecting interests of Spain, such as those mentioned in Sir G. Lowther's despatch No. 80, Confidential, of the 11th April, 1908.

I have, &c.

(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

[8716] No. 82.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 6.)

(No. 42.)

Sir, *Tangier, February 28, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a summary of events of interest which have taken place during the past week.

I have, &c.

(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

Inclosure in No. 82.

Events of the Week.

SOME excitement was caused in Tangier during the past week by the rumour that a Spanish force had been ambushed and severely handled by the tribe of Msala in the neighbourhood of Ceuta. The rumour has since been denied by the Spanish authorities, and the facts of the case appear to be as follows:—

About ten days ago a small body of Spanish soldiers under the command of a lieutenant, who was inspecting some outposts, was fired upon by men of the Msala tribe and forced to retreat after suffering some casualties. It appears that their assailants were members of the family of the late brigand Valiente, who, it will be remembered, was killed by a relative some two years ago. The reason for the attack is not quite clear, but the Spanish authorities believe that it was due to an order issued by the Governor of Ceuta forbidding the inhabitants of the village in which the Valiente family reside to enter the town till further notice. It appears that this order was issued in consequence of numerous depredations which had recently taken place in the neighbourhood, the latest instance being an attack upon the courier between Ceuta and Tetuan. These acts of aggression were traced with practical certainty to the Valiente family. On hearing of the attack the Governor at once sent out a strong force, including some field guns, which destroyed by shell fire the houses of those members of the Valiente family who were believed to have been concerned in the affair. It is hoped that by this salutary lesson order may be restored in the district.

Mr. Madden reports from Casa Blanca that a very large crowd was present at the departure of General d'Amade, which took place on the 22nd instant. Previous to his departure the General was entertained to dinner by the British colony, when great cordiality prevailed.

Considerable suspicion has been aroused at Mogador by the movements of a yacht called the "Moonstone" which arrived there recently. It was given out by the owners of the yacht that they desired to open up trade with districts to the south of Cape Juby, which had never been recognized as part of the territory of the Sultan

of Morocco. Although a strict watch was kept on the vessel, it appears certain that she succeeded in landing a large quantity of arms for Kaïd Anflus off Cape Sim.

The Spanish Mission left for Fez on the 23rd instant, but were held up by heavy rains which made the rivers impassable for some days.

[8860] No. 83.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 7.)

(No. 16.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, March* 7, 1909.

RAISULI.

My telegram No. 15 of the 28th ultimo.

Raisuli does not appear to have received from the French Legation any guarantee for the good faith of the Makhzen or for their future just treatment of him. He was merely promised the good-will of France if he turned out a moderately good Kaïd. As an earnest of his good intentions M. Regnault asked him to deliver to justice those who were implicated in the murder of M. Charbonnier, and to put an end to courier robberies.

[9646] No. 84.

Consul MacLeod to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 13.)

(No. 9.)
Sir, *Fez, February* 23, 1909.

I UNDERSTAND that the negotiations between the French Minister and the Sultan continue to proceed satisfactorily.

The most absolute secrecy, however, is observed on both sides, and no details have been communicated by either side to my Spanish or German colleagues or myself.

In regard to the Spanish Mission, matters have not been progressing smoothly. The Court consider M. Merry del Val unconciliatory. In his turn, M. Merry del Val has been dissatisfied with the Court's delays in sending the escort and transport animals for him, which was due to their wish to give the French Minister their undivided attention (see my despatch No. 7 of the 8th February).

Even after dispatching the escort and transport the Court would not tell the Spanish Consul here what house had been allotted to the Mission. Thereupon M. Merry del Val sent an express courier to the Consul with letters to the effect that he would not leave Tangier (where the transport and escort had meanwhile arrived) until he learned what house had been chosen for his residence while here.

The Court replied, crossly, that surely the Minister did not suppose that, after sending the escort and transport, they would leave him to camp here houseless; they had, however, chosen the house which was Sid Menebhi's residence when he was Minister of War, and which was built by him. The Consul tells me that he reported favourably on the suitability of that house, so M. Merry del Val by now is probably on his way to Fez.

Next to the foregoing affairs the main preoccupation of the Court during the week has been their negotiations with Raissouli. They have now settled with him on the following terms, and he leaves here on the 26th instant for Tangier, where the concluding formalities of the arrangement will be done.

The settlement is as follows:—

1. Raissouli gives up his British protection.

2. Raissouli pays back to His Britannic Majesty's Government, through His Majesty's Minister at Tangier, the 20,000*l.* ransom he received for the release of Kaïd Sir Harry Maclean.

Of this amount some 15,000*l.* are now on deposit at the State Bank in Raissouli's name. This money, together with 5,000*l.* with which the Sultan will provide Raissouli (thus making 20,000*l.*), will then be handed by Raissouli to His Majesty's Minister in presence of Sid Mohammed Gubbas, the Sultan's Representative at Tangier. Raissouli will then hand over his patent of protection, and be given back the document of Agreement he signed when he was granted protection.

3. Sid Gubbas will then hand to Raissouli Shereefian letters appointing him Governor of the hill tribes in the Tangier, Laraiche, Tehran Peninsula, excepting the Fahs, but including Angera and Arzila.

The Court were desirous that I should attest Raissouli's renunciation of British protection, but this I declined to do, as the protection was based on an arrangement between the British and Moorish Governments, and so it was necessary that the British Government's assent be had to the renunciation, and that it be done therefore through His Britannic Majesty's Minister. Moreover, except by the Minister's instructions, no Consul could give a valid assent to a renunciation of protection. I pointed out also that in the Sultan's interest it would not be prudent to give any appearance of hurry in the matter, as this, in view of Raissouli's intensely suspicious and fickle character, might result in alarming him and changing his mind.

Raissouli has been giving out (he did so to myself amongst others) that he has had satisfactory verbal assurances from the French Minister upon the Agreement, such as made him feel sure the French Government would not allow any ill-treatment of him by the Makhzen, and would see that the Makhzen observed good faith.

Sid Abbas Al Fessi (Acting Grand Vizier) stated to me, however, that the French Minister had taken nothing to do with the matter.

The French Minister, on my inquiring, replied that he had given no such assurances. All that had happened was that Raissouli called on him and told him of the arrangement and his desire to be friendly and obliging to France.

M. Regnault replied wishing all success to the arrangement, and added that if he proved a good Kaïd and maintained good order he would have the *bienveillance* of the French Legation, and now there were two matters in which Raissouli could show his friendliness to France: first, by putting a stop to courier robberies and the like on the roads; and next, by handing out from Angera the murderers of M. Charbonnier, who were still there unpunished. Both of these matters Raissouli promised he should see to without fail.

I remarked to M. Regnault that I wondered at Arzila, with its facilities for contraband trade, being included in Raissouli's district, the more so that M. Regnault had formerly said to me he should object to either the Fahs or Arzila being allotted to Raissouli. The Minister seemed rather taken aback, and replied that he supposed now it could not be helped.

In that connection I would confidentially point out that Arzila might conceivably be used by the Makhzen themselves, should they wish to procure private supplies of arms, ammunition, or Government stores, should they find the regulations of the Algeciras Act inconvenient.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. M. MACLEOD.

[9647] No. 85.

Consul MacLeod to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 13.)

(No. 10.)
Sir, *Fez, February* 24, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to report that Raisuli called upon me this evening, prior to his departure to-morrow for Tangier and Arzila.

He told me that the districts assigned to him comprise Arzila, Gharbia, and Bedawa, together with the mountainous regions, Andjera, Wad Ras, Ouzmer, Beni Msowar, Jebel Habib, Beni Arrous, Ben Ider, Beni Leit, Soumata, and Beni Issef, and that he intended to live mostly at Arzila. The district is, as will be seen from the inclosed outline map,* about 75 miles long, and, at its broadest, about 25 miles in width. The central and southern parts of it are more or less barren mountains, sparsely populated, and the inhabitants so extremely poor and unused to being governed that Raisuli can hardly expect to gain much from them. So it is presumably from the northern and western tracts that he expects to recoup the great cost (20,000*l.* and the loss of his British protection) at which he has procured this post. That sum is, however, so disproportionate to what could be gained by ordinary Moorish methods from even

* Not reproduced.

these tracts that it is possible he may have some idea of exploiting parts of them with Europeans, as, for example, in connection with minerals in Andjera and farming in Arzila, Gharbia, and Bedawa neighbourhood.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. M. MACLEOD.

[9622] No. 86.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 13.)

(No. 44.)
Sir, *Tangier, March* 7, 1909.

THERE has been a great deal of talk lately in Tangier of the probability of the issue in the immediate future of a new Moroccan loan.

I asked the French Chargé d'Affaires to-day whether anything had actually been settled on the subject at Fez, and he told me it had been decided *en principe*, although nothing had been arranged as to details. El Mokri, the Minister of Finance, was leaving shortly for Paris ostensibly on a mission of ceremony to thank the French Government for the mission of M. Regnault to Fez, for the evacuation of the Shawia, &c., but in reality to negotiate the terms of the loan. The French Government, he said, were anxious that the matter should be discussed as little as possible, as the more it was talked about in this country the more difficult it would render the situation of the Sultan. I also inquired as to the movements of M. Guiot, who arrived here last week. M. de Saint-Aulaire told me that he was leaving Tangier to-day, and proceeding to Berlin to arrange various financial matters which required to be placed on a new footing owing to the Franco-German Agreement. The object of his mission, he added, was somewhat *vaguement défini*. I cannot help thinking that it is in connection with the loan that he is going to Berlin.

I have, &c.
(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

[10486] No. 87.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 18.)

(No. 18.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, March* 18, 1908.

RAISULI. Your telegram No. 18 of the 2nd instant.

On Monday night Raisuli arrived here, and has since then been in communication with me, as also with Commissioner for Foreign Affairs. I paid a visit to the latter yesterday after his interview with Raisuli, and he informed me that the Sultan had sent down to him the two documents written and sealed by Raisuli, the one renouncing his British protection, the other engaging to deliver to the Sultan the 15,000*l.*; he had further received instructions to hand the money over to me when it had been obtained from Raisuli. No instructions had been sent to him with regard to the remaining 5,000*l.*, but the Sultan had said it should be paid, and he did not doubt that on my arrival at Fez the promise would be fulfilled. I was careful to point out to Cid Guebbas that Raisuli had invested just under 4,000*l.* of the 15,000*l.* in house property, but that I must of course receive the total amount in money. He this morning agreed that this should be done. The two documents sealed by Raisuli were sent round to me last night, they seem quite in order; I have had copies made of them. I told Cid Guebbas that it was, in my opinion, a matter of regret that the total sum of 20,000*l.* could not be handed over to me at once. Guebbas pressed me to accept 15,000*l.* on account; he has written to the Sultan strongly urging him to pay the total sum now, but it is unlikely that an answer can be received before I leave for Fez. I can hardly imagine that for so small a sum as 5,000*l.* the Sultan would fail to keep his word, and I therefore propose, subject to your approval, to do as I am asked by Guebbas.

[10505] No. 88.

Consul MacLeod to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 19.)

(No. 11.)
Sir, *Fez, March* 1, 1909.

IN my despatch No. 1 of the 22nd January I reported that the Pretender, Buhamara, was increasingly active and was encamped at Wad-el-Hader, Dsul.

Thereafter he summoned the people of Eastern Hiayna to submit to him and to give hostages for their good faith towards assisting him to move through their lands to Fez. This they declined to do, and appealed to the soldiers for help in the form of arms, ammunition, and soldiers. The Sultan replied that he would not repeat his predecessor's unwise policy of supplying the Hiayna with arms and the like and sending costly expeditions to those hills, and it was for the Hiayna to defend themselves, and, if they could not do so, Buhamara might come near Fez and the Sultan would fight him there.

During the last few days the Pretender has moved from Wad-el-Hader to Abor, in Eastern Hiayna, near Sok Tlata Outa Buaban, about 27 miles from Fez. This is the spot from which the Sultan Mulai Abdul Aziz made, in the summer of 1903, so many costly and fruitless efforts against Buhamara.

The approach of Buhamara has naturally occasioned a certain amount of uneasiness here, mainly apprehensions of lawlessless on the roads to the east of the city. To prevent such disorders and to hinder the central and western parts of Hiayna from joining the Pretender the Sultan has sent the bulk of the troops now here into camp at Sboo Bridge, about 1½ miles east of the city.

In view of the circumstance that some of his leading officials are Sheraga men (fugitives from that tribe) it is possible the Pretender may leave the direct road to Fez, which crosses Sboo Bridge, and move through Sinhaja and Ain Mediouna to Sheraga and try to approach Fez through Ulad Juma, that is to say, from the north-north-east.

Judging from previous movements of the Pretender, his following is not likely to increase much, for the farther he goes from his own accustomed districts there is the more difficulty in continuously feeding any large number of men and animals, and so deserters are apt to outnumber recruits.

Although the Sultan and Court assert it will make no difference, this renewed activity of the Pretender will probably tend to prolong His Majesty's stay at Fez.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. M. MACLEOD.

[10499] No. 89.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey—(*Received March* 19.)

(No. 46.)
Sir, *Tangier, March* 10, 1909.

THE Sultan has appointed a Commission to examine all claims of foreign subjects against the Moorish Government. The Commission will be presided over by Sid Guebbas, the other members being Sid Dris el-Boukili, the last Vizier for Foreign Affairs under Sultan Abdul Aziz, and Sid Abderahman Bennis, one of the Moorish Delegates at the Algeciras Conference and for framing the various Regulations thereunder. Representatives of the State Bank will be associated with the Commission as technical advisers.

I have, &c.
(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

[10500] No. 90.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 19.)

(No. 47.)
Sir, *Tangier, March* 10, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to report that Sid Guebbas has addressed a letter to the dean of the Diplomatic Body informing him that the Sultan has appointed the Shereef Sid Mohammed-el-Amrani, President of the International Claims Commission at Casa Blanca, in succession to Moulai Lamin, and Hadj Abderahman-el-Helu and Sid-el-Arbi-ben-Quiran as Commissioners in the place of Sid Ghannam and Sid-el-Ghassal.

These officials are proceeding at once to Casa Blanca, and it may be expected that the International Commission may now shortly be able to resume its work.

It is unfortunate that, notwithstanding the strong representations in that sense made by me to Sid Guebbas, as reported in my despatch No. 8 of the 10th January, the former Moorish Commissioners have not been maintained in their posts, as some delay may be occasioned in the proceedings of the Commission by the Moorish Commissioners being new to the work and not fully acquainted with all that passed previous to the adjournment.

I have, &c.
(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

[10501] No. 91.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 19.)

(No. 48. Confidential.)

Sir, *Tangier, March* 14, 1909.

YOU will have read Mr. Consul Macleod's despatch No. 12 of the 4th instant, forwarded to you under flying seal, with regard to the latest movements of the Pretender and the attitude adopted by the Sultan.

There appears little doubt that the Imperial army is hopelessly inefficient. It is composed of an undisciplined rabble of men varying in age from 17 to 70. Only about 10 per cent. of their rifles can be counted upon to go off when intended to, and the term uniform can only be applied to their garments, in so far as they are all practically in rags. The absolute calm of the Sultan in the presence of these distressing conditions inclines me to the belief that he intends, when the Pretender gets near enough, to fall back upon the French and send them out with some of the field batteries now at Fez, which will make short work of the rebel horde.

I am informed confidentially that the Maghzen are convinced that Bu Hamara is being pushed by the French with the object of forcing the Sultan's hand, and hastening the conclusion of the negotiations. They maintain that they have proofs of this, though it appears to me unlikely. The game would be a risky one to play in this country, where no confidence appears to be respected; moreover, the position of the French is so strong that there would seem to be no necessity of having recourse to tricks of such a nature.

The idea, however, is an old one (see Mr. Rattigan's despatch No. 133, Confidential, of the 5th June of last year), and it was no doubt freely propagated among the Moors by the agency of the German Legation.

The reported evacuation of the Shawia by the French does not seem to have been particularly well received among Moorish circles, where the suspicion exists that it has only been consented to in return for a more important concession elsewhere.

What appears to me the most serious factor in the situation is the growing disaffection among the people of Fez, who are beginning to resent very bitterly the the wholesale extortions of the Sultan and his Viziers. I am assured by persons who have had considerable experience of the Shereefian Court that the rapacity of the present officials, from the highest to the lowest, surpasses anything that they have ever known.

All the reports that reach me combine to show that the Spaniards are in very bad odour at the Court. The Sultan complains bitterly of the recent expeditions they have made inland with fire and sword; the overbearing manner of the youthful Spanish Consul at Fez has, moreover, given great offence, and the Minister himself has added to his unpopularity by the rude attitude which he took up with regard to the arrangements of the house which was being prepared for him at Fez. All this, taken with the loss of position consequent upon the Franco-German Agreement, does not augur well for the success of M. Merry del Val's mission.

I have, &c.
(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

[10502] No. 92.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 19.)

(No. 49. Very Confidential.)

Sir, *Tangier, March* 14, 1909.

I AM informed very confidentially from Fez that a hitch of some sort has evidently taken place in the negotiations which are being conducted between the Sultan and the French Minister. My information would seem to be borne out by the fact that M. Regnault, who has up till now recommended my occupying the house which he will by the time of my arrival at Fez have vacated, now writes to say that the unforeseen may always happen in this country and that it would, perhaps, be wiser for me to arrange for some other house to be given to me, so as to avoid the risk, infinitesimal though it be, of arriving at Fez and finding the French Mission still in possession of the quarters destined for me. Moreover, in the course of conversation yesterday, the French Chargé d'Affaires told me that he did not see how M. Regnault could possibly leave as soon as he had originally intended. Various points he told me had been submitted by him quite recently to the French Government, and no decision had as yet been taken upon them by the Council of Ministers.

Several days would probably elapse before his instructions would be telegraphed to him, and they would then have to be sent on to Fez, a matter of at least a week in the present state of the roads. They would, moreover, no doubt give rise to fresh discussion, and his opinion was that the Mission would not be able to leave, at the earliest, before the end of March or beginning of April. I hear from what I consider a trustworthy source that the main lines of the new Morocco loan have been drawn up. The Maghzen are to receive 150,000,000 fr. (6,000,000*l.*) on the security of the 40 per cent. balance of the customs, the tobacco monopoly, the gate and other taxes at the ports, and all Government domains on the coast and in the interior. All previous loans, with the exception of the one of 62,000,000 fr. secured on the 60 per cent. of the customs, are to be paid off in order to redeem the mortgages on the Government domains. It is also probable that the Maghzen's share in the proceeds of the tax on town buildings (see your despatch No. 81 of the 29th May, 1907, and Sir G. Lowther's No. 127 of the 1st June) and the tax on land transfers (Article 65 of the Act of Algeciras) will be assigned as additional security for the loan.

I have not mentioned the information which I have received in regard to the loan to the French Chargé d'Affaires as he is inclined to be *boutonné*, and would, probably, tell me nothing; moreover, I hope in a short time to receive full details from M. Regnault when I meet him at Fez or on my way up.

I have, &c.
(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

P.S.—Since writing the above, information has reached me to the effect that the relations between the Maghzen and the French Mission are very much less cordial than they were. The officers of the French Mission told my informant that the attitude of the Sultan had undergone a change, that he was continually raising objections and showed far less keenness and energy than at the beginning. This change may be the work El Glawi or that of the Acting Grand Vizier, Ci Abbas-el-Fessi, who is anti-French, and who may have succeeded in persuading the Sultan that the activity of the Pretender and his own unpopularity are in reality to be ascribed to the French. I also hear that M. Regnault has very much modified the high opinion which he had formed of Mulai Hafid's intelligence and energy.

R. L.

[10503] No. 93.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 19.)

(No. 50. Confidential.)

Sir, *Tangier, March* 15, 1909.

HIS Majesty's Consul at Fez informs me confidentially that Manesmann's agent, whose departure for the capital was reported in my despatch No. 31 of the 18th ultimo, is pressing the Maghzen for a mining contract, and is offering as an induce-

ment to supply a large quantity of arms and ammunition, of which the Government is at present very much in need. He is also laying out considerable sums of money in bribes. Mr. MacLeod tells me that the French Minister and Mr. Harris, who to some extent represents the interests of the International Mining Syndicate at Fez, are both aware of what is going on. In this connection I would add that the French Chargé d'Affaires, in the course of conversation two days ago, told me that he had had a visit from the German Minister, who had said that he feared that there might be difficulties with the firm of Manesmann, as after all the money they had spent in Morocco, and the position of priority which they had to some extent acquired, they would hardly be satisfied with a share in the participation of the German group in the International Syndicate, which amounted in all to only 20 per cent.; other more powerful firms than they had come in, and their share would consequently only be a very small one. I told M. de Saint Aulaire that Manesmann's point of view was quite comprehensible, but that Dr. Rosen had assured Mr. Harris that all the firm could expect would be to be included in the German group. He replied that Dr. Rosen admitted that, but feared that there might be trouble. M. Porche should by this time have arrived at Fez, and I imagine that the general Mining Law for Morocco will shortly be communicated to the foreign Representatives previous to promulgation; this should do much to clear up the whole situation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

[11004] No. 94.

German-Spanish draft Protocol.—(Communicated privately by M. Cambon, March 19, 1909.)

A LA date du 9 février, 1909, le Gouvernement de la République française et le Gouvernement allemand ont signé une Déclaration en vue de faciliter l'exécution de l'Acte d'Algésiras et d'éviter désormais entre eux tout malentendu à ce sujet.

Bien que cet Arrangement ne dût affecter ni modifier en aucune manière les intérêts politiques particuliers que les Traités ont reconnus à l'Espagne au Maroc, en considération de ces intérêts les deux Gouvernements ont communiqué l'Arrangement au Gouvernement espagnol avant la signature et la publication.

En présence des assurances données par le Gouvernement français et le Gouvernement allemand concernant les intérêts politiques particuliers que les Traités ont reconnu à l'Espagne au Maroc, le Gouvernement espagnol a répondu qu'il ne pouvait qu'accueillir avec satisfaction un acte destiné à faire régner définitivement entre les intérêts des Puissances au Maroc une harmonie à laquelle est étroitement liée la prospérité de l'Empire chérifien.

[10926] No. 95.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 22.)

(No. 119.)
Sir,
Paris, March 20, 1909.

WITH reference to Mr. Lister's despatch No. 44 of the 7th instant, copy of which was inclosed in your despatch No. 123 of the 17th of the month, I have the honour to inform you that at the close of an interview which I had with the Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday I said to him that I had heard a report that there was to be a Moroccan loan. His Excellency replied that no doubt the Sultan would require money before very long, but that there was no question of a loan at present. His Majesty was anxious to be on the best of terms with the French Government, and was sending a special envoy to Paris to thank them for their attitude towards him. I suggested that his mission might include a request for money, and that the German Government might wish to participate in a loan. M. Pichon stated that any money that might be required by the Sultan would have to be raised through the Morocco State Bank, in which institution Germany had her share, but that she would not have any special position in regard to it. There was a French Consortium anxious to work with German financiers in this matter as in others, but at present there was no question of a loan.

A friend of mine in the financial world to whom I applied for information told me, after inquiry of a prominent French financier, that nothing was being done at present for the raising of a loan for Morocco, but that there was a talk of such a loan, and that German financial houses would no doubt take a share when one was issued.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

[11628] No. 96.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 27.)

(No. 52.)
Sir,
Tangier, March 18, 1909.

I AM informed by Cid Guebbas that the first sitting of the reconstituted Casa Blanca Claims Commission has been fixed by the new President for the 31st instant.

I have, &c.
(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

[11629] No. 97.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 27.)

(No. 53. Confidential.)
Sir,
Tangier, March 21, 1909.

AS I had the honour to report in my telegram No. 18 of the 18th instant, Raisuli arrived in Tangier on the night of the 15th instant and came to see me on the following morning. He appeared very much depressed, and it was not without difficulty that I elicited from him an account of the arrangements which he had made with the Sultan at Fez. He said that he had had no desire to obtain the governorship of the tribes which had been allotted to him, that he had wished to live quietly as a private person, but that the Sultan had sent for him, had told him that the British Government insisted upon the payment of the 20,000*l.* advanced for the ransom of Kaïd Maclean, and that at length he had been obliged to affix his seal to a document handing over to His Shereefian Majesty the 15,000*l.* deposited on his account at the State Bank. He had in return received the governorship of the following thirteen tribes: Anjera, Beni M'sowar, Gibel Habib, Wad Ras, Beni Ider, Beni Leet, Sumata, Khamas, Beni Issef, Beni Aros, Amar, Gharbia, and Bedawa. He did not allude to the question of his protection until I raised it, when he somewhat unwillingly admitted that he had signed that away as well. He said that he regretted bitterly what he had done, that his seal had been obtained from him under pressure; he had, he said, "been shamed into agreeing."

It is all very well for Raisuli to say that he did not desire the governorship, but there is no doubt that he went to Fez with the intention of obtaining something of the sort (see Mr. White's despatch No. 263 of the 23rd October, 1908). No doubt he never thought that the price he would have to pay for it would be the loss of British protection as well as the 15,000*l.*

I said that, of course, what he told me was deeply interesting, but that, as far as I was concerned, it remained a private arrangement between him and the Sultan, and so far I had received no official notification from the Maghzen of any sort or kind. I asked him whether he had brought any official papers with him, but he said no. It was then agreed that he had better go and see Guebbas.

On the following day I called myself upon Guebbas. He had in the meantime seen Raisuli, and he told me in the strictest confidence that the two papers sealed by the latter had been sent down to him secretly, and that he would communicate them to me that afternoon. He had also received instructions to hand over to me the 15,000*l.* I pointed out that of that 15,000*l.* a certain sum had been invested by Raisuli in house property, and I made it quite clear that the total sum must be paid to me in cash. Guebbas agreed to this, and said he would see Raisuli about it. The properties, he considered, were now worth more than had been paid for them. Guebbas said he had received no instructions with regard to the payment of the remaining balance of 5,000*l.*, though the Sultan had taken the responsibility for it. It would no doubt be paid over as soon as I arrived in Fez. I said that I could not help regretting that the whole sum should not be paid up at once; that the good

impression produced upon my Government would be modified by this delay. Guebbas, however, begged me most urgently to accept the payment of the 15,000*l.* on account, and I have agreed to do so.

In the afternoon, at Guebbas' request, Mr. Irwin fetched the two documents sealed by Raisuli, of which I inclose translations. They appear to me to be quite in order and they certainly are most explicit.

Raisuli saw Guebbas again two days' ago with regard to the question of the house property, but said that he had absolutely no money available, and that the Maghzen must take over the title-deeds and procure the money themselves upon them. I am accordingly sending Guebbas copies of the deeds, and he will transmit them at once to Fez. He seems to anticipate that there will be no difficulty in getting the matter arranged, but I doubt its being settled before I arrive at the Court.

Raisuli came to see me yesterday morning to say good-bye. He once more complained bitterly of the way in which he had been driven to agree to these arrangements, and said that he had never believed that they would be considered binding! In any case, he said he should always consider himself as being under British protection and appeal to me, as the Representative of His Majesty's Government, to support him with the Sultan. I pointed out to him that this was quite impossible, and that it was he himself who had rendered it so. Should any discussion with the Maghzen arise, how could I possibly maintain the view that he was entitled to British protection in face of a document bearing his seal which he had delivered to the Sultan declaring that of his own free will he irrevocably renounced British protection for himself and for his people for ever? After a certain amount of argument he was obliged to admit the justice of what I said. He then asked me whether in the event of his behaving well, as he swore that he intended to do, he could count upon the support of His Majesty's Government. I said that the one wish of my Government was to see justice done, and that I felt sure that if in any quarrel with the Maghzen they were convinced that justice was on his side, they would do what they could to induce the Maghzen to recognize the fact that their attitude towards him depended in fact solely upon himself. He repeated that he was determined to behave well in the future, but that he had no confidence in the Maghzen; that if there was anything they wanted to get out of him they would care very little whether he had behaved well or badly. He is evidently in very bad spirits and very nervous as to what the future may have in store for him.

We parted the best of friends, and he has invited me to stay with him at Arzila. He also expressed the hope that he should see me on my way to Fez, when I pass through some of the districts under his jurisdiction. I must say that in the light of past events I responded somewhat half-heartedly to his offers of hospitality.

I have, &c.

(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

Inclosure in No. 97.

Documents communicated by Raisuli to Mr. Lister.

(1.)

Praise to God.

(Translation.)

HE who appends his Makhzen Seal after the date declares that he renounces British protection as regards himself, his brethren, and those who are related to him and dependent upon him and who are mentioned with him in the terms arranged. He withdraws from it so that it will not be permissible for him to revert to it. He divests himself of it fully, completely, and irrevocably, and will never again claim it in any way whatever. This he does voluntarily and willingly, not by compulsion or constraint. He desires thereby to remain a subject of our Master and Lord, victorious in Allah, be the future long or short, and in order to enter the official service, of our Lord, Allah exalt him. He likewise undertakes to perform Makhzen service under the usages governing it, faithfully and zealously, with the utmost loyalty and good faith in all words and deeds in the manner of faithful and trusty Kaïds. He will be subject to the rules which govern them in everything, and he will use his endeavours towards maintaining tranquillity and the general weal, and towards (everything) which

will conduce to the fullest prosperity of himself, his brethren, and his jurisdiction; he will not exceed the views of His Shereefian Majesty, and will only act in accordance with his wishes; he will not countenance anything of a dangerous nature, nor anything which could bring the smallest harm to His Majesty or his subjects. A complete declaration by which he frees himself from the said protection, and he hereby engages to undertake the duties of (Makhzen) service under the established conditions.

Made the 3rd Safar, 1327, the 24th February, 1909.

(Seal of Hamed ben Mohammed-el-Raisuli.)

(L.S.)

(2.)

Praise to God.

(Translation.)

HE who appends his Makhzen Seal after the date declares that he renounces in favour of His Majesty, exalted by Allah, the 15,000*l.* deposited through the British Government at the bank in his name and on his account against the settlement of the affair of Kaïd Maclean, the English instructor, and of his claim against the late Government which was included with it. He gives to His Shereefian Majesty full power to deal with the said sum in whatever way he may see fit and decide, and he surrenders it in the fullest sense, without question or dispute, of any nature whatsoever concerning it, now or henceforth, by the power of Allah. He acknowledges that he has received for his own account 5,000*l.*, being the completion of the 20,000*l.*, in which sum the said two matters were settled through the said (British) Government and the late Makhzen under the conditions agreed upon between them. A complete renunciation and surrender. He recognizes their purport and the signification of their words.

Peace, the 3rd Safar, 1327, the 24th February, 1909.

(Seal of Hamed ben Mohammed-el-Raisuli.)

(L.S.)

[11631] No. 98.

List of Heads of Foreign Missions at Tangier, 1909.

[Reprinted from "List of Heads of Foreign Missions at Tangier, 1908," with corrections contained in Mr. Lister's despatch No. 55 of March 22, 1909.]

COUNT KOZIEBRODZKI is the *Austro-Hungarian* Minister. I have been privileged with the previous acquaintance of this somewhat irascible young diplomatist, who, I believe, has succeeded in making himself generally disliked in all his posts. Of exceedingly violent temper, he does not hesitate to lay hands upon native servants and others who provoke him, and it remains a wonder to us all that he has not yet met with retaliatory measures.

Increasing age and transfer to a post where he might have more interests to watch might possibly produce a sobering influence on him, but the severe reprimand he received at the recent Conference at the hands of Marquis Visconti Venosta did not have the anticipated effect. He is distinctly unpopular, is married to an extremely quiet German lady of good family, but with insufficient strength of character to check the violent outburst to which he is prone.

Count de Buisseret, the *Belgian* Minister, I have known in several posts during his career. Keenly intelligent and quick-witted, his usefulness is somewhat marred by an extremely nervous temperament, which at times provokes him to great obstinacy in the meetings of the Diplomatic Body, of the Conseil Sanitaire, and of the Light-house Commission. He takes much interest in promoting Belgian trade here, and his labours have been rewarded by seeing a recent advance in that direction. He is married to an American lady from Washington.

He has been on a mission to Fez, and his success was limited, it is said, to

obtaining from the Sultan the use of a piece of ground for playing polo here. He is also convinced that his recent services at Algeciras entitle him to promotion.

M. Regnault, the new *French* Minister, entered the service in 1883, and has been mostly employed in Tunis and latterly in Switzerland; but in 1904 he represented the French bondholders in this country, and accompanied M. Saint-René Taillandier on the mission to Fez.

A simple *bourgeois*, he is somewhat superior to the modern type of French diplomatist. Of untiring energy and activity, he brings to bear on the great variety of subjects now dealt with here a technical knowledge seldom at the command of a diplomat *de carrière;* and during the very numerous meetings held here for the construction of the "Règlements," the outcome of the Act of Algeciras, he displayed a considerable power of clearly exposing his views with fairness and moderation. Of admirable temper and free from all excitability, he generally produced a better impression on the meetings than his more nervous, though more learned, German colleague.

M. Regnault has some reputation as a financier, and was employed as an expert at Algeciras, eventually signing the Act as one of the Delegates. On his recent visit to the Court he seems to have created as good an impression as was possible on the Sultan. Although entirely lacking the suave manners of a diplomatist of the Courts of Europe, he yet generally has succeeded in acquiring a certain measure of popularity and reputation for straightforwardness amongst his colleagues with the exception of the German Minister, with whom his relations are far from cordial. Personally I have found him a colleague with whom it is easy to work.

M. Regnault is under 50 years of age, and it is probable that he will be called to higher functions in the service of his country. He is married, and has a large family of daughters.

Dr. Rosen, the *German* Minister, is the true type of intelligent and learned German *bourgeois*, his good manners being rather more forced than natural. The son of George Rosen, one of the greatest German Orientalists, who was for many years Consul-General at Jerusalem, he spent his boyhood in Palestine, where he learnt Arabic as his mother-tongue.

In 1885–86 he accompanied the present Lord Dufferin as tutor to India, and I believe that the high opinion that the late Lord Dufferin formed of his talents induced him to recommend Dr. Rosen to the notice of Bismarck.

Dr. Rosen's great knowledge of the Persian language and a journey he made through Persia from India led to his employment as first dragoman at the German Legation in Tehran, where he remained for some years, and took charge of the Legation during the Minister's absence.

For the last few years he has been Director of the Oriental section of the German Foreign Office, and also conducted a recent mission to Abyssinia. Last summer he was sent to Paris to negotiate the preliminaries of the Conference at Algeciras. He has a thorough knowledge of English and French, and always expresses himself with great admiration for English institutions and for our rule in India. He always endeavours to give the impression that his attitude is an extremely moderate and conciliatory one, but he will nevertheless, I am convinced, prove a dangerous opponent to any energetic policy on the part of the French here. His manner is one that is likely to appeal to the Sultan and the Moors. He does not conceal his disapproval of the action of his predecessor, Count Tattenbach. My relations with him are very pleasant. He is married to a Mme. Roche, half-English and half-French, but educated in England. He has taken rather a dislike to his post, perhaps feeling that the rôle he will be called upon to fill is not so active a one as he anticipated.

Dr. Nerazzini has replaced M. Malmusi at the *Italian* Legation. Dr. Nerazzini was previously Consul-General at Shanghae. He began life as a doctor in the navy, and accompanied the Duke of the Abruzzi on some of his travels. He also received some credit from his Government for effecting successfully the negotiations for the exchange of the prisoners after the Abyssinian war. His conversation is mainly centred on narrating his political triumphs in Abyssinia, and his energies here seem to have been directed to discovering facts to the discredit of his predecessor, more especially in connection with a letter handed to M. Malmusi by the Sultan at Fez containing certain reserves in His Majesty's acceptance of the Algeciras Act, and which documents M. Malmusi suppressed for some time. It is in connection with this incident that M. Malmusi is said to now have been placed *en disponibilité*.

Dr. Nerazzini lives in an extremely modest, not to say slovenly, style, and makes no attempt at extending hospitality of any kind either to his colleagues or to the

Italian colony. His principal desire appears to be directed to obtaining a speedy transfer; but in the meantime his policy is certainly not in support of French interests, in spite of his protestations to the contrary to the French Legation.

The *Netherland* Minister is the Chevalier de Rappard. Holland had for many years been represented here by Germany, and it has never very clearly appeared why that country was not satisfied to allow that condition of affairs to continue. The interests of Holland in Morocco are practically nil. The only persons with any claim to Dutch nationality are a family of some thirty persons of Jewish persuasion, who have only been brought into daylight by the attentions shown to them by the new Minister.

M. de Rappard is a man of some 42 years, of considerable energy, a good linguist, and with a desire to be extremely impartial; but his sympathy for Germany, where he has spent some years of his previous career, is apt at times to predominate. He followed with great care and attention the discussions of the Diplomatic Corps for the construction of the "Règlements" arising out of the Act of Algeciras last winter, and was often most useful in finding a formula to satisfy all parties.

In order to justify to some extent his appointment, he is anxious to push Dutch trade, and is a frequent visitor at the local grocers' establishments endeavouring to introdue curaçao and other Dutch delicacies into the local markets.

Assisted by a wealthy but somewhat unpolished wife, he dispenses considerable hospitality here. He has no business with Moorish officials and is popular with them.

Count Martens Ferrão, the *Portuguese* Minister, both to appearance and to the position he occupies, somewhat resembles his colleague in London, M. de Soveral. Having no axe to grind, and practically no interests to safeguard, he rarely finds himself in disagreement with his colleagues, with all of whom he is on the best of terms. Married to an Italian lady with private means, he entertains to a considerable extent. He has never been to Fez, and has practically nothing to do with the Moorish authorities. Having lately represented his Government at Algeciras as Second Delegate, he considers himself entitled to a higher post, and has now proceeded to Lisbon, with a view to moving the powers that be in that direction.

M. Botkine has recently succeeded M. de Bacharacht (now Minister in Switzerland) as *Russian* Minister here, the post having for over a year been filled by M. Sabline as Chargé d'Affaires.

M. Botkine is younger than most Ministers in the Russian service, and has quite recently been promoted to the rank of Minister Plenipotentiary. He has previously been employed in Washington, Lisbon, Sophia, Brussels, and recently in London, and is married to a fashionable American lady. He has not until now developed any interest in the situation in Morocco, and declares that his Government is equally indifferent as regards the affairs of this country. But there are indications that his sympathies are more strongly French than those of his predecessor, and though not taking his duties very seriously, his support will evidently be unflinchingly thrown into the balance to favour the policy of France in Morocco.

In February 1908 M. de Llaberia was succeeded by M. Merry del Val as *Spanish* Minister. The new Minister is a brother of the Cardinal, and the clerical spirit is strong within him. The spirit combined with considerable pride of birth and contempt for the *roturier* Government of the French Republic increases the jealousy and mistrust of France which he shares with all Spaniards. He is a man of considerable energy and a hard worker, but he is narrow-minded and obstinate, and he lacks judgment. His fear that the French may steal a march upon him in Tangier—which he already seems to consider as the centre of the Spanish sphere—amounts to an obsession, and leads him constantly to advance Spanish claims which are quite indefensible. This is especially the case in municipal matters, in which he never fails to introduce the "nationality" element. He has so far succeeded in irritating the French and the Moors alike, and there seems no doubt that he has placed himself very much in the hands of the German Minister. In view, however, of the improvement which took place at the end of the year between the French and German Legations this will not have served any useful purpose, and has only excited the mistrust of the French. I understand that he represents the opinions of the Bureau of the Spanish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, rather than those of M. Maura or M. Allendesalazar. He was selected to teach King Alfonso English, and was for some time employed in the Private Secretaries' Department, and I gathered from the conversation which I had with His Majesty last November that he entertains a high opinion of him.

M. Merry del Val is married to a pretty and rather empty-headed little Spanish

lady, who is really miserable at Tangier, though she tries to make the best of it. She is all the time longing for the delights of the small coterie in which she lives at Madrid, and sighs for the advantages of coiffures and modistes, from which she is quite cut off here.

Mr. Gummeré, the *United States'* Representative, was here for some years as Consul-General, and was last year raised to the rank of Envoy. Possessing only a very superficial knowledge of the French language and no acquaintance with any other, he does not take much interest in the deliberations of the Diplomatic Corps. His attention is occupied with questions of protection, and, unlike some of his predecessors, has avoided getting mixed up in doubtful transactions in this connection. He is a man of no special ability, and is unmarried.

[11934] No. 99.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 29.)

(No. 55.) *Madrid, March* 24, 1909.

Sir,

I REFERRED in my despatch No. 27, Confidential, of the 11th ultimo, to the offers said to have been made by Messrs. Mannesmann, a German firm, to the Spanish Syndicate which has been formed to work the Beni-bu-fruor mines behind Melilla. Some of the members of the Syndicate are said to have received these offers favourably, but I have not yet heard that a share in these mines has been actually made over to Messrs. Mannesmann, whose claim to hold a valid Concession from the Sultan may well be questioned.

In this connection a short article appearing in yesterday's "Época" may be worthy of notice as an indication of the view of the question held by the Spanish Government. The article throws discredit on the reported transfer of some of the shares of the Syndicate to foreign capitalists, and it expresses the belief that, if the Syndicate desired to part with any shares there would not be wanting Spanish purchasers to take them over, and so to preserve the Spanish character of the undertaking.

I have, &c.
(Signed) MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[12652] No. 100.

Consul MacLeod to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received April* 3.)

(No. 12.) *Fez, March* 4, 1909.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that the Pretender Buhamara has moved from Abor to Sifsafa, a point between the Rivers Libben and Amhar, in Hiayna, near their confluence and about 8 miles north-west of Abor.

When at Abor he appointed Kaïds over Eastern and East-Central Hiayna. His following is not increasing, and is composed only of contingents from South Mtalsa, South Guezzenaya, South Sinhaja, Huwara, North Ghiata, Dsul, Branés, and East Hiayna.

None of the Riff tribes to the north and north-east, nor the mountain people to the north-west, nor those to the south and south-west of him appear to have joined him.

The direction he has now taken confirms the expectation that his intention is to move next to Sheraga, but his plans will probably be affected by the result of a meeting of the tribes near Sifsafa, which he has convoked for Sunday, the 7th instant.

The Acting Vizier for Foreign Affairs told me this morning that the Sultan is still resolute not to attempt to attack him, nor to counter-agitate amongst the tribes, but to let him come as near Fez as he chooses, as doing so will afford the surest means of putting an end to him, or at any rate discrediting him.

On the afternoon of the 2nd instant the Shereefian camp in Ait Yusi was attacked by the Aits Helli sept of that tribe. Artillery was used by the French non-commissioned officers, and the attack was repulsed, the Aits Helli having three or four men killed. During the night of 2nd to 3rd instant the Aits Helli attempted to renew the attack, but were repelled. Their loss on this occasion is not known, but the troops had some two or three men killed.

The situation there appears to be that this force has gone imprudently far into

that district, that is, to about 7 miles south of Sefroo, for its work of exacting contributions could have been done with much more safety and probably with little less efficiency much closer to the town of Sefroo, into which it could have withdrawn in case of need.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. M. MACLEOD.

[12653] No. 101.

Consul MacLeod to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received April* 3.)

(No. 13.) *Fez, March* 6, 1909.

Sir,

DURING the night of the 4th to 5th instant, the Shereefian camp in Ait Yusi was again attacked by that tribe. The attack was not pressed home, but, nevertheless, some nine or ten of the soldiers were killed by each other in the panic which the affair caused.

Commandant Mangin, head of the French Military Mission, when relating this affair to me, remarked that, according to the latest particulars he had from the French non-commissioned officers with that force, it was now reduced by about a-half, some 800 men having deserted within the last three or four weeks.

In regard to this expedition, the Sultan has acted, and is still inclined to act, much in the fashion his predecessor was wont to follow. He impulsively sent a body of the rawest troops imaginable against these hill people. The troops easily enough burned some villages on the foothills, and took some contributions and plunder in flocks and money, with which, being the utmost such troops could do, the Makhzen should have been content, and should have then recalled them.

Instead of this they have been pushed farther into the hills, suffer these repeated attacks, and desert in such large numbers.

If not withdrawn soon this force—from which a few hundreds of fairly good soldiers might have been selected, trained, and made really serviceable—seems likely to disappear. The (to officials) profitable businesses of absorbing the deserters' pay and collecting recruits to replace them will then be resumed; indeed, the former practice during the last few weeks has, by all accounts, become as rife as ever.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. M. MACLEOD.

[12654] No. 102.

Consul MacLeod to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received April* 3.)

(No. 15.) *Fez, March* 12, 1909.

Sir,

IN my despatch No. 13 of the 6th instant I described the serious position of the Sultan's expedition in Ait Yusi.

With the support of the French Minister, Commandant Mangin made certain recommendations, which have been followed with such good results that the expedition has been successful to a surprising extent during the last few days.

The recommendations were:—

1. That the expedition should be reinforced by Kaïd Bonowda's troops, some 500, and by tribal contingents of Ulad Jaima and Sheraga, and be commanded by Kaïd Bonowda.

2. That Kaïd Bonowda carry out the operations in the manner and at the time which Commandant Mangin should advise.

3. That Commandant Mangin and the French non-commissioned officers superintend the paying and feeding of the troops.

In pursuance of the plan adopted and followed, reconnaissances of the enemy's positions were carefully made.

Thereafter the expedition advanced with the artillery under the French non-commissioned officers in the front and the infantry in the centre.

On the first day the Ait Yusi were shelled out of their position, round which they had dug shallow trenches, and took refuge in a "kasbah" some 2 miles further on; the expedition thereupon occupying the Ait Yusi's vacated position.

Next day the "kasbah" was attacked in the same manner and was captured and occupied by the expedition. The losses of the Ait Yusi are not known, but the troops had some twenty men killed and fifty to sixty wounded. During the two days 113 artillery rounds were fired.

On the third day the Ait Yusi sued for peace and terms were arranged, by which their leader and themselves submitted to the Sultan, and agreed to furnish contributions in animals and grain and to give a levy of about 400 recruits for the Sultan's infantry.

No Berber tribe, in living memory, has furnished levies of recruits to any Sultan, so, if this condition be fulfilled, His Majesty will have scored a most notable success and one which can hardly fail to make a strong impression on these northern tribes generally, even although these levies be only from the near foothills, and not from the farther and most mountainous tracts of Ait Yusi.

I took an opportunity to congratulate the Sultan heartily on such an unheard-of success as getting infantry recruits from the Ait Yusi Berbers, to which he answered briefly that this was a trifle, and that he would make even the Zemmour Berbers give him recruits!

The Sultan is manifestly sensible of the vital necessity of having a strong army and of the value of modern weapons, particularly artillery. But of the even greater importance of incorrupt administration, of thorough and assiduous training, and of care for the comfort of his troops, he seems as yet to have little realization.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. M. MACLEOD.

[12655] No. 103.

Consul MacLeod to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received April* 3.)

(No. 16.)
Sir, *Fez, March* 16, 1909.

IN regard to the French Minister's negotiations, the secrecy which was agreed upon has, so far, been surprisingly well kept, and the negotiations continue to excite much less curiosity here than might have been expected.

Many reports in regard to them are, of course, in circulation, but even the most plausible appear to be little more than conjectures by persons whose experience enables them to guess with some likelihood of being correct in at least some of their surmises.

So far the same has been the case with the Spanish Minister's business also.

The Minister and the Sultan himself and three of his officials, namely, Al Mukhri, Abbas-al-Fessi, and Abdullah-al-Fessi, alone really know what is proceeding, and these three latter are too afraid of their positions to speak to anyone without the Sultan's permission. Inquiry of any of them could not fail to be mentioned to the Sultan, and in all probability by the latter to raise jealousy—to the Ministers concerned.

In regard to the French negotiations, it seems certain, however, that they have not latterly been proceeding with the smoothness which obtained at first, that a Moorish Mission is to be sent to Paris within a few weeks to make certain demands, notably for the evacuation of Casa Blanca and Oujdah as well as Shawia, and that the conclusion of the negotiations will be made at Rabat after that Mission's return. The Minister has now informed the Makhzen that he wishes to leave Fez on the 22nd instant.

Up till now, only some 200 of the promised infantry recruits from Ait Yusi have come in, and none of the other contributions demanded by the Sultan's force there. In regard to the Pretender, there is nothing new to report, except that the Sultan (according to some outside information I have received) is in correspondence with at least one influential Shereef, Hadj Hamo Idri, of Marnisa. The tribes thereabouts are practically independent and never pay taxes. They gave a sort of nominal adhesion to the Pretender, Buhamara, but have lately abandoned him and have given nominal recognition to Mulai Hafid, which possibly the latter may be trying to develop into active hostility to Buhamara.

Meantime, the Sultan's preparations towards leaving for Rabat go on actively, and the harems of His Majesty and of the Grand Vizier Glawi are now on the point of departure, and the Sultan says he himself will leave as soon as possible after the 3rd April, *i.e.*, the "Mulud" festival. The troops now in Ait Yusi will, presumably, be brought back to Fez before then, and the Sultan should then have some 5,000 to 6,000 infantry and artillery ready to accompany him, and perhaps 2,000 men of tribal contingents—the latter mostly mounted.

The issue for the Sultan then to consider will be serious, namely, whether to move to the south and leave the districts east and north-east of Fez open to incursions from the Pretender and Fez itself in a discontented state by reason of his incessant exactions and non-payment of the Makhzen's local debts, and his general unpopularity and the badness of trade, or to attempt a campaign against the Pretender, such as, if entirely successful, would definitely establish his authority in all Northern Morocco; and even if but partially successful, would at least pacify the immediate eastern and north-eastern neighbourhood of Fez.

From the south provinces the Sultan is still getting neither men nor money, and all news here from Marrakesh is to the effect that that district has become disaffected in consequence of the exactions of the Grand Vizier Glawi and his brothers. In addition to draw him southwards, there is the prestige he would gain by himself taking over the districts in Showia, which, it is presumed, the French are about to evacuate.

During the past week the Sultan has called in from the Fez people the modern rifles distributed to leading inhabitants during the recent troubles. A special levy of money is being made for the repairing of the town walls and forts; and a night patrol of twenty local inhabitants in each of the eighteen quarters of the city has been established. These men have been supplied with native (muzzle-loading) muskets and are to get each 1 peseta hassani per night (6½*d.*). This arrangement is popular, and the pay will be sufficient if honestly and punctually issued.

A quaint proceeding of the patrol is, that they all fire a round of blank powder at 11 o'clock by way of reminding the public of their presence.

As long as the Sultan remains in the neighbourhood there is no apprehension felt for public order hereabouts.

Food is cheap, and the crop prospects so good as to make this cheapness likely to continue so long as the neighbourhood is peaceful. On the other hand, the present régime is highly unpopular, especially the Sultan himself; trade is bad, and there is much want of employment, and the Sultan does not contemplate leaving a force here, but intends to hold the citizens themselves responsible for its safety.

The questions of public order and the safety of Europeans here after the Sultan's departure will, therefore, have to be carefully kept in view.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. M. MACLEOD.

[12656] No. 104.

Consul MacLeod to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received April* 3.)

(No. 17.)
Sir, *Fez, March* 19, 1909.

YESTERDAY morning Sidi Mohammed Kittany, the well-known "Alem" and agitator, accompanied by all his family and household, suddenly left Fez, taking with him all their effects and leaving their houses entirely empty.

The departure was arranged beforehand with entire secrecy, the Shereef's effects having, for the most part, been taken away by degrees by tribesmen who came ostensibly merely to pay him their respects and give him presents.

His flight has, naturally, caused some sensation in the city, and has disquieted the Sultan and Makhzen considerably, as they have no idea what his intentions are.

It is matter of common knowledge that he has been much disgusted with the whole course of events since Mulai Abd-el-Aziz was deposed at Fez, on which occasion he, in most people's opinion, had hoped to have been proclaimed Sultan. In the event, however, he supported Mulai Hafid, joined him between Mequinez and the River Oum Rebea, and, apparently with acceptance, urged Mulai Hafid to resist the French to the uttermost.

After reaching Mequinez, however, Mulai Hafid began to ignore him, and these last nine months, beyond giving him and his brother Abd-el-Hai the use of Makhzen houses as residences, has neglected the Kittany family entirely.

He left Fez by the North Gate (Bab-al-Gisa), rode round to the west of the city, and was joined by some parts of Berber horsemen.

What direction exactly he has taken is not yet known, but in the meantime the Sultan has sent out horsemen with letters remonstrating against his departure and inviting him to return.

The tribes amongst whom chiefly he has influence are Berbers within the triangle

Fez-Rabat-Marakesh, namely, Zimmur, Zair, Beni Mguild, Zayan, Beni Mtir, and Girwan.

The almost incessant rains of the last few weeks should be of service to Kittany, as the roads at present are almost deserted, and so his movements will both be little observed and difficult to follow.

This flight of Kittany, unless satisfactorily explained, can scarcely fail to prove another obstacle in the way of the Sultan's leaving Fez shortly.

In the latter connection I have to report that the departure of the Sultan's women-kind for Rabat was, two days ago—just as they were about to ride out—put off till after the 3rd April, *i.e.*, till after the ensuing Moslem festival.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. M. MacLEOD.

[12657] No. 105.

Consul MacLeod to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 3.)

(No. 18.)
Fez, March 23, 1909.

Sir,

The Shereef Sidi Mohammed Kittany, whose flight from Fez I reported in my despatch No. 17 of the 19th instant, reached El Gour, Beni Mtir, about 30 miles west-south-west of Fez on the evening of the 18th instant.

On the 19th and 20th he began his propaganda. As to its nature the reports are still conflicting, some being to the effect that he invited the tribes thereabouts to join him in a Holy War and dethrone the Sultan, others that he merely appealed for refuge against an alleged intention of the Sultan to imprison him.

Meantime the Sultan severely reprimanded the Governor and Deputy-Governor of Fez, and imprisoned the Headmen ("Mukudmin") of the quarters where the Kittany families lived for their want of vigilance. Orders were sent to the Kaïds of Beni Mtir to apprehend Kittany and his party, but to do them no injury. The Kaïds were warned, moreover, that each of them would be held responsible for these orders being carried out and that if Kittany escaped, the Sultan would burn every village in Beni Mtir, that a mehalla of some 2,500 soldiers was being sent thither from Fez, and that the mehalla, now in Ait Yusi was ready to attack Beni Mtir on the south.

On the 20th, the Kittany "Zaouia" (building for the assembly of members of a religious confraternity) at Fez was shut up, and orders were drawn up for suppression of them throughout the rest of the country. The latter, however, I understand, have not actually been forwarded yet.

Under the superintendence of Commandant Mangin, the mehalla preparations were pushed on with the greatest energy, the Sultan himself inspecting them even in the minutest details, while the future arrangements were planned by Commandant Mangin, two of whose sous-officiers were to accompany the mehalla to work the guns.

Some sixty-five mounted tribesmen of Beni Mtir, who had been assisting the mehalla in Ait Yusi and were believed to be much impressed with the French Artillery practice there, were also sent into Beni Mtir.

These measures proved successful beyond the anticipation of anyone here, European or native, accustomed as we all have been to the almost invariable failure of the Makhzen of late years. At noon yesterday replies came from the Beni Mtir Kaïds to the effect that they had arrested the Kittany party, and requesting the Makhzen to send out transport animals and an escort for the prisoners to Fez. It was explained that the Kittanys had used animals lent by various tribesmen beyond Beni Mtir, and that the latter had fled with their animals when they saw the course affairs were taking. The required animals and escort were at once sent out, and the Kittany party are expected to reach Fez again to-night or to-morrow.

So tenacious, as a rule, are those Berbers of the respect due to their "Mzrag"—a safe conduct once granted—especially to a noted Shereef like Kittany, that it is possible they may try to make terms of submission for him, or perchance, even yet, refuse to surrender him.

Meanwhile, however, the prospect is all the other way, and the Sultan appears on the eve, by this prompt extinction of what might have proved a most formidable

insurrection, of a still more striking success than he achieved over Mulai Mohammed and Raisuli.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. M. MacLEOD.

P.S.—The time Kittany chose, namely within three weeks of the "Mulud" festival, when bands of Aissawa and other fanatical sects are passing from various districts on their annual pilgrimage to their saints' tombs at Mequinez, was peculiarly opportune for the raising of such an agitation.

J. M. M.

[12611] No. 106.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 3.)

(No. 58. Confidential.)
Tangier, March 26, 1909.

Sir,

WITH reference to your telegram No. 22, I have the honour to report that I alluded to the matter of the International Mining Syndicate for Morocco the other day in the course of conversation with the German Minister. Dr. Rosen repeated to me very much what he had said to the French Chargé d'Affaires (see my despatch No. 50, Confidential, of the 15th instant). He declared categorically that the International Syndicate had the official support of the German Government, and that that support had been given mainly by his advice; at the same time he felt that Messrs. Mannesmann, who had spent much time and money in trying to obtain a Mining Concession in Morocco, were perfectly justified in doing all in their power to make their position as strong as possible. In their efforts to do so, however, they must depend solely on their own private resources, and he had clearly told them that they could not expect any sort of official support from him. He had, in fact, asked them not to let him know what they were doing, as it would only complicate his position. He was, he said, very glad of this opportunity of discussing the matter with me, as it might prevent the possibility of misconstruction He believed that Messrs. Mannesmann were employing a very inferior interpreter at Fez, and that from time to time the Maghzen had asked Dr. Vassel to come, either during or after their interviews, to explain points that had remained obscure. He hoped that I would realize that this did not in any way mean that he was helping Mannesmann. In this connection I would state that His Majesty's Consul at Fez had reported to me a most confidential conversation which he had recently with Dr. Vassel on the subject. The latter had told him that he was in a dilemma in this matter. He had previously, in pursuance of instructions from his Legation, energetically supported Messrs. Mannesmann, but now the German Government had transferred their support to the Syndicate, and in the meantime the Franco-German Agreement had been signed. He had consequently ceased to speak for Messrs. Mannesmann, but they were influential people, and he feared that they might attack him in the press. Dr. Vassel added that his present instructions from Tangier were so ambiguous as to make him think that Dr. Rosen was in a similar dilemma. Mr. Macleod remarked that Messrs. Mannesmann were reported to have expended large sums of money in procuring the assistance of the Ministers of Abd-el-Aziz and Mulai Hafid alike, but this Dr. Vassel denied. They had, he admitted, "lent" various sums to Abd-el-Aziz, and in the month of October last had advanced a sum of some 60,000 dollars to Mulai Hafid at a moment when he was quite without funds to pay his troops, but this was all.

Mr. Macleod also informs me that Mr. Henry Macpherson, formerly British Vice-Consul at Cadiz, has arrived at Fez on behalf of the Compañías Espanolas de Minas del Rif, and called upon him the other day.

I had heard that he was coming from His Majesty's Consul at Seville, and I believe that he was here at the same time as the Duke of Tovar, the head of the Romanones family, who are the leading men in the Spanish Company. Mr. Macpherson told Mr. Macleod that his Company was owned by the leading mineral capitalists of Spain, with a capital of 240,000*l.*, wholly Spanish, but not yet all called up; that they employed 2,000 men and had a railway 29 kilom. long from Melilla to Nador, where a station had been erected. The Company had a Concession from the Pretender to take minerals within the limits of the district of the Guelaya tribe, except one hill in the

east-south-east, which Bu Hamara had conceded to a French Company. The rent paid by the Spanish Company was 1,000*l.* a-month, which had been paid regularly until lately, when the Pretender, in consequence of the tribes having risen against him, left the district.

The French Company, Mr. Macpherson said, had never paid their rent, and were in disfavour with Bu Hamara. The Spanish Company had applied to the ex-Sultan Abd-el-Aziz for permission to take minerals in Guelaya and the Riff, but His Majesty had said that he had no effective authority in that district, and that he had consequently made terms with the Pretender. The Company now wished to come to terms with the new Sultan.

In speaking of Messrs. Mannesmann, Mr. Macpherson said that they affirmed that they had a Concession from the ex-Sultan to take minerals from the whole of Morocco, including Guelaya, but the Spanish Company disputed its validity. The latter, he said, were prepared to come into the International Mining Syndicate, provided that proper terms could be arranged.

As I stated in my telegram No. 19 of the 18th instant, Mr. Harris informed me that he had heard that secret instructions had been sent to the Spanish Minister to support Messrs. Mannesmann, who had recently taken the Duke of Tovar into partnership, and I have since received a letter from him, in which he describes a somewhat stormy interview which took place between him and M. Merry del Val on the subject. The latter confessed to being charged to support the Mannesmann-Tovar group, but finally gave Mr. Harris an undertaking that he would not open the question of mines with the Maghzen until he received fresh instructions with regard to the Syndicate.

Mr. Harris tells me that he has telegraphed to the "Times" on the subject, and read M. Merry del Val the telegram he had sent, which, he said, had upset the latter considerably. He appears to have added that he was astonished at the Spanish Government supporting a German enterprise which had not even the support of its own Government, and to have told him that Spanish action in attempting isolation when all the other Governments were agreed to the principle of international co-operation would create a disastrous effect. Mr. Harris is a little inclined to exaggerate his own exploits, but he thoroughly enjoys a fight, and has the courage of his opinions.

One of the representatives of the French group, the Commandant Maumené, has arrived at Tangier, and called upon me to-day. He is leaving as soon as possible for Fez (in five or six days), and gave me some letters for Harris. He said he would be very glad if I would read them first; but I replied that, as I had not yet official cognizance of the matter, and had seen none of the previous correspondence, I thought that my reading them would serve no useful purpose. He agreed, and I have simply forwarded the letters.

I have, &c.
(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

[12612] No. 107.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received April* 3.)

(No. 59.)

Sir, *Tangier, March* 28, 1909.

YOU will have received my telegram No. 22 of the 25th instant, and His Majesty's Consul at Fez's despatch No. 17 of the 19th instant, forwarded under flying seal, reporting the escape from Fez of Sidi Mohammed Kitani, with all his family, household, and household effects.

The news caused general consternation in Tangier, and Guebbas and Menebhi took a very gloomy view of the situation, they both of them evidently believed that Kitani's intention was to raise the standard of revolt amongst the Berber tribes, with whom he possesses great influence, and to place himself upon the throne in the place of Moulai Hafid. He is a man of some 35 years, and is descended from one of the great Shereefian families. He has attained a considerable reputation for sanctity and knowledge of the Islamic Law, and some thirteen years ago introduced an innovation into the ritual of prayer, which has become very popular throughout the country; it is even said that there is not a town in Morocco nor a tribe, however small, but has got one or more zaouias (places of worship) dedicated to his teaching, and used for the special observance of the ritual introduced by him. He is said

to be most fanatical and anti-European. Menebhi told me that he had made the pilgrimage to Mecca with him. He was, he said, a reckless man, and might create great trouble if left to himself; it was just possible, however, that in this particular instance, he might be following the advice of his father, a very wise and learned man, and that his flight from Fez had only been prompted by considerations for his safety. That was what he would like to believe. At the same time his information pointed to the fact that Kitani had for some time past been in communication with the Berber tribes, and he had warned Moulai Hafid only quite recently to be on his guard. Immediately on receipt of the news of Kitani's escape the Sultan gave orders that the zaouias in which his disciples worship were to be closed throughout the country, thus giving proof that he at all events was not frightened.

On the following day a rumour was circulated in Tangier that Kitani had been taken, and yesterday morning I received a letter from His Majesty's Consul at Fez, dated the 23rd March, and sent down by favour of a special French messenger, to the effect that he was reported to have been given up by the Beni 'Mtir tribe, and that, although the report was denied in Fez, the Maghzen had received a letter from the Kaïd, who had been sent out to capture him, saying that he had him in custody and was bringing him into Fez. The "Dépêche Marocaine" of this morning stated that he had actually entered Fez in chains, but this is not confirmed. It seems, however, possible that the rumour is founded on fact, and the Sultan has called the oulemas and notables together to discuss the question of his punishment. If he is captured the Sultan's prestige will no doubt be greatly enhanced, and I imagine that His Shereefian Majesty will not lose so excellent an opportunity of filling his treasury by mulcting the adherents of Kitani of very large sums of money.

I have, &c.
(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

P.S. *March* 29.—So far I have not heard that Kitani has arrived at Fez, and Menebhi, whom I saw last night, says he will not believe in his capture till he hears that he has actually been seen in the capital.

R. L.

[12613] No. 108.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received April* 3.)

(No. 60. Confidential.)

Sir, *Tangier, March* 28, 1909.

OWING to the apparent inability of the Sultan to make up his mind and the series of contradictory messages which he has conveyed to me through His Majesty's Consul at Fez, the departure of my Mission has been delayed, I may almost say, from day to day, and there seems little chance of my getting off before the beginning of next week, if, indeed, then.

When the matter of my Mission was first broached, the Sultan said it might be more convenient for him to receive me at Rabat, but on the 27th February I received an official note from the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, dated Fez, the 23rd February, acknowledging receipt of the letter by which I informed him that, in accordance with instructions which I had received from you, I desired to leave for the Shereefian Court on the 1st April, in order to present my letters of credence together with Sir G. Lowther's letters of recall, and stating that the Sultan would be glad to welcome me at Fez. His Majesty at the same time asked me to come up rather sooner than the date named, as he was on the eve of departure. I, accordingly, hurried on all my preparations and informed Mr. Tyrrell in my telegram of the 27th ultimo that the members of the Mission should be ready to start by the 20th March.

On the 10th March, the Sultan again told Mr. Macleod that it might be more convenient for him to receive me at Rabat. Mr. Macleod, however, deprecated this change, pointing out that the occasion was a great one, and that it would make a far better effect throughout Morocco and in the British Empire if the first British Mission in His Majesty's reign were received in Fez. The Sultan fully admitted this, and once more said he would receive me at Fez, for assuredly it was his wish to be on the best of terms with His Majesty's Government. He added that he would give the necessary directions for the baggage train to be sent off at once. Since then I

have been anxiously waiting to hear of their departure; but notwithstanding the daily representations made to His Majesty's Consul to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, no arrangements were made, although the Sultan continued to send me messages begging me to hasten my departure.

On the 15th March, Mr. Macleod wrote to tell me that the Sultan, who was apparently in a very bad temper, had sent me a message through the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs to the following effect:—

"The Sultan says he wrote accepting with pleasure a visit at Fez from the Minister, and he is still willing to see the Minister at Fez. Unfortunately, however, owing to the larger number of animals required for sending the Shereefian harem to Rabat, he simply cannot spare transport animals just now, and so he desires the Mission to come up with the animals that take down the French Minister, who is leaving very shortly for Tangier. As the Sultan intends to leave for Rabat as soon as possible he may not be able to see the Minister for very long here, but should that be the case His Majesty will be very pleased if the Minister would remain on at Fez and see the city and enjoy himself."

This appeared to me a ridiculous message, and I accordingly addressed a somewhat strongly worded note to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, pointing out that in order to meet the clearly expressed wishes of His Shereefian Majesty I myself and His Majesty's Government had hurried on all the preparations necessitated by my Mission to Fez; that I would of course accede to His Shereefian Majesty's desire that I should come up with the animals that were taking down the French Mission; that I noted his invitation to remain on at Fez and enjoy myself, should he be obliged to leave for Rabat, but that I wished to make it quite clear to his Excellency that I was undertaking the journey in obedience to the instructions of His Majesty's Government to present the letters to the Sultan by which my august Sovereign had accredited me as his Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Morocco, and to discuss the various questions pending between our two Governments. I, therefore, felt confident that His Shereefian Majesty would remain at Fez a sufficient time after the date of my arrival, to permit me to carry out these instructions.

Guebbas and all the more serious Moors assure me that there is no chance of the Sultan leaving the capital as soon as he says, and all this talk of leaving immediately too is thought by many to be merely a bluff to induce the Southern to leave Morocco City. If so it has been successful, as El Glawi and Aissa-ben-Omar left for Rabat on the 22nd instant. They were not accompanied by 'Mtougi.

On the night of the 24th instant, the news reached Tangier of the flight of Kitani (see my immediately preceding despatch) and there appeared a very good chance of the Mission being postponed altogether. Both Guebbas and Menebhi took a most gloomy view of the situation, and according to a letter which I received from Dr. Verdon their impression was shared by El Mokri and Ben Daoud, two of the most serious men at Fez. If, however, the report of his capture proves to be true, the fear of disturbances is past and there is no reason to delay the Mission. M. Regnault is expected to arrive at Laraiche to-morrow, the 29th instant, and will come on to Tangier in a man-of-war. The transport animals should arrive easily by the end of the week, and barring further alterations in the Sultan's plans or unforeseen events of any kind, I hope to get off early next week.

I cannot but think that the Sultan has treated me in somewhat cavalier fashion, but it is just possible that the fact that he is or may be anxious to start for Rabat as soon as possible may induce him to expedite the transaction of our business.

I have, &c.
(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

[12934] No. 109.

Consul MacLeod to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 5.)

(No. 19.)

Sir, *Fez, March 24, 1909.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 18 of yesterday, I have the honour to report that Kittany and all his party were duly brought before the Sultan late yesterday afternoon in irons, and were committed to prison, after being told that the Sultan would tell them their fate in a day or two.

Some three men—two from Fez and one from Mequinez—who had assisted Kittany and were found with him, were severely flogged before being sent to prison.

The Acting Vizir for Foreign Affairs informs me that Kittany had begun preaching a "Holy War," and had had himself proclaimed Sultan.

The importance of this prompt extinction of this most dangerous design is difficult to exaggerate. The result cannot but greatly enhance the Sultan's prestige both here and generally, and it is particularly satisfactory as affording a proof of the Sultan having begun to regain the Makhzen's former authority over these tribes.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. M. MACLEOD.

[13285] No. 110.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 8.)

(No. 64. Confidential.)

Sir, *Madrid, April 4, 1909.*

IN reply to an interpellation on Spanish policy in Morocco, the Minister for Foreign Affairs has made several speeches during the last week in the Chamber of Deputies. They are all to the effect that nothing has occurred to undermine in any way the structure of the triple understanding between Spain, France, and England in regard to that country. I am preparing an abstract of the debate.

Señor Allendesalazar deserves credit for the consistency with which he has repeated the above satisfactory assurance whenever he has been called upon to make a public pronouncement on the Morocco question, either in the Cortes or through the columns of the press. You are aware, however, that behind this façade of friendship and concord there have not been wanting symptoms of discord between the policies of the French and Spanish Governments in Morocco, and that the recent Franco-German Agreement has given rise in Spain to considerable apprehension lest the elimination of Germany from the position of equality of political influence which she had previously asserted at Fez and Tangier might lead to increased friction between France and her Spanish partner in the joint work of pacification on which they are engaged.

M. Revoil, French Ambassador, informs me, on his return from an absence of some weeks in Paris, that the Spanish Government have not relaxed their efforts to secure some fresh international recognition of the special position which in common with France they claim to occupy in Morocco. Their first advances in this direction, as reported in my despatch No. 27, Confidential, of the 11th February, were made at Berlin. But, receiving no encouragement from that quarter, it seems that they addressed themselves directly to the French Government. M. Revoil states that M. Pichon, who was much engaged with the Near Eastern crisis, requested him to put the Spanish proposal into a form which would enable the French Government to accept it. This he did, and I understand that a further effort was made by Spain to obtain the adhesion of Germany to the new formula. Germany refused to adhere unless, in return, Spain would be prepared to withdraw her opposition to the landing of a German cable on the Morocco coast opposite the Canary Islands. It will be remembered that the extension of the proposed Emden–Teneriffe cable from Teneriffe to any point of the African coast north of the 7th degree of north latitude, and therefore to the coast of Morocco, was expressly excluded by the terms of the Spanish Royal Decree of the 6th June, 1907, granting landing rights to the German cable in the Canary Islands. Germany therefore required nothing less than the modification of the above Royal Order in one of its essential provisions. The Spanish Government were much annoyed by this request, and they found no difficulty in rejecting it unreservedly, though by so doing they were once more reduced to the necessity of appealing to France alone for the fresh investiture with which they desire to strengthen their position in the north of Morocco.

M. Revoil states that the French Government are very ready to give some satisfaction to Spain on this point, but that Spain has, as usual, thrown away her opportunities by rejecting the simple method of seeking from the first a plain understanding with France, without any previous appeal to Germany. As matters stand, Spain has wasted nearly two months in futile endeavours to find some means of counteracting the impression made by the Franco-German Agreement of the 9th February.

Meanwhile, M. Revoil states that the interviews which took place at Fez between

M. Regnault and Señor Merry del Val were quite satisfactory. Since the departure, however, of the French Minister, his Spanish colleague is believed to have taken up once more the idea of a Spanish military mission, which had been dropped some weeks ago at the instance of the French Government. The proposal has taken the shape of a Spanish offer to present the Sultan with two batteries of field guns, with a staff of instructors to explain their use. M. Revoil states that his Government is far from pleased with this evidence of the persistence of Spain in her intention to exercise a military influence at Fez. I understand that his Excellency is instructed to renew the representations which he made when the subject was first started, and to lay special stress in doing so on the fact that Fez lies outside the sphere in which Spain claims to hold a special position.

M. Revoil hears that the position of the Sultan is still far from secure. His political inconsistency, as well as his unattractive personality—the Ambassador describes him as a *déséquilibre*, cruel, violent, and given to drink—have alienated many of his early supporters, thus compelling him to think seriously of falling back on Rabat, as his predecessor did before him.

I have, &c.
(Signed) M. DE BUNSEN.

[13498] No. 111.

Consul MacLeod to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received April* 10.)

(No. 21.)
Fez, March 30, 1909

Sir,

OF the Italian military mission to Morocco, the only remaining officer is Captain Campini, who recently returned to Fez to resume charge of the Sultan's arsenal.

The arsenal was closed in September 1907 when Captain Campini left Fez, and the workmen for the most part became scattered. A few days ago, however, the Sultan in person inspected the arsenal minutely, and thereafter asked Captain Campini to report upon the practicability of manufacturing both cannon and small arms there throughout, that is to say, to manufacture arms out of the raw materials to be found in the country.

Captain Campini reported that small arms could only be manufactured here out of partly prepared materials imported from abroad; that the work most suitable for this arsenal was repairing and transforming small arms.

In regard to cannon, Captain Campini pointed out that it would never pay the Sultan to manufacture the small quantities Morocco required, for the machines to make them would cost far more than the guns.

The Sultan then asked whether anything could be done with some 8,000 chassepot, 1860 model, paper-cartridge rifles in store here. Captain Campini submitted that he could convert them into chassepot 1874 model for use with metal cartridges. The Sultan caught up this idea so warmly that he authorized Captain Campini to begin this work forthwith. Some 50 native workmen still remaining of the 200 or so formerly employed were found and set to work, and some twenty-five of these rifles are now being transformed daily, and it is expected that about forty a-day may be turned out by-and-by, when the men become more familiar with their work. Setting aside the (native) Court Treasurers and the (native) Arsenal Administrators, the Sultan handed Captain Campini a sum of money and directed him to himself pay the workmen.

No European has hitherto been allowed to pay the workmen, and in former times the arsenal was valued in Moorish circles chiefly as a source of gain to the native officials attached to it.

Captain Campini tells me that the new plan works admirably, and the slight extra work of paying them is, he finds, far more than recouped by the contentment, the better work of the men, and the general facilities this control of expenditure affords him.

It remains to be seen, however, how long the Sultan's keenness will last, and whether it will survive demands for more money when the amount he lately handed out is exhausted.

Meantime, Captain Campini's own salary is being paid to him by a bank, under guarantee of the Italian Government, who in turn will claim it from the the Sultan, together with the arrears of pay already owed to that Government for the services of Colonel Ferrara and Lieutenant Caldara, both now retired.

The ambition the Sultan is showing in this matter to make himself as independent as possible in regard to arms, affords a proof of the dislike he is believed to entertain of the provisions of the Act of Algeciras in regard to supplies of arms and the like from abroad for the Makhzen, and which is hinted at in the last paragraph of my despatch No. 9 of the 23rd ultimo.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. M. MACLEOD.

[13479] No. 112.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received April* 10.)

(No. 62.)
Tangier, April 3, 1909.

Sir,

The British Vice-Consul at Tetuan reports that on the 15th ultimo the Basha informed him that some of the Kuf people who had captured Mr. Clark Kennedy last summer were in town, and that he desired to arrest them, but that the Spanish Consul sought to protect them. At the Basha's request Mr. Consul Bewicke went to see him, and a message was sent to the Spanish Consul requesting him to come also to discuss the matter. The Spanish Consul, however, refused to come, stating he was busy. The matter was discussed between the Basha and Mr. Bewicke, and the Basha decided to arrest the Oulad Haddu, as their names did not appear on the list of protégés delivered by the Spanish Consul, nor had any notice been given of Spanish protection having been extended to them; moreover, if protection had really been granted to them it must have been subsequent to the acts of brigandage, which would be contrary to Article 5 of the Madrid Convention.

Two of the Haddu family were subsequently arrested, one a boy, who was set at liberty again, though he was carrying over a hundred cartridges, the other Ruham-ben-Haddu, the principal member of the family. Upon hearing of this arrest Mr. Bewicke went to see the Basha again, and was informed that the prisoner had been handed over to the Spanish Consul, who had called upon the Basha and claimed him as being under Spanish protection. The Basha said he had objected that he had seen no document proving the protection, but had finally agreed to surrender the prisoner, stipulating that he should be kept in custody pending the receipt of instructions from Tangier.

The Basha called on Mr. Bewicke the following day and informed him that the Spanish Consul had set Ruham-ben-Haddu at liberty; that, hearing of this, he had sent to the Spanish Consul to ask for an explanation; that the Spanish Consul had come to see him, and had stated that though he had extended his protection to Ruham-ben-Haddu the previous day the protection ceased upon his being set at liberty, and that he was not under Spanish protection. The Basha complained bitterly of the conduct of the Spanish Consul on this and other similar occasions, and declared that it rendered it impossible for him to govern the town and district.

Shortly after the escape of Ruham-ben-Haddu a fight took place between his men and those of the Sheikh of the district appointed by the Basha. Two men were killed and two wounded. The Basha sent out some soldiers, and Ruham-ben-Haddu then addressed a letter to the principal Moor of Tetuan demanding that two of his friends then in prison should be released at once, and threatening that he would either carry off or kill any one he can catch outside the town. The people are much alarmed at this threat, and some dare not go even to their gardens outside the town walls. Communications by road between Ceuta and Tetuan are also cut off.

Upon receipt of Mr. Vice-Consul Bewicke's despatches I called upon M. Figuerola, the Secretary left in charge of the Spanish Legation during the absence of M. Merry del Val on his mission, and left with him a Memorandum setting forth the facts of the case, calling his attention to the extraordinary conduct of the Spanish Consul at Tetuan, and requesting him to inquire into the matter.

Some days having passed without my receiving any communication from M. Figuerola, I requested Mr. White to see him and inquire what had been done in the matter, bringing to his notice the action of Ruham-ben-Haddu since his return to Kuf, of which the report had not reached me when I left the Memorandum with him.

M. Figuerola stated that he had received a report from the Consul at Tetuan, who admitted that Ruham-ben-Haddu was not under Spanish protection, and explained his action by saying that, fearing arrest, he had taken refuge in the Spanish Consulate, and that he had therefore felt bound to protect him; that he had kept him

at the Consulate for some time, but as he heard nothing from Mr. Bewicke he had released him; and that when Mr. Bewicke did come to see him it was too late, as he had already set the man at liberty.

Mr. White pointed out that the Spanish Consul's explanations were quite inacceptable; that the Spanish Consul was well aware that Ruham-ben-Haddu was one of the brigands who had captured Mr. Clark Kennedy; that it was on this account he was to be arrested—he had refused to meet Mr. Bewicke at the Basha's house, but had subsequently made the Basha give him up by stating that he was under Spanish protection, which was not true; that he had subsequently set the man at liberty, notwithstanding the stipulation of the Basha that he should not be released pending the receipt of instructions from Tangier, and without communicating with the British Vice-Consul, though he knew that it was in consequence of his representations to the Basha that the man had been arrested. Mr. White further pointed out that the right of asylum was not extended to criminals, but merely to innocent people under persecution.

M. Figuerola, while forced to admit the justice of these remarks, explained that he was merely Chargé d'Affaires, and in a delicate position, and did not feel that he could take action in the matter. He said, however, that he would think the matter over, and send me a written communication on the subject.

I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of the communication I subsequently received from the Spanish Legation. I met M. Figuerola, and told him that I could not conceal from him my disappointment at the nature of his communication, which appeared to me to be very unsatisfactory; that I was reluctant to report the matter to you, but that I did not see that any other course was open to me.

I have, &c.
(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

Inclosure in No. 112.

Note communicated to Mr. Lister by Spanish Legation.

LA Légation d'Espagne s'est empressée de demander des renseignements sur le cas des montagnards de Kuf et vient de recevoir du Consulat à Tetuan des informations incomplètes par rapport à cette affaire, qui a motivé la démarche de la Légation de Sa Majesté britannique.

D'après les informations reçues, les Arabes se sont refugiés au Consulat d'Espagne en réclamant le droit d'asile. Ils sont ensuite partis librement sans que le Consul ait reçu le moindre avis de M. le Vice-Consul de la Grande-Bretagne, qui ne s'est adressé à lui que le lendemain du départ des indigènes. Les déclarations du Consul d'Espagne à Tetuan sont formelles à cet égard.

Tanger, le 2 avril, 1909.

[13480] No. 113.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received April* 10.)

(No. 63. Very Confidential.)

Sir, *Tangier, April* 3, 1909.

AS I had the honour to report in my telegram No. 26 of the 1st instant, the French Minister returned to Tangier on the 31st ultimo. M. Regnault called upon me that evening, and paid me another long visit the following day. He wished, he said, to give me some idea of the impressions which he had derived from his visit to Fez and of the results which he had been able to obtain, but he begged me to consider his remarks as strictly confidential, as he was most anxious that nothing should find its way into the press. He was quite satisfied with the "relations" which he had been able to establish with the Sultan; at the same time His Shereefian Majesty was a most difficult man to do business with, and no definite settlement had been arrived at of any of the big questions. In negotiating the Sultan's mind was that of a jew-dealer in the bazaar. He was always terrified of being done and of offering more than was absolutely necessary, the consequence was that if M. Regnault showed any readiness in accepting any proposal of the Sultan it

was withdrawn next day! In the early stages of the negotiations the question of the evacuation of the Shawia was discussed, the Maghzen showing a commendable spirit of conciliation, and the bases were fixed for an agreement on the subject; suddenly, towards the end of the Mission, the Sultan declared that he must insist upon the evacuation of Casa Blanca. M. Regnault replied that he had no instructions on the subject; that its eventual evacuation, of course, formed part of the scheme of the French Government, but that, as the idea had been that the evacuation should be carried out gradually and by zones, and that Casa Blanca would naturally be reserved to the last, none of the arrangements for insuring security, proper administration, &c., had been settled or even discussed. The Sultan said that he took it upon himself to insure the security of the town and country, and that any agreement with regard to the Shawia was conditional upon the immediate evacuation of Casa Blanca. M. Regnault said that he could only refer the matter to Paris, and it will be discussed there by the Moorish Special Mission, which is shortly to be dispatched. Very much the same thing appears to have happened with regard to the Algerian frontier. The French Minister stated the desire of the French Government to gradually withdraw their troops from the advanced posts which they had been obliged to occupy, commencing in the south with Bou Benib, &c., and requested that the mixed force of French and Moorish police, which had been agreed to in principle at Rabat, might be formed at once. After some discussion the Sultan agreed, but subsequently insisted that the men of the police force should be purely Moorish from the very beginning, not gradually become so as had been arranged, and said that in any case he wished the question reserved for discussion by the Viziers in Paris.

The question of a loan was never broached by M. Regnault, although he discussed the financial situation of the Maghzen with the Sultan. The attitude adopted by His Majesty at the beginning was ridiculous and bombastic, but M. Regnault believes he realizes the absolute necessity of a loan, and a big one, and has made up his mind to obtain it.

M. Regnault succeeded in persuading the Sultan to agree to the creation of an Administration ("direction") of Public Works, with M. Porché as Technical Adviser. He also proposed that M. Lorens, the Spanish Assistant Engineer of the Caisse Spéciale, should be appointed as his second. This, however, the Sultan had not agreed to, but it will no doubt be pressed by the Spanish Minister.

M. Regnault also communicated to me for a few hours the *procès-verbaux* of the interviews which he and the Spanish Ministers had had with the Viziers in connection with the execution of the various clauses of the Act of Algeciras. I inclose a brief summary which I made of the most important points, from which you will gather how little satisfaction they have been able to obtain. I was particularly struck with the reactionary spirit which characterizes the Sultan's attitude throughout, and M. Regnault tells me that in reality it was far stronger than appears in the *procès-verbaux*, which have been made as mild as possible. M. Regnault also showed them to the Portuguese Minister (the doyen), but to nobody else. They will not be officially communicated to the other Governments until an agreement has been come to on the subject between the French and Spanish Governments.

I gather that the refusal of the Sultan to apply Article 60 of the Algeciras Act, with regard to the acquisition by foreigners of real property in Morocco, has already become known in Tangier, and has produced a very bad impression.

M. Regnault told me that he was very much struck by the desire of the present Sultan to mould himself and the Government of his Empire on the lines followed by his father, Moulai Hassan, not from any special filial admiration or piety, but simply because he considers that he was a Sultan who had centred all power and authority in himself. Personal power and the control of the money bags are his two main objects, and, in order to attain them, his idea seems to be to make use of foreigners by picking their brains, but at the same time to exclude them as far as possible from any share in the execution of the plans they submit to him, thus retaining for himself all the profit and all the control.

His avarice and the difficulty of inducing him to part with money are, M. Regnault told me, incredible, and his wholesale extortions have made him most unpopular. He seems to be quite cynical in his disregard of the claims to recognition of the men who contributed most to his elevation to the Throne, and the proud and intellectual inhabitants of Fez resent bitterly his surrounding himself with exotic kaïds whom they despise as gross and illiterate mountaineers. Moulai Hafid prides himself on his theological and literary attainments and occupies his spare time in writing lampoons

on the various distinguished men in the country. I understand that Kittani was one of the favourite targets for his satire.

At the same time M. Regnault admits that among his own people his knowledge of the men with whom he has to deal and his skill in handling them are very remarkable. This came out very conspicuously in his conduct of the recent negotiations for the surrender of Kittani, when by a judicious employment of bribes, threats, and persuasion, he succeeded in three days in crushing a conspiracy which at one moment appeared likely to threaten his throne.

He has great audacity and is extraordinarily lucky, a quality which in Morocco, as elsewhere, commands the highest respect.

The general impression which I have derived from my various conversations with M. Regnault is that he is at heart disappointed with the results of his mission, which opened so brilliantly, thus fulfilling the prophecy made by Abdel Aziz, that his brother would at first promise everything and end by giving nothing. This opinion is moreover borne out by reports which I have received from His Majesty's Consul at Fez who tells me that the Viziers are evidently anxious as to the frame of mind in which the French Minister left and are continually trying to pick his brain on the subject.

The Sultan latterly appears to have shown clearly that he did not wish to have anything definitely settled, though for what reason M. Regnault was at a loss to say. Possibly from fear of the reproaches of El Glawi he preferred to leave everything open and to be able to say that he had signed nothing away. So long as his powerful Grand Vizier remained in his own southern domains, he had a certain fear and respect for him, although M. Regnault believes, that once he has got him within his reach he will snap his fingers at him as he has done at the others. M. Regnault leaves to-day for Paris where he expects to remain about two months. Negotiations will be re-opened as soon as the Moorish Special Mission arrives but there is little likelihood of anything being settled there as the Sultan will never grant full powers to his Ambassadors, and the idea is that M. Regnault on his return to Morocco will rejoin His Majesty and try and arrive at a final agreement.

I have, &c.
(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

Inclosure in No. 113.

Brief Summary of the Procès-verbaux *of the Interviews between the French and Spanish Ministers and the Acting Grand Vizier, the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the Minister for Finance.*

ALGECIRAS ACT.

Chapter I.—*Organization of Police.*

THE French and Spanish Ministers claimed that deserters from the police should be arrested and not be allowed to enlist in the Sultan's Mehallahs. This was opposed by the Viziers and the Sultan who, however, finally agreed that the dispositions of the *règlement* should be applied excepting in the case of deserters who escaped into the interior. The French and Spanish Ministers said they could not admit this right of the Sultan to modify the *règlement* which had already been accepted by the Maghzen. The Viziers complained that the police officers had got keys of the town gates at Saffi and Rabat. The French Minister explained that in the former case this was necessitated by the fact that the police were quartered in forts separated one from the other by gates which were shut at night; at Rabat it was necessitated by the refusal of the Governor on a previous occasion to open the town gates to allow reinforcements of police to join a party which was attacked outside the walls. The Viziers undertook to find a formula which would preserve the rights of the Governor without interfering with the duties of the police.

Chapter IV.—*Article* 60.

The French and Spanish Ministers demanded that the Article should be put into force. A long discussion ensued. The Sultan took up the position that all the Articles of the Act of Algeciras were conditional on the fundamental principle of the recognition of the integrity of Moorish territory. This integrity he maintained existed only

on paper in the Act of Algeciras. M. Regnault expressed his surprise at this statement, in view of the numerous discussions which had taken place lately between him and His Majesty for the evacuation of the Shawia and the frontier districts. The Viziers then drew attention to the recent Spanish military expeditions from Melilla and Ceuta. M. Merry del Val said he intended to discuss that question with the Sultan. The Sultan finally declared that he did not consider the moment opportune for applying the provisions of Article 60.

Article 61, "*Taxe Urbaine.*"

The Viziers declared that Administrators had been appointed to arrange for the application of the tax on town buildings at Tangier first, and subsequently at the other ports in succession. M. Merry del Val drew attention to the fact that the tax should be enforced simultaneously at all the ports.

The Viziers maintained their position, but said that no time would be lost in applying the Article throughout the Empire.

Chapter V.—*Contraband of War.*

The French and Spanish Ministers applied for the renewal of the Mandat, which is shortly to expire. The Sultan raised all sorts of objections, saying he would undertake the suppression of the trade himself. M. Regnault pointed out that this was out of the question, as he possessed no ships. Finally the Sultan very grudgingly granted the extension for one year.

International Claims Commission.

The Sultan tried to get out of paying the Delegates on the Casa Blanca Indemnities Commission, maintaining that each Government should bear its own expenses. Notwithstanding the remonstrances of the French and Spanish Ministers this attitude has been maintained.

Victims at Casa Blanca.

M. Regnault demanded 100,000 fr. per head for the nine workmen killed at Casa Blanca. The Government offered 4,000 douros (about 500*l.*). If the Maghzen were made to pay more the Sultan said that no more foreign workmen would be employed in Morocco. M. Regnault pointed out that under those circumstances it would be difficult to proceed with public works. The Sultan said he would employ one European architect or engineer, as then, if he were assassinated, he would only have one indemnity to pay.

Commission d'Hygiène.

The Sultan absolutely declined to allow the Commission d'Hygiène to carry out the various schemes which it has under consideration, for a slaughter-house, a cattle market, general market, new town gates, &c., and says that the Maghzen will do whatever is necessary.

[13481] No. 114.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received April* 10.)

(No. 64. Confidential.)

Tangier, April 4, 1909.

Sir,

IN the course of conversation the other day, the French Minister alluded to the International Mining Syndicate and the attitude of the German Minister, which formed the subject of my despatch No. 58, Confidential, of the 26th ultimo. M. Regnault told me that he feared there was little doubt that Dr. Rosen had done what he could to induce the Spanish Minister to support the Mannesmann-Tovar group. On receipt of the news that the Duke of Tovar had been admitted to partnership by Messrs. Mannesmann, M. Merry del Val had, it appears, asked D. Rosen what the attitude of the German Government was towards the firm, and also towards the International

Mining Syndicate. Dr. Rosen had admitted that the latter had the official support of the German Government, but made as light of it as possible, and on the contrary dwelt at great length on the support given in the past to Mannesmann, the right that the firm evidently had to consideration on account of priority, *droits acquis*, &c., and gave M. Merry del Val to understand that it would give him much pleasure if he (M. Merry del Val) could see his way to pushing their interests at Court. He succeeded, in fact, in conveying a very incorrect impression of the real facts of the case.

Thus primed by Dr. Rosen, M. Merry del Val started for Fez. Then came the conversation with Mr. Harris, reported in my abovementioned despatch, closely followed, so M. Regnault informs me, by the still more stormy interview with Mr. Macpherson, the representative of the Compañías Espanolas de Minas del Rif. The latter attacked the Minister most hotly for supporting a German firm, who not only had not the support of their own Government, but were also the most dangerous rivals of his own firm, who from the beginning had been supported by the Spanish Government. He was, he said, determined to report the whole matter to Madrid, and to apply for redress. M. Merry del Val, it appears, was at first dumbfounded, but after thinking the matter over has realized that he has been made a cat's-paw of by the astute Dr. Rosen, and is proportionately disgusted!

A day or two later Mr. Macpherson informed Mr. MacLeod that he had just heard from Madrid that the Compañías Espanolas de Minas del Rif had thrown in the lot with the Mannesmann-Tovar group; the situation has consequently completely changed, but the episode, as told me by M. Regnault, is instructive, and explains the great desire shown by Dr. Rosen to insist on the support given by the German Government to the International Mining Syndicate, and by specious reasons to avoid "the possibility of any misconstruction being placed on his action, or by the action of Dr. Vassel at Fez."

I have, &c.
(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

[14236] No. 115.

Consul MacLeod to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received April* 16.)

(No. 22.)
Sir, *Fez, April* 1, 1909.

I BEG to report that a few days ago, in private conversation with me on another subject, Dr. Vassel chanced to relate what passed between the Sultan and him at the interview alluded to in the last paragraph of my despatch No. 3 of the 26th January.

The Sultan, in much agitation, asked him sharply, "Does the Anglo-French Agreement provide for the independence of Morocco?" To this Dr. Vassel replied satirically, "Oh yes! The first Article is for preserving Morocco's independence. The remaining Articles provide the means for taking it away." Though he did not say so to me, probably Dr. Vassel offered some detailed arguments in that sense.

Yesterday, in the course of an interview I had with him on other matters, the Sultan spontaneously reverted to that subject, remarking, but in good-natured tones, as if merely to invite a friendly discussion, "that Anglo-French Agreement surely was very bad for Morocco. Morocco has gone from bad to worse since ever it was made. I am very sorry about it, the more so since I came to Fez, and have been reading much of the correspondence between Morocco and England in the time of Queen Victoria, and learn how great was then your friendship!"

I energetically denied that the Agreement was in any way a cause of Morocco's decadence, and pointed out that the country had been in reality going from bad to worse for centuries, but very particularly so since Mulai Hassan died. I compared the former state (for instance) of the provinces between Fez and the Algerian frontier, Oujdah, &c., when garrisons used to exist and trade used to be carried on, but which had all been neglected and lost by the Grand Vizier Buhamad during the years of Mulai Abdelaziz's minority. I described the former and latter state of the army and of very especially the finances. In the latter connection particularly the worse the state of things became the deafer had been the Court to all suggestions about them. It was those things which had created the Anglo-French Agreement as to Morocco, and it was not the Agreement which had created those things.

This was matter of history, for the chief disasters had preceded by more than one year the signing of the Agreement.

To this the Sultan answered: "That may be so of course, but the Agreement

[13479] No. 114*.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 41.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, April* 15, 1909.

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency herewith a copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Minister at Tangier* respecting the conduct of the Spanish consul at Tetuan, through whose instrumentality one of the natives concerned with the capture of Mr. Clark Kennedy last summer, who had been arrested by the basha of Tetuan, was set at liberty.

The facts as stated in Mr. Lister's despatch show that there was no justification whatever for the extraordinary action of the Spanish consul, and the explanations he has given so far are quite unsatisfactory.

I request that your Excellency will communicate the facts of the case to the Spanish Government, protesting strongly against the action of the consul, and expressing the hope that they will mark their disapproval of his conduct.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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* No. 112.

provides that France will not increase the duties on British goods in Morocco for thirty years and will not allow fortifications to be built in the Straits of Gibraltar and along the Moorish Mediterranean shore. To assume and to acknowledge such a position was to contemplate the destruction of the independence of Morocco."

I replied that the contrary was the fact. These arrangements were made to secure the independence of Morocco. We foresaw, with the increasing debt, the inevitable arrival of foreigners in the Customs Administration. Had the old Makhzen power to prevent these foreigners increasing duties or seizing them altogether, if they were so minded? Surely it was only common sense on our part to anticipate what has actually come to pass and to forestall any conceivable demand by the Sultan at the instance of this or that Power for the duties to be increased. But for this and the Act of Algeciras the French might press us continually to consent to increases of duties or the like on our goods, our rights as to which Morocco is not, in point of fact, able just now to guarantee.

To put the matter another way, however, we had never gone beyond agreeing that it was the French who had best advise and assist Morocco. It was for the Sultan, in the exercise of his independence, to accept or reject such assistance and advice, and not to be swayed by such sentiments as those about "independence." As a matter of fact, "Allah" alone was independent. Every created being, Potentates included, were more or less dependent.

The Sultan then said these explanations were new to him, but what about not allowing fortifications to be built in certain parts of Morocco? Was not that to interfere with Morocco's independence?

I answered that on practically the whole of the shores in question the authority of the Sultan had ceased to exist long before the Anglo-French Agreement was signed. For the most part these shores, at the time of the Agreement, belonged, if not in theory, in point of fact, to Buhamara, and it was therefore for the best future interests of the Sultan that certain Great Powers should have agreed not to allow fortifications to be built there. The requisition of those lands by the Sultan would surely be facilitated by the absence of fortifications on them.

The Sultan made no answer to this, but presently said: "Oh yes! Oh yes! I daresay. That is all so, but what about the equivalent you obtained as to Egypt?"

To this I answered that it was, in effect, the pledge given to us by France for the due performance of this Agreement about Morocco, an Agreement of the highest benefit to Morocco. That was why such a security ought to be a source of satisfaction to Morocco. Which was safest for Morocco: to treat with France unpledged to any one, or to treat with her, under security of Agreements previously concluded with the other neighbours of Morocco?

But all that was, I said, by the way, for the truth was that none of the Powers coveted and were disposed to seize parts of Morocco. This country had, or need have, no enemies whatever, save inside it.

Thereupon the Sultan remarked that, anyhow, this might all be so, but the Agreement, which had been made secretly, had come, without explanation, upon the Moors suddenly, and so had surprised them. He then went on to say that he had been much touched and surprised by the great friendliness the French Minister, M. Regnault, had shown. M. Regnault had proved conciliatory and considerate beyond praise, and he (His Majesty) could not thank him enough.

The Spanish Minister was, however, very different and was showing himself most inconsiderate and unconciliatory, and, the Sultan heard, was about to make some impossible demand for the cession of Jebel Musa (Apes Hill) to Spain merely to make Ceuta bigger. As I knew nothing of this matter, I let this observation go unanswered.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. M. MacLEOD.

P.S.—I need scarcely point out that my object in such conversations with the Sultan has been to give him true conceptions of the Anglo-French Agreement and, if possible, to convince him that the real objects of France and Great Britain are not to acquire Morocco and Egypt for themselves, but to assist those countries to establish such good order and progress as will make them grow stronger and stronger.

J. M. M.

[14208] No. 116.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 16.)

(No. 68. Confidential.)

Madrid, April 8, 1909.

Sir,

THE French Ambassador, in recent conversations with me about the state of affairs in Morocco, has shown considerable anxiety lest the German firm (Messrs. Mannesmann) should in the end succeed in their efforts to secure a participation in the enterprise of the Spanish Mining Company, which is interested in the development of the Beni-bu-fruor mines behind Melilla. His Excellency is aware that, as pointed out by His Majesty's Minister at Tangier in his despatch No. 36 of the 18th February, Concessions granted in Morocco since the date of the Algeciras Act ought to be invalidated under the pending Shereefian Firman concerning Mining Concessions, and that therefore the Concessions which Messrs. Mannesmann claim to hold must be wanting in any solid legal foundation; but he fears that Messrs. Mannesmann are nevertheless intriguing to obtain from the Sultan certain powers to work the mines which would at least enable them and their Spanish associates to place difficulties in the path of the International Syndicate, which is now engaged in preparing a scheme for the amicable distribution of mining property in Morocco among the claimants of various nationalities. A recent telegram published by the "Times" from its correspondent at Fez seems to show that there is some ground for M. Révoil's apprehensions, and the purport of that telegram is elucidated in Mr. Lister's despatch No. 50, Confidential, of the 15th ultimo, showing that Messrs. Mannesmann's proceedings at Fez are becoming well known, and are not disavowed by the German Minister at Tangier, though the latter is said to have stated a little while ago that he did not consider that Messrs. Mannesmann constituted a danger to the Syndicate.

M. Révoil has again spoken both to the King and to the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs on this subject. His Majesty said that he would have the matter looked into. Señor Allendesalazar returned rather an evasive answer. M. Révoil is therefore still uneasy, and he tells me that the chief reason for the sensitiveness of the French Government on the point of German enterprise in the Riff country is the belief which they entertain that the main, though as yet unavowed, object of Messrs. Mannesmann and of the German Government is to complete the Spanish railway from Melilla to the mines and then to extend it to Taza. An important line of communication with the interior would thus be practically in German hands, for the Spanish element in the concern would become gradually eliminated.

His Excellency is irritated by the conduct of Señor Merry del Val, Spanish Minister in Morocco, now at Fez, who is reported to be openly supporting the demands of Messrs. Mannesmann and of the Duc de Tovar, an ardent supporter of the German interest.

You are aware that I have myself warned the Spanish Government against the danger of allowing foreign participation in the Riff mining enterprise, and that the Spanish Ministerial organ, as reported in my despatch No. 55 of the 24th ultimo, has lately been making some quite satisfactory declarations on this point. There would seem, however, to be some influence at work which is encouraging the German firm to renew its overtures. M. Révoil does not hesitate to ascribe it chiefly to Comte de Tattenbach, German Ambassador in Madrid, notwithstanding the fact that the German Government is overtly favourable to the International Syndicate. I have already alluded to the connection between the Duc de Tovar and the German Embassy (see my despatch No. 27, Confidential, of the 11th February), and I have heard from various sources that his Excellency is doing what he can to induce his countrymen to invest capital in Northern Morocco.

M. Révoil has also called Señor Allendesalazar's attention to the offer of two batteries of artillery which the Spanish Minister is said to have made to the Sultan at Fez. The Foreign Minister said that Señor Merry del Val had been instructed to withhold this offer unless M. Regnault concurred, which he was, of course, not likely to do. If the idea of a military mission should again be taken up by the Spanish Government, it would more probably take the form of a proposal to send out Spanish officers to instruct Moorish troops at Tetuan or Larache.

I have, &c.

(Signed) MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[14211] No. 117.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 16.)

(No. 67.)

Tangier, April 12, 1909.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a Memorandum containing the general news which has reached this Legation during the past week.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HERBERT E. WHITE.

Inclosure in No. 117.

Memorandum.

GENERAL MOINIER, who succeeded General d'Amade in command of the French troops in Showia, has returned to Casa Blanca, having concluded his tour of inspection of all the posts in the country. The tour was very successful, the General having been everywhere well received by the natives, who assembled in large numbers to "play powder" in his honour. A little temporary excitement was caused by notices in Arabic having been posted by the French to the effect that artillery and small-arm firing practice would be carried on in a specified district, but the natives were reassured on learning the true meaning of the notice.

The Grand Vizier, El Glawi, and the Vizier for Foreign Affairs, Aissa-ben-Omar, accompanied by the "Khalifas," or deputies of Kaïds M'tougi and Gundufi, the Sultan's brother, Mulai-el-Kebir, and a small force of about 400 horse arrived at Casa Blanca on the 10th instant. The main force, which is said to be large, is proceeding to Fez viâ Sakhra-el-Djaja, thus avoiding the Showia Province. The meeting of the southern Kaïds with the French troops in Showia is said to have been quite cordial. They were joined on the road by the Showia Kaïds, while the Shereef El Amrani and the Governors of Casa Blanca and Mediuna went to meet them. General Moinier and the French Consul-General at Casa Blanca also rode out a short distance from the town to greet them. Kaïd El Glawi, in his own name and in that of his companions, expressed warm thanks for the reception which had been given them by the French authorities. It is said that the southern Kaïds are proceeding to Rabat, and will await the Sultan at that place.

The Consular Agent at Marakesh reports that the Sultan's letter announcing the capture of El Kittani was read in the great mosque at that place and produced a good effect, though the members of the Kittani sect and the Fez Moors residing at Marakesh were displeased at the news.

Mr. Consul McLeod reports that the "Mulud" festival was celebrated with the usual ceremony at Fez, the assembly of soldiers, tribesmen, and townspeople being the largest that has been seen of recent years. Contrary to the usual custom when foreign Missions are at Fez, the Spanish Minister and his staff did not attend the ceremony. This was taken as an indication of the coolness of the relations between the Spanish Minister and the Court. The Sultan and the Court officials make no secret of the strained relations that exist, and contrast the attitude assumed by M. Merry del Val with the friendly and conciliatory attitude of M. Regnault, who has left a very favourable impression on Mulai Hafid and his officials.

[13480] No. 118.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 164.)

Foreign Office, April 16, 1909.

Sir,

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency herewith a copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Minister at Tangier respecting his French colleague's mission to Fez.*

I request that your Excellency will mention the subject of this mission to the

* No. 113.

French Minister for Foreign Affairs, and will inquire what action the French Government propose to take to insure compliance by the Sultan of Morocco with the provisions of the Algeciras Act.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. GREY.

[14907] No. 119.

Mr. W. Harris to Foreign Office.—(Received April 20.)

(Confidential.)
Dear Sir Charles Hardinge, c/o *British Consulate, Fez, April* 10, 1909.

YESTERDAY the Viziers asked me to send direct to the Foreign Office—as His Majesty's Minister is *en route* for Fez—the inclosed account of the Spanish Minister's demands. I told them it would be more convenient to send it through His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, but for some reason or other they desired me to communicate it direct to London.

I had already informed His Majesty's Consul here some days ago of the "Apes Hill" question, of which he obtained the necessary confirmation, which he forwarded to Tangier.

For obvious reasons I have used none of this material in the "Times."

I remain, &c.
(Signed) WALTER HARRIS.

P.S.—I will put Mr. Lister in possession of these facts as soon as he arrives here—in about a week's time.

The object of the Viziers in making known these demands to me is, as you will no doubt perceive, to be able to communicate them to His Majesty's Foreign Office without having recourse to official channels.

W. H.

Inclosure in No. 119.

Demands presented by his Excellency the Spanish Minister to His Shereefian Majesty the Sultan.

Fez, April 10, 1909.

THE cession of the eastern slopes of Apes Hill, including all points overlooking Ceuta.

The Spanish Minister gives as his reason for this demand on the part of his Government, a possible invasion of British troops, who would be able to threaten Ceuta with artillery.

The Sultan has replied that as an invasion of Morocco territory would affect him more than the Spaniards, he is prepared to take all precautions necessary, either by diplomacy or other means, to safeguard his interests, and added that his experience of British diplomacy in Morocco rendered him perfectly tranquil on the subject.

2. The sending of 5,000 Moorish soldiers under Spanish officers to Melilla. The Spanish Government could distribute their army, reinforced, if necessary, by Spanish troops, at five or six points on the Riff coast, where barracks would be erected. The Spanish Government is prepared to transport the Moorish troops in Spanish ships, and will guarantee the overthrow of Bu Hamara, the Pretender, and furthermore, is prepared to advance all sums of money necessary for the payment of the soldiers and all other expenses, on the Maghzan undertaking to repay these sums at a future and more convenient date.

The above two demands have already been laid before His Shereefian Majesty, and, I am informed, will be refused *in toto*.

The Spanish Minister will also demand—

3. The nomination of a Moor, who is a Spanish subject, as Governor of Tetuan.

4. The confirmation of all Agreements and concessions made between the Spanish Government and Bu Hamara, or granted by the latter to individual Spaniards, including the mines conceded. In the case of a refusal on the part of His Shereefian Majesty the Spanish Government will defend its right by force.

5. The cession of five points on the Riff coast, with territorial possession, for the erection of light-houses.

The following two demands will, in all probability, be accepted by the Sultan.

6. The indemnity for expenses incurred at Casa Blanca.

7. The reimbursement of all sums spent during times of famine at Melilla and other "presidios" for the maintenance of Moorish refugees.

(This was agreed to by Mulai Abdul Aziz in 1907.)

(Signed) W. B. HARRIS.

[14907] No. 120.

Mr. W. Harris to Foreign Office.—(Received April 20.)

(Confidential.)
Dear Sir Charles Hardinge, *Fez, April* 11, 1909.

SINCE writing to you yesterday I have had a long talk with Señor Merry del Val, the Spanish Minister, who confirms the account I sent you yesterday of his negotiations, with the exception that his Government do not propose to ask for a Spanish-protected Moor to be named Governor of Tetuan. The rest is quite correct.

He implored me to take all precautions against these negotiations being made public either here or in Europe.

I remain, &c.
(Signed) WALTER HARRIS.

[15187] No. 121.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 23.)

(No. 159.)
Sir, *Paris, April* 20, 1909.

I ASKED the Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday what had been the result, if any, of the Mission to Fez of the French Minister in Morocco. I had heard that the Sultan had been very intractable, had shown reactionary tendencies, and was not disposed to carry out in its entirety the Algeciras Act, and that, for the murder of the nine workmen killed at Casa Blanca, the Moorish Government had offered a ridiculously small sum (about 500*l*., I understood, instead of 100,000 fr.) for each murder.

M. Pichon said that M. Regnault had only reached Paris a short time ago, and he had not yet had time to discuss fully with the French Representative the various conversations which he had had with the Sultan and his advisers. The Sultan was haughty and had a high opinion of himself, and was not a person with whom it was easy to negotiate. At one moment he spoke of large sums of money as of no consideration to him, at another he made difficulty about small amounts. M. Regnault was not on the whole dissatisfied with the result of his journey to Fez. The Sultan appeared to be ready to come to an agreement on reasonable terms for the evacuation of the Shawia. The important point on which the Sultan was most obstinate was the Article of the Algeciras Act relating to the acquisition of property by foreigners. M. Pichon had no recollection of any particular difficulty being made for proper compensation for the Casa Blanca murders. Probably the persons interested in the indemnities had been complaining that the Moorish Government were making difficulties. His Excellency said that the negotiations with the Moorish Government would be continued at Paris, when the Special Mission from the Sultan arrived, and meanwhile he would fully discuss with M. Regnault the several questions at issue with the Maghzen.

As the Minister for Foreign Affairs was evidently not well acquainted with what had passed between the French Minister in Morocco and the Sultan and his advisers, was not aware that M. Regnault had described to Mr. Lister what had taken place, and had not yet had time to discuss with M. Regnault and to consider what should be done by the French Government to insure compliance by the Sultan with the provisions of the Algeciras Act, I thought it best to abstain from carrying out the instruction contained in your despatch to me No. 164 of the 16th instant, to inquire what action the French Government propose to take.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

[15352] No. 122.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 24.)

(No. 70.)

Sir, *Tangier, April* 18, 1909.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 67 of the 12th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith copies of three despatches I have received from His Majesty's Consul at Dar-al-Baïda giving a detailed account of the visit of the southern Kaïds El Glawi, El Madani, and El M'toogi to that place.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HERBERT E. WHITE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 122.

Consul Madden to Mr. Lister.

(No. 74.)

Sir, *Casa Blanca, April* 10, 1909.

THE Viziers (or principal Governors) of South Morocco arrived here this afternoon, and were accorded an imposing reception by the French. Preceded by armed Moorish horsemen and standards, and by half a squadron of Chasseurs d'Afrique (who had been previously drawn up in front of the French Consulate), came the Viziers accompanied by General Moinier and staff, who left them at the main gate and returned to the camp.

The Viziers did not enter Dar-al-Baida, but passed along the road just outside the walls. The French Consul-General rode between Kaïds Ci El Madani, El Glawi, and El M'toogi, while immediately behind came Mulai-el-Kebir, brother of the Sultan, and Kaïd Ci Aissa, the Governor of Abda Province, with the town officials, and some of the personnel of the French Consulate. About 400 armed Moorish horsemen, many of them Schluhs from the Sus, and who were mostly carrying Martini-Henry rifles, though some had more modern small-bores, followed. Near the Saint House of Sidi Billiott the Franco-Moorish intramural police was drawn up. The French military escort of chasseurs saluted the Viziers at the Algerian soldiers' cemetery, near the Emsallah, and returned to camp.

The procession had previously passed through the lines of Spanish extraurban Moorish police, which was drawn up at the salute in the outer Soko in two columns, one of cavalry and the other of infantry, under the Spanish Lieutenant-Colonel Sylvestre.

On reaching the shore the armed Moorish horsemen deployed on the beach, entirely unsurveyed and unescorted by French troops, their demeanour leaving nothing to be desired. Their camp is pitched on a slope beyond Ain Maazi, and presents a picturesque appearance, containing as it does no less than three "afrags" or royal tent inclosures for the Sultan's women (who have been brought from Marakesh) and for the harems of the Viziers.

I saw the French Consul-General afterwards, and he informed me that he was very glad that these important Governors had been able to overcome the hesitations they had felt as to coming to Casa Blanca. He had been most anxious for these Viziers, whom he described as historical personages, since they were the artizans of the Hafidist reign, to come into contact with the French, and for this reason he had done all in his power to get them to traverse the main road through the French camp in order to give them a big reception. He said that they had desired at first to go to their tents at Ain Maazi by an outside way, and not to approach very near the French camp or town.

I understood from M. Malpertuy that he wishes to show the Viziers the wireless telegraph and other things of interest, so as to inculcate them, if possible, with some ideas of the benefits of civilization, in the hope that they will influence Mulai Hafid in this direction. My French colleague also desires to get to know these Viziers personally, in order to test their real political opinions, he said.

The total escort which has come here with them numbers 1,500; the French authorities authorized only this number to come to Casa Blanca, and the Viziers will stay here as long as the French Consul-General wishes them to remain, so he tells me. On leaving Casa Blanca they will proceed to Rabat, there to await the arrival of the main Arab army, which is making its way by the Sokhrat-el-Djadja road, but,

owing to its very slow rate of progress, it is unlikely that it will reach Rabat much under fifteen days.

The whole affair was undoubtedly a remarkable demonstration and acknowledgment of French predominance of influence, and justified the assurance evidently felt by the French in the natives. There was as little as possible outward show of French supervision, but just the fact that in the offing lay a small cruiser, and on the hill opposite is the strangers' camp.

A special performance of the French military band is to be given to-morrow afternoon for the Viziers; and on Monday, the 12th instant, a review of the French troops, with the French and Spanish Moorish Tabors, is to be held on the beach in their honour, and, no doubt, to impress them with the discipline and power of the French army here.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

Inclosure 2 in No 122.

Consul Madden to Mr. Lister.

(No. 77.)

Sir, *Casa Blanca, April* 13, 1909.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 74 of the 10th instant, I have the honour to report that Mulai Kebir and the three Viziers, El Glawi, Ci Aissa-ben-Omar, and El M'toogi, attended on the 11th instant a special concert given in their honour by the military band, and to which the Consuls and principal residents were invited by the General.

The Moorish personages arrived at the Head-quarters Staff accompanied by an Algerian escort of spahis and several representatives of the French Consulate, who went to the Arab camp to bring them up, and on dismounting were conducted by General Moinier to seats in the centre of the pavilion, where they remained during the performance, surrounded by European ladies and gentlemen and officers.

The ground immediately in front of the pavilion was kept by spahis in order to afford the distinguished visitors an uninterrupted view of the band-stand; and the Algerian band and detachment on its way to change guard in town was diverted from the main road and wheeled round so as to pass immediately in front of them.

The Viziers evinced very little outward interest, and gazed with rather impassive faces on the moving crowds and Algerian display given in their honour.

On this occasion only Algerian Mahommedan soldiers were employed, no French soldiers being on duty, though many were to be seen moving about among the crowd.

Yesterday, the 12th, a grand review of Spanish and French troops and the Moorish Tabors of Police was held on the beach at low tide. The forces were drawn up in companies in an extended line round the bay, the panorama presenting a picturesque and impressive sight. After General Moinier and the staff, followed by a large escort of spahis, had galloped down the line, the troops moved slowly eastward, in order to prepare to march past the saluting point. The General, with the Moorish Viziers, the Spanish Commanding Officer, and the French Consul-General, then took the review, the staff with the escort of spahis and the Arab horsemen being immediately behind them. The troops went past in column of companies in the following order: the bands, preceded by the Algerian drum-major, who performed various clever feats with his bâton, Spanish troops, Naval Brigade, Engineers, Zouaves, Tirailleurs Algeriens with their screw-guns, Army Service Corps, Foreign Legion (a very small section), a battery of mountain-guns, Artillery with twelve guns, Chasseurs d'Afrique, and Spanish Mounted Police.

It was noted that the police forces marched past very well, and the Spanish mounted Moorish Tabor especially presented a very creditable appearance.

The troops massed, after the review, near the town, and were again inspected by the Viziers, who finally went to a position near the town gate and witnessed the whole force march past. Altogether about 2,500 men were on the ground.

The Viziers have also visited the wireless telegraph station, a telegram for them from Ci Guebbas arriving while they were there, also the hospital, cinematograph, port works, and other places of interest.

I gather from conversation with my French colleague and officers that the only one of the Viziers who shows much intelligence and interest is El Glawi. Kaïd Aissa

is described as very reserved; and El M'toogi (who is an old man) and Mulai Kebir as rather sullen and taciturn. Of course, the position for them is extraordinary—to be in their own Moorish town and yet to be received by the French.

The visit was a successful one, though, so I understand from my French colleague.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

Inclosure 3 in No. 122.

Consul Madden to Mr. Lister.

(No. 79.)

Sir, *Casa Blanca, April* 15, 1909.

WITH reference to my previous despatches, I have the honour to report that Mulai Kebir and the Viziers El Glawi, Ci Aissa, and El M'toogi, with their Mehalla, left Casa Blanca this morning early for Fedalla, where they arrived this evening, on their way to Rabat.

Shortly after the departure of the Mehalla the cruiser "Cosmao" left also, and steamed up the coast on her way to Tangier. I hear that French soldiers were drafted to Fedalla in order, no doubt, to give the Viziers a fitting reception there, and for purposes of precaution.

The French Consul-General was to have accompanied the Viziers a short distance on their way, but he tells me that the Mehalla had already started before he arrived, so he overtook them, and had a further chat with El Glawi.

The visit outwardly has been a success. I have just seen my French colleague, who tells me that he considers it will help to advance European interests, as the Kaïds have been shown many things entirely new to them, the wireless telegraph especially pleasing and interesting El Glawi.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

[15353] No. 123.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 24.)

(No. 71.)

Sir, *Tangier, April* 19, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a summary of the events which have been reported to this Legation during the past week.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HERBERT E. WHITE.

Inclosure in No. 123.

Summary of Events in Morocco during the past week.

HIS Majesty's Consul reports that the Beni M'guild and Zemmur tribes were much incensed with the Beni M'tir for having surrendered the Shereef el Kitani, and threatened reprisals. The Sultan therefore decided to send reinforcements to Beni M'tir for their protection, and, acting on the advice of Commandant Mangin, Chief of the French Military Mission, who has been charged with the general instruction of the troops, he has sent Sergeant Balding to occupy a "Kasbah" in south Beni M'tir with some 500 men and maxims. The Sultan desired to employ Messrs. Belton and Redman in preference to Sergeant Balding, of whom he does not yet know much, but Commandant Mangin persuaded His Majesty to employ the latter, who is much better qualified for the duty.

The Sultan has recently added to his forces by the following ruse. At the feast he invited the "Genawa," or negro fraternity, to a feast at the palace and then informed them that they were all Government slaves and must serve as troops; there was no course open to the negroes but to bow before His Majesty's orders; a new regiment of infantry was thus formed.

Mr. Consul MacLeod further reports that the Spanish Minister does not appear

to be making much progress with his negotiations. He is said, among other things, to have suggested that the Sultan should send some 4,000 or 5,000 troops to the Riff district near Melilla, Spain undertaking to transport them to that place, and to provide a sufficient number of instructors to train the troops. The cost to be repaid by His Majesty when there may be funds to spare.

The Sultan does not appear disposed to accept this proposal; His Majesty apparently thinks it would be preferable to provide himself with the means of transporting his own troops. He inquired of Mr. MacLeod whether the British Government would be disposed to sell some obsolete small cruisers or gun-boats which would be useful for coast-guard work and carrying despatches, and two lightly-armed transports for carrying troops.

The Spanish Minister further requested that supplies from the neighbouring districts should be allowed to enter Melilla for the use of the garrison, free of duty.

His Majesty's Consul at Casa Blanca reports that some excitement was caused at Marrakesh recently by the Governor placing guards at the town gates on account of a report that a French force was in Dukala, on its way to Marrakesh. Mr. Consular Agent Lennox pointed out to the Governor the bad effect produced by this measure, and assured him that the report could not be true. The guards were then removed from the gates, but others were placed on the road at a distance from the city. This report probably had its origin in a request made by the Dukala tribesmen that French soldiers should be sent to their district to destroy the locusts, according to the method practised in Algeria.

[15973] No. 124.

Memorandum communicated by the Spanish Embassy, April 27, 1909.

THE persons representing the different groups that form the Union des Mines Marocaines are not yet agreed upon the Concessions that ought to be obtained from the Makhzen. But anyhow, the Governments to which these groups belong are agreed upon the necessity of making the Sultan understand that the Trust has the support of the Powers, so as to facilitate the concession of the Firman alluded to in Article 112 of the Algeciras Act. Besides those forming the International Trust, other firms of Spanish, English, French, and German nationalities have petitioned for the grant of Mining Concessions in different parts of the Mogreb; and as for the respective Governments, the majority of these Petitions are as worthy of protection as those referring to the Trust, it would be convenient that the Governments of Madrid, London, Paris, and Berlin came to an agreement about the form in which their Representatives in Morocco ought to support the International Trust, in order that by doing so they do not harm the interests of the others who may have rights of preference, for having presented their Petitions at an earlier date, or for other reasons worthy of consideration. As the Spanish Government have not received any written official communication from the British Government, with regard to the kind of collective support which the Union des Mines Marocaines have to receive from the Representatives of the Powers in Tangier, they would feel obliged if the Secretary for Foreign Affairs would answer on a verbal note, stating the opinion of the British Government on the subject, to enable us to give our agreement to their point of view, or to make the observations that we might think pertinent on the matter.

Spanish Embassy, London, April 27, 1909.

[16311] No. 125.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 50.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, April* 27, 1909.

THE Spanish Ambassador told me to-day that in the course of the negotiations for the German-Spanish Agreement about Morocco which the Spanish Government had proposed, the German Government had said that they could not very well recognize Treaties without knowing what the Treaties were. They had, furthermore, said that they could not make an Agreement of this kind without having something in return to put before their public opinion. They had, therefore, asked for the right to connect

the Emden-Teneriffe cable with Morocco. The Spanish Government could not concede this; but, by some mistake, Count Tattenbach, after an interview with the Spanish Foreign Minister, had telegraphed to Berlin that the Spanish Government were ready to concede it. Herr von Schoen had at once telegraphed to the Emperor, who was keenly interested in it, and expressed his great satisfaction to the Spanish Ambassador.

This was all a mistake. The Spanish Foreign Minister had always been quite decided that this concession could not be made, and the Ambassador supposed that the negotiations for an Agreement about Morocco would have to be dropped.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. GREY.

[16502] No. 126.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 1.)

(No. 35.) [Viâ Tangier.]
(Telegraphic.) P. *Fez, May 1, 1909.*

AT the Sultan's invitation I went to see him this evening. His Majesty appeared much upset after a long interview with the Spanish Minister, who had behaved even more overbearingly than on previous occasions. Sultan had maintained his attitude of refusal to discuss anything until Spanish troops which had recently occupied territory on the mainland opposite Chafarinas Islands, and those which had occupied Mar Chica some sixteen months ago, were withdrawn. He was prepared himself to maintain order in those regions.

Spanish Minister replied that he was not authorized to discuss this matter, whereupon Mulai Hafid said he would send a special Mission to Madrid for the purpose. In these circumstances the Moorish Government consider the negotiations with M. Merry del Val at an end. It is proposed to send Mission to Madrid in a week's time.

Sultan wishes me to inform you of the above, and he would be glad if His Majesty's Government would instruct His Majesty's Ambassador at Madrid to endeavour to persuade Spanish Government to withdraw their troops. The purpose of the Spanish Government is, he believes, to avail themselves of the weakness of Morocco at the present moment to occupy Moorish territory from which it will be difficult later on to eject them.

[15973] No. 127.

Sir Edward Grey to Señor de Villa Urrutia.

Your Excellency, *Foreign Office, May 1, 1909.*

IN reply to the Memorandum which you left with me on the 27th ultimo, in regard to the question of Mining Concessions in Morocco, I have the honour to inform you that His Majesty's Government are awaiting further information from His Majesty's Minister at Tangier before coming to a definite decision in regard to their attitude towards the International Mining Syndicate. I shall not fail to address a further communication to your Excellency on this subject as soon as I am in a position to do so.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. GREY.

[16505] No. 128.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 2.)

(No. 38. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, May 2, 1909.*

WITH reference to Mr. Lister's telegram No. 35, I am informed most confidentially by Guebbas that the Sultan has sent him a letter, to be transmitted, with translation, to the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs, complaining of Spanish Minister's refusal to discuss evacuation of Moorish territory occupied by Spanish troops.

[16647] No. 129.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 3.)

(No. 73. Confidential.)
Sir, *Fez, April 20, 1909.*

AS was reported in my telegram No. 29 of the 8th instant, the Mission consisting of myself, Colonel Count Gleichen, Mr. Irwin, Mr. Frank Rattigan, accompanied by Mrs. Rattigan, Mr. Cyril Rattigan, and Major Fowler left Tangier on the morning of the 8th instant. We had intended leaving on the Wednesday, but owing to an incessant downpour of rain, which commenced on Tuesday afternoon and lasted for some thirty hours, it was found necessary to postpone our departure for a day, as the route which we had originally chosen was impassable, and other arrangements had to be made. On our third day's march we were met on the frontier of his Governorship by the Governor of Alcazar, Bushta Bagdadi, the great Moorish General whose name you will remember, with a very large body of horsemen, and escorted by them the following day into Alcazar. All the troops, the various bands of the town, forming a strange medley of men, costumes, and instruments, and a large portion of the inhabitants came out to meet us, and I am assured that no Mission before has been accorded such a reception. I believe this to be largely due to the Consular Agent, Mr. Carleton, who had taken considerable trouble, and is evidently excessively popular with the Governor and the people. Three days later a most unfortunate and unforeseen misfortune befell us, when our excellent Moorish scribe, an elderly gentleman of dignified aspect, was attacked by a must camel, and to save himself from being pounded to death threw himself off his mule. The soldiers were fortunately able to distract the attention of the enraged animal, but Ben Yahia, on being examined, was found to have broken his arm in two places and to have dislocated his thigh. This necessitated our remaining a whole day in camp. The morning of Sunday I was awakened by a number of shots quite close to our camp, and one of our soldiers rushed into my tent and snatched up my gun: "They were," he said, "trying to steal the money." It appeared that the Sultan had profited by my escort to send up a sum of 100,000 dollars to Fez. The money had been sent off early that morning with a special escort to reach Fez that night. They had come in with some of the fugitives from the route of the Sultan's mehalla, reported in my telegram No. 32, and a scuffle ensued in which one poor young fellow of the latter party was shot through the stomach and brought in to die in camp. He seems to have been unarmed, and to have been practically murdered in cold blood, and the incident might have had the most unpleasant consequences for the Mission. Fortunately he belonged to the tribe through which we had passed two days before; otherwise, had he belonged to the tribe in which our camp was pitched, there seems little doubt that we should have been attacked. I am representing this to the Makhzen.

As we rode on towards our last camp, pitched just outside the gates of Fez, we gathered more and more information with regard to the defeat of the Sultan's mehalla. It has shared the fate of all its predecessors sent by previous Sultans to attack the Berbers in their own country. The Imperial troops were led into an ambush, and there some 200 of them were shot down. Sergeant Balding, who, to his great delight, had been sent out the day before with a horse and 100 dollars, tells me that the men fought well enough, but were never given sufficient cartridges, and, of course, as is always the case in this country, the day was finally lost by treachery. Various Berber contingents who had nominally submitted to the Sultan, and were fighting with his army, when they saw that things were going badly went over to their own people, and it was then that the guns were lost, the gunners believing that the troops advancing towards them were their friends until the latter were within 60 yards and began picking them off with their rifles.

As I said, however, in my above-mentioned telegram, the Berbers are known never to pursue, and absolute calm prevails in the town of Fez, the inhabitants regarding the whole thing as an amusing incident. The Sultan, I understand, is somewhat upset for the first time, as the defeat is a blow to his prestige, and will shake his people's belief in the luck which has hitherto attended him. There seems little doubt that success had turned his head, and that he thought he would succeed even where all his predecessors had failed. The dispatch of the mehalla and its maintenance for so long a period in the Berber mountains was against the advice of

his Ministers and of men such as Ben Ghabrit, &c., who all foresaw disaster. He refuses, however, to be beaten, and is at present forming a fresh mehalla, which, it is rumoured, he intends to command in person. It appears, however, probable that the whole affair will be settled by negotiation. Various taxes which the Sultan demanded will be remitted, and the captured guns and booty will be restored. This seems all the more probable as I learn that, so far, the camp has not been looted.

At our last camp, just outside the gates of Fez, I received a long visit from the Spanish Minister, who appeared to me in a very bitter frame of mind towards the Sultan and everything that spelled Government in Morocco. Since then I have seen various persons more or less in the know, and I gather that M. Merry del Val has not departed from his usual rather heavy-hoofed manner of dealing with the Moorish Government, that he has placed a series of pistols at the Sultan's head, having among other things demanded the practical cession of the whole of Gibel Musa (Apés Hill), in order that no other Powers should be able to erect fortifications upon it. He is said to have added that, in the event of a war between Great Britain and Spain, the former would no doubt occupy Gibel Musa and bombard the Spanish coast from it. His Majesty is said to have replied that he understood that close friendship existed between England and Spain, and that the foreign diplomatists he had seen had always assured him that in Europe such friendships lasted for ever. All M. Merry del Val has succeeded in obtaining is a categorical refusal, on the ground that the territory was, and must always remain, Moorish; that the Moorish Government had alone the right of erecting fortifications upon it if they wished to; and that, moreover, the demand appears to the Sultan quite contrary to certain clauses of Treaties between other Powers (referring no doubt to Article 7 of the Declaration of the Anglo-French Agreement respecting Egypt and Morocco). This latter touch shows considerable adroitness.

M. Merry del Val appears to have been hardly more fortunate in his treatment of the question of the position of the Spanish Mining Companies, and I understand the Makhzen decline to admit that it is anything but illegal. At the same time Mr. Macpherson informs me that they have admitted that the Company possesses a right of priority in the case of mines which they have discovered and worked, and the possession of which nobody else contends.

I also received visits of welcome from the Acting Vizier for Foreign Affairs, and from El Mokri, the Minister of Finance.

On the following morning, about 10 o'clock, the two latter accompanied by the Minister of War, a good-natured looking black boy of about 17 or 18 years old, a son of the Grand Vizier, El Glawi, rode out to escort me into the city. The entry was a magnificent sight. Notwithstanding the recent defeat, the way was lined with thousands of troops and order was very well maintained. The National Anthem was played by several bands posted at intervals on the route. In the afternoon the Acting Grand Vizier called upon me, and I am to be received with the whole of my staff by the Sultan to-morrow—a mere visit of ceremonial, when I present my letters of credence.

I have, &c.
(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

[16648] No. 130.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received May* 3.)

(No. 74. Confidential.)

Sir, *Fez, April* 20, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a Memorandum which His Majesty's Consul has submitted to me of a recent conversation which he had with the Sultan, in which His Majesty inquired whether it would be possible for him to purchase three obsolete vessels from His Majesty's Government.

I feel convinced that this idea has been inspired by the French Minister pointing out to him, in connection with His Majesty's statement that he would himself put down contraband trade in arms, that he was not in a position to do so, as he possessed no ships (see my despatch No. 63 of the 3rd instant).

I am under the impression that no such ships as the Sultan requires would be sold by His Majesty's Government excepting to be broken up, but as His Shereefian

Majesty is almost certain to raise the question again with me, I should be glad to receive your instructions on the subject.

I have, &c.
(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

Inclosure in No. 130.

Memorandum communicated by Consul MacLeod to Mr. Lister.

(Private.)
(Extract.)

ON the 11th His Majesty sent for me, and after inquiring for you and hoping you would be here very soon, for he had some particularly urgent matters to discuss with you, he went on to say he had heard (?) that the British Government had just now some more or less obsolete war-vessels to sell, and he wished to have prices and specifications, &c., of them, for he would like to buy three vessels! One—to be a small fast cruiser or big gun-boat—a fighting vessel suitable for coastguard work, carrying despatches, &c. (I inferred a vessel of about 1,000 tons gross and 18 to 20 knots speed), and two transport steamers, lightly armed, suitable for conveying soldiers, horses, Government stores, &c., and on occasion doing coastguard work (I inferred vessels of about 2,000 tons gross and of 12 to 15 knots in speed, with suitable armament).

I answered that my impression was the British Government did not sell their old vessels except on condition of the buyers agreeing to break them up, to which the Sultan replied that he did not know the usages in those matters, but he would be glad if I could make these inquiries.

(I could not see very well where the money for these vessels is to come from, nor, right off, whether such purchases, unless by adjudication, would not be against the Act of Algeciras; but as the proposal might conceivably involve some good business, and perhaps, later, employment to British subjects, and in any case, if impracticable, could always be declined later on, I concluded it would be best to answer in such wise as would keep the matter open and you free to deal with it in any way you might prefer.)

I asked how far His Majesty was ready to go in prices. He laughingly answered he could not tell until he had the particulars and quotations, and asked me to come again to the Palace next day and show him what I was writing on the matter, so that corrections might be made. The Sultan then, in a bantering way, asked some questions about the British and German rivalry over fleets, remarking that apparently we were not trusting very much to our various Agreements with this and that Power.

Fez, April 14, 1909.

[16649] No. 131.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received May* 3.)

(No. 75.) *Fez, April* 21, 1909.

Sir,

IN accordance with the old-established precedent of the Shereefian Court, I was received, with the other members of the Mission, by the Sultan this morning, the third day after my arrival in Fez, His Shereefian Majesty retaining the right to decide whether the day of arrival should count or not. In my case the Sultan reverted to some extent to the ceremonial followed during the reign of his father, Moulai Hassan, and the reception took place in the pavilion opening upon the GreatCourt of El Mechwar. The French and Spanish Mission, on the other hand, were received in a small pavilion in a remote part of the gardens, where no sort of pageant or display was possible.

The Great Square, surrounded by crenelated walls, was entirely lined by troops; the approaches to the pavilion were thronged with white-robed Kaïds, and various brass bands played simultaneously bars from the National Anthem, the Marseillaise, and the French military tattoo.

The Sultan was seated cross-legged on a painted sofa, the stuffing of which was very much the worse for wear, surrounded by the Acting Grand Vizier, the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the Minister of Finance. On being introduced into

the Imperial presence by the Kaïd Mechwar, I read the inclosed short speech,* and handed to His Majesty Sir Gerard Lowther's letters of recall, and also my letters of credence as His Majesty's Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary to the Shereefian Court.

The Sultan's reply, translation of which is likewise inclosed,* was read by the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I then presented to the Sultan the various members of the Mission, and after a gracious intimation that His Imperial Majesty hoped that we would visit the Imperial gardens we withdrew.

The Sultan rode off almost immediately with a large escort to inspect the troops.

I have, &c.
(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

[16650] No. 132.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 3.)

(No. 76.)
Sir, *Tangier, April 26, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a summary of the news that has reached this Legation during the past week.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HERBERT E. WHITE.

Inclosure in No. 132.

Summary of news respecting Morocco during the past week.

NO news has been received as to the probable movements of the southern Kaïds, who are at Rabat awaiting the arrival of their troops, which left them on the borders of Shawia and took the Sakhra-el-Djaja road, and are reported to be in difficulties with the tribes.

In the meantime Mulai Hafid is preparing a further attack on the Beni M'tir. This is considered by many to involve considerable risks, as in the event of another defeat the position at Fez might become critical.

If the reports that have reached Tangier are correct, the Shereef Kitani has paid the penalty for the Beni M'tir disaster with his life. He was severely flogged, and it is said that he has died from the effects.

The Sultan apparently intends to collect the negroes from all parts of the country, and re-establish the old "Bokhari" guard. Negroes are being collected for this purpose in various districts and are being sent to Fez in chains.

Some stir was caused at Tangier yesterday by the hoisting of a German flag on the new mole which has been built under contract by a German firm. None of the instalments due under the contract have been paid by the Moorish Government, and at last, in despair, after having exhausted all the steps that could be taken through the Legation to bring pressure to bear on the Makhzen, the contractor took possession of the mole and hoisted the German flag on it. A protest was at once lodged at the German Legation by the Moorish authorities, and the flag was removed by the contractor at the invitation, as I understand, of his Legation.

News has reached Tangier of an attack by Moors on a party of four Frenchmen, who had crossed the Algerian frontier and penetrated into Morocco to prospect for minerals. Two of them were killed and the others wounded. The French Legation has not yet received the details nor taken any action in the matter, leaving the initiative to the Algerian authorities.

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* Not printed.

[16795] No. 133.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 3.)

(No. 57. Very Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Berlin, May 3, 1909.*

MOROCCO.

I have been informed in confidence by the Spanish Ambassador that the signature of Hispano-Franco-German Declaration was decided on in principle, and that all details had been settled when a demand was made by German Government for a Concession for a German cable from Teneriffe to Morocco, in exchange for signature of Declaration. M. Polo de Bernabé informed Baron von Schoen that this could not possibly be granted, but nevertheless instructions were sent to Count Tattenbach to apply for Concession for cable. Latter telegraphed consent of Spanish Government. This information was communicated to German Emperor, who telegraphed his great satisfaction at success of negotiations for grant of Concession, and authorized signature of Declaration. Meanwhile, M. Polo de Bernabé was instructed by telegram by Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs to inform German Government that Spanish Government could not grant cable Concession under any circumstances, as such a grant would constitute an infraction of Spanish law prohibiting the junction of two Spanish possessions by a foreign cable. Disagreeable position in which, in view of the Emperor's telegram, Imperial Foreign Office were placed by this refusal was pointed out to Spanish Ambassador by Baron von Schoen, but former assured him that Spanish Government's decision was final, and that, had Count Tattenbach's reply been shown to him before it was communicated to the Emperor, this difficulty would not have arisen.

Baron von Schoen hinted, as my Spanish colleague informed me, that he had been given to understand that no objections would be raised to cable Concession by either England or France. I replied in the negative to M. Polo de Bernabé's question as to whether anything that I might have said would have given this impression.

[16502] No. 134.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Lister.

(No. 28.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, May 3, 1909.*

SPAIN and Morocco. Your telegram No. 35.

His Majesty's Government must first be satisfied that the Sultan himself is loyally carrying out provisions of Algeciras Act before they can even consider question of giving him diplomatic support in his demands on Spain. He is, I understand, raising difficulties as regards carrying out the stipulations which confirm right of foreigners to acquire land in Morocco, and we do not yet know whether he will adopt a more satisfactory attitude in other matters in which British interests are closely involved. It should be made clear to him that no satisfactory relations with the Treaty Powers are possible unless he complies with the terms of the Algeciras Act, but as it is important that the three Powers should so far as possible show a united front, you should avoid giving any encouragement to any proposal for British intervention between him and Spain or France.

[16795] No. 135.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 125. Confidential.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, May 4, 1909.*

WITH reference to your Excellency's telegram No. 57 of the 3rd instant, I transmit to you herewith copies of the papers marked in the margin on the subject of the proposed Spanish-German Agreement in regard to Morocco.* As regards the hint which is supposed to have been conveyed by the German Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Spanish Ambassador to the effect that neither Great Britain nor France would be likely to raise any objection to the extension to Morocco of the Emden–Teneriffe cable,

* Señor de Villa Urrutia, April 29; to ditto, May 3, 1909 (not printed); and *ante*, No. 25.

I have to say that His Majesty's Government have in no way modified their attitude of opposition to this proposal, as stated in my telegram No. 8, Commercial, of the 14th June, 1907, to His Majesty's Ambassador at Madrid, of which a copy is inclosed.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. GREY.

[17127] No. 136.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 6.)

(No. 78.)
Fez, April 22, 1909.

Sir,

I WAS received again this morning by the Sultan, and presented to His Majesty the presents sent by the King. The audience was, as yesterday's, a purely formal one, but I asked His Majesty to instruct his Viziers to place themselves in communication with me as soon as possible, in order that we might discuss the various questions pending between our two Governments, which I felt His Majesty was as desirous as I was of seeing settled. His Majesty said he would certainly do so. I said there were one or two questions which I would like to discuss personally with His Majesty (referring to the final settlement of the debt for Kaïd Maclean's ransom, Menebhi's affairs, and Dr. Verdon's position). His Majesty said he would be very glad to receive me for this purpose another day.

He then said that in the course of his historical reading he had been very much struck with the close relations of friendship which had existed in the past between the Sovereigns of Morocco and Great Britain; he quoted to me even certain letters which had been exchanged between them, and asked me whether I had cognizance of them. I had to admit that I had not. He then said that to his regret he feared that the bonds which had united our two countries had been allowed to slacken, and that Great Britain no longer took the same interest in Morocco politically or commercially as in the past. I assured His Majesty that this was not the case. That the maintenance of the integrity and independence of the Shereefian Empire was of the highest importance to Great Britain, and that commercially she was ever seeking new markets for her goods and new opportunities for trade, consequently she must desire no less than the Moorish Government themselves the development of the wealth and prosperity of this country. His Majesty said he was glad to hear me say this, but he did not seem quite convinced. As he continued to harp on the same string it seemed evident, after the remarks which he had made to His Majesty's Consul (see Mr. Macleod's despatch No. 22 of the 1st April), that what he had in his mind was the modification of previous conditions introduced by the signature of the Anglo-French Agreement. I thought it was useless to go on beating about the bush, so I said that of course superficially it might appear as though England, since the conclusion of her Agreement with France, had taken a less active interest in Moorish affairs, but this was only superficial. Nothing could alter our fundamental views with regard to Morocco, and our friendship for her Sovereign and people remained the same. Moreover, the improvement in our relations with France could not but serve the best interests of Morocco, for so long as rivalry and friction existed between France and England the development of Morocco must necessarily be retarded, owing to the continual opposition placed by the one in the way of the proposals of the other. His Majesty finally said that he hoped I should do all in my power to increase the intercourse between the two countries, which could only give him and his people the greatest pleasure.

When I left he kept back Mr. Macleod, with whom he talks very openly. He told him that he did not wish me to think that in what he said he intended anything hostile against the French. He was on excellent terms with them, and had nothing to complain of. He was, moreover, very glad that England and France should have settled their differences. The one man with whom he found any difficulty in getting on with was "that Spanish Minister" (as he described him), in whose programme he could not find one single item which he could grant, although he had tried his very best, being most anxious to show some sign of conciliation and good-will.

The Sultan asked Mr. Macleod to repeat to me what he had said about the French, and begged him to come to Court again this evening so as to be sure there should be no misunderstanding.

* To Sir M. de Bunsen, No. 8, Commercial, Telegraphic, June 14, 1907.

I have told Mr. Macleod to reaffirm all that I had said to the Sultan, but at the same time to take advantage of the *franc-parler* which His Majesty allowed him to make him realize that friendship could not be entirely one-sided, and that if he was so anxious to see an increase in British trade with Morocco he should, on his side, take steps to make it evident that he intended to protect it from the loss and injustice from which it had suffered latterly. I had come up to Fez with my pockets full of the just claims of British merchants, and it would be a splendid opportunity for him at the opening of his reign, and as I hoped of a new régime of prosperity for Morocco, to show that he was making an effort to redeem the errors and injustices of his predecessor and his Government, by giving orders for the settlement, at all events of the most pressing amongst them.

I have, &c.
(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

P.S.—Mr. Macleod tells me that he has had a very satisfactory interview with the Sultan. His Majesty appeared to fully realize the justice of the remarks I had made with regard to the necessity of his giving some proof that British merchants would in the future be protected from loss and injustice; His Majesty also said that as soon as he had dispatched his Mehalla he would be far less busy, and should look forward to a long and informal discussion of all the various matters interesting our two Governments. It appears that he again reverted to the question of the ships, and admitted to Mr. Macleod that he required them in order to himself undertake the policing of the coast against the contraband trade in arms.

Mr. Macleod tells me that the Sultan appeared very much pleased with his presents, especially the jugs and the revolver. The jardinière had rather puzzled him.

R. L.

[17126] No. 137.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 6.)

(No. 77.)
Tangier, April 27, 1909.

Sir,

AS you are aware, a German firm obtained from the Moorish Government, prior to the signing of the Act of Algeciras, a contract for certain harbour works at Tangier. Under the terms of this contract the works, which are now practically completed, were to be paid for in three annual instalments, of which the last is now some time overdue.

Although no payments had yet been received from the Moorish Government, the contractor last summer desiring to give the commerce of the port the benefit of the spacious stores erected on the new mole, allowed the Makhzen to take over the works after they had been examined and passed by the State engineer. The contractor, however, obtained from Sid Guebbas a letter recognizing that the works would remain the property of the contractor until they were paid for.

Ever since the first instalment fell due the German Legation, at the request of the contractor, have been pressing the Makhzen for payment. Before the recognition of Mulai Hafid it was of course fully realized by the contractor that he could not hope for payment, but after His Majesty's recognition by the Powers, the State funds being at the disposal of His Majesty, there seemed to be no reason why at least a payment on account should not be made. The only replies, however, received from Mulai Hafid on the subject were that the cost of the mole must be ranked with the other Government debts to be dealt with when a favourable time arrived.

The contractor at last, losing patience at these evasive replies, called upon Sid Guebbas to make payment within fifteen days. On the fifteenth day the contractor presented himself before Sid Guebbas, accompanied by an interpreter of the German Legation, and asked whether the money would be paid or not. His Excellency stated that he had not yet received an answer from the Court to his letter on the subject. Pressed for a categorical reply, Sid Guebbas said he was unable to pay the money, having no funds at his disposal.

Next morning the port officials were surprised to find the German flag hoisted on the mole. The lieutenant of the port went to the contractor and requested him to remove the flag. The contractor, however, declined to do so, stating that he had taken possession of the harbour works, which were his property until they were paid

for, and that the flag had been hoisted with the approval of the German Legation; he added that he granted the Moorish Government a term of thirty days for removing the goods deposited in the custom-house stores, which he would take possession of and close on the expiration of that term.

The matter being reported to Sid Guebbas, he immediately sent for the interpreter of the German Legation and protested against the action of the contractor. Dr. Rosen is at Tetuan at present, having left the Legation in charge of the Secretary, M. Rotenhan.

M. Rotenhan sent for the contractor and induced him, though with some difficulty, to remove the flag, undertaking that his rights should not be in any way compromised thereby. He then informed Sid Guebbas that the flag had been hoisted without his knowledge or approval and had been removed, but he maintained all the rights secured to the contractor under the terms of this contract and other engagements entered into by the Moorish authorities, and he pressed for a fulfilment of its engagements by the Moorish Government.

M. Rotenhan at once called at the principal Legations to remove any false impression that might have been created by the hoisting of the German flag on the mole, but being Sunday afternoon I was absent from the Legation when he called and did not see him.

Sid Guebbas tells me that he has made a full report of the incident to the Sultan and must await instructions, but he apparently is not very hopeful of receiving a satisfactory reply.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HERBERT E. WHITE.

[17506] No. 138.

Draft of Spanish-German Protocol.—(Communicated by Spanish Ambassador, May 6, 1909.)

A LA date du 9 février, 1909, le Gouvernement de la République française et le Gouvernement allemand ont signé une Déclaration en vue de faciliter l'exécution de l'Acte d'Algésiras et d'éviter désormais entre eux tout malentendu à ce sujet.

Bien que cet Arrangement ne dût affecter ni modifier en aucune manière les intérêts politiques particuliers que les Traités ont reconnu à l'Espagne au Maroc, en considération de ces intérêts les deux Gouvernements ont communiqué l'Arrangement au Gouvernement espagnol avant la signature et la publication.

En présence des assurances données par le Gouvernement français et le Gouvernement allemand concernant les intérêts politiques particuliers que les Traités ont reconnus à l'Espagne au Maroc, le Gouvernement espagnol a répondu qu'il ne pouvait qu'accueillir avec satisfaction un acte destiné à faire régner définitivement entre les intérêts des Puissances au Maroc une harmonie à laquelle est étroitement liée la prospérité de l'Empire chérifien.

[17891] No. 139.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 6.)

(No. 46.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Fez, May 6, 1909.*

KITTANI succumbed the day before yesterday to the effects of the flogging which, as the Grand Vizier has divulged under the seal of secrecy, he received on the 17th ultimo after the disaster at Beni M'tir.

[16795] No. 140.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 202.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, May 6, 1909.*

WITH reference to the telegram No. 57 of the 3rd instant from His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin, which will have reached you in the telegram sections, I transmit to your Excellency herewith a copy of a despatch to Sir E. Goschen,* with inclosures,

* No. 135.

on the subject of the proposed Spanish-German Agreement in regard to Morocco. You will see from this despatch that His Majesty's Government maintain their opposition to any extension to Morocco of the German Emden–Teneriffe cable.

In view of the suggestion stated to have been put forward by Herr von Schoen, I should be glad to know whether the French Government have modified the attitude of opposition to this proposal which they adopted in 1907, while the negotiations for the Cable Concession were still in progress.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. GREY.

[17330] No. 141.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 7.)

(No. 160. Very Confidential.)
Sir, *Berlin, May 3, 1909.*

M. POLO DE BERNABÉ, the Spanish Ambassador at this Court, called upon me to-day, and asked me whether I had ever had any conversations with Herr von Schoen on the subject of the negotiations now proceeding for the signature of a Hispano-Franco-German Declaration respecting Morocco. I replied that I never exchanged a word either with Herr von Schoen or any one else on this subject. He said that he had put this question to me because certain difficulties had arisen with regard to the signature of the Declaration, owing to the German Government having at the last moment demanded, in return for the good-will manifested by their readiness to sign, a Concession for the laying of a German cable between Teneriffe and Morocco. Herr von Schoen, in asking for this Concession, had hinted that he had reason to believe that neither England nor France would raise any objection. M. Polo de Bernabé added that he had replied to Herr von Schoen that he did not quite see what England and France had got to do with it, that it was a matter that concerned Spain alone, and that he was certain that his Government would never give such a Concession.

M. Polo de Bernabé then told me, confidentially, what had occurred subsequently. According to his account, Herr von Schoen, after receiving the above answer from M. Polo de Bernabé, said that the Emperor was so anxious that this Concession for laying the cable should be secured that he had no other course but to instruct Count Tattenbach to approach the Spanish Government on the subject. Herr von Schoen carried out this intention, and shortly afterwards received a telegram from Count Tattenbach stating that the Spanish Government acceded to the German request and would grant the Concession required. On receipt of this despatch Herr von Schoen informed the Emperor by telegram that the Concession was granted. He received a telegram from His Majesty in reply, expressing the greatest satisfaction, congratulating Herr von Schoen on his success, and authorizing him to instruct Prince Radolin to sign the Declaration at once. In the meantime M. Polo de Bernabé had received a telegram from the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs, stating that Count Tattenbach had applied for the Concession, but that he had been told that to their great regret the Spanish Government were unable to comply with the request of the German Government, as it was against the laws of Spain to allow foreign cables to connect any two points of Spanish territory. M. Polo de Bernabé communicated this telegram to Herr von Schoen shortly after the latter had received the telegram from the Emperor. In view of what had passed Herr von Schoen was naturally in despair on hearing the refusal of the Spanish Government to grant the cable. He said that there must be a misunderstanding, and produced Count Tattenbach's telegram; but M. Polo de Bernabé on his side produced that of the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs, which was drawn up in such a way as to preclude all idea of a misunderstanding, as far as the decision of the Spanish Government was concerned. Herr von Schoen said that he was in a most difficult position as regards the Emperor, and appealed to my Spanish colleague to move his Government to reconsider their decision, pointing out that a Concession of some sort was necessary to make the Declaration palatable to German public opinion, and that the Emperor had set his heart on the laying of the cable, which was, moreover, so desirable in the interest of German subjects trading in and with Morocco. M. Polo de Bernabé replied, however, that he was quite convinced that any further application to the Spanish Government would be useless, adding, moreover, that it was the intention of the Spanish Government to lay a cable them-

selves from Teneriffe to Morocco. Upon this Herr von Schoen promptly asked that the construction and laying of the Spanish cable might, at all events, be intrusted to a German firm. M. Polo de Bernabé replied that it was true that this work would have to be intrusted to some foreign firm, but that it was the custom of the Spanish Government in such cases to invite public tenders and accept that which offered the most favourable terms.

My Spanish colleague has to-day addressed a note to Herr von Schoen pressing his Excellency to authorize Prince Radolin to proceed at once to the signature of the Declaration, the text of which has already been accepted in principle by the German Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. E. GOSCHEN.

[17506] No. 142.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Goschen.

(No. 189.) *Foreign Office, May 7, 1909.*
(Telegraphic.) P.

SPANISH-GERMAN Declaration respecting Morocco.

Text of proposed Declaration has been communicated to me by Spanish Ambassador. Please inform German Government saying that His Majesty's Government have no objection whatever to it and that while it does not concern them directly they would welcome its conclusion, which would be evidence of the good relations existing between the two countries in question.

[15187] No. 143.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 204.) *Foreign Office, May 7, 1909.*
Sir,

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 159 of the 20th ultimo reporting a conversation with the French Minister for Foreign Affairs in regard to the results of the recent Mission to Fez of the French Minister in Morocco. Your Excellency states in the last paragraph of that despatch that inasmuch as M. Pichon was evidently not well acquainted with all that had passed on that occasion, and as yet had no opportunity of discussing with M. Regnault what action should be taken by the French Government to insure the Sultan's compliance with the Algeciras Act, you considered it best to abstain from carrying out the instructions contained in my despatch No. 164 of the 16th ultimo.

Your Excellency will recollect that one of the provisions of the Algeciras Act to which His Majesty's Government attached special importance was the confirmation of the right of foreigners to acquire real property throughout the Shereefian Empire —a right, which although it existed under former Treaties, had hitherto been systematically evaded by the Moorish authorities. Should the Sultan, in spite of his express undertaking to carry out the Algeciras Act, now refuse to apply this Article, which is one of the few from which it was hoped that British interests would derive direct advantage, it is obvious that a bad impression will be created in this country, and it therefore behoves His Majesty's Government to consider in advance what steps they can take to secure a more reasonable attitude on the part of His Shereefian Majesty.

You will remember that Article 66 of the Act provides that goods of foreign origin shall, as a temporary measure, be subjected to a special tax on entering Morocco. This tax probably affects the trade of this country more than that of any other, as a large proportion of the considerable French imports is understood to enter Morocco overland. The French Government naturally desire the retention of the surtax, since the customs dues are to a great extent pledged to France for the service of her loans, and it is probable that, if a hint were given to them that failure on the part of the Sultan to carry out the provisions of Article 60 would compel His Majesty's Government to reconsider their consent to the levy of the customs surtax under Article 66, they would feel disposed to use their best endeavours to induce the Sultan to adhere closely to the obligations imposed upon him by the Algeciras Act.

Your Excellency is authorized to use your own discretion as to the time and manner in which a communication to this effect can best be conveyed to M. Pichon, but you should keep the question in mind and take advantage of any suitable opportunity that may present itself.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. GREY.

[17405] No. 144.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 8.)

(No. 80.) *Tangier—Fez, April 25, 1909.*
Sir,

I HAD a long conversation yesterday with El Mokri, the Minister of Finance, who appears to me far the ablest and most enlightened member of the Maghzen. He is a man of culture, has travelled a great deal, and though, unfortunately, he speaks no language but Arabic, one feels with him that one is dealing with a man of the world. He lives in one of the most beautiful houses in Fez.

We discussed the arrangements to be made for the final discharge of the debt due for Kaïd Maclean's ransom, and he promised to lay my views on the subject before the Sultan to-day. I hope before long to be able to report that this matter has been finally settled.

El Mokri then asked me whether I had seen the Spanish Minister. I said yes, but that he had not given me any information with regard to the progress of his negotiations. El Mokri said that matters were at a deadlock. The demands of M. Merry del Val were quite unreasonable. He insisted, he said, on the cession of territory near Melilla which had been occupied recently, quite illegally, by Spanish troops, the cession of the whole of Gibel Musa, on the ground that was of no use to Morocco, whereas the possibility that it might be occupied by a Power at war with Spain constituted a standing danger, the cession of the land on which certain springs were situated which might be made use of to increase the water supply of Ceuta, the dispatch to the Riff of a large body of Moorish soldiers to be instructed by Spaniards, and the grant to Spain of large fishing Concessions in the waters between Tangier and Melilla, and the installation of twelve fishing stations, which would no doubt be quickly developed into small ports and centres of Spanish influence and activity. To all of these demands a flat refusal had been returned. The Sultan had said that he declined absolutely to cede an inch of territory—with regard to the dispatch of the soldiers he was prepared to carry out the provisions of old Treaties between Morocco and Spain which he admitted had latterly been allowed to fall into abeyance, and according to which small garrisons or guard ports were to be kept in the interests of public security in various Kasbahs in that part of the country. But more than this he declined absolutely to do. I asked whether, in framing these demands, the Spaniards offered anything in return in the way of pecuniary or other advantage. El Mokri replied, "Absolutely nothing." Of course, so far, I have only heard the Moorish version of the case, but from all I hear, it appears to be about correct, and I cannot but think that the Spanish programme has been drawn up somewhat brutally. It is one which might have been presented at the close of a victorious campaign, rather than on the occasion of the mission of a Minister to present his letters of credence to the Sovereign of a friendly Power on his elevation to the throne.

El Mokri asked me to consider our conversation as strictly confidential, as it was not really in his province to discuss such matters with me. The Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs is evidently very jealous with regard to his position.

I have, &c.
(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

[17406] No. 145.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 8.)

(No. 81.) *Tangier, April 29, 1909.*
Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that on the 14th ultimo Sid Guebbas addressed a letter to each of the foreign Representatives informing them that the Sultan had given

orders that the Regulations regarding the taxation of town buildings (copy of which was transmitted to you in Sir Gerard Lowther's despatch No. 127 of the 1st June, 1908) were to come into force at Tangier from the beginning of the current year, and requested them to "hasten to appoint" the three foreign Notables to sit on the valuation Commission as provided in Article 9 of the Regulations.

After an interchange of views between the foreign Representatives it was decided to reply to Sid Guebbas that the Regulations must be brought into force at all the ports simultaneously, and could not be applied at Tangier before they were applied elsewhere.

The object of the Moorish Government in endeavouring to levy the tax at Tangier alone is clear. At Tangier the property liable to taxation under the Regulations is principally in the hands of foreigners and protected persons, the properties in the hands of Moorish subjects being comparatively small, whereas at the other ports it is the reverse, the tax falling almost entirely upon the Moors.

Were the tax to be applied solely for municipal purposes the objection would probably not have been raised, but as half the proceeds of the tax will be paid into the Shereefian Treasury it does not seem equitable that foreigners should be called upon to pay the tax before it is levied from the Moors.

I have &c.
(Signed) HERBERT E. WHITE.

[17410] No. 146.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received May* 8.)

(No. 85. Confidential.)

Tangier, May 2, 1909.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 77 of the 27th ultimo, I have the honour to report that Sid Guebbas has informed me confidentially that he received instructions from the Sultan to arrange with the contractor for paying off the debt on the Tangier harbour works by monthly instalments spread over a term of two or three years, the instalments to be paid out of the Makhzen funds in the hands of the State Bank. Sid Guebbas, under his instructions, consulted the Director of the State Bank, who declined to give any definite advice without referring the matter to Paris, but pointed out that the payment by instalments as proposed would absorb a large portion of the Makhzen funds at the Bank, and would doubtless give rise to protests on the part of others having claims on the Makhzen, and even on the part of the Bank itself.

Sid Guebbas informed me that he has reported fully on the subject to the Sultan, pointing out the danger of giving the German contractors a preference over other creditors, but drawing attention to the desirability of paying for the later drain work, so as to avoid the risk of the contractor selling the *terre-plein* which he holds as security for his debt. No settlement will be arrived at until a reply is received to this letter.

The total amount due to the contractor for the harbour works, the drain and quay, and interest up to date is but little short of 3,000,000 fr. (120,000*l*.)

I have, &c.
(Signed) HERBERT E. WHITE.

[17414] No. 147.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received May* 8.)

(No. 89.)

Tangier, May 2, 1909.

Sir,

SID GUEBBAS came to see me this morning, and whilst with me was brought a letter which had just arrived by express courier from Fez. He opened the envelope in my presence and found it contained a long Shereefian letter addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs at Madrid, and another one for himself, which, his Excellency informed me, contained instructions that he was to have the Shereefian letter translated and forwarded at once to its destination. Sid Guebbas did not read the whole of the Shereefian letter, but informed me that it was a complaint against the Spanish Minister, who refused to discuss with the Sultan the question of the evacuation by the Spanish troops of the places held by them on Moorish territory.

Sid Guebbas asked my advice as to the manner of forwarding this letter. I told

[17407] No. 145 A.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received May* 8.)

(No. 82.)

Tangier, May 1, 1909.

Sir,

WITH reference to your despatch No. 37 of the 1st ultimo, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of the contract drafted in alternative form, which I understand the Union des Mines marocaines proposes to submit to the Sultan. The draft contracts were communicated to me by Count Sainte-Aulaire, who had received them from his Government.

You will observe two very important *lacunæ* in these drafts: first, the districts to which the contracts are to apply are not specified; second, the basis upon which the payments to be made to the Sultan are to be calculated is not stated.

Both drafts commence by declaring that all minerals in Morocco are the property of the Makhzen, and proceed to state that the Makhzen grants a concession for forty years to the Union des Mines marocaines to prospect for and work all minerals, wherever situated, whether in Government, tribal, or privately owned lands in certain districts to be specified. The monopoly is to carry with it the important concession of the right to make roads, bridges, railways, harbour works, &c.; and to levy toll on the Government and on the public for the use of the same, which use is limited by the requirements of the union.

The concession is to be granted in accordance with the terms of the Shereeefian firman to be issued under article 112 of the Algeciras Act; but, in the second draft, with the reservation "pour tout ce qui n'est pas contraire à la présente convention."

The union will have the right to transfer the concession to any special district or mine.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

Inclosure in No. 145 A.

Draft Contract submitted to Sultan by Union des Mines marocaines.

Concession: Formule No. 1.

SA Majesté le Sultan,

Considérant que toutes les substances minérales situées soit à la superficie du sol, soit en profondeur, dans toute l'étendue du territoire chérifien sont la propriété du Maghzen;

Qu'il est de l'intérêt du Maghzen comme des populations marocaines d'en hâter la découverte et la mise en valeur;

Considérant que tant à raison de sa composition que de ses moyens d'action l'Union des Mines marocaines est en état, d'une part d'assurer avec activité et compétence le développement des richesses minières de l'Empire chérifien, et d'autre part de concilier les intérêts internationaux en présence;

A décidé de passer avec elle la convention qui suit:—

1. L'Union des Mines marocaines s'engage à assurer à ses propres frais la prospection minière des territoires ci-dessous ainsi que les études préliminaires à l'exploitation des gisements industriellement exploitables.

2. En conséquence, l'Union des Mines marocaines aura pendant quarante ans la charge d'y faire des recherches soit sur les terres du Maghzen, soit sur les terres des tribus, soit sur les terres des particuliers. Elle jouira dans ce but et à titre exclusif permanent et gratuit de toutes les autorisations nécessaires. Elle ne pourra, cependant, faire les dites recherches dans les propriétés closes de murs, dans les cimetières, ni dans les terrains horm.

3. L'Union des Mines marocaines pourra vendre les produits de ses travaux sous réserve de payer au Maghzen, en versements annuels, des redevances calculées d'après les quantités exportées conformément aux bases ci-dessous.

4. En considération des engagements pris par l'Union des Mines marocaines. Sa Majesté le Sultan déclare sa volonté de lui concéder dans les termes et aux conditions du firman chérifien, qui réglera le régime des mines les gisements situés sur les territoires ci-dessus, qui lui seront désignés par l'union au cours de la période de quarante ans indiquée à l'article 2.

Toutefois, les impôts et redevances n'excéderont pas les sommes résultant de l'application du tableau joint à l'article 3, et le Maghzen s'interdit pendant quarante années d'établir sous quelque forme que ce soit un autre impôt frappant spécialement l'industrie minière.

5. Si pour la mise en valeur des gisements du territoire ou pour l'évacuation des produits il est nécessaire de construire des routes, ponts, câbles aériens, chemins de fer, aménagements de ports, ou autres travaux, l'Union des Mines marocaines sera autorisée à y procéder.

Elle devra s'engager dans ce cas à en permettre l'usage au Maghzen et au public dans la mesure compatible avec une bonne exploitation, et sous les tarifs et conditions à déterminer. Pour ces travaux l'Union des Mines marocaines jouira des mêmes droits et avantages que si elle travaillait pour le Maghzen.

6. Si certains de ces travaux ne pouvaient se faire sans subvention ni garantie d'intérêt, l'Union des Mines marocaines devrait être, à toutes conditions égales, préférée à tout autre demandeur.

7. Pendant la période de quarante ans ci-dessus, Sa Majesté le Sultan ne conférera ni reconnaîtra à aucun autre demandeur de droits miniers quelconques sur les territoires en question.

Toutefois si un gisement minéral industriellement exploitable était négligé ou délaissé par l'Union des Mines marocaines, le Maghzen pourrait mettre celle-ci en demeure de l'exploiter.

Si au bout de deux ans les travaux de premier établissement n'étaient pas commencés le Maghzen aurait le droit de disposer le gisement comme il lui semblerait bon, sous réserve au profit de l'Union des Mines marocaines d'un droit de préférence à conditions égales jusqu'au moment où le bénéficier éventuel commencerait ses travaux.

8. La durée de quarante ans ci-dessus se comptera pour chaque région à partir du jour où d'un commun accord il aura été reconnu que la sécurité est suffisante pour permettre les travaux de recherche.

9. L'Union des Mines marocaines aura la faculté de se substituer librement pour certains territoires ou certains gisements soit des sociétés distinctes formées par ses participants, soit des exploitants choisis sur la liste soumise dès à présent au Sultan.

Si elle présentait au Sultan un nouvel exploitant ne remplissant ni l'une ni l'autre de ces conditions, le Maghzen apprécierait les garanties qu'il offre et pourrait l'écarter s'il ne les jugeait pas suffisantes.

Lorsque les gisements reconnus par l'Union des Mines marocaines auront fait l'objet de concessions minières conformément au firman chérifien relatif au régime des mines elle ne pourra disposer comme tout autre concessionnaire.

10. Sa Majesté le Sultan connaissant l'importance que présente pour le Maghzen et pour ses sujets le développement de l'industrie minière fera tous ses efforts pour les faciliter et le protéger.

Fermage : Formule No. 2.

Sa Majesté le Sultan,

Déclare retenir pour le Maghzen la propriété et la jouissance de toutes les substances minérales situées soit à la surface, soit en profondeur, dans toute l'étendue des territoires indiqués ci-dessous ;

Et considérant que tant à raison de sa composition que de ses moyens d'action, l'Union des Mines marocaines est en état d'une part d'assurer avec activité et compétence le développement des dites richesses minières, et d'autre part de concilier les intérêts internationaux en présence ;

Il a décidé de passer avec elle la convention qui suit :—

3. Corresponds to first paragraph of article 4 in formule 1, omitting references to Shereefian firman.

1. (Identic with article 1 in formule 1.)

2. (Identic with article 2 in formule 1.)

3. En considération de cet engagement Sa Majesté le Sultan déclare sa volonté de lui confier pour quarante années l'exploitation de tous les gisements minéraux révélés dans les dits territoires.

4. Corresponds to article 3 of formule 1.

4. La dite exploitation donnera lieu à une redevance payée chaque année au Maghzen, basée sur les quantités exportées pendant l'année et calculée d'après le tableau ci-après :—

5. Corresponds to remainder of article 4, but limits the application of the Shereefian firman.

5. Pour tout ce qui n'est pas contraire à la présente convention l'exploitation sera soumise aux firmans chérifiens visant le régime des mines au Maroc.

Toutefois le Maghzen s'interdit pendant toute la durée de l'affermage d'établir sous quelque forme que ce soit aucun autre impôt frappant spécialement l'industrie minière.

6. (Identic with article 5 in formule 1.)

7. (Identic with article 6 in formule 1.)

8. Identic with article 8 of formule 1, except first paragraph, which is strengthened.

8. Pendant la période de quarante ans prévue à l'article 3 Sa Majesté le Sultan ne pourra conférer ni reconnaître à aucun autre sous quelque forme que ce soit de droits miniers sur les territoires ci-dessus.

(Rest of article identic with second and third paragraphs of formule 1.)

9. Identic with article 8 of formule 1 with addition of last sentence : "et pour chaque gisement . . . . marchandes."

9. La durée de quarante ans ci-dessus se comptera pour chaque région à partir du jour où d'un commun accord il aura été reconnu que la sécurité est suffisante pour permettre les travaux de recherche et pour chaque gisement à partir du jour où aura commencé l'extraction de quantités marchandes.

10. (Identic with article 9 of formule 1, omitting the last paragraph.)

11. (Identic with article 10 of formule 1.)

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[17408]

No. 145*.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 8.)

(No. 83.) *Fez, April 27, 1909.*

Sir,

SINCE I have been at Fez I have had several conversations with Mr. Harris on the subject of the "Union des Mines marocaines," and in accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram No. 22 of the 19th ultimo, have given him clearly to understand that it is impossible for His Majesty's Government to give their support to any Syndicate until they are in possession of full details with regard to the scheme. I also said as a personal opinion of my own, that it appeared to me that the participation offered to Great Britain was ridiculously small. Mr. Harris' reply to this is that whereas French, Spanish, and German Companies have already spent very large sums of money in acquiring mines, and in the case of the two former in actually working them, no attempts have been made of any sort by British capital to obtain mines or mining concessions in Morocco, and advances made by the French mining group to British capitalists have been refused. Mr. Harris also told me that it had been very difficult to find capitalists in England ready to put up the sum required for the proposed participation, small as it is.

I have the honour to inclose a Memorandum which Mr. Harris has given me, giving a brief summary of what has been done up to now, and showing how matters stand at present.

From what he tells me, the action both of the German Ambassador at Madrid and the German Minister at Tangier has been tortuous. Dr. Rosen undoubtedly supported Mannesmann here, notwithstanding his protestations to the contrary, and they both did their best by distorting the facts to induce the Spanish Government and M. Merry del Val to do the same. For a moment the Spanish and German Companies combined, but Mr. Harris tells me that this combination has now been dissolved, and the Spanish Companies are in negotiation with the Syndicate. Messrs. Mannesmann have, I understand, been informed semi-officially by the German Government that they must come to terms with the Syndicate.

Mr. Harris has received a letter from Baron Langwerth von Simmern, who, as you are aware, is now head of the Moroccan Department of the German Foreign Office, in which he states that he takes a very particular interest in the Syndicate, and thanked him for the conciliatory methods he had employed in the negotiations, as well as in the telegrams which he sent on the subject to the "Times," and says he feels sure of the ultimate success of the venture.

In view of some of Mr. Harris' statements in his telegrams, notably one in which he said that Messrs. Mannesmann had not the official support of the German Government, "whatever may have been the action of the German officials in Morocco," this letter is rather interesting. Baron Langwerth of course holds very different views from Dr. Rosen with regard to German policy in Morocco, and never approved of the latter's ultra hostility to France.

Mr. Macpherson, the representative of the Spanish Companies here, came to see me the other day and asked me what the attitude of His Majesty's Government was towards the Syndicate. I told him that it was impossible for them to give their support to a scheme of which they did not know the details; that when these were submitted to them they would be carefully considered; I added that I believed that in principle they were in favour of the system of internationalisation.

I have, &c.

(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

Inclosure in No. 145*.

Memorandum by Mr. Harris on "Union des Mines marocaines."

THE "Union des Mines marocaines" was founded in 1907, but no definite formation was undertaken until January 1908, when several meetings were held at Paris, at which representatives of the French and German groups were present. At the desire of both I had been invited to attend. The union then took a more definite

form, the French and German representatives severally putting forward the claims of French and German Companies who had discovered, registered, acquired, or exploited mines in Morocco.

M. D'Arcy, President of the Chamber of Mines of Paris, was President, and M. Freilinghaus, Managing Director of Messrs. Krupp and Co., Vice-President. On the part of British capital no claims have been made for mines in Morocco, no discovery of mines registered, and no exploiting carried out. Several advances made by the French group to British capitalists were refused, and very few shareholders were forthcoming.

I managed, however, to obtain an increase in the British participation to 10 per cent. of the whole capital, but was obliged to take over the larger part of the new shares. Sir Ernest Cassel was invited to take the rest. The earlier shareholders remained unchanged. The countries represented by groups are France, Germany, Spain, England, Italy, Belgium, and Portugal (I give them in the order in which they hold shares). Originally, the Spanish participation was fixed at 10 per cent., but in consideration of the exploiting of mines by Spanish Companies, especially in the Riff districts, and of the large sums of money already expended, and also of Spain's political interest in that part of Morocco, her share has been increased.

As far as is known, French Companies have spent upwards of 100,000*l.* already in acquiring, exploiting, &c., the German Companies some 40,000*l.*, and the Spaniards probably much more. The British Companies, &c., have spent nothing, nor can we bring a single mine registered as having been discovered by a British subject into the union.

Italy, Belgium, and Portugal's shares are considerably below that of England. The exact participation of France, Germany, and Spain has been somewhat altered, owing to the additional Companies now included in those groups, but the final details will be laid before His Majesty's Foreign Office. This, I have reason to believe, may have already been done.

It was agreed at the meetings in Paris:—

1. That no form of monopoly should be applied for.

2. That the union's concession—if such it can be called—should be in absolute accordance with the Act of Algeciras and with the "Règlement minier," to be issued by the Sultan.

3. It was further agreed that the form of concession should be seen and approved by the Governments of the countries interested before being finally laid before the Sultan.

This will no doubt be done very shortly, if not already carried out.

A list of the groups and shareholders will also be sent to the Governments concerned.

No negotiations of any kind have been yet undertaken by the union with the Sultan or Maghzen, though I have personally made known to His Shereefian Majesty the existence of the union.

The last meeting of the group took place in Paris on the 5th January, and the following day—both Governments having been made aware of the accord reached—the French and German Governments reopened negotiations for the Franco-German *entente*, and for the scheme of international participation in commercial, &c., affairs in Morocco.

(Signed) W. B. HARRIS.

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him that it appeared to me that as there is no Moorish Representative at Madrid, the ordinary course would be to hand it to the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires here, requesting that it be forwarded to its destination.

Sid Guebbas expressed the fear that the letter if sent to the Spanish Legation might be delayed or held back, and asked whether it could not be delivered at Madrid through a foreign Embassy. I told him that it was not for me to give him advice in this matter, and that he must act as he thought best, but I observed that if he forwarded the Shereefian letter to the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires, informing him that it was accompanied by a translation, and requesting him to transmit it at once to Madrid, it seemed to me very unlikely that the letter would be delayed. I added that a foreign Government could not well undertake to have the letter delivered by their Representative at Madrid, as such a course would give offence to the Spanish Government.

Sid Guebbas begged me not to mention to any one that he had spoken to me on this subject; he said, however, that he would also mention the matter to the French Chargé d'Affaires.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HERBERT E. WHITE.

[17386] No. 148.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received May* 8.)

(No. 87. Very Confidential.)

Madrid, May 1, 1909.

Sir,

I MENTIONED in my despatch No. 64 of the 4th April that the Spanish Government were continuing to press for a fresh acknowledgment by France and Germany of the special political position which Spain claims to occupy in the north of Morocco, and that Germany had intimated to Spain that she would withhold her signature of the document recording this acknowledgment until Spain consented to allow the projected Emden–Teneriffe cable to be prolonged from Teneriffe to a point on the coast of Morocco. I also reported that the Spanish Government had refused to sanction any prolongation of the cable to a point on the African coast lying north of the 7th parallel of northern latitude, as indeed she was bound to do by the terms of the Royal Order of the 6th June, 1907, in which the question of the Emden–Teneriffe cable is fully treated.

The French Ambassador, who has gone fully into this question in his conversations with the Spanish Foreign Minister and with the King of Spain, has been good enough to give me a few further particulars.

It appears that Count Tattenbach, in demanding landing rights for the cable in Morocco, assumed a very peremptory demeanour. Señor Allendesalazar replied that he was tied by the conditions laid down in the Royal Order, and that the Spanish Government were themselves contemplating the laying of a cable from the Canaries to the Morocco coast, which would before long supply the Germans and everybody else with an easy means of communicating with Morocco. The German Ambassador contrived to misunderstand this clear answer and telegraphed to Berlin that Spain would grant the extension of the German cable as desired. Señor Allendesalazar repeating in a subsequent interview his argument that Spain was scarcely at liberty to depart from the terms of a Royal Order embodying the conclusions reached by negotiation with other Powers in addition to Germany, Count Tattenbach resorted to intemperate language, concluding with the assurance that, when his reports came to be compared with the declarations of the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs, the German Government would not hesitate for a moment in believing the version of the German Ambassador. Señor Allendesalazar replied that he was afraid he would be compelled to continue the conversation with Berlin through the Spanish Ambassador at that Court.

M. Révoil informs me confidentially that King Alfonso is much incensed against Count Tattenbach in consequence of the domineering tone which he seems to have adopted in carrying on a negotiation with the Spanish Government. In the course of an interview with his Excellency His Majesty said he did not known how far this overbearing attitude might have been successful at Tangier or at Lisbon, but that it would not be found a paying one at Madrid, and that Count Tattenbach's assistance would henceforth be dispensed with as far as possible in future dealings with Germany.

Meanwhile, M. Révoil says there is no intention here of yielding on the cable question, except with the previous concurrence of the French and British Governments. On the merits of the point at issue his Excellency is not sure that any particular reason now remains for opposing a German cable to Morocco, provided Spain herself were satisfied, and I gather from him that the question may possibly be raised in Paris and London. When the matter was under discussion at Madrid two years ago the possibility of the extension of the cable from the Canary Islands to Morocco greatly preoccupied M. Jules Cambon, then French Ambassador at Madrid, and the efforts of both the French and British Embassies at Madrid were successfully employed to prevent it. But in view of the recent Franco-German understanding regarding Morocco, M. Révoil doubts if France could continue to oppose the idea. I told him I was not sure how His Majesty's Government would regard the question if put to them.

M. Révoil also gathered in conversation from Count Tattenbach that the latter was endeavouring to obtain from the Spanish Government some relaxation of the limitations under which a German Company has recently secured, as you are aware, a Concession to construct a coaling depôt near Teneriffe. The pier which Messrs. Crosa, acting for the Germans, were authorized to construct was to be made of timber, so as to permit of its early removal or destruction in case of necessity under orders from the Spanish War Department. Count Tattenbach, it seems, is pressing for a stone pier, to which the military authorities continue to entertain objections.

King Alfonso referred to this question also, during the conversation which M. Révoil has related to me in the strictest confidence. His Majesty said that Count Tattenbach had pressed his demands in connection with the pier in the same hectoring manner as he had put on in speaking of the cable.

The position of the case as regards the German pier at Teneriffe, and the rival scheme of Messrs. Wilson, has been fully explained in my despatches Nos. 60 and 85 of the 31st March and the 30th April respectively. I may add that Señor Allendesalazar assures me that Count Tattenbach's representations on this point have nothing to do with the projected declaration concerning the position of Spain in Morocco.

M. Révoil tells me that King Alfonso, at the very beginning of the conversation which took place at the audience recently granted to him, plunged at once into the diatribe against Count Tattenbach, the general purport of which my French colleague has enabled me to report in this despatch. Señor Allendesalazar has not himself complained to me of Count Tattenbach's language, though he displayed some resentment in mentioning the German demand in connection with the cable, and was evidently annoyed by the endeavour which Germany is thus making to secure some special advantage in return for the desired declaration concerning Morocco.

The declaration in question is the one of which the draft was communicated to you by M. Paul Cambon on the 19th March (Confidential print, Morocco, 19th March, section 7).

I may say that Count Tattenbach's general demeanour since his arrival in Madrid has been perfectly courteous and friendly, both in his relations with Spanish society and with his diplomatic colleagues, the only exception being afforded by his determination to avoid a frank interchange of views with the French Ambassador on the subject of Morocco. M. Révoil believes that Count Tattenbach is instructed to concert measures with him for putting into effect the details of the recent Franco-German Declaration concerning Morocco. Count Tattenbach avoids in a marked manner any kind of conversation with his French colleague on this topic.

I have, &c.
(Signed) MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[17531] No. 149.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 8.)

(No. 61.) *Berlin, May 8, 1909.*
(Telegraphic.) P.

SPANISH-GERMAN Protocol respecting Morocco.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs asked me to express his thanks to you for the communication which I made to him in accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram No. 189 of yesterday.

His Excellency added that an Agreement with Spain would serve to reassure that Power, although as they had had no difficulties with her in Morocco, it was not so necessary

as the Agreement with France. He had asked Spain, in return for the Agreement, to give landing rights in Teneriffe for a cable to Morocco, as he was desirous of defending himself from the outcry in commercial circles to the effect that he had, without receiving any equivalent in exchange, sacrificed German rights. This the Spanish Government had refused to grant, and consequently negotiations to find a solution were still in progress. His Excellency stated that there was no *arrière-pensée* of gaining political influence by this concession, and that his object was purely a commercial one.

[17506] No. 150.

Sir Edward Grey to the Spanish Ambassador.

Your Excellency, *Foreign Office, May 8, 1909.*

WITH reference to the request which you were good enough to make to me on the 6th instant that His Majesty's Government should express themselves favourably at Berlin respecting the proposed Spanish-German Declaration relative to Morocco, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin has been instructed by telegraph to state to the German Government that His Majesty's Government have no objection to make to the Declaration, and that though it does not concern them directly, they would welcome its conclusion as a sign of the good relations between the two countries.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. GREY.

[17352] No. 151.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Carnegie.

(No. 206.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, May 8, 1909.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 202 of the 6th instant instructing you to ascertain the views of the French Government in regard to the desire of the German Government to extend the Emden–Canary Islands cable to Morocco, I have to inform you that the French Ambassador called at the Foreign Office on the 5th instant, and informed Sir C. Hardinge that the Spanish Ambassador would request my support to the proposed Spanish-German Declaration respecting Morocco. I am forwarding to you in a separate despatch a copy of the note which I have addressed to the Spanish Ambassador on the subject.

In reply to an inquiry as to the attitude of the French Government towards an extension of the German cable to Morocco, M. Cambon stated that if the Spanish Government had pressed M. Pichon to withdraw the opposition of the French Government against landing rights in Morocco he would, to give satisfaction to the Spanish Government, have agreed to do so. Since the Spanish Government, however, maintained their veto and would not make any concession to Germany on this point, the French Government maintained their attitude also.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. GREY.

[17917] No. 152.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 12.)

(No. 88.)
Sir, *Madrid, May 5, 1909.*

I LEARN from your telegrams Nos. 12, 13, and 14 of the 3rd instant that the new Sultan of Morocco is endeavouring to induce the Spanish Government to evacuate the military posts which they established last year at Mar Chica (La Restinga) and Capo de Agua, both lying on the coast between Melilla and the Algeciras frontier.

As Muley Hafid has appealed, through His Majesty's Minister in Morocco, to His Majesty's Government to assist him in this endeavour, I venture to place before you the grounds, as I understand them, on which the Spanish Government were led to occupy the ports in question.

The circumstances were reported by me at the time, and they are restated in my Annual Report for the year 1908.

The Spanish Government found its legal right to take the action complained of on the failure of the Sultan and Government of Morocco to fulfil their Treaty engagements with Spain in respect of the following points:—

Treaty of Tetuan, the 26th April, 1860, Article 6 ("State Papers," vol. li, p. 930):

"On the frontier lines of the neutral ground, ceded by His Majesty the King of Morocco to the Spanish garrisons of Ceuta and Melilla, a Kaid or Governor, shall be placed by His Majesty the King of Morocco, with regular troops, to prevent and repress assaults on the part of the tribes; the Moorish guards, who are to serve at the garrison of Penon and Alhucemas, shall be placed on the seashore."

Convention signed in the city of Morocco, the 5th March, 1894, Article 4 ("State Papers," vol. lxxxvi, p. 540):

"In order to avert any fresh act of aggression on the part of the Riffinians, and to give due effect to the provisions of Article 6 of the Treaty of the 26th April, 1860, His Majesty the Sultan of Morocco engages to establish and constantly maintain in the neighbourhood of the territory of Melilla a Kaïd and a detachment of 400 Royal troops.

"Under similar conditions, other Moorish forces shall be quartered and likewise constantly maintained in proximity to the Spanish fortresses of Chafarinas, the rock of Los Velez or La Gomera and Alhucemas, in conformity with the provisions of Article 6 of the Convention on the limits of Melilla of the 24th August, 1859, and Article 5 of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Spain and Morocco of the 26th April, 1860—these forces shall be under the command of the same Kaïd as those in Melilla.

"A sufficient force, with its corresponding Kaïd, shall for the same purpose be stationed for the fortress on the borders of Ceuta.

"Article 5. The appointment to the post of Pasha of the district of Melilla will now, and for the future, necessarily fall upon a dignitary of the Empire, who, by his special qualifications, shall offer sufficient guarantees for the maintenance of relations of harmony and friendship with the authorities of the fortress and territory of Melilla. The Moorish Government shall give previous notice to the Spanish Government of his appointment or removal.

"The aforesaid Pasha shall be empowered to decide himself, in agreement with the Governor of Melilla, on all questions or claims of exclusively local character, and in the event of disaccord between the two authorities his decision shall be submitted to the Representatives of the two nations in Tangier, excepting in cases the importance of which necessitates the direct intervention of both Governments."

Supplementary Convention signed at Madrid on the 24th February, 1895, Article 3 ("State Papers," vol. lxxxvii, p. 773):

"His Majesty the Sultan of Morocco, in conformity with the engagement set forth in Article 4 of the Morocco Treaty, undertakes, when Prince Muley Araafa is absent, to immediately establish and maintain in the neighbourhood of Melilla a detachment of 400 Moorish troops ('Moros de Rey') under the command of a Kaïd, and likewise engages to at once establish the necessary forces in the vicinity of the remaining Spanish posts for the purposes set forth in the aforesaid Article 1 of the Morocco Treaty."

The Spanish Government has continued to assert, in explanation of the military measures which it has taken in the region of Melilla, that, in the absence of anything approaching to the efficient native control over the territory adjoining this fortress which is stipulated in the foregoing Articles, it was bound itself to take steps for the preservation of order.

It argues further that, having been charged under Articles 30 and 103 of the Algeciras Act, with special duties in relation to the suppression of contraband and to customs supervision in the Riff country, it was impossible for Spain to stand by helplessly while the Roghi was daily smuggling into the country rifles and other munitions of war across the Mar Chica. The occupation of the Restinga was the most effective way of stopping this illegal traffic in arms.

Apart from these avowed motives, based on international Treaties, it is evident

that the recent activity of Spain in the neighbourhood of her possessions on the North coast of Africa and even in Tangier, has been largely prompted by the desire to establish herself more firmly than before in the northern portion of Morocco which she regards as having been specially assigned to her as a sphere of influence by the arrangements concluded with France in October, 1904. Another powerful motive, operating more especially in the Melilla district, was afforded by the French occupation of Udda in March 1907. By this move France virtually extended her authority to the banks of the Muluya River and thus became a still nearer neighbour than before to the Spanish fortresses. Her advance was regarded with much displeasure at Madrid, where the extension of French influence in Morocco has always been considered as constituting a barrier in the way of the legitimate expansion of the Spanish people southwards. It induced the Spanish Government to set to work, after four centuries of inactivity, to peg out its claims in the mining region behind Melilla, to make provision for a railway to connect the mines with the coast, to establish closer relations with the Roghi, to occupy the Restinga and Cabo de Agua and thus to strengthen, if she could, her claim to the eventual inheritance of this part of Morocco.

I have mentioned in former despatches that, although France did not actually protest against a Spanish advance which might be said to alter somewhat the *status quo* which both Powers profess to desire to maintain in Morocco, the French Ambassador reminded the Spanish Government on the occasion both of the occupation of the Restinga, and of that of the Cabo de Agua that, under the provisions of the Secret Treaty of October 1904, Spain ought to have secured the consent of France before taking any step of this kind. Señor Allendesalazar sheltered himself as best he could behind the stipulations of the Treaties quoted above and argued that, in the immediate neighbourhood of her fortresses Spain had a right to claim entire freedom of action.

However this may be, there is little doubt that France watches the recent activity of Spain in the Riff country with the same degree of suspicion and dislike as was certainly produced in Spain by the French advance to the Mulaya.

I am inclined to think that anything in the nature of a summons to Spain to evacuate her new military posts to the east of Melilla would be met by the inquiry whether France would be prepared to retire simultaneously from the Ujda country, and whether the Sultan of Morocco is now in a position to fulfil his Treaty engagements to Spain.

I have, &c.
(Signed) MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[17919]

No. 153.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received May* 12.)

(No. 90. Confidential.)

Madrid, May 8, 1909.

Sir,

I HAVE had the honour to receive, through your Department, the repetition of Mr. Lister's telegrams Nos. 14, 15, and 16, giving an account of the manner in which the Spanish Minister, Señor Merry del Val, is carrying out his mission to the Sultan at Fez.

It has hitherto been claimed by the Spanish Government that, whereas the French are disliked and openly opposed throughout the country, the Spaniards are generally regarded by the Moors with sympathy and even affection. However this may have been in the past, it would seem that the efforts which Spain has recently made to consolidate and extend her influence along the northern coast have aroused a feeling of resentment in the minds of the Sultan and his Advisers. Señor Merry del Val's methods of diplomacy have evidently not contributed to remove this sentiment.

If Señor Merry del Val has failed to ingratiate himself at the Moorish Court, he has also contrived from the beginning of his Mission to Tangier to appear constantly in the light of an enemy to the development of French influence in Morocco. While Señor Allendesalazar has not ceased to proclaim at Madrid that the cordial understanding between France, England, and Spain, in matters relating to that country, continues to inspire the foreign policy of Spain, his representative on the spot is shown by Mr. Lister's Reports to have voted generally, at the diplomatic meetings, with the enemies of this triple combination and to have drawn his counsels chiefly

from the German Legation. Mr. Lister's account of the matter is fully confirmed by M. Révoil. His Excellency has come to regard Señor Merry del Val as an avowed enemy, and I have reason to believe that he is using his influence at Madrid to bring about the fall of Señor Maura's administration, in the hope that under a new Government no time would be lost in changing the Representative of Spain at Tangier. I understand that the Ambassador has already received satisfactory assurances from Señor Moret, leader of the Opposition on this point, and that Señor Percy Caballero, new Ambassador to the Vatican, is the favoured candidate of the French Embassy for the post of Minister for Foreign Affairs in succession to Señor Allendesalazar. He has already filled this office during the last brief Liberal Administrations.

I inquired of the Foreign Minister a few days ago how matters were proceeding at Fez. His Excellency said that the new Sultan was very unyielding. He would transact no important business with M. Regnault without a promise to evacuate Casa Blanca and Ujda, which the French Minister was quite unable to give. His Majesty's attitude towards Señor Merry del Val had been precisely similar. No Spanish demands could be even discussed without a previous undertaking, but that the Restinga and Cabo de Agua would be at once handed over to an Imperial Mehalla. Señor Merry del Val was therefore preparing for an early return to Tangier. A Moorish Embassy was also understood to be on the point of starting for Madrid and Paris charged with the mission of making speedy arrangements for the restitution to Morocco of all the places occupied in the last two years by France and Spain. The position of the Sultan was meanwhile becoming more problematical every day.

Señor Allendesalazar states that Señor Merry del Val's relations with both his French and English colleagues at Fez have been of the most friendly description.

M. Révoil informs me that, in reply to his repeated representations in opposition to the establishment of a Spanish Military Mission at Fez, the Foreign Minister has now given him the most positive assurance that, whatever may have been said to the Sultan on this point by Señor Merry del Val, Spain will take no such step without the full concurrence of France.

I have, &c.
(Signed) MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[18031] No. 154.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 13.)

(No. 92.)
Sir, *Madrid, May 9, 1909.*

I HAVE had the honour to receive your telegram No. 17, informing me of the support which you are giving at Berlin to the Spanish request that the German Government will sign the formula recognizing the special position of Spain in Morocco.

In my despatch No. 87 of the 1st instant I reported on the action of the German Ambassador in Madrid in connection with this matter. Count Tattenbach seems to have finally failed in inducing this Government to consent to the extension of the Emden–Teneriffe cable to the Morocco coast. My French colleague informs me, however, that his Excellency is still pressing for some favour in return for the desired German declaration, his efforts being now directed towards securing an undertaking that, if a Spanish cable be laid from the Canary Islands to Morocco, the materials used shall be exclusively of German manufacture.

I have, &c.
(Signed) M. DE BUNSEN.

[18349] No. 155.

Consul MacLeod to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 15.)

(No. 23. Confidential.)
Sir, *Fez, April 30, 1909.*

THE Sultan Mulai Hafid's local affairs here have now reached a stage at which it may be useful to review them briefly and, with such experience of him as a few

[17406] No. 154*.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. White.

(No. 54.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, May 13, 1909.*

I HAVE received your despatch No. 81 of the 29th ultimo, reporting that the Sultan had ordered that the regulations regarding the taxation of town buildings should come into force at Tangier from the beginning of the current year.

I approve the action taken by you in concert with your colleagues in informing Sid Guebbas that the regulations must be brought into force at all the ports simultaneously, and could not be applied at Tangier before they were applied elsewhere.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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months' intercourse has afforded, to come to some conclusions upon his character and prospects.

From the time he was proclaimed at Fez his popularity went on increasing until his arrival there. It then reached its zenith. Thereafter, partly by reason of the change of attitude towards the Powers, particularly France—which circumstances forced him to assume—but mostly by his ever-increasing demands for money, he became more and more disliked. He was, however, held in salutary fear, both by his officials and the general public, but there was considerable sympathy felt for the ideals upheld by the Shereef Kittany of a Morocco living self-sufficiently in an antiquated Moslem fashion, and rigorously excluding Europeans, which sentiments were markedly increased by the Sultan's undignified manner and his unnecessarily familiar intercourse with foreigners.

At this juncture occurred the flight of Kittany from Fez towards the Berber tribes of Central Morocco.

Brought suddenly face to face with the issue of giving practical effect to such aspirations, and entering upon struggles, first with the Berbers and next with the Powers, and the general insecurity and ruin then involved to all peaceful life and trade, the public suddenly realized the folly of such ideals. There was general consternation at the outlook, followed, directly Kittany was caught, with such great relief, as was voiced in the sentiment one heard then on all sides, " Mulai Hafid is, indeed, a Sultan ; and now we shall have peace and security ! "

The undoubted fact that the Sultan's capture of Kittany was, to a considerable extent, facilitated by chance circumstances favouring the measures he adopted to effect it, rather added to, than lessened, in the popular mind, his prestige in the affair, this being, in Moorish eyes, evidence of divine favour.

The native public, not without some reason, enumerated the Sultan's feats thus :—

1. His successful march through the Zayan Berbers to Mequinez and Fez.
2. His suppression of Mulai Mohammed.
3. His settlement with Raissuli.
4. His capture of Kittany.

In every one of these cases the Sultan falsified the predictions of practically all European critics—and of many Moorish critics as well ; and expectations began to be expressed that he might, before very long, even capture the Pretender Buhmara himself.

All this, naturally, tended to give him somewhat high—perhaps too high—notions of himself, which cannot but have been shocked to some extent by the recent utter rout of his punitive expedition against the Berbers who supported Kittany.

This expedition was regarded, I think justly so, as uncalled for, and obviously beyond the Sultan's power to effect with such miserable troops as he possesses. The event might have been valuable as an object-lesson to the Sultan on the unwisdom of attempting too much ; but, as things stand, it can only be regarded as the last of the many unsuccessful efforts of Moorish Sultans to impose their authority (beyond a merely religious suzerainty) upon these Berbers.

The disaster was much like that which befell Mulai Abd-el-Aziz' expedition (December 1903) against the Pretender. On that occasion, however, none soever of those to blame were punished in any way. On this occasion Mulai Hafid in person reprimanded the returned troops severely, caused some fifty artillerymen and a number of officers to be flogged, and disbanded two regiments, distributing the men into other regiments, and reducing all the officers to the ranks. On the other hand, the wounded had some medical care bestowed on them, and were given fresh clothes, and the Sultan praised and rewarded some regiments and officers who had behaved creditably in this and the Ait Yusi expedition.

A fresh punitive expedition was then prepared and dispatched. The French Captain Leglay, the French non-commissioned officer Pisani, Sergeant Balding, and Dr. Verdon have been sent with this expedition, and more care than formerly is apparently being exercised in its conduct. Pickets are placed, scouts are sent out, and infantry are stationed in trenches between the camps and the pickets, and all are regularly fed, but of real discipline the troops have yet acquired little or none, and of marksmanship none at all.

The French Military Mission are not to blame for this ; they have urged the Sultan not to attempt such campaigns until, say, 5,000 or 6,000 men (or even fewer) had a few months' proper training. The Sultan, however, relies on the chronic mutual

distrust and disunion amongst the Berbers and their anxiety to save their crops, on which they and their flocks depend for sustenance during the next twelve months; but whether the Sultan will really push this force beyond Beni Mtir, or will eventually be contented with reducing the Beni Mtir to such obedience as will keep the Fez–Mequinez direct road safe and permit of the resumption of normal trade with the other Berber districts beyond remains to be seen.

It is much to be hoped the latter will prove the case.

On the eastern side the Pretender, who had been inactive for some time, proclaimed that the defeat in Beni Mtir had been inflicted by his orders (!), and advanced some 8 miles, through Hiayna, nearer to Fez. To this the Sultan answered by imprisoning two Hiayna Kaïds and a number of Hiayna tribesmen then in Fez and seizing their animals, with the result that Western Hiayna submitted to the Pretender. Two mehallas, of small size, of the latter's are now on the east side of Ulad-el-Hadj (the tribe next to Fez on the east), and distant some 12 to 15 miles from the city.

The Sultan has posted a mehalla, some 1,000 strong, to which the (English) Kaïd Belton is attached, at Metafi, some 5 miles east of Fez, to guard that neighbourhood.

To sum up, the local situation seems to be that the Sultan, merely to restore the *status quo ante*, must at least, reduce the Beni Mitir and Hiayna to his rule before he can seriously think of leaving Fez, and must effect these objects before the present crops have been harvested, and mostly hidden, that is to say, before the end of July.

Turning next to the Sultan's character:

He seems to me to do well, and masterfully, what he has had experience of, namely, management of Moorish officials and tribes.

Of dealings with foreigners he has had very little practical experience. Such knowledge as he has had of them is mainly from his acquaintance with Europeans at Marrakesh in former days—men who were merchants or retainers, to whom he was an important client as well as Viceroy, and who, therefore, flattered him—and to reading Arabic newspapers.

He appears to be only now, by degrees, gaining some notion of international usages, of the point of views of foreigners, of the value of the diplomatic and indirect influence of foreign Governments, and of the power of public opinion in European countries. Of the light in which his actions will appear to foreigners, and especially foreign Governments, he has few ideas beyond what his own natural shrewdness and knowledge of human nature, as exhibited by Moors, suggest. He is, as yet, hardly capable to judge of anything by other than Moorish standards.

Though an excellent scholar (in the Moslem sense of the word), he has no modern ideas of finance, and few even of arithmetic. His financial principles are merely to spend not a farthing which can be avoided, to disburse even what is unavoidable only at the last moment, and to refuse nothing, unless to elicit or enforce a payment of more, which, of course, often results in his being penny-wise and pound-foolish. He is, as a rule, very industrious and insists on having even the most trifling things reported to and settled by himself. This checks abuses largely, but has the great disadvantage of keeping all Departments (except the one in which His Majesty chances to be busy) practically idle.

He has strong views on the immediate necessity of consolidating and increasing the Makhzen's hold upon the cities and tribes of the interior—with which views he has, I believe, succeeded in considerably impressing the French Minister—and regards that as of much greater and more urgent importance than the modern improvements which Europeans press upon him, and which seem to him (rightly or wrongly) mostly to affect only the fringe of his dominions.

He is cunning, cynically and avowedly untruthful, and suspicious. Indeed, over-suspicion is at once the best and the worst trait in his character—the best, as it prevents his being cheated by his own people; and the worst, as it causes him to disbelieve people, Europeans in particular, who may be telling him the truth—and makes him apt to attribute to them intentions which they do not entertain.

He is not at all punctilious in religious observances, and the stricter sorts of Moslems have been occasionally shocked by the freedom of the views he expresses. He is passionate and subject to fits of depression, to relieve which, it seems, unfortunately, clear that he does sometimes have resource to alcoholic stimulants.

The future relations between a Sultan of such character and the Powers can scarcely fail to present many difficult problems, for just by so much as he develops into a strong, masterful Ruler of his own people (itself the most necessary desideratum for safeguarding Europeans in the enjoyment of their most elementary

rights), by so much will he be apt to resent and resist anything which may appear to him meddlesome or dictatorial.

It will obviously be a most difficult matter from time to time to insist successfully on his submitting to this or that Power's view, and not at the same time to weaken him regrettably both in his own and his people's eyes.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. M. MacLEOD.

[18267] No. 156.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received May* 15.)

(No. 90 Confidential.)

Fez, April 29, 1909.

Sir,

THE Sultan received me in private audience on the 27th instant. His Shereefian Majesty was seated in a tent pitched on a small bridge over the Fez River in a very marshy and desolate part of the Imperial gardens. I understand it is one of his favourite spots. He was attended by the Acting Grand Vizier, the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the Minister for Finance. As His Majesty always remains absolutely silent at first, I opened the conversation by thanking him for having sent Dr. Verdon out officially with the mehalla, as I felt that His Majesty wished in this manner to confirm his position. The Sultan said that he was now altogether reinstated.

I then said that I would be glad if the matter of the payment of the 20,000*l.* for Kaïd Maclean's ransom could be finally wound up. Two points remained to be settled, viz.:—

1. The question of the conversion into money of the properties purchased by Raisuli out of the 15,000*l.* deposited on his account at the bank; and
2. The payment of the remaining 5,000*l.*

The Sultan replied that he had undertaken to pay the 5,000*l.*, and that the payment would be made in four monthly instalments of 1,250*l.* each; that the first instalment had already been handed by Sid Guebbas to Mr. White (this Mr. White has reported to me), that the second would be paid in a day or two, and that orders had been given to the State Bank to pay the third and fourth when they fell due.

I said that I could not but regret that His Majesty had not seen fit to pay the whole sum at once, as the impression produced would be a sorry one; but he replied that he really had not the money at his disposal, that I knew the deplorable condition of the finances of the country owing to the recent years of anarchy, and that he begged His Majesty's Government not to be hard upon him and to accept the arrangement which he proposed. We then discussed the question of the properties, and he at once said that to save trouble the Maghzen would take them over, and that the sum they represented (some 3,970*l.*) would also be paid by instalments; the first two would be paid in with the second instalment of the 1,250*l.* in a few days, and the third and fourth in the same way. I said that I must have this in writing, and he instructed the Grand Vizier to attend to this. I have now received a perfectly satisfactory note on the subject from Si Abbas-el-Fassi.

I thought it wiser to agree to this arrangement, as it means that the whole sum will be paid up at the end of two months; the delay can really make very little difference to His Majesty's Government, and I learn that the Sultan was very much gratified at my accepting his proposal. I feel that he will now be inclined to deal more liberally with the various claims which we want settled.

During the rest of the audience, which lasted an hour and a-half, we talked on matters of general interest, and I hope to have succeeded in placing our personal relations on a friendly footing. His Majesty has read a great deal, and is very well up in the history of his country. I told him that I had hoped to make a trip to Morocco City, but he said that he would not hear of my going now; that I must wait till he was there, and then pay him a visit. He would, he said, at the same time arrange for me to go up to the Atlas Mountains and visit all the southern ports. He has also invited me to visit him at Rabat, but said that for the moment he would prefer my not going there owing to the unsettled condition of the country.

His Majesty had a small motor-boat tied up below the bridge, the engines of

which had been removed; he proposed, however, that I should return in it all the same to the Palace gates, which I did, accompanied by the Grand Vizier and the Lord Chamberlain, the boat being somewhat clumsily manœuvred by a negro slave with one oar. His Majesty watched our somewhat erratic argosy with great interest, having been joined by two ladies as soon as I left the bridge. One of them, I gather, is a relative of Glawi, a clever managing woman who has great interest with the Sultan and enjoys his complete confidence. I imagine that she must have overheard all our conversation, as the bridge is so small that she must have been just behind the tent.

I have, &c.
(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

[18268] No. 157.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 15.)

(No. 91. Confidential.)

Fez, May 1, 1909.

Sir,

AS I had the honour to report in my telegram No. 35 of the 28th ultimo, the Sultan asked me to come round and see him on the afternoon of the 28th ultimo.

I found His Majesty considerably upset, and evidently in a very bad temper, after a long interview which he and his Viziers had had with the Spanish Minister. M. Merry del Val's tone, His Majesty said, had been more overbearing than ever, and he realized that negotiation with him was impossible. The Sultan told me that he had repeated once more what he had said from the very beginning, that it was impossible for him to come to any agreement on the various points raised in M. Merry del Val's programme so long as the Spanish troops remained in the posts occupied by them in the Riff at the beginning of last year. (Moorish geography is vague, but, as far as I can make out, the posts referred to by His Majesty are the point on the strip of land dividing Mar Chica from the Mediterranean and various points facing the Chafarinas Islands, the occupation of which was reported in Mr. White's despatches Nos. 44 and 68 of the 22nd February and 14th March of last year.) To this M. Merry del Val replied, as on previous occasions, that he had no authority to discuss this point, and the Sultan had then said that under the circumstances it was better to break off negotiations at Fez, and he would send a Mission to Madrid, where the matter could be discussed.

The Spanish Minister had appeared much incensed at this, and said that it remained to be seen whether the Mission would be received. In any case he must insist that the officials chosen were of equal rank to those selected to proceed to Paris. He asked the Sultan if he could tell him their names. His Majesty said he would, but at this stage of the conversation (according to M. Merry del Val) he asked for his field glasses, and proceeded to inspect some object on the far horizon. The conversation dropped, and, after a few moments' awkward silence, M. Merry del Val rose and took his leave, saying as he left that the Sultan would find that Spain was a valuable friend to Morocco, but that she might also prove a dangerous enemy. The Sultan, after describing the conversation, said he was most anxious to have my opinion. I said that I could only speak as a private person, but that it certainly appeared to me that if His Majesty was determined to maintain his condition as to the evacuation, and M. Merry del Val had no authority to discuss it, a deadlock had been reached, and there was nothing for it but to send the Mission to Madrid. At the same time it appeared to me most unfortunate that there should be an open rupture, and I thought no pains should be spared to arrive at a solution, and insure M. Merry del Val's leaving Fez on outwardly friendly terms with the Maghzen. His Majesty answered that he too regretted what had occurred, that he did not wish me to think for a moment that he had adopted an uncompromising attitude towards M. Merry del Val. There were many things in his programme to which he hoped to be able to agree, both points already specified in Treaties and others. At the same time he had from the first made his attitude quite clear with regard to the evacuation of Moorish territory, and if now, after seven weeks, M. Merry del Val still declined to discuss it on the grounds that he had no instructions, it really was useless to protract the negotiations any further. He had, he said, quite made up his mind to send the Mission; it was to start on Thursday next (this is an impossibility), and he begged me to lay the matter before you, and expressed the hope that His Majesty's Ambassador at Madrid might

be instructed to use his good offices with the Spanish Government to facilitate a settlement. The Sultan said that the occupation was illegal and unjustifiable. He was perfectly prepared to execute the obligations imposed upon him by Treaty, and send Moorish garrisons to the various kasbahs and guard-houses, which would be quite sufficient to maintain order and guarantee the security of the district.

On the following morning the Spanish Minister came to see me and gave me his account of what had occurred, which I must say tallied with what the Sultan had told me. He quite admitted that the Sultan had from the outset said he could agree to no arrangement until the territory occupied in the Riff had been evacuated; and that he had replied that that was a matter which he had no authority to discuss. I asked him whether he had not informed his Government of the attitude adopted by the Sultan and asked for instructions; he replied that most certainly he had, but that the Government had absolutely ignored it, and that he could only imagine that they had done so deliberately and did not want the matter discussed. Moreover, as notwithstanding what the Sultan had said, the Viziers commenced negotiations with him on various points in his programme, he had hoped that the whole thing had been bluff on the Sultan's part, and that he would hear no more of it. I fear that M. Merry del Val's estimate of the situation was entirely wrong, and has now led him to the present deadlock. Moreover, if his tone when discussing with the Sultan and the Maghzen is anything like the one that he adopts in conversation with me, I am not surprised at the failure of his negotiations. As I reported in my telegram No. 40 of yesterday's date, he said that Spain, of course, would never think of treating with Morocco on a footing of equality, that it was a gross impertinence on the part of the Sultan to put forward any conditions, and practically laid down that all the Moorish Government had to do was to accept any proposals which the Spanish Government might be good enough to make to them. He also speaks freely, not only to myself, but also to Mr. Harris, of the probable landing of Spanish troops. It is high time, he said, that Morocco should be again made to feel the power of Spain. She was evidently forgetting what had occurred some fifty years ago. I asked whether he did not think this would create international complications, but he replied certainly not. The French had done it, and so could they. I did not continue the conversation, as it could serve no useful purpose. M. Merry del Val, of course, ridicules the idea that the Sultan can restore and maintain order in the district by the dispatch of the small number of troops provided for by Treaty. Spanish commerce, he says, has suffered greatly from the prevalent insecurity, and the lives of all Europeans are in danger. As long as this state of things continues Spanish troops must remain there.

Since then I have had two more interviews with M. Merry del Val, and I must say that his tone has become very much more moderate. In the note which he has now received, a translation of which he read to me, the Maghzen state that they are sending a Mission to Madrid to discuss the question of the evacuation of Moorish territory occupied by Spanish troops, to which the Sultan attaches special importance, and which M. Merry del Val states that he has no authority to discuss, and also other "questions of importance." They do not say, however, that all future arrangements must be conditional on the evacuation, which was the attitude originally taken up by the Sultan. The officials to be sent are the second Khalifa of the Grand Vizier, corresponding to Si Abbas-el-Fassi, but junior to him, and Sid Mohammed-ben-Zniber, who was at one time the Minister of Finance, and was employed in drawing up the various "Règlements" resulting from the Act of Algeciras.

I have had long conversations with El Mokri, the Minister of Finance, and with the Acting Grand Vizier, and have done all I could to urge moderation and avoid a rupture. They quite agree as to the advisability of this, and it is evidently the Sultan who has decided to break off negotiations. His Majesty has come to the conclusion that M. Merry del Val is an impossible man to negotiate with, and openly says that any change would be for the better. Nothing now will be done until the Spanish Minister receives instructions from Madrid, but in the meantime the relations between him and the Maghzen remain quite friendly. In answering the Maghzen's note he will ask for arrangements to be made for him to leave Fez on the 12th instant, but unless otherwise instructed he will go through all the usual formalities, except the dinners offered on such occasions by the Viziers, and ask for a farewell audience of the Sultan.

I have, &c.
(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

[18275] No. 158.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received May* 15.)

(No. 98.) *Tangier, May* 9, 1909.

Sir,

THE principal event during the past week has been the flight of the Mulai Kebir from Rabat to the Zair tribe, by whom, it is reported, he has been proclaimed Sultan.

Mulai Kebir is a half-brother of the Sultan and of Mulai Abdelaziz, whom he deserted in a similar manner about a year since, escaping to the Zair and joining Mulai Hafid, who sent him with the Viziers to Marakesh at the time of Mulai Abdelaziz' march on that city from Rabat.

The half-brothers have, however, as I understand, never got on well together, and recently the Sultan took possession of property belonging to Mulai Kebir, who received orders to proceed to Fez with the Viziers, leaving Mulai Bubeker, uterine brother of Mulai Hafid, as Viceroy at Marakesh in his stead.

Mulai Kebir evidently did not care to trust himself with the Sultan fearing that he would share the fate of his other brothers who had gone to Fez. He must have prepared his escape beforehand with some of the Zair tribesmen, of whom a number visited him at Rabat.

I have had occasion to see Mulai Abdelaziz and Sid-el-Menebhi recently, and they both consider that the flight of Mulai Kebir may have serious consequences. If, as is believed, the Zair and Zemmur tribes have proclaimed him it is probable that the other Berber tribes will follow their example, and in that case the Sultan's position would be seriously menaced, as the Berber tribes are very powerful and they would very possibly procure Mulai Kebir's proclamation at Mequinez. The Sultan would find himself surrounded by hostile tribes on all sides except for a small tract on the north, and, should the expedition operating against the Beni Mtir meet with a reverse, His Majesty's position would become critical, for even at Fez and in the districts considered loyal he is personally very unpopular.

It is, however, quite possible that the reports of Mulai Kebir's proclamation may prove to be unfounded, and that he merely fled to the Zair for personal safety and without ambitious designs.

Much may depend on the line the Viziers may assume; but on this point no certain forecast can yet be made. From the somewhat contradictory reports that reached Tangier they appear to be in no hurry to reach Fez, and are probably waiting to learn the object and effect of Mulai Kebir's flight and the results of the expedition against the Beni Mtir. Mr. Vice-Consul Neroutsos reports that they were to camp at Meshra Remleh on the 6th, that would make a total march of 20 miles in four days, a slow rate of progress considering that they are constantly receiving messages from Mulai Hafid urging them not to delay their march. Both Mulai Abdelaziz and Sid-el-Menebhi stated to me that the Grand Vizier need have no fear for his personal safety at Fez as the Sultan would not dare to touch him; on the contrary, they both declared that he could, if he wished, seize the Sultan and depose him.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HERBERT E. WHITE.

[18425] No. 159.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received May* 16.)

(No. 51.) *Fez, May* 12, 1909.

(Telegraphic.) P.

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs has told me that the early capture of Mulai Kebir, who has taken refuge with a Shereef of the Zair, is practically certain.

[18560] No. 160.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received May* 17.)

(No. 99. Confidential.) *Fez, May* 6, 1909.

Sir,

AS I had the honour to report in my telegram No. 46 of to-day's date, Kittani died the day before yesterday from the effects of a flogging which was administered on the night of the 17th ultimo. Up till yesterday the Maghzen had always given out that the flogging had nothing to do with the Beni 'Mtir disaster. That it had in fact been given before the news had been received, and was the result of treasonable letters of Kittani which had been seized at Marakesh and sent to the Sultan. Last night, however, the Grand Vizier admitted under the strictest seal of secrecy that that was not the case. It appears that on the receipt of the news of the reverse somebody mentioned in the presence of the Sultan that the Beni 'Mtir openly attributed it to the "barakka" (the saintly blessing) of Kittani, on which the Sultan flew into a passion and said that he would soon show them all the value of Kittani's "barakka."

Orders were at once given that he was to be very severely flogged. After the flogging he was thrown into a dungeon in a pitiable condition. No sort of care was shown for his wounds, and only the barest and coarsest nourishment was allowed for him. When his body was taken out for burial it was found that his clothes had grown into his lash wounds, which had healed in places and produced horrible sores. I gather that the effect produced in Fez among those who are aware of the true facts of the case is one of stupefaction for the Sultan's disregard for the inviolability of the person of a holy man, mingled with dismay as to their own possible fate. They hardly dare speak of it even among themselves. Mr. Harris tells me that in a long conversation which he had two nights ago with the Grand Vizier, the latter spoke very openly and depicted the situation in the darkest colours.

There was no money. The Sultan was determined to refuse the demands of all foreign Powers, he had no idea of how the Government of an Empire should be carried on, and was trying to run it on the same lines as those on which he had managed his palace at Marakesh; worst of all, nobody dared say a word to him. Possibly things might change on the arrival of El Glawi, and he personally should be glad when that day arrived, although he believed that he was in the bad books of the Grand Vizier. What he hoped above all was that the latter might at once dismiss him, as he had no wish to form part of the present Maghzen. This wish may also to some extent be accounted for by the fact that under Moulai Hafid's régime there is little money to be made.

In the meantime the Sultan's usual success, which was broken by the Beni 'Mtir disaster, appears once more to be accompanying his dealings with his own people. News reaches me from various sources that he has succeeded, no doubt by negotiations and money, in isolating the Beni 'Mtir from the other Berber tribes. His Mehalla is very strongly entrenched and is engaged in eating up and destroying the whole country. Pressure is being put by the inhabitants of those districts on the remainder of the tribe to come to terms, some of them have actually come into the Mehalla, and rumour has it that Delegates have been sent to Rabat to sacrifice to El Glawi. There appears to be no truth in the report that the latter's Mehalla has been destroyed on its way to Rabat. El Glawi and the Viziers accompanying him are said to have left Rabat and are expected to arrive in Fez on Saturday or Sunday.

Kaïd Belton, who is in command of the Mehalla sent out to watch the movements of the Pretender, wrote to me last night to say that the Beni Warrain, who seemed wavering, have sent in to make sacrifices, that the Pretender is at about eight hours distant from the camp, and that he has only about 800 men with him, of which half are mounted. The general opinion is that he has ceased to constitute any real danger, and that even the tribes have deserted him.

I have, &c.

(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

[18567] No. 161.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 17.)

(No. 96.)

Sir, *Madrid, May 13, 1909.*

THE alleged failure of Señor Merry del Val's mission to Fez having occupied for some days the press and public opinion of Madrid, the Government was interpellated on the subject in the Chamber of Deputies on the 10th instant. The reply of Señor Allendesalazar, Minister for Foreign Affairs, was subsequently condensed into an official paragraph which appeared in the newspapers on the following day. From the inclosed translation you will see that, while denying the absolute rupture of the negotiations at Fez, and announcing that they would be continued in Madrid on the arrival of the expected Moorish Embassy, the Foreign Minister sought to show that, if Spanish diplomacy had suffered any check, the earlier mission of M. Regnault, the French Minister at Tangier, had been equally unsuccessful. Both the French and Spanish Ministers had been confronted with the Sultan's demand that, as a preliminary to further discussion, an undertaking should be given with regard to the early evacuation of the points of Moorish territory occupied respectively by the French and Spanish troops. Both Ministers had naturally declared that their powers did not extend to making the required engagement.

On this point the French Ambassador at Madrid informs me that the parallel which the Spanish Government are so anxious to draw between the fortunes of the two missions to Fez is by no means so close as the above statement would show. M. Regnault, it was true, had been received by the Sultan in a somewhat uncompromising spirit. But he had gone so far, before he left Fez, as to promise the evacuation of Udja and of the Showia region, subject to the loyal acceptance by the Sultan of certain frontier arrangements. It was only when the Sultan insisted further on the immediate evacuation of Casa Blanca itself that M. Regnault had been compelled to refer to Paris and to break off the discussion at Fez. Señor Merry del Val had shown a far less conciliatory spirit. The points near Melilla had been occupied by Spain on the pretext that the Sultan had no power to keep order there. The Spanish Minister ought to have at least undertaken, as M. Regnault had done, that evacuation would ensue upon the Sultan taking measures to fulfil his Treaty obligation of keeping an efficient force in the region in question. He had refused to consider even a conditional withdrawal of the Spanish troops, and he had thus proved to the Sultan that France is prepared to deal with these questions in a more accommodating temper than Spain.

Señor Merry del Val's demands are also stated by M. Révoil to have been of a most exorbitant nature. The Spanish Minister is reported to have claimed absolutely the same treatment for the districts adjoining the Spanish fortresses as is secured to France by her Treaties with Morocco in respect of the Algerian frontier. He demanded further, according to M. Révoil's information, a Spanish monopoly of all the fisheries along the north coast of Morocco. It was natural that the Sultan should have declined to proceed with a negotiation conducted in this spirit.

Meanwhile, the Spanish Government is being urged by some of the organs of the press to strengthen the garrisons of Ceuta and Melilla, and even to send an expeditionary force to operate in the neighbourhood of those fortresses. M. Révoil is watching the situation closely. For the present he does not apprehend that Spain will take any action of this kind. But his Excellency is much dissatisfied with the part which Señor Merry del Val is reported to have played in connection with the recent negotiations.

I have, &c.
(Signed) MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

Inclosure in No. 161.

Reply of Señor Allendesalazar in the Chamber of Deputies to the Interpellations respecting the alleged failure of Señor Merry del Val's Mission to Fez.

(Translation.)

WITH regard to the news published in the press relative to the result of the negotiations intrusted by the Government of His Catholic Majesty to Señor Merry del

[17408] No. 162*.

Foreign Office to Sir E. Cassel.

(Private.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, May* 17, 1909.

WITH reference to your letter to Sir Charles Hardinge of the 26th March last,* I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to communicate to you, for your private information, a copy of a memorandum by Mr. Harris, on the present position and prospects of the "Union des Mines marocaines."

I am to add that His Majesty's Government, while in favour of the principle of internationalisation of mining business in Morocco, are unable in the present state of their information to express an opinion upon the value of the concessions to be obtained by the Syndicate, or as to the advisability of British participation therein. If British capitalists should in the end participate, His Majesty's Government will favourably consider the support which should be given to them on the conditions being made known to them.

I am, &c.
(Signed) W. LANGLEY.

* Not printed.

Val, we can give an assurance that both during the course of the negotiations and in the replies given by the Sultan and his Viziers to the Spanish Ambassador the same procedure has been followed in Fez as was followed with M. Regnault regarding the action taken by him as Ambassador of France.

Certain of the demands presented were favourably received by the Maghzen; the attention which is due to others was delayed on the ground of the present situation of Morocco (good care was taken to return a direct refusal to none); and finally, at the last moment, they demanded that the satisfaction of several just claims should be made to depend on the signature of an Agreement regarding the evacuation of those points in the Riff country which the Spanish Government has been obliged to occupy with military forces in order to secure their communications with Melilla and Chafarinas and to put a stop to the contraband traffic in arms and ammunition, so that the Moors who are unwilling to recognize the authority of the present Sultan may not be able to provide themselves with material of this kind.

As he did in the case of France, Mulai Hafid has announced to the Spanish Government his proposal to send a special mission, like that which has been to him in Fez, to terminate here in Madrid the negotiations opened there, and especially to press for the above-mentioned evacuation without waiting for order and public security to be re-established by the officials and forces, which it is his duty to send in order to establish Moorish authority in that region.

[18439] No. 162.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received May* 17.)

(No. 173.)
Sir, *Berlin, May* 15, 1909.

THE Spanish Ambassador called on me on the 10th instant, and explained to me at some length the situation caused by the insistence of the German Foreign Office that on the signature of the proposed Agreement between Germany, Spain, and France with regard to Morocco, the Spanish Government should give landing rights in Teneriffe for a cable between the Canaries and Morocco, in communication with the cable between Teneriffe and Emden. His Excellency then asked me confidentially if I could give him any support by pointing out to Baron von Schoen that, in signing the Declaration, Germany was only recording what she had already stated on more than one occasion to be her policy, and that no compensation of the kind in question could be considered to be due to her from Spain. I replied by reading to him the communication I had made to Baron von Schoen on the 7th instant by your instruction, and pointed out that, as His Majesty's Government had stated that they were not directly concerned in the matter, it might seem inconsistent to you to offer an opinion on such a point unless it were asked for. I did not report the matter to you, as it appeared from your despatch No. 125 of the 4th May last that M. de Villa Urrutia had already spoken to you on the subject.

In the course of the following day M. Cambon alluded to the difficulties which had arisen, and said that he did not consider that it was to the interest of either France or England to intervene between Spain and Germany in the matter. He proceeded to speak with much bitterness of the action of the Spanish Government, who were raising all sorts of difficulties for the French in Morocco, principally through the jealousy of M. Merry del Val, their Minister. I might judge of the competency of the latter to deal with the situation on hearing that his first proceeding on reaching Fez had been to demand authorization for the establishment of a settlement of Franciscan monks in the town itself.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. DE SALIS.

[18719] No. 163.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received May* 18.)

(No. 100.)
Sir, *Fez, May* 8, 1909.

THE news of the flight of the Sultan's brother, Moulai-el-Kebir, from the camp of the southern Kaïds, a day's march this side of Rabat, which took place on the night of the 3rd instant, and which has doubtless already been reported to you from Tangier, has

evidently caused the Sultan some preoccupation. Moulai-el-Kebir is the only remaining brother who has given evidence of any sort of intelligence or character. He was much disappointed at not being named Khalifa at Marakesh by Moulai Hafid, and though never in open rebellion, has from time to time been tempted to listen to the treasonable counsels of the Sultan's enemies. The motives of his flight are still unknown, whether fear as to his possible ill-treatment on arrival at Fez, or whether an intention to raise the standard of revolt. He probably has not definitely made up his own mind on the subject, and is waiting to see the result of the Sultan's present operations against the Beni 'Mtir. At present he is supposed to be in security amongst the Zemmur tribe. That the Sultan attaches a certain amount of importance to his escape is proved by the fact that he has recalled Ma Haboub, the Commander-in-chief of the principal mehalla operating against the Beni 'Mtir, and an uncle by marriage of Moulai-el-Kebir, and replaced him by the Kaïd Mechwar (the Lord Chamberlain). He evidently thought it dangerous to leave so near a relation of his brother's at the head of so large a body of troops.

I have, &c.
(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

[18255] No. 164.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Carnegie.

(No. 222.) *Foreign Office, May* 20, 1909.

Sir,

YOU will have seen from the telegram sections and other correspondence which will have reached you that His Majesty's Minister in Morocco, acting under my instructions, has approached the Sultan with regard to the failure of the latter to carry out the provisions of Article 60 of the Algeciras Act, which confirms the rights of foreign subjects to acquire land in Morocco.

In his telegram No. 49 of the 10th instant Mr. Lister reported that the Sultan, after explaining his reasons for not putting Article 60 into force, begged that a delay might be granted, and added that he was already in communication with the French Government on the subject.

Before taking any further steps I should be glad to learn what action the French Government propose to adopt in the matter. In the opinion of His Majesty's Government, it is important to remove without delay the long-standing grievance of the foreign commercial community in Morocco that they are unable to acquire land in that country, notwithstanding the right to that effect secured to them under the Madrid Convention and confirmed by the Algeciras Act; and His Majesty's Government consider that the Sultan should be pressed to give way and to fulfil his obligations.

They cannot but feel that if the Treaty Powers were explicitly to agree to a postponement of the matter, the Sultan's pledge might not improbably remain unredeemed indefinitely.

I request that you will communicate with the French Government in the sense of the preceding paragraph, and will inquire whether they hold the same views and are prepared to take diplomatic action to secure the desired result.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. GREY.

[19171] No. 165.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 21.)

(No. 54.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, May* 21, 1909.

I AM assured by the German Minister, with reference to Mr. Lister's despatch No. 83 of the 27th ultimo, that the communication to the German Consul at Fez of the text of the instructions he had received from his Government constituted the sole support which he had given to Mr. Mannesman.

Dr. Rosen states that the mining venture of Messrs. Mannesman has been turned into an International Syndicate, and both of the International Syndicates are now regarded by the German Government with equal benevolence. He added that one of

the Mannesmans had been conducting negotiations here with a representative of the "Union des Mines Marocaines," but these negotiations had been adjourned as when they were nearly concluded Mr. Mannesman stated he could settle nothing without the consent of his brothers.

[19210] No. 166.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 22.)

(No. 104.) *Fez, May* 10, 1909.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that the Mission to be dispatched to Paris, consisting of Hadj Mohammed-el-Mokri, Minister of Finance, and Sid Abdullah-el-Fasi, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, and accompanied by Ben Ghabrit, the Algerian Interpreter of the French Legation, left Fez yesterday for Tangier. They are, I understand, to be conveyed to Marseilles in a French cruiser leaving Tangier on the 17th instant.

Before leaving El Mokri told me that he was authorized to discuss the question of a loan in Paris, and that it was absolutely essential for the Maghzen to get some money. He also said that it was the Sultan's desire that they should go on to London on a complimentary Mission in return for my Mission to Fez, that nothing had been settled as to date, but that it was possible that, after performing the ceremonious part of their Mission to Paris, they might proceed to London, and then return to France and settle down to serious business. He evidently anticipated that their stay in France would be a long one, for, as he said, negotiations were always long and difficult for people who wanted money.

I have, &c.
(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

[19211] No. 167.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 22.)

(No. 105.) *Fez, May* 11, 1909.

Sir,

AS I had the honour to report in my telegram No. 50 of the 10th instant, I was informed at the last meeting which I had with the Viziers that the Sultan had decided that all claims were to be referred to the Commission now sitting at Tangier. The Grand Vizier stated that a large and competent staff of men had been appointed on the Commission, that they had at their disposal the means of examining and verifying the claims, and that this arrangement would greatly facilitate and expedite a settlement. Si Abbas added that the French and Spanish Governments had accepted this arrangement.

I answered that I was much surprised at what he told me, that it had been clearly laid down that the Tangier Commission was only to discuss direct claims against the Government and that I must reserve my answer on the matter.

I subsequently asked M. Gaillard whether it was true that the French Government had accepted the arrangement, and he answered in the affirmative. M. Regnault's Mission, he said, had not been "a mission of claims," but had confined itself to the discussion of political matters.' Moreover, most of the French claims had already been examined at Rabat, and were only awaiting a settlement. M. Gaillard said that he could not but think that the arrangement might really prove advantageous for the claimants.

Bukili and Hadj Dris Benjelun, who were the principal Delegates, were both clever men, accustomed to deal with Europeans, and it might be possible to exercise more pressure at Tangier than at Fez.

There may be a certain amount of truth in what he says, though, of course, reference to the Committee will entail further delay, and the final settlement will always rest with the Sultan. I also asked the Spanish Minister whether his Government had consented to the arrangement. He told me that it had been submitted to him, but that owing to the breakdown of his negotiations no reply had been given. He certainly intended, however, to recommend his Government to accept it.

At my interview with the Sultan on Sunday I spoke to him very seriously on the subject, and said that His Majesty's Government had yet to learn whether his attitude

would be satisfactory in matters important to British interests other than the execution of the Act of Algeciras. The question of British claims was one, and I had hoped that he would have given orders for the examination and settlement here of all purely commerciel claims for money owing for goods delivered to Moors by British merchants and never paid for. He replied that he was most anxious to see justice done in these matters, but that unfortunately all claims were not honest ones; that all involved the payment of money, and consequently required to be examined and verified; that he had neither the men nor the information at Fez necessary for this, and that he had therefore decided to refer all alike to the Commission at Tangier; he then repeated the arguments used by the Grand Vizier. He added that a precedent existed for this arrangement in the case of the Demnat claims during Moulai Hassan's reign, which had given excellent results. He concluded by expressing a hope that His Majesty's Government would agree to the course proposed as the French and Spanish Governments had done; otherwise the whole question would have to be reopened. I am to see the Grand Vizier this afternoon, and shall continue to urge upon him the desirability of settling several of the more urgent commercial claims, the justice of which had already been admitted by the previous Maghzen; but I fear that he is of little use, and in view of the imminent arrival of El Glawi (in a few days' time) he is not likely to take any strong action in the matter.

I have, &c.
(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

[19212] No. 168.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 22.)

(No. 106. Very Confidential.)

Sir, *Fez, May 11, 1909.*

AS I had the honour to report in my telegram No. 49 of the 10th instant, I was received in audience by the Sultan last Sunday, and conveyed to him the substance of your telegram No. 28.

I noticed on entering the pavilion that His Majesty appeared in a most excellent temper, and I wondered how long it would last, in view of the unpleasant truths I had to tell him, but to my great surprise it remained quite unruffled, and I could only imagine that he must have received good news with regard to internal matters, the flight of Moulai-el-Kebir, or the Beni M'tir campaign. I discovered, however, afterwards that this was not at all the case, indeed, very much the reverse. He is excessively preoccupied as to Moulai-el-Kebir's intentions, furious with El Glawi for having allowed him to escape, and the news from the Mehalla is anything but reassuring; the various tabors are quarrelling among themselves; many of the Kaïds are wavering in their allegiance since the news reached the camp of Moulai-el-Kebir's flight, and the attitude of Hammo-ben-Hammo, the Sultan's father-in-law, and most powerful supporter among the Berber tribes, is far from reassuring.

I felt certain that the Sultan would make the same retort to me as he did through his Viziers to the French and Spanish Ministers when they reproached him with the non-execution of the provision of Article 60 of the Act of Algeciras, viz., that there were fifty-nine Articles before No. 60, and that he on his side complained of the non-execution of Article 1, the integrity of the Moorish Empire. On that occasion M. Regnault had replied that he was surprised that the Sultan should make such a reproach to him considering that he was at that moment negotiating with him for the evacuation of the Shawia and of the districts on the Algerian frontier recently occupied by French troops. The Viziers had then replied it was not the French that His Majesty had in mind, whereupon the Spanish Minister said at once that it was evidently the Spaniards who were intended. After some tergiversations on the part of the Viziers the matter was allowed to drop.

My conjecture proved correct. The Sultan, after listening to what I said, replied that he understood the attitude of His Majesty's Government, but that the Article relative to the acquisition of land by foreigners was only the 60th, that there were fifty-nine before it, and that he on his side complained of the non-execution of the first Article. Spanish troops were illegally occupying Moorish territory, and, worse than all, the Spanish Minister, after being seven weeks at Fez, declined absolutely to discuss the question with him. In this he contrasted the Spanish attitude very unfavourably with that of the French.

I answered that I understood the matter would be discussed at Madrid, so that that grievance was disposed of. The occupation, as he knew full well, had been rendered necessary and imperative by the hopeless state of anarchy existing in the Riff, which had resulted in the loss of Spanish lives, the pillage of Spanish property, the destruction of commerce, and the enormous increase of the contraband trade in arms, to the great advantage of the Pretender. I had armed myself beforehand with all the arguments employed by the Spaniards at the time of the occupation, and repeated them to the Sultan. He said that since then the conditions had completely changed; the country had quieted down very considerably, and had returned to its allegiance. He was, moreover, quite prepared to send up at once the garrisons stipulated by Treaty, and guaranteed himself to restore security. I said that this was not so easily done as he seemed to think, and I doubted whether the presence of a few hundred Moorish troops would be sufficient.

In any case I could not admit that the Spanish action justified his attitude with regard to Article 60, and I endeavoured to make him realize the shortsightedness of his policy. I pointed out that nothing but advantages could accrue to Morocco from the acquisition of land by foreigners. It might fairly be said that persons desiring to buy land practically all belonged to the merchant class; the possession of their land would mean the consolidation of their interests in the country, it would prompt them to expand their commercial relations, with the result that money would flow into the country, and that the customs receipts would greatly increase. In the case of my own countrymen I could say this with absolute certainty, for the first idea of the Englishman on coming to a new country was to own the piece of land on which his home was built. At present by his ill-advised opposition he had ranged all the Treaty Powers against him, and so long as he maintained it, it was useless for him to expect any assistance or any sympathy from them. He had, moreover, raised a general outcry in the European press, which at the outset of his reign had been so favourable, and had created an agitation in all the ports of his Empire, which was most regrettable.

His Majesty replied that he realized the truth of much that I had said, that he fully intended to give effect to Article 60, and that he should do so as soon as he possibly could with safety. The state of security of the country, however, was not yet such as to justify it. He had only been on the throne for a short time, and had not yet been able to leave Fez and enforce his authority throughout his Empire (this is an idea of all Moorish Sovereigns that their authority is not recognized till they have shown themselves in the more important parts of the Empire). He hoped shortly to leave for Rabat and Morocco city, and he promised that when he reached the former, Article 60 should be brought into force. If in the present state of insecurity, before he had been given time to assure order, foreigners were permitted to buy land and build outside the walls of the towns, robberies and murders would certainly ensue. All the blame would be thrown upon him, the Powers concerned would land troops, and the state of Morocco would be worse than ever. He said that he attributed the Casa Blanca massacre and all its disastrous results solely to the permission thoughtlessly granted by Moulai Abdel Aziz for the construction of a railway by the French at a moment when he had not the power to enforce his authority and protect the lives of the men employed upon it.

I said that I was glad to hear that he fully intended to give effect to Article 60, and noted his promise to do so on his arrival at Rabat, whenever that might be. He should, I thought, weigh very carefully against the arguments he had brought up in favour of delay, the consequences of his present attitude. He was breaking one of the principal clauses of the Act of Algeciras, which he had solemnly accepted, and which was one of the conditions of his recognition; so long as he continued to do so he could never hope to establish satisfactory relations with the Treaty Powers, and his country would suffer accordingly. I said that I should have thought that some means could be found of giving gradual effect to the Article. All the more so, as the right of foreigners to acquire land had been accepted and laid down by the Convention of Madrid, but had remained a dead letter, owing to the fact that the Maghzen had always refused their permission for the issue of title-deeds. To avoid the possibilities foreseen by the Sultan, a discretionary power could still be left to them, but they could be instructed to grant permission where no danger existed. His Majesty did not like the idea of this, as he said it would only give rise to endless discussions as to what was safe and what was not. He, however, repeated his promise to enforce the Article as soon as he arrived at Rabat. He asked me to inform you of his firm intention to do so, and to beg you to grant him this delay. He was, he said,

approaching the French Government on the subject, and he hoped that both would realize the difficulties of his position and give him time. I said that I would at once report to you all that His Majesty had said, but that I would be very glad if I might be furnished with a written Memorandum of his views on the subject in order that there might be no mistake.

I have, &c.
(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

[19207] No. 169.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 22.)

(No. 101.)
Sir, *Tangier, May 14, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, copy of a despatch I have received from His Majesty's Consul at Casa Blanca, reporting the shipment of slaves by a British steamer.

As I reported in my despatch No. 71 of the 19th ultimo, the Sultan has given orders that negroes, not privately owned as slaves, are to be sent to Fez to form a bodyguard of His Majesty. Negroes are accordingly being caught in the various districts and being sent to Fez in chains. It is with this object that the negroes referred to by Mr. Consul Madden were shipped from Mazagan to Tangier.

I have seen the Tangier Agent of the "Power Steam-ship Company" and spoken to him of the matter. He had not heard of the incident, but subsequently informed me that the men had been embarked as prisoners, and that it was not known that they were slaves.

The Agent promised to communicate on the subject with the Company, and to warn the captains of their steamers to be careful not to receive slaves on board their ships.

I have brought the matter to the notice of Cid Guebbas, and requested him to take steps to insure that no slaves are embarked by British ships.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HERBERT E. WHITE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 169.

Consul Madden to Mr. White.

Sir, *Casa Blanca, May 1, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith, copy of a despatch I have received from the Acting Vice-Consul at Mazagan, reporting the shipment of some slaves from that port on board the British steamer "Pouvoir" of the Power Line of steamers, for conveyance to Tangier.

Mr. Acting Vice-Consul Griffin informs me, in a private letter, that he has heard that the slaves are intended to form a negro bodyguard at Fez for the Sultan.

The steamer "Pouvoir" touched here this morning for a very short time, and proceeded to Rabat I am informed.

I am referring Mr. Griffin to your Consular despatches of the 17th September and the 16th October, 1906, as, being new to the Consular Service, he is apparently unaware of these instructions. I am requesting him, at the same time, to do all in his power in the future to prevent the transport of slaves on board a British vessel, and, if necessary, to convey a suitable warning to the captain against receiving them.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

Inclosure 2 in No. 169.

Acting Vice-Consul Griffin to Consul Madden.

Sir, *Mazagan, April 30, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the Basha of Mazagan, Si El Hossein El Baghdadi, has been arresting and imprisoning all the slaves (male) he has found in the town at large.

Seventeen of these slaves he has shipped to-day, with heavy chains round their necks, by the British steam-ship "Pouvoir" for Tangier.

I have written to the Agents of the steamer for full particulars regarding these slaves, and, if I receive his reply in time, I shall inclose a copy herewith.

I am, &c.
(Signed) HENRY GRIFFIN.

Inclosure 3 in No. 169.

Messrs. Brandt and Toel to Power Steam-ship Company,

Sir, *Mazagan, April 30, 1909.*

WE hasten to inform you not to have shipped nineteen slaves in chains, but nineteen negroes—passengers are going to leave per Steam-ship "Pouvoir."

Your, &c.
(Signed) BRANDT AND TOEL.
(*Per* A. Bartels.)

[19208] No. 170.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 22.)

(No. 102.)
Sir, *Tangier, May 15, 1909.*

AS you are aware, the French Société des Mines Norte-Africana obtained from the Pretender a Concession for a mine about 16 miles from Melilla, and had commenced to lay down a railway, when the works were stopped at the time of the defeat of the Pretender's troops and the capture of his stronghold at Selouan.

Since that time the Director of the Society and his engineers have on several occasions endeavoured to reach the abandoned mines from Melilla, but, without success. It was therefore decided to make the attempt from Algeria, and a short time since an engineer set out from Oujda accompanied by an escort of some sixty well-armed Beni-Snassen tribesmen. The Algerian authorities, whilst not in any way encouraging the expedition, did not feel themselves called upon to take steps to prevent it. The attempt met, however, with no success; the expedition was attacked, and, though there were no casualties on either side, the engineer felt it useless to persist and returned to Algeria.

The incident would be of no importance were it not that it has tended to increase the friction and jealousy between the French and Spaniards. It is said that the news of the expedition reached Melilla in the exaggerated form that the French engineer was accompanied by a body of spahis, and the Governor of Melilla sent out native agents to verify the facts. The "Telegrama de Rif," a paper said to be edited by an officer of the Melilla garrison and to enjoy a semi-official position, published an attack on what is styled the disloyal manœuvre of the French on territory within the Spanish sphere of influence.

The local French newspaper replied that Spaniards have no more right to claim an exclusive monopoly of the exploitation of the districts within the Spanish sphere of influence than the French can claim to exclude Spanish or other foreign enterprise from the remainder of Morocco. Very similar language has been held to me by the French Chargé d'Affaires, who said that amongst the requests put forward at the Court by M. Merry del Val was one for a Concession of mines and of various public works in the Riff and adjacent districts, such as railways, lighthouses, &c., without submitting them to adjudication as stipulated in the Algeciras Act. The Spaniards are making every effort to extend the limits of their existing territories and to obtain a footing at other places in the Riff, and it is evidently their intention, whilst pushing Spanish economic, commercial, and industrial enterprise, to do all that they can to prevent other foreigners from obtaining Concessions, or acquiring any interests in these regions.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HERBERT E. WHITE.

[19213] No. 171.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received May* 22.)

(No. 107.) *Tangier, May* 16, 1909.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch I have received from His Majesty's Consul at Casa Blanca, reporting that the French army of occupation in Shawia is being reduced by some 2,300 men.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HERBERT E. WHITE.

Inclosure in No. 171.

Consul Madden to Mr. White.

(No. 91.) *Casa Blanca, May* 14, 1909.

Sir,

ACCORDING to information now made public, the French Government have decided to reduce the troops landed here by some 2,300 men. The departure commenced to-day by the embarcation of the 1st Battalion of Senegalese Infantry, consisting of twenty officers and 725 men. To-morrow the 1st Battalion of the 3rd Algerian Tirailleurs, nineteen officers and 675 men strong, are to embark on the transport "Vinh Long" for conveyance to Algeria. At the end of this month and early in June cavalry and artillery are to be sent home, so it is announced, bringing up the total number of the soldiers sent back to France to the figure above stated. It was stated at first that 3,000 men would be repatriated, but from the numbers made public it does not seem that so many will be sent away—at all events, for the present.

It is well known that the French military and civil officials have been opposed to the reduction of the garrison, which is also not popular with their colony. The French are even credited with having set afloat the rumours lately current here as to a state of unrest in the district, with a view of stopping the withdrawals or of postponing them, while the troops outside were hurriedly reinforced by tirailleurs from Casa Blanca. But, the Arabs being completely subdued, it fell through.

The French, however, have still some 6,000 men here, and I learn on good authority that they have not the smallest intention of evacuating the Shawia. General Moinier, too, in his order of the day to the departing troops ends as follows: "En quittant le Maroc, soyez sans crainte pour l'avenir de votre œuvre; nous resterons encore assez nombreux pour la défendre." In fact, the French hold on the province is to-day complete, as, besides their own troops, they have 2,500 Moroccan Goum, commanded by French officers, with a complete system of "bureaux arabes" at their numerous posts in Shawia.

The survey of the Shawia, too, is being carried on incessantly, and officers are now at work in mapping out the river at Meshraa-es-Shaer.

Nevertheless, the French Government are, from what I hear from various quarters, seemingly anxious to reduce expenses here as far as possible. A Staff officer tells me that no reply can be obtained from Paris to an application from General Moinier for the supply to him of a bungalow to live in, he having only a small and incommodious wooden hut as quarters at present.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

P.S.—I beg to inclose herewith copy of General Moinier's order of the day above referred to.*

A. M. M.

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* Not printed.

[19214] No. 171*.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received May* 22.)

(No. 108.) *Tangier, May* 17, 1909.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 98 of the 9th instant, I have the honour to report no confirmation has reached Tangier of the proclamation of Mulai Kebir by any of the Berber tribes, it would seem therefore that his flight was prompted merely by fear, or, if he had ambitious designs, he must have found that the Berbers were not disposed, for the present at any rate, to support them. It may be hoped, therefore, that the Makhzen's confidence as to his speedy capture may prove well founded.

The news of his flight produced a considerable effect at Fez and amongst the Berbers in that neighbourhood. Sid-el-Menebhi informed me this morning that Sid-el-Mokri had received letters by express courier from Fez reporting that the Berbers had taken Sefroo, and that the Sultan's forces operating in Beni M'tir had thought it prudent to fall back some distance towards Fez.

The Viziers were expected to reach Fez shortly, but it was considered probable that one of them, at any rate, would first proceed to Mequinez to consolidate the Sultan's position there.

I have, &c.

HERBERT E. WHITE.

[19377] No. 172.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 24.)

(No. 181. Confidential.)

Berlin, May 19, 1909.

Sir,

IN the course of conversation with Herr Stemrich yesterday at the weekly reception at the Foreign Office, I mentioned to him that some days previously Baron von Schoen had made some remarks to me with regard to the proposed Declaration respecting Moroccan affairs to be made by Spain, France, and Germany. Could he tell me if matters had made any progress since that time?

Herr Stemrich replied that as he was only representing Baron von Schoen for a few days he had declined to take up the matter, which must accordingly wait until the Secretary of State's return.

I gathered from both the Spanish and French Ambassadors that the matter had made no progress in the last few days. M. Cambon further told me that Count Tattenbach had made some new proposals at Madrid, but that the Spanish Government had declined to entertain them, and had expressed the desire to continue any discussion on the subject through their Ambassador at Berlin.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. DE SALIS.

[19374] No. 173.

Lord Acton to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 24.)

(No. 28. Treaty.)

The Hague, May 22, 1909.

Sir,

WITH reference to my telegram No. 5, Treaty, of this day's date, I have the honour to transmit, herewith, copies of the French and German texts of the Award delivered to-day by the Arbitral Tribunal in the matter of the Casa Blanca dispute.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ACTON.

Inclosure in No. 173.

Arbitral Award delivered by The Hague Tribunal respecting Casa Blanca Dispute.

CONSIDERANT que, par un Protocole du 10 novembre, 1908, et par un Compromis du 24 du même mois, le Gouvernement de la République française et le Gouvernement Impérial allemand se sont mis d'accord pour charger un Tribunal Arbitral, composé de cinq membres, de résoudre les questions de fait et de droit que soulèvent les événements qui se sont produits à Casa Blanca, le 25 septembre, 1908, entre des agents des deux pays;

Considérant que, en exécution de ce Compromis, les deux Gouvernements ont désigné respectivement comme Arbitres:

Le Gouvernement de la République française, le très honorable Sir Edward Fry, Docteur en Droit, autrefois siégeant à la Cour d'Appel, Membre du Conseil Privé du Roi, Membre de la Cour Permanente d'Arbitrage; et M. Louis Renault, Membre de l'Institut de France, Ministre Plénipotentiaire, Professeur à la Faculté de Droit de Paris, Jurisconsulte du Ministère des Affaires Étrangéres, Membre de la Cour Permanente d'Arbitrage;

Et le Gouvernement Impérial allemand, M. Guido Fusinato, Docteur en Droit, ancien Ministre de l'Instruction Publique, ancien Professeur de Droit International à l'Université de Turin, Député au Parlement italien, Conseiller d'État, Membre de la Cour Permanente d'Arbitrage; et M. Kriege, Docteur en Droit, Conseiller actuel intime de Légation, Conseiller rapporteur et Jurisconsulte au Département des Affaires Étrangères, Membre de la Cour Permanente d'Arbitrage;

Que les Arbitres ainsi désignés, chargés de nommer un Surarbitre, ont choisi

comme tel M. K. Hj. L. de Hammarskjöld, Docteur en Droit, ancien Ministre de la Justice, ancien Ministre des Cultes et de l'Instruction Publique, ancien Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre Plénipotentiaire à Copenhague, ancien Président de la Cour d'Appel de Jönköping, ancien Professeur à la Faculté de Droit d'Upsal, Gouverneur de la Province d'Upsal, Membre de la Cour Permanente d'Arbitrage;

Considérant que, conformément aux dispositions du Compromis du 24 novembre, 1908, les mémoires et contre-mémoires ont été dûment échangés entre les parties et communiqués aux Arbitres;

Considérant que le Tribunal, constitué comme il est dit ci-dessus, s'est réuni à La Haye le 1er mai, 1909;

Que les deux Gouvernements ont respectivement désigné comme Agents:

Le Gouvernement de la République française, M. André Weiss, Professeur à la Faculté de Droit de Paris, Jurisconsulte adjoint du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères;

Et le Gouvernement Impérial allemand, M. Albrecht Lentze, Docteur en Droit, Conseiller intime de Légation, Conseiller rapporteur au Département des Affaires Étrangères;

Considérant que les Agents des parties ont présenté au Tribunal des conclusions suivantes:

Savoir, l'Agent du Gouvernement de la République française:

Plaise au Tribunal,

Dire et juger que c'est à tort que le Consul et les agents du Consulat Impérial allemand à Casa Blanca ont tenté de faire embarquer sur un navire allemand des déserteurs de la Légion Étrangère française ne ressortissant pas à la nationalité allemande;

Dire et juger que c'est à tort que le même Consul et les mêmes agents ont, dans les mêmes conditions, accordé, sur le territoire occupé par le corps de débarquement français à Casa Blanca, leur protection et leur assistance matérielle à trois autres légionnaires, qu'ils croyaient ou qu'ils pouvaient croire Allemands, méconnaissant ainsi les droits exclusifs de juridiction qui appartiennent à l'État occupant, en territoire étranger, même en pays de Capitulations, au regard des soldats de l'armée d'occupation, et des actes, quels qu'ils soient et d'où qu'ils viennent, qui sont de nature à compromettre sa sécurité;

Dire et juger qu'aucune atteinte n'a été portée, en la personne de M. Just Chancelier du Consulat Impérial à Casa Blanca, et du soldat marocain Abd-el-Kerim-ben-Mansour, à l'inviolabilité consulaire, par les officiers, soldats, et marins français qui ont procédé à l'arrestation des déserteurs; et qu'en repoussant les attaques et les voies de fait dirigées contre eux les dits officiers, soldats, et marins se sont bornés à user du droit de légitime défense.

Et l'Agent du Gouvernement Impérial allemand (conclusions traduites):

Plaise au Tribunal,

1. En ce qui concerne les questions de fait,

Déclarer que trois individus qui avaient antérieurement servi dans la Légion Étrangère française, Walter Bens, Heinrich Heinemann, et Julius Meyer, tous trois Allemands, ont, le 25 septembre, 1908, au port de Casa Blanca, pendant qu'ils étaient accompagnés par des agents de l'Allemagne, été violemment arrachés à ces derniers et arrêtés par des agents de la France; qu'à cette occasion des agents de l'Allemagne ont été attaqués, maltraités, outragés, et menacés par des agents de la France;

2. En ce qui concerne les questions de droit,

Déclarer que les trois individus mentionnés au No. 1 étaient, au 25 septembre, 1908, soumis exclusivement à la juridiction et à la protection du Consulat Impérial allemand à Casa Blanca; que des agents de la France n'étaient pas alors autorisés à entraver l'exercice par des agents de l'Allemagne de la protection allemande sur ces trois individus et à revendiquer de leur côté sur eux un droit de juridiction;

3. En ce qui concerne la situation des individus arrêtés le 25 septembre, 1908, au sujet de laquelle il y a contestation,

Décider que le Gouvernement de la République française, aussitôt que possible, se dessaisira des trois Allemands désignés au No. 1 et les mettra à la disposition du Gouvernement allemand.

Considérant que l'Agent de la République française a, dans l'audience du 17 mai, 1909, déclaré que, dans ses conclusions, il ne s'agit, soit pour les déserteurs de

nationalité allemande, soit pour les autres, que des mesures prises par des agents allemands après la désertion et en vue de faire embarquer les déserteurs;

Considérant qu'après que le Tribunal eut entendu les exposés oraux des Agents des parties et les explications qu'ils lui ont fournies sur sa demande, les débats ont été déclarés clos dans l'audience du 17 mai, 1909;

Considérant que, d'après le régime des Capitulations en vigueur au Maroc, l'autorité consulaire allemande exerce, en règle générale, une juridiction exclusive sur tous les ressortissants allemands qui se trouvent dans ce pays;

Considérant que, d'autre part, un corps d'occupation exerce aussi, en règle générale, une juridiction exclusive sur toutes les personnes appartenant au dit corps d'occupation;

Que ce droit de juridiction doit être reconnu, toujours en règle générale, même dans les pays soumis au régime des Capitulations;

Considérant que, dans le cas où des ressortissants d'une Puissance qui bénéficie au Maroc du régime des Capitulations appartiennent au corps d'occupation envoyé dans ce pays par une autre Puissance, il se produit, par la force des choses, un conflit entre les deux juridictions susindiquées;

Considérant que le Gouvernement français n'a pas fait connaitre la composition du corps expéditionnaire et n'a pas déclaré que le fait de l'occupation militaire modifiait la juridiction consulaire exclusive découlant du régime des Capitulations; que, d'autre part, le Gouvernement allemand n'a pas réclamé au sujet de l'emploi au Maroc de la Légion Étrangère, qui, notoirement, est, pour une certaine partie, composée de ressortissants allemands;

Considérant qu'il n'appartient pas à ce Tribunal d'émettre une opinion sur l'organisation de la Légion Étrangère ou sur son emploi au Maroc;

Considérant que le conflit de juridictions dont il a été parlé ne saurait être décidé par une règle absolue qui accorderait d'une manière générale la préférence, soit à l'une, soit à l'autre des deux juridictions concurrentes;

Que, dans chaque cas particulier, il faut tenir compte des circonstances de fait qui sont de nature à déterminer la préférence;

Considérant que la juridiction du corps d'occupation doit, en cas de conflit, avoir la préférence, lorsque les personnes appartenant à ce corps n'ont pas quitté le territoire placé sous la domination immédiate, durable et effective de la force armée;

Considérant qu'à l'époque dont il s'agit la ville fortifiée de Casa Blanca était militairement occupée et gardée par des forces militaires françaises qui constituaient la garnison de cette ville, et se trouvaient, soit dans la ville même, soit dans les camps environnants;

Considérant que, dans ces conditions, les déserteurs de nationalité allemande, appartenant aux forces militaires de l'un de ces camps et étant dans l'enceinte de la ville, restaient soumis à la juridiction militaire exclusive;

Considérant, d'autre part, que la question de la compétence respective, en pays de Capitulations, de la juridiction consulaire et de la juridiction militaire étant très compliquée, et n'ayant pas reçu de solution expresse, nette, et universellement reconnue, l'autorité consulaire allemande ne saurait encourir aucun blâme pour avoir accordé sa protection aux déserteurs susnommés, qui l'avaient sollicitée;

Considérant que le Consul allemand à Casa Blanca n'a pas accordé la protection du Consulat aux déserteurs de nationalité non allemande, et que le drogman du Consulat n'a pas non plus dépassé à ce sujet les limites de sa compétence;

Considérant que le fait que le Consul a signé, sans le lire, le sauf-conduit portant six personnes au lieu de trois et omettant l'indication de la nationalité allemande, telle qu'il l'avait lui-même prescrite, ne peut lui être imputé que comme une faute non intentionnelle;

Considérant que le soldat marocain du Consulat, en contribuant à l'embarquement des déserteurs, n'a fait qu'agir d'après les ordres de ses supérieurs, et que, à raison de sa situation inférieure, aucune responsabilité personnelle ne saurait peser sur lui;

Considérant que le Secrétaire du Consulat a intentionnellement cherché à faire embarquer des déserteurs de nationalité non allemande comme jouissant de la protection du Consulat;

Qu'à cette fin il a, de propos délibéré, amené le Consul à signer le sauf-conduit mentionné ci-dessus; et que, dans la même intention, il a pris des mesures tant pour conduire au port que pour faire embarquer ces déserteurs;

Qu'en agissant ainsi, il est sorti des limites de sa compétence et a commis une violation grave et manifeste de ses devoirs;

Considérant que les déserteurs de nationalité allemande se sont trouvés au port sous la protection de fait de l'autorité consulaire allemande, et que cette protection n'était pas manifestement illégale ;

Considérant que cette situation de fait aurait dû, dans la mesure du possible, être respectée par l'autorité militaire française ;

Considérant que les déserteurs de nationalité allemande ont été arrêtés par cette autorité malgré les protestations faites au nom du Consulat ;

Considérant que l'autorité militaire aurait pu, et par conséquent dû, se borner à empêcher l'embarquement et la fuite de ces déserteurs, et, avant de procéder à leur arrestation et à leur emprisonnement, à offrir de les laisser en séquestre au Consulat allemand, jusqu'à ce que la question de la juridiction compétente eût été résolue ;

Que cette manière de procéder aurait aussi été de nature à maintenir le prestige de l'autorité consulaire, conformément aux intérêts communs de tous les Européens vivant au Maroc ;

Considérant que, même si l'on admet la légalité de l'arrestation, les circonstances ne justifiaient, de la part de militaires français, ni la menace faite à l'aide d'un revolver, ni la prolongation des coups portés au soldat marocain du Consulat même après que sa résistance avait été brisée ;

Considérant que, quant aux autres outrages ou voies de fait allégués de part et d'autre, l'enchaînement et la nature exacte des événements sont impossibles à établir ;

Considérant que, conformément à ce qui a été dit plus haut, les déserteurs de nationalité allemande auraient dû être remis au Consulat pour rétablir la situation de fait troublée par leur arrestation ;

Que cette restitution aurait aussi été désirable en vue de maintenir le prestige consulaire ;

Mais, considérant que, dans l'état actuel des choses, ce Tribunal étant appelé à déterminer la situation définitive des déserteurs, il n'y a plus lieu d'ordonner la remise provisoire et temporaire qui aurait dû s'effectuer.

Par ces motifs,

Le Tribunal Arbitral déclare et prononce ce qui suit :—

C'est à tort et par une faute grave et manifeste que le Secrétaire du Consulat Impérial allemand à Casa Blanca a tenté de faire embarquer, sur un vapeur allemand, des déserteurs de la Légion Étrangère française qui n'étaient pas de nationalité allemande.

Le Consul allemand et les autres agents du Consulat ne sont pas responsables de ce chef ; toutefois, en signant le sauf-conduit qui lui a été présenté, le Consul a commis une faute non intentionnelle.

Le Consulat allemand n'avait pas, dans les conditions de l'espèce, le droit d'accorder sa protection aux déserteurs de nationalité allemande ; toutefois, l'erreur de droit commise sur ce point par les fonctionnaires du Consulat ne saurait leur être imputée comme une faute, soit intentionnelle, soit non intentionnelle.

C'est à tort que les autorités militaires françaises n'ont pas, dans la mesure du possible, respecté la protection de fait exercée sur ces déserteurs au nom du Consulat allemand.

Même abstraction faite du devoir de respecter la protection consulaire, les circonstances ne justifiaient, de la part de militaires français, ni la menace faite à l'aide d'un revolver, ni la prolongation des coups donnés au soldat marocain du Consulat.

Il n'y a pas lieu de donner suite aux autres réclamations contenues dans les conclusions des deux parties.

Fait à La Haye, dans l'Hôtel de la Cour Permanente d'Arbitrage, le 22 mai, 1909.

Le Président,
(Signé) Hj. L. HAMMARSKJÖLD.
Le Secrétaire-Général,
(Signé) MICHIELS VAN VERDUYNEN.

[19375]

No. 174.

Lord Acton to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received May* 24.)

(No. 29. Treaty. Confidential.)

The Hague, May 22, 1909.

Sir,

WITH reference to my immediately preceding despatch, Treaty, of this day's date, I have the honour to inform you that after the conclusion of the meeting of the Casa Blanca Arbitration Tribunal to-day, at which the Award was given, Sir Edward Fry called upon me and asked me to draw your attention to various points therewith connected.

It will be seen from the text of the Award that the Agent of the German Government called upon the Tribunal to decide "Que le Gouvernement de la République française, aussitôt que possible, se dessaisira des trois Allemands . . . . et les mettra à la disposition du Gouvernement allemand."

In their Award the Tribunal state in regard to this point that " il n'y a plus lieu d'ordonner la remise provisoire et temporaire qui aurait dû s'effectuer." The deserters consequently remain for the present in French captivity, and, in the opinion of Sir Edward—an opinion which will probably be universally shared—the omission of the Court to make an order for the delivery of the deserters constitutes an undoubted triumph for France, in whose favour the Award may be said, on the whole, to incline.

In regard to the procedure followed by the Court, Sir Edward Fry made the following observation: "The 'Compromis' provides for the settlement of questions of fact as well as of law, and contains a provision for the production by each side of certified copies 'de toutes pièces et documents qu'elle compte invoquer dans la cause' and also a power for the Court or some of its members to visit such places as may appear useful 'en vue de procéder à des mesures d'information'; but it contains no other provisions for taking evidence in the presence of the Court or of the parties." In Sir Edward's opinion, if Great Britain should ever go to arbitration on questions of fact, it would seem necessary to make more ample provision for taking evidence, more especially in view of the great difference of practice existing between Great Britain and all or most foreign countries.

His Excellency also drew my attention to the fact that the present Award is the first to be signed by the President and Secretary of the Court, in accordance with Article 79 of the Convention of 1907, which limited the signatures to those of these two officials, in order to dispose of the difficulty which might arise, should all the Arbitrators be required to sign, if one of their number were to differ with the terms of the judgment.

Sir Edward Fry is of the opinion that should the apparent intention of the Casa Blanca Tribunal to permanently withhold not only from the general public, but from the confidential cognizance of the Governments the *mémoires* and *contre-mémoires* in the case, be persisted in, it would be worth His Majesty's Government's while to endeavour to modify this decision by diplomatic means, as the documents in question are not only of historic interest, but would be of material importance to Great Britain in connection with future arbitrations.

Sir Edward also informs me that the proceeding had retained an amicable character throughout, and that even the mutual relations of the French and German Special Agents, who, from the nature of things, were in a position of antagonism to one another, were of the most friendly description. I gather from what his Excellency implied in his conversation with me that the Italian and British members of the Court were not invariably on the side of the country by which they were selected as Arbitrators.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ACTON.

[19598] No. 175.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received May* 25.)

(No. 200.)

Paris, May 24, 1909.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the Paris press has expressed a general approval of the settlement by The Hague Arbitration Tribunal of the Casa Blanca deserters' question.

The "Temps" examines the terms of the judgment and notes with satisfaction that on the essential points of right France's contention has been adopted, although the action of the French soldiers during the dispute with the agents of the German Consulate is blamed. The sentence is rather in the nature of a compromise than of a regular judicial pronouncement. The task of the Arbitrators was a delicate one, but they carried it out to the best of their ability. No one has the right to criticize their conclusions, which are entirely acceptable to all concerned and provide an honourable solution for a controversy which, in spite of its paltry cause, nearly brought about a conflagration in Europe.

The article goes on to comment on the risks which incidents of this kind entail. France and Germany possess too rich a share of the common patrimony of civilization not to reprove such risks, and they are bound to try and avoid them. Their *entente* relative to Morocco, which followed soon after the Casa Blanca crisis, was a first effort in the right direction. Definite agreements, in which neither the dignity nor the interests of either party are compromised, are both desirable and possible. The existence of general engagements with their respective allies do not at all stand in the way of such agreements. It is not enough to solve, after the trouble has arisen, such controversies as those connected with Morocco, or the Congo–Cameroon frontier difficulties, or affairs like that of Missoum-Missoum. Agreements should be come to beforehand so that the two countries should be spared these superfluous emotions. Such is the lesson to be drawn from the arbitral decision, and there is reason to believe that the Governments themselves realize its teaching.

The "Figaro," after discussing the points submitted to the Tribunal and the solution found, declares that "all is well that ends well," and that as the "Cologne Gazette" says: "In this affair there are neither victors nor vanquished." There is only the example of two great peoples who, confronted by a painful episode, showed a sufficient good-will on both sides to seek an arrangement in the best possible conditions. Such an example must not be forgotten.

The Ministerial papers "Le Radical" and "La Petite République" show great satisfaction at the settlement of the Casa Blanca affair. The latter observes that the whole world will rejoice at the spectacle of jurisconsults being able to settle a quarrel which formerly could have only been decided by the arbitrament of the sword.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

[19995] No. 176.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received May* 28.)

(No. 113. Confidential.)

Fez, May 15, 1909.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your telegram of the 30th ultimo and of your despatch No. 49 of the 1st instant on the subject of the Union des Mines Marocaines. Mr. White has also sent me a copy of his despatch No. 82 of the 1st May transmitting copy of the contract drafted in alternative form, which he understood the company proposed to submit to the Sultan. From conversation which I have had with Mr. Harris I am led to believe that this contract has been superseded since the failure of the Mannesmann negotiations, and Mr. Harris affirms that a new form of contract is being drawn up for the company at the French Foreign Office. I am, of course, unable to gauge the accuracy of this statement, but you are very possibly kept informed from Paris of what is going on. I should certainly imagine that the French Government would never have passed the formula of contract obtained by Mr. White as it practically constitutes a monopoly, which M. Regnault, when I saw him at Tangier, said could never be admitted.

Mr. Harris, moreover, has always assured me that no form of monopoly should be applied for. There is evidently some serious cause for delay, as the French and German negotiators who were to have arrived ten days ago, and for whom Mr. Harris had actually engaged a house, are remaining on in Tangier. Mr. Harris is convinced that by this time the formula must have been drawn up and submitted to you, but in view of the five days' post from Tangier to Fez all communications are greatly delayed, and as the negotiations are being now carried on in Paris, I would suggest that His Majesty's Ambassador be instructed to approach M. Regnault on the subject, who can most certainly give him full details of what is being done.

Mr. Macpherson, who leaves to-day for Tangier and Madrid, called upon me yesterday to say good-bye. He showed me a quantity of photographs of the out-crops on the Spanish mines, which to my inexperienced eye looked most remarkable, and before leaving asked whether I could give him any further information as to the attitude of His Majesty's Government towards the Union des Mines Marocaines. I said that the position was the same: that, as far as my latest information went, no details as to the formula proposed by the syndicate nor the scope of their negotiations with the Moorish Government had been submitted to His Majesty's Government, and that without these it was quite impossible for them to grant their support to the undertaking. Mr. Macpherson said that, as a business man, he quite understood their attitude, which indeed was the only reasonable one.

He then told me in strict confidence that he was most anxious to work with the English in mining operations in Morocco, and that he had friends among the iron magnates of Great Britain, notably the Bairds, who were only too anxious to come in with him. If, he said, His Majesty's Government intended to support the Union des Mines Marocaines he would advise the Spanish Government to do the same, and he and his friends would probably constitute the Spanish group. If, however, His Majesty's Government withheld their support, and the Union became a Franco-German concern, with possibly Belgian capital thrown in, he would much prefer to keep out of it, to retain for his company all that they had been able to obtain so far in Morocco in the way of mining rights, and to endeavour to induce his English mining friends to join him. I said that I quite understood his idea, and advised him to call upon Sir Maurice de Bunsen as soon as he arrived in Madrid and submit his views to him. He was at the end of the telegraph wire, and very possibly possessed information much more recent than mine. At all events he could communicate at once with His Majesty's Government, whereas I could never expect to get a reply to a telegram under at least ten days. Mr. Macpherson said he should certainly do so.

I have, &c.

(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

[19996] No. 177.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received May* 28.)

(No. 114.)

Fez, May 18, 1909.

Sir,

AS I had the honour to report in my telegram No. 52 of the 15th instant, the Great Southern Kaïds rode into Fez on Saturday morning the 15th May. I rode out to meet them, and it is difficult to imagine a more picturesque and impressive sight than their entry.

They advanced over the great undulating plain on which Fez is situated in a line about 500 yards long, composed of some 2,000 horsemen in serried ranks, preceded by fifty or sixty banners, the flags of the Governments of the south, the holy cities, and shrines. In the centre, mounted on splendid horses, with gorgeous saddles and trappings, rode the Kaïds themselves, El Glawi, Aissa-Ben-Omar, 'Mtougui, the son of Gundafi, Ben Ayadi, and a host of minor Chiefs, representing together the united power of the south. Kaïd Anflus was to follow later with another large body of troops. The highest honours had been paid to them by the Sultan, who had sent out his own bodyguard to line the way, and outside the gates of the city they were met by the Viziers of Fez, the Lord Chamberlain, and other high dignitaries of State.

The Sultan watched their entry from the roof of one of his pavilions, and I cannot help thinking that his feelings must have been a little mixed at the display of so much power. It is of course officially given out that he is overjoyed at their arrival, and no doubt to some extent he is, as he has probably often felt the want

of the support of the powerful men of his Empire during the last difficult months at Fez. At the same time he likes to keep all power in his hands, and he must realize that El Glawi with the southern Kaïds at his back, and 4,000 men on whom he can count absolutely, constitutes a formidable force with which he will have to count. The latter, too, criticises freely much that the Sultan has done, and does not attempt to disguise his intention of introducing great changes; it appears, therefore, inevitable that in the next few months there should be a struggle for the mastery. Both men are strong and determined, and the Sultan, though for the moment he appears the weaker, has great audacity.

I have, &c.
(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

[19997] No. 178.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received May* 28.)

(No. 115. Confidential.) *Fez, May* 18, 1909.

Sir,

AS I had the honour to report in my telegram No. 53 of the 16th instant, the Spanish Minister left Fez on Sunday morning, the 16th. He had accepted the usual banquets offered by the Viziers to foreign Ministers, and on the day before his departure was received in farewell audience by the Sultan. The audience was followed by a banquet in the Palace, at which the Sultan, of course, was not present. Various presents were sent round to the Minister in the evening and accepted by him. I gather that, notwithstanding these outward marks of friendliness, the relations remained excessively strained, and I am told that the gloom of the banquets was indescribable; the general hilarity was not added to by the fact that M. Merry del Val was suffering from an acute gastric attack.

I went round to see him early in the afternoon of Saturday, and he came round to the Legation to say good-bye after his interview with El Glawi. I asked him what his impressions had been. He said that Glawi was very "grand seigneur," as far, he added, as any Moor could be, but that he struck him as far from intelligent. This surprised me, for it was quite the contrary of what I heard in other quarters. He then went on to say that, to his great surprise, El Glawi had at once gone straight to the point, had expressed his regret at the failure of M. Merry del Val's negotiations, and had said that had he been at Fez things would have gone very differently. He further undertook now that he had arrived to modify the Sultan's attitude in the matter. So far from evincing any satisfaction at this assurance from the man who at the present moment is the most powerful man in Morocco, M. Merry del Val said that his directness showed a great want of tact, and an evident ignorance of the way to treat with the representatives of foreign Powers. He did not, moreover, consider that Glawi was justified in making such a statement. I must say that this struck me as hypercritical. If El Glawi was to discuss the situation at all—and it was ridiculous that he should not—he was bound to go straight to the point, considering that it was already late in the afternoon and that M. Merry del Val was leaving the next morning at 7. However, I said nothing, as the latter appeared in a nervous, overstrung condition.

M. Merry del Val told me before leaving that he had no idea what line his Government intended to take, and that the only instructions he had received was to leave on the day that he had proposed.

I have, &c.
(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

[19999] No. 179.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received May* 28.)

(No. 117.) *Fez, May* 19, 1909.

Sir,

A LETTER was received two days ago by Commandant Mangin from the French instructor, who accompanied the mehallah operating against the Beni M'Tir, to the effect that the camp was attacked by the Berbers about 6 o'clock in the evening of the 16th instant. The attack was repulsed, fighting lasting till about 8·30. News has

now been received that fighting was resumed on the following day, the advantage again remaining with the Imperial troops. On the 18th the mehallah struck their camp and advanced. They were attacked on the march by a very considerable force, the fight raged from 8 in the morning till 3 in the afternoon, and resulted in the defeat of the enemy. All the European instructors are reported safe. Commandant Mangin informs Count Gleichen that in his opinion the victory may be considered as final, and that the Kasbah of the Hajib, now in the hands of the Beni M'Tir, will very shortly be reoccupied by the mehallah.

This fortress is on the boundary of the Beni M'Tir and the Beni M'Guild countries, and its possession means that the Shereefian troops can defy the attacks of the Berbers, who have no artillery, and at the same time harry the surrounding country. The Sultan's position is consequently a strong one, and once he has taken the Kasbah he should be able to impose advantageous terms for himself. It is within the range of possibility that he may wish to continue the struggle and inflict a more crushing defeat on the tribes, but it is hardly likely; and I gather that the Viziers are already of opinion that the effort entailed was quite out of proportion with the object in view. Still he has strengthened his position and enhanced his prestige by this victory, and if he has secured the complete submission of the Berber tribes for some time to come the achievement is not inconsiderable.

From accounts of the actions which I have received from Dr. Verdon the troops seem to have fought uncommonly well, and the punishments and degradations inflicted by the Sultan on the regiments guilty of conspicuous cowardice under fire in the last defeat have evidently borne fruit.

I have, &c.
(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

[20000] No. 180.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received May* 28.)

(No. 118.) *Fez, May* 19, 1909.

Sir,

I PAID my official visit yesterday to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Aissa Ben Omar, and to the Grand Vizier El Glawi. The latter was to have received me on the previous day, but was detained very late at the Dar-el-Maghzen owing to the dispatch of a large contingent of the cavalry which he had brought up with him from the south to reinforce the Mehalla operating against the Beni 'Mtir.

Aissa Ben Omar is a very fine-looking old man, but gives me the impression of being quite unintellectual and uncultured, and, as he admits himself, absolutely ignorant of foreign affairs. He is a sporting country squire on a very large scale, possesses, I have no doubt, considerable shrewdness, and has the reputation of managing his tribe very well.

I spoke to him of the claims of the Saffis merchants, Messrs. Hunot, Messrs. Murdoch and Butler, and Messrs. Lamb, pointing out to him that they were purely commercial, that it was simply a question of orders being issued to the local authorities to collect the money from the various debtors. I repeated all the old arguments that I had used *ad nauseam* to the Sultan, and to the previous Viziers of the necessity of showing British commerce that the present Government intended to see justice done by them and to protect their rights. I was prepared to submit all other claims to the Tangier Commission, but these were in a very different category. They were simply debts owing by private persons for goods delivered, and had been running for years. Letters had already been issued at the time of Sir G. Lowther's Mission, and I trusted that he would use his influence to get orders given here for these to be settled at once.

His Excellency replied that he knew the firms well, that he had a large running account with all three, and that they acted in a way as his bankers. He believed that every penny that was owing to them by members of his own tribe had been paid; if not, he would have the amounts debited at once to his own account. In the case of the other tribes it was far more difficult. False reports were sent to the Maghzen by recalcitrant tribes, and all sorts of objections were raised. In any case he would have to refer the whole matter to the Sultan, but he assured me that he realised the situation, and the necessity for giving a proof of goodwill, and would do all he could to convince His Shereefian Majesty.

An hour later I was received by El Glawi, who is a very different class of man,

and of a far higher intellectual calibre. I discussed with him the case of Menebhi. He told me he was one of his greatest friends, and that I could rely on his support. He had now heard the views of the Maghzen, and though the question seemed complicated, he could promise me that a settlement would be come to. He asked me to put my views down on paper, so that he could think the matter over and decide on the best course to be followed in Menebhi's interests. The latter now seems anxious not to come to Fez. Moreover, he could hardly get here before my departure, so I have asked Glawi if possible to get the Sultan to make a proposal which I could submit to Menebhi on my return to Tangier. El Glawi said he would do this. I also mentioned the case of Kaïd Maclean. I said that he was, of course, most anxious to return to Morocco and would prefer to do so in an official capacity. I did not know what the Sultan's feelings were on the subject, but I thought that if the Maghzen did not take him back into their service they ought at least to grant him a pension after his long years of service. El Glawi promised also to sound the Sultan on this subject. I then mentioned Verdon and Balding, and said how anxious I was to see the question of their pay placed on a more satisfactory footing. Glawi interrupted me, and said that Abbas-el-Fasi had told him that very day that the whole matter had been arranged. Mr. Irwin is going to find out from Si Abbas what the arrangement is.

I also put in a good word for Kaïd Belton, who, notwithstanding the Sultan's explicit orders, has received no pay for three months, owing, I believe, to the enmity and dishonesty of the "Hadjieb." As the latter is in great disgrace with Glawi, there seems a chance that something may be done. He promised to make inquiries.

We had a long talk on the general situation, and he spoke with great wisdom. He is most anxious to retain the good-will of His Majesty's Government, and realises that their wishes must be met wherever possible, both politically and commercially, and promised to support my representations to Aissa Ben Omar. I said that we asked so little, and that in the interests of Morocco it appeared to me most essential that at a moment when the Spanish negotiations had broken down and the Spanish Mission had left in disgust, proof should be given that it was not the Maghzen who were uncompromising and impossible to deal with. He promised me again that I should have satisfaction, and again asked me to let him have a note of the various points I had made. This I am doing. My impression is that he means what he says, and that he believes he is able to carry out the promises he makes. I can only hope that it may prove to be the case.

I have, &c.
(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

[20003] No. 181.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received May* 28.)

(No. 121.)
Sir, *Fez, May* 20, 1909.

NOTHING definite is known in Fez as to the whereabouts of Moulai-el-Kebir, whose flight from the Vizier's camp was reported in my despatch No. 100 of the 8th instant.

The Sultan sent for the French consul a few days ago and told him he had reason to believe that he was at Tangier in disguise, and that his movements were being facilitated by a Frenchman, of whose identity His Majesty seemed uncertain (the man whom the Sultan had in his mind subsequently turned out to be M. Lacoste de l'Isle, the agent of the Compagnie Marocaine at Laraiche and Alcazar). His Shereefian Majesty said that he feared that his brother might take sanctuary at the French Legation, and asked M. Gaillard to write at once to M. de Sainte-Aulaire to prevent this. Should Moulai-el-Kebir appeal to the French Legation His Majesty begged that he might be handed over to the authorities, who would send him up to Fez, where the "aman" (a guarantee of security) would be accorded to him.

The story, as far as M. Lacoste de l'Isle is concerned, is quite untrue, as M. Soudan, the Fez agent of the Compagnie Marocaine, had a letter from him yesterday from Alcazar, but the information which he gives him is interesting, as it shows that Moulai-el-Kebir must have been meditating flight for some time. It appears that when at Casa Blanca with the Viziers, Moulai-el-Kebir, who had already had dealings

with the Compagnie Marocaine, went to their agent in that town, M. Bernaudat, and told him that he was anxious that the company should take over the administration of his farm and properties in the Gharb, as he was leaving for Fez and might not be able to attend to his affairs. M. Barnaudat sent a radiogram to this effect to M. Lacoste de l'Isle at Alcazar, and also forwarded the *fondé de pouvoirs* given by Moulai-el-Kebir. Before this arrived news of Moulai-el-Kebir's flight had reached Alcazar. M. Lacoste de L'Isle went out at once to his principal farms, where he found his people packing up their goods and decamping. With great difficulty he obtained permission to enter, and has now taken an inventory of the cattle, grain, &c., in the farm, branding the former with a distinguishing mark. In order to prevent this action being misrepresented at Fez, M. Soudan is to submit a memorandum on the subject to the Sultan, describing exactly what has occurred. The Compagnie Marocaine at the same time state that they are prepared either to continue to administer the farms as desired by Moulai-el-Kebir, or to deliver them over to Moulai-el-Kebir, or in the case of their confiscation to give them up to the Maghzen. In the latter event, however, they claim that the sums already owing to them by Moulai-el-Kebir, and the expenses entailed by the recent action they have taken on his behalf, should be paid up to them.

Reports continue to reach Fez that Moulai-el-Kebir really is at Tangier, and it seems just possible that he may have made up his mind to escape to Europe.

I have, &c.
(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

P.S.—Since writing the above M. Gaillard has been to see me. He saw the Sultan last night, who told him that the properties were being confiscated, that he preferred the Compagnie Marocaine to have nothing to do with them, and that he himself would take over and pay whatever was owing to them by Moulai-el-Kebir.

His Majesty said that his information as to his brother being at Tangier was incorrect, that he was still in the Zair country, and trying, so far unsuccessfully, to raise the tribes.

M. Gaillard admitted to me that his fear was that Moulai-el-Kebir should go down to the Shawia (which is quite close to the Zair) and take refuge with the French authorities there, the French Government had already too many protégés of this sort, the ex-Sultan to start with, various members of the late Maghzen, &c., and they had no wish to add to their list.

R. L.

[20001] No. 182.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received May* 28.)

(No. 119.)
Sir, *Tangier, May* 21, 1909.

A REPORT having reached Tangier that two Germans, who were travelling in the Suss prospecting for mines, had been captured, I called upon the German Minister and enquired whether he had received any official confirmation of the rumour.

Dr. Rosen read to me a radiogram he had just dispatched to the German Vice-Consul at Mogador making enquiries on the subject. He said that he had heard of these two Germans, and suspected that one of them was one of the six Mannesmann brothers, who have for the last few years been so actively prospecting in this country, but that he had as yet no certain information on the subject.

Dr. Rosen went on to say that he was glad of the opportunity of speaking to me on the subject of the Mannesmanns, so as to prevent any misconception as to the action of the German Legation in regard to their negotiations at Fez. He said that his Government, whilst anxious that mining enterprise in Morocco should be so far as possible on an international basis, had always held the view that the Mannesmanns were entitled to the full benefit of any position they had acquired in regard to mining rights. When Mr. Mannesmann was at Fez in 1906, before, and during his (Dr. Rosen's) mission, he had submitted to the Sultan Abdulaziz a list of mines, and requested rights of priority in regard to them. He received in reply a letter stating that the Makhzen had taken note of his request. This document had recently been confirmed by Moulai Hafid. It must depend upon the Firman to be promulgated by the Sultan in regard to mines whether Mr. Mannesmann's document is of any value or not, but such as it is, it has been taken note of or registered at the German Legation,

in the same way as the French Legation has taken note of similar documents held by Frenchmen; this merely amounted to a record of facts.

Dr. Rosen added that he has spoken frankly both to Mr. Lister and to Count St. Aulaire on the subject, as he wished them to be fully informed as to the position of the Legation in regard to Mr. Mannesmann. He himself had taken no initiative in the matter, but had merely transmitted textually to Dr. Vassal at Fez the instructions he had from time to time received from Berlin. He said that Messrs. Mannesmann had now formed an international syndicate with Spanish, French, Austrian, English, and other firms, and that a few days since he (Dr. Rosen) had been informed by his Government that they would maintain a position of "equal benevolence" towards that syndicate, and the international syndicate in which Messrs. Krupp, Schneider, Harris, &c., are interested.

I enquired of Dr. Rosen what English firm had joined the Mannesmann syndicate. He replied that he had not heard the name of the English firm, but believed that there was English participation in the syndicate.

Dr. Rosen added that negotiations had been proceeding for some time between the Mannesmanns and the Union des Mines Marocaines, but hitherto without success. The Union had commenced negotiations with the Mannesmanns in Europe, but they said the brother in Tangier had the matter in hand; a representative of the Union had accordingly come to Tangier, and appeared to be on the point of coming to an arrangement with Mr. Mannesmann here, when he was informed that nothing could be settled without the other brothers. He has accordingly now returned to Paris, and it is impossible to say what the result of the negotiations will be. Dr. Rosen said his Government would view with favour a combination of the two syndicates, so that they could join the other Governments in giving their whole support to one syndicate.

I observed that His Majesty's Government had not yet felt in a position to lend their support to the international syndicate, as they were not sufficiently informed as to the extent in which British interests were involved and the schemes of the syndicate. It would, I thought, be impossible to support any application for a concession in the nature of a monopoly.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HERBERT E. WHITE.

[19989] No. 183.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received May* 28.)

(No. 209.)

Paris, May 27, 1909.

Sir,

WITH reference to your despatches Nos. 204, 222, and 227, of the 7th, 20th, and 24th instant respectively, I have the honour to report that, at an interview which I had with the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning, I stated to his Excellency that the Sultan of Morocco was showing himself very intractable in regard to the provision in the Algeciras Act for the holding of property by foreigners, that the failure of the Moorish Government to carry out this provision had caused great discontent amongst the foreign residents at Tangier, and that if the Sultan were allowed to procrastinate in the matter he might put off carrying out his obligation indefinitely. The question therefore arose whether pressure might be put on His Majesty by an intimation that if he did not give effect to the stipulation in regard to the holding of land by foreigners the Powers could no longer consent to the imposition of the surtax of $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. on imports. This might bring him to reason.

M. Pichon said that the Moorish Special Mission had been received by the President, and negotiations would be entered into with them at once. It would be intimated to them that unless the Sultan carried out his obligations under the Algeciras Act in this matter and in others it would become necessary to resort to reprisals, and one of the reprisals to be hinted to them might certainly be the cessation of the surtax.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

[19872] No. 183*.

Memorandum communicated to Turkish Chargé d'Affaires, June 1, 1909.

WITH reference to the enquiry made by the Turkish chargé d'affaires on the 25th ultimo, His Majesty's Government have pleasure in acceding to the request of the Sublime Porte, and His Majesty's consul at Casa Blanca will be instructed to use his good offices for the protection of Turkish interests at that place. This will of course not bring Turkish subjects there within the jurisdiction of the British consular court, nor entitle them to claim from the Moorish Government the extra-territorial privileges secured to British subjects under Anglo-Moorish treaties.

Foreign Office, June 1, 1909.

[20807] No. 184.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received June* 4.)

(No. 104. Confidential.)

Madrid, May 31, 1909.

Sir,

MR. MACPHERSON, a member of the Spanish mining syndicate interested in the development of the country behind Melilla, has just called to inform me that active work in the mines of Beni-bu-Fruor and on the railway leading to it from Melilla is about to be resumed. He could not tell me what measures would be adopted to protect the working parties against the depredations of the tribes. The syndicate, he said, was now opposed, to the extent of 80 per cent. of its capital, to any arrangement with Mannesmann or any other German group. Only Señor Romanones and his brothers, representing the remaining 20 per cent., were still endeavouring to form a German connection. Mr. Macpherson is now more anxious than ever to introduce an English element into the syndicate. He states that the Spanish Government favour such a combination. He has offers from Messrs. William Baird of Glasgow, but, before proceeding further in the matter, he would like to know whether the British Government would view with favour a British participation in the enterprise, or whether they had identified themselves with the International Syndicate, which represented rather different interests. Mr. Macpherson assures me that the International Syndicate is getting more and more into French and German hands, and that a very small share in its operations will be reserved to British investors. I said that I had as yet no information as to the attitude of His Majesty's Government towards the International Syndicate.

Speaking of the state of affairs at Fez, where he has recently been, Mr. Macpherson states that public opinion in that city and among the surrounding tribes is almost unanimously hostile to the Sultan, who has been compelled by the weakness of his position to throw himself into the arms of the French. The latter are said to have greatly extended their influence of late. They control the Sultan's military forces through Colonel Mangin, his Public Works Department through a French engineer, as well as all financial matters through the Paris bankers, who are at this moment negotiating with the Moorish mission in the French capital.

In these circumstances, the field still left open to Spanish influence is described by Mr. Macpherson as being confined within very narrow limits. As regards the failure of Señor Merry del Val's mission to Fez, he confirms fully the reports already furnished by Mr. Lister, and states that the Spanish Minister is greatly incensed against the Sultan for seeking another channel of communication with the Spanish Government by means of the pending mission to Madrid.

I have, &c.

MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[20804] No. 185.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received June* 4.)

(No. 218. Confidential.)

Paris, June 3, 1909.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of a letter from M. Darcy, chairman of the Union des Mines marocaines, requesting me to communicate to His Majesty's Government a statement of the nature and objects of the society formed for the exploitation of mineral wealth in Morocco.

M. Darcy expresses the hope that His Majesty's Government will support the representatives of the society who are proceeding on a mission to Fez.

I have, &c.

FRANCIS BERTIE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 185.

Union des Mines marocaines to Sir F. Bertie.

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Paris, le 2 juin*, 1909.

IL a été fondé, en 1907, sous le nom d' "Union des Mines marocaines," un groupement international, dont le siège est à Paris, et dont les promoteurs se sont efforcés de réunir, en vue d'un effort ordonné et de quelque ampleur, d'une part, le plus grand nombre de personnes ou de sociétés ayant fait, ou en état de faire, des travaux miniers au Maroc; d'autre part, des groupes ou des individualités industriels dont l'honorabilité et l'importance soient de nature à inspirer toute confiance.

Votre Excellence trouvera ci-joint la liste des fondateurs de notre société, qui comprend notamment les plus puissantes firmes métallurgiques d'Europe, ainsi que de ceux qui ont bien voulu s'y joindre. Comme elle le remarquera, un certain nombre de personnalités anglaises font partie de notre syndicat, et se sont assuré dans nos affaires un pourcentage d'une certaine importance.

Dans le but de consolider le résultat des travaux exécutés par nos participants et de nous assurer des titres de nature à nous permettre de les élargir et de les multiplier, nous avons envoyé à Fez une mission composée de trois représentants. L'un d'entre eux est Mr. Walter B. Harris, correspondant du "Times," auquel nous avons eu le plaisir de faire place, sur son désir, parmi nous, et qui nous apporte un concours aussi avisé qu'actif. Cette mission va soumettre au Sultan un projet de convention dont nous joignons le texte avec une note qui en précise l'esprit et la portée. Ces deux documents sont strictement confidentiels.

Nous croyons savoir que, avisé de nos projets par ses représentants au Maroc, le Gouvernement anglais a exprimé le désir, avant de donner suite à des intentions qu'on a bien voulu nous représenter comme bienveillantes, de connaître d'une manière précise le but et la formule de nos efforts.

Il nous semble que la voie la plus simple et la plus correcte pour les lui faire connaître est de prier votre Excellence de vouloir bien lui transmettre les documents ci-contre.

En les lui soumettant nous demandons la permission de faire observer que notre mission arrivera ces jours-ci même à Fez, où Mr. W. B. Harris l'a précédée de quelques mois, et que si le Gouvernement anglais croyait possible de joindre son bienveillant appui à celui que veut bien nous donner le Gouvernement français et que d'autres nous ont promis, il conviendrait de ne point retarder des instructions qui, déjà peut-être, ont été sollicités par les agents de Sa Majesté.

Cette affaire aurait donc un caractère d'urgence, sur lequel nous attirons avec déférence son attention.

Veuillez, &c.
Le Président du Conseil d'Administration,
DARCY.

Inclosure 2 in No. 185.

List of Founders of the Union des Mines marocaines.

(Société anonyme au Capital de 500,000 fr.)

ACTIONNAIRES FONDATEURS.

(A.)—*Groupe français.*

COMPAGNIE des Forges de Châtillon, Commentry, et Neuves Maisons	Paris.
Compagnie des Forges et Aciéries de la Marine et d'Homécourt	Paris.
MM. Schneider et Compagnie, maîtres de forges	Paris.
Compagnie marocaine	Paris.
Compagnie d'Agadir	Paris.
M. E. Hoskier, banquier	Paris.
M. le Comte Armand	Paris.
M. F. Carbonel, ingénieur	Paris.

(B.)—*Groupe allemand.*

Friedrich Krupp, Actiengesellschaft	Essen-sur-le-Rhin.
Gewerkschaft Deutscher Kaiser	Bruckhausen.
Gelsenkirchener Bergwerks-Actiengesellschaft	Gelsenkirchen.

(C.)—*Groupe anglais.*

Mr. Williams (Illtyd), maître de forges	Middlesborough.
Mr. E. Martin, directeur de la Guest, Keen, and Nettlefolds (Limited)	Abergavenny.
Mr. Bonar Law, député de Londres	Kintillo, Helensburgh (N.B.).

(D.)—*Groupe espagnol.*

Altos Hornos de Viscaya	Bilbao.
M. Francisco de Laiglesia, gobernador del Banco hipotecario	Madrid.
M. le Marquis de Villamejor (Maison Figueroa)	Madrid.

(E.)—*Groupe italien.*

Onorevole Pavoncelli, député, ancien Ministre des Travaux Publics...	Naples.
M. Piaggio, sénateur	Gênes.

(F.)—*Groupe portugais.*

MM. Henri Burnay, banquiers	Lisbonne.

NOUVEAUX ADHÉRENTS.

1. *Groupe allemand.*

Metallurgische Gesellschaft	Francfort-sur-le-Mein.
M. Langenheim, ingénieur des mines, prospecteur au Maroc	Tanger.

2. *Groupe anglais.*

Mr. Harris, propriétaire de mines de charbon	Pays de Galles.
Mr. W. B. Harris, correspondant du "Times"	Tanger.

3. *Groupe belge.*

Société générale de Belgique	Bruxelles.
Mines et Fonderies de Zinc de la Vieille Montagne ...	Angleur près Liège.

4. *Groupe italien.*

Credito italiano	Gênes.

5. *Groupe français.*

Compagnie des Minerais de Fer magnétique de Mokta-el-Hadid	Paris.
Banque française pour le Commerce et l'Industrie ...	Paris.
Crédit foncier et agricole d'Algérie	Paris.
M. Darcy, président des Forges de Châtillon, Commentry, des Mines de Blanzy et de Dourges, et du Comité central des Houillères de France	Paris.
M. de Peyerimhoff, ancien directeur au Gouvernement général de l'Algérie	Paris.

Inclosure 3 in No. 185.

Draft of Convention to be submitted to the Sultan of Morocco.

EN considération, d'une part, que les recherches et travaux accomplis antérieurement par les participants de l'union constituent en sa faveur des titres d'invention et de priorité qu'il est juste de constater; d'autre part, qu'il est de l'intérêt du Maghzen comme des populations marocaines de hâter la découverte et la mise en valeur des mines, et que, tant à raison de sa composition que de ses moyens d'action, l'union est en état d'assurer ce travail avec activité et compétence comme de concilier les intérêts internationaux en présence:

1. Sa Majesté le Sultan reconnaît pour vingt ans à l'Union des Mines marocaines le permis de recherches global et exclusif sur l'ensemble des gîtes minéraux des périmètres suivants:

En conséquence l'union s'engage à assurer à ses frais sur l'étendue de ces périmètres la prospection des gisements minéraux de toute nature ainsi que les études préliminaires à l'exploitation de ceux qui seraient industriellement exploitables.

2. Chacun des permis de recherches ci-dessus donnera lieu au commencement de chaque année à un versement de 1,000 pesetas aux mains de Sa Majesté chérifienne, à moins que l'union n'ait au cours de l'année précédente déclaré renoncer à un ou plusieurs d'entre eux. La redevance ne sera plus due pour ceux-ci.

3. L'Union des Mines marocaines, ses représentants ou associés sont autorisés: (1) à faire tous les travaux nécessaires à la recherche, à l'extraction, et à l'évacuation des matières minérales, que ce soit dans les terrains Maghzen, dans ceux des tribus ou dans ceux des particuliers, mais non dans les terrains enclos de murs dans les cimetières et dans les terrains horm; (2) à vendre les produits extraits sous réserve de payer au Maghzen des redevances calculées d'après les quantités exportées et conformément aux bases suivantes:

4. Aucune concession minière ne pouvant être donnée régulièrement avant le règlement minier, l'Union des Mines marocaines aura, après la publication de cet acte, à requérir la transformation en concession des droits que le permis lui confère sur les gisements du territoire dont elle aura reconnu l'exploitabilité.

Cette transformation aura lieu de plein droit suivant la procédure fixée par le règlement minier, lequel sera aussitôt applicable tant aux gisements qu'à l'exploitation, sauf ce qui concerne la consistance des périmètres, la durée des permis, les versements et redevances auxquels l'union s'est obligée et qui seront exclusifs de tous autres.

5. La période de vingt ans indiquée ci-dessus comptera et les versements annuels seront exigibles à partir du moment où, d'un commun accord, la sécurité sera reconnue suffisante pour travailler aux mines; ils cesseront de courir si cette sécurité venait à disparaître et pour la période pendant laquelle elle n'existerait pas.

6. Sa Majesté le Sultan, reconnaissant l'importance que présente pour le Maghzen et pour ses sujets le développement de l'industrie minière, fera tous ses efforts pour le faciliter et le protéger.

Elle donnera à cet effet, soit spontanément, soit à la demande de l'union, toutes les instructions utiles à ses caïds et autres représentants.

Inclosure 4 in No. 185.

Note by the Union des Mines marocaines.

LA convention proposée au Sultan n'est en somme que la constatation des titres d'invention ou de priorité acquis depuis huit ans au Maroc par l'union et ses participants.

Cette constatation revêt la forme du permis de recherche, la seule qui soit compatible, semble-t-il, avec l'Acte d'Algésiras.

A raison de l'insuffisance des cartes, de l'inexistence d'un service topographique, de l'incertitude des noms et des limites du caractère forcément superficiel d'études faites en pleine insécurité, le seul procédé pratique est celui du périmètre étendu. Certains de ceux-ci, notamment dans les régions désertiques, couvrent une surface notablement plus large qu'on ne l'admettrait dans un pays ancien et ouvert. D'autres, par contre, ne s'éloignent pas de la superficie normale des concessions minières. Leur ensemble ne constitue pas plus de 6 pour cent à 7 pour cent du territoire marocain et, parmi les régions qui paraissent offrir des possibilités au point de vue minier, laisse disponibles des superficies beaucoup plus considérables.

La durée des permis de recherche est fixée à vingt ans. Cette durée un peu plus longue que dans les règlements européens répond aux sacrifices déjà faits par l'union dans une période extrêmement ingrate, à la lourdeur des charges que la prospection lui imposera avant toute rémunération, et à la nécessité de garantir de quelque manière les résultats acquis pendant les longues années qui s'écouleront avant que la constitution de moyens de transport modernes ait permis l'exploitation dans l'intérieur.

Ces permis de recherche laisseraient valables les priorités acquises antérieurement à leur délivrance par des travaux réels et des déclarations régulières.

Il semble d'ailleurs que l'union doive détenir, à ce point de vue, la presque-totalité de ces titres dans les périmètres qu'elle réclame.

[20926] No. 186.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 5.)

(No. 123.) *Fez, May 22, 1909.*

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that Kittani's father was yesterday released from prison. His brother still remains in custody, but the impression is that he too will very shortly be set at liberty.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

[20927] No. 187.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 5.)

(No. 124. Confidential.) *Fez, May 23, 1909.*

Sir,

AT the Grand Vizier's request, I paid him an informal visit yesterday afternoon, and sat with him for more than an hour in his garden. He had invited Mr. Harris, with whom he is on intimate terms, to come too, consequently I did not take an interpreter.

El Glawi told me that he expected that the Benir 'Mtir campaign would very soon be over; the Sultan intended to occupy the Kasbah of Hadjieb, but once he had done that negotiations would begin. The Beni 'Mtir had already sued for terms. I believe that the Sultan still insists that they should furnish troops, but, although Glawi did not actually say so, I gather that he will be prepared to drop this demand as inexpedient at present, although he still considers it justified.

I told him that Dr. Verdon had come in two days before with the wounded, and that I was glad to hear that the Sultan has spoken with high appreciation of the services he had rendered; they were, I said, no doubt very great. He was during the day continually exposed to the fire of the enemy, and during the whole night, when the rest of the camp were resting, he was going backwards and forwards tending the wounded. All this, moreover, without receiving any pay. El Glawi said that he had understood that the whole question of his position and pay had been regulated on the same footing as before, but I told him that, so far he had not received a penny, nor did I think that any definite orders had been given. He called at once for pen and paper, and wrote a note, which he signed and gave to a slave to deliver at once, turning to me and saying that I need have no further anxiety, and that the matter was settled. He had also, he said, included Sergeant Balding in the orders which he had given. I thanked him very much, and I really believe the question is settled as far as anything ever is in Morocco.

I told El Glawi that Verdon, although suffering himself from a slight attack of dysentery, was returning to the camp this morning, as there was a general idea that the Berbers would attack on Saturday, and he wished to be at his post; I was sorry, as I had been particularly anxious to present him to his Excellency. I then suggested that I should send for him then and there, and El Glawi said he would be delighted. This was done, and I think Verdon made a very good impression. He gave the Grand Vizier an account of the recent fighting, to which his Excellency listened with interest, asking at the end whether he required anything for the wounded. Dr. Verdon replied that they were short of tents, and his Excellency at once wrote an order to the Hadjieb, that whatever Dr. Verdon applied for in the way of tents, &c., were to be granted to him.

El Glawi told me that the disorganisation of the government and administration was appalling, and that none could imagine what the work was to try and put a little order into the existing chaos. I learn from other sources that a great deal has been done in this direction since his arrival, that departments have been created in the various administrations, and that efforts are being made to classify and organise the work. I understand that Glawi's own enormous establishment, unlike that of the other great Kaïds, is wonderfully well managed, and, though it is run on ample lines, there is no waste. He is now trying to introduce some of his method into the Maghzen.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

[20928] No. 188.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received June 5.*)

(No. 125.)
Sir,

Fez, May 25, 1909.

IN order to celebrate the 24th May, and to have an opportunity of inviting the Great Viziers to the legation, I gave an official reception last night. I had already mentioned the matter to the Grand Vizier, who said he would be delighted to come, but that the Sultan's permission would first have to be obtained. I accordingly wrote to his Excellency officially and received a most gracefully turned reply accepting for himself and the members of the Government. He arrived accompanied by a large suite of secretaries, amins, runners with lanterns, black slaves, &c.; and as he passed through the outer courts of the legation all my servants threw themselves on their faces shouting "God bless the life of my Lord!" thus paying him almost the same honours as to the Sultan. He desired me to convey to the King the congratulations of the Sultan and to express His Shereefian Majesty's great pleasure that the auspicious date should have fallen during the presence of the mission at Fez, thus enabling him and his Government to participate in our joy. He was closely followed by Aissa-ben-Omar, 'Mtougui, the Minister for War, the Acting Minister of Finance, and a number of lesser lights, and I am informed that the presence of so many members of the Maghzen is unprecedented. The limit of the unexpected, however, was reached when His Majesty's consul informed me with bated breath that the head of the Aisowa, the holiest man in Morocco and by reputation the most fanatical, was just arriving. He seemed a very amiable, middle-aged gentleman, and spent his evening in the patio sipping mint tea and eating cakes. How or why he came I have not been able to ascertain, as he is certainly not *en relations* with the legation, but I am assured by those competent to express an opinion on such matters that the honour paid was immense. Other holy men present included the Shereefs of Wazzan, direct descendants of the Prophet on the male side, their mother being an English governess of considerable character if of relatively inferior birth.

During the evening El Glawi informed me that the Imperial troops had occupied the Kasbah of the Hadjieb, that negotiations with the Beni 'Mtir had commenced, and that he considered the campaign as over. He anticipates that the Sultan will leave very shortly for Rabat. Nothing could be pleasanter than he was, and in speaking of a confidential memorandum which I had sent in to him a few days ago, of the various points to which I attach particular importance, he assured me that I should leave Fez satisfied. Aissa-ben-Omar also told me confidentially that, in accordance with my wishes, orders were to be given to the local governors to collect the debts owing to Messrs. Hunot and Messrs. Murdoch and Butler, and if this is done conscientiously a great point has been gained. In connection with the other claims Mr. Harris has

[20932] No. 188*.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received June 5.*)

(No. 129.)
Sir,

Fez, May 24, 1909.

CONSTERNATION has been caused during the last day or two amongst foreigners and protected persons by instructions which have been issued by the Sultan to collect from them those extraordinary taxes and dues from which they have hitherto been exempt. I have the honour to transmit herewith a despatch which has been addressed to me on the subject by Mr. Consul Macleod, and which appears to me to explain the situation very clearly.

I apprehend that the whole question will have to be submitted for discussion to the representatives of the Powers at Tangier, and I have instructed Mr. Macleod to advise protected persons pending a decision to pay the extraordinary dues under protest, and to warn the Moorish authorities that repayment will be demanded.

Ever since my arrival in Morocco it has appeared to me that the whole question of foreign protection required careful revision, as it opens the doors to abuses of all sorts; at the same time, of course, some such arrangement was rendered indispensable owing to the absence of any sort of adequate judicial system, and the unscrupulousness of the authorities.

What, however, appears to me inadmissible is that the Sultan should have taken this step not only without consulting the Powers, but even without informing them of his intention. He has the reputation of being well-informed on European matters, and he has certainly not been slow to take a leaf out of the book of Baron Aehrenthal.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 188*.

Consul MacLeod to Mr. Lister.

(No. 31.)
Sir,

Fez, May 24, 1909.

THERE is reason to believe that the Sultan is about to attempt to collect from foreigners and protected persons at Fez those extraordinary taxes and dues from which hitherto they have been exempt.

As full a list of Fez ordinary and extraordinary taxes and dues as, from the constant refusal of the Moorish authorities to afford information, I have been able to make will be found in my despatch of the 26th March, 1902, to Sir Arthur Nicolson.

So far as I can discern, the principles of taxation as regards foreigners and protected persons, prescribed by treaties or established by usage, are (1) that they are not taxable twice in regard to any article, or things manufactured from it; nor (2) are they liable to pay any tax or levy not specifically mentioned in treaties, nor any imposts of an arbitrary or varying kind, for example, tribute or tribal assessments.

During the months preceding his recognition by the Powers, the Sultan increased the taxes on cattle, sheep, goats, &c., sold in the market, but allowed the butchers to sell the meat therefrom at such increased rates as enabled them to recoup the increase. The result, in effect, is that the consumers pay this tax.

On the other hand, before being recognised by the Powers, the Sultan voluntarily abolished the tax of 10 per cent. (nominal) levied on all goods going from Fez to Berber districts. This tax, as it was an impost on foreign goods over and above the duty levied at the ports, had been a standing grievance of foreigners for many years.

Discussion upon it arose (if I remember rightly) during Sir Charles Euan Smith's mission in 1892, and certainly during Sir Ernest Satow's mission (1894–5).

In view of the terms of article 7 of the British treaty of commerce and navigation of 1856, Sir Ernest Satow decided that we could only object to this tax when it was imposed on British subjects or protected persons. That is to say, we could not object to its being levied on British goods owned by Moorish subjects or foreigners.

The result of the Sultan's abolition of this due ought obviously to be to promote trade with the Berber districts.

According to treaties, foreigners and protected persons are liable to pay only the taxes stipulated in the treaties, namely :—

1. Custom-house duties ;
2. Agricultural tax ;
3. Gate tax ; and
4. (After conclusion of arrangements with the diplomatic body.) New special taxes under articles 64 and 65 of the Act of Algeciras.

The dues now about to be demanded by the Sultan from foreigners and protected persons at Fez are not comprised in any of the above categories.

These dues were first (in modern times) collected about 1861, at Fez, after the Spanish war. There were then no foreigners nor protected persons at Fez.

On any person coming under protection, these dues ceased to be demanded from him.

I beg to enclose herewith copy and translation of a list of Fez markets, showing those in which dues are payable and not payable by foreigners and protected persons.

This list was in the French consular agency for many years preceding the establishment in 1894 of a French vice-consulate at Fez, and it embodies the usage observed by the Moorish Government and the consular offices here, and to which the Moorish Government has never taken exception.

I enclose, further, extracts of articles 4, 5, and 20 of the general treaty between Great Britain and Morocco, 1856, and of articles 3, 4, and 9 of the treaty of commerce and navigation between Great Britain and Morocco, 1856, and of articles 3, 10, 12, and 13 of the Convention of Madrid, 1880.

The French convention of 1863 regarding protected persons says nothing about their paying any dues. It would appear, therefore, that the Sultan cannot impose any tax or due upon British foreign subjects or protected persons without the previous consent of their respective Government, other than those specified in treaties.

To admit the contrary would be to affirm (which, in effect, the ensuing proceedings of the Sultan will imply His Majesty to assert) that the Sultan has the right to tax any foreigner or protected person to any amount His Majesty may choose.

The clause "but these" (employed persons) "shall be treated and regarded as other subjects of the Moorish dominions," in article 4 of the British treaty of commerce and navigation with Morocco, 1856, may perhaps be quoted to support the theory that the Sultan is only bound to treat foreigners and protected persons on at least as good a footing as his own now protected subjects.

Article 9 of the above treaty may also be represented to exclude from additional taxes only such goods as are purchased for export.

Speaking generally, I would remark that it is unfortunate that these Fez dues have never been made the subject of specific agreements. In regard to articles for local or inland consumption, it would seem anomalous that foreigners and protected persons be better treated than the Sultan's own ordinary subjects.

If the Sultan were (1) to offer to come to some understanding with the Powers on the matter, and (2) to agree that he would never grant immunity from those taxes to any of his own subjects (for there are many such privileged persons as well as foreigners and protected persons), or allow tax collectors to favour Sheerefs or other persons, and (3) to agree that these taxes would not be increased without the assent of the Powers, it would be somewhat difficult to answer his request.

But against the arbitrary, violent attitude His Majesty seems to adopt (indeed, has already adopted in instructions issued to tax collectors these days) all the consular representatives here protest strongly.

As their goods may be detained should they refuse to pay these—to them—new imposts, pending receipt of your Excellency's instructions, I propose to advise protected persons to pay under protest, and to warn the Moorish authorities that repayment will be demanded.

These dues have always been the subject of very bitter popular feeling. They are collected often in small sums, often from very poor people, and occasion a cost in collection and an animosity out of all proportion to their value. They are in many case practically taxes on wages, and so deep-rooted is the popular hatred of them that the authorities, on occasions of public disorders being likely to occur, invariably suspend them.

My own view is that the Sultan would do well to abolish them altogether and

substitute, in agreement with the Powers, for them some such direct taxes, payable by everybody, as those contemplated in article 65 of the Act of Algeciras.

I have, &c.
J. M. MACLEOD.

P.S.—As to whether or not the Sultan's attitude deserves the retort, to which he has exposed himself, of asking for the punishment of the functionaries who collect illegal dues (see article 3, British treaty of commerce and navigation, 1856), I do not, of course, offer any opinion.

J. M. MACL.

Inclosure 2 in No. 188*.

List of Fez Taxes, Market Dues, &c.

1. PAYABLE by Foreigners and Protected Persons.

Gate tax. Both on entering and leaving city.	"Hafir."
Camels, cattle, sheep, horses, mules, goats, asses, and all beasts of burden.	On sale in market or privately. Half payable by buyer and half by seller.
Grains, oil, dried fruits, walnuts, almonds, raisins, olives, henna, saffron.	"Ashor," or first sale, of harvest. Ten per cent. on sale in market, half payable by buyer and half by seller.

2. NOT payable by Foreigners and Protected Persons.

Dues in following markets—
- Woollen garments.
- Cotton garments.
- Silk garments.
- Good second-hand clothes.
- Old second-hand clothes.
- Drapery.
- Slippers.
- Silver.
- Arms.
- Charcoal.
- Wheat (resale).
- Butter, oil, preserved meats.
- Draperies.
- Vegetables.
- Wood.
- Salt.
- Wool.

Farmers of above market dues are always warned by Moorish authorities that these dues are not payable by foreigners or protected persons.

Note.—The above is translation of an Arabic list furnished to consular corps by M. Gaillard, French consul (doyen of consuls, Fez), on the 13th May, 1909, which, informally, we all agreed was to be followed, the above having been the usage and, according to the treaty, right ever since these dues were established.

Inclosure 3 in No. 188*.

Extracts from General Treaty between Great Britain and Morocco, 1856.

ARTICLE 4.

THEY (British subjects) shall not be obliged to pay any taxes or impositions. They shall be exempt from . . . . every extraordinary contribution . . . .

ARTICLE 5.

(British subjects) shall be free to appoint anyone whom they may choose of their own friends or servants for the transaction of their affairs either on land or sea . . . .

Extracts from Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between Great Britain and Morocco, 1856.

ARTICLE 3.

No tax, toll, duty, or charge whatsoever, beside the export duty hereinafter mentioned, shall under any pretext or on any account be imposed by any person whatsoever in any part of the dominions of Morocco upon or in respect of any goods

or produce whatsoever which may have been purchased for exportation by or on behalf of any British subject, but the said goods or produce when so purchased shall be conveyed from any place in Morocco, to, and embarked from any port therein absolutely free and exempt from all other taxes, tolls, duties, or charges whatsoever . . . . and should any such officer or subject of the Sultan) act contrary to this stipulation, the Sultan shall immediately punish with severity the governor, officer, or other subject, who shall have been guilty of such misconduct, and shall render full justice to British subjects for all injuries or losses which they may duly prove themselves to have suffered thereby.

ARTICLE 4.

The subjects of Her Britannic Majesty within the dominions of His Majesty the Sultan of Morocco, shall be free . . . . to commit their affairs to the management of any persons they may appoint as their broker, factor, or agent, nor shall such British subjects be restrained in their choice of persons to act in such capacities, ... those persons who shall be thus employed, and who are subjects of the Sultan of Morocco, shall be treated and regarded as other subjects of the Moorish dominions.

ARTICLE 9.

If any article of Maroquine produce, growth, or manufacture, except the articles enumerated in article 2 (keef, opium, ammunition, tobacco, &c.) be purchased for exportation, the same shall be conveyed by the British merchant, or by his agents, free of any kind of charge or duty whatsoever, to a convenient place of shipment. Subsequently, on exportation, the export duty, according to the tariff in article 7, shall alone be paid on it.

Madrid Convention, 1880.

ARTICLE 3.

(Persons protected as employés of consuls, vice-consuls, or consular agents.) Ces protégés ne seront soumis à aucun droit, impôt, ou taxe quelconque, en dehors de ce qui est stipulé aux articles 12 et 13.

ARTICLE 10.

Il n'est rien changé à la situation des censaux telle qu'elle a été établie par les traités et par la convention de 1863, sauf ce qui est stipulé, relativement aux impôts, dans les articles suivants.

ARTICLE 12.

Les étrangers et les protégés, propriétaires ou locataires de terrains cultivés, ainsi que les censaux adonnés à l'agriculture, paieront l'impôt agricole. La nature, le mode, la date, et la quotité de cet impôt seront l'objet d'un règlement spécial entre les représentants des Puissances et le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères de Sa Majesté chériffienne.

ARTICLE 13.

Les étrangers, les protégés, et les censaux propriétaires de bêtes de somme paieront la taxe dite des portes. La quotité et le mode de perception de cette taxe, commune aux étrangers et aux indigènes, seront également l'objet d'un règlement spécial entre les représentants des Puissances et le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères de Sa Majesté chériffienne.

La dite taxe ne pourra être augmentée sans un nouvel accord avec les représentants des Puissances.

Extract from Article 65 of the Act of Algeciras.

(*a.*) Un droit de timbre sur les contrats et actes authentiques passés devant les Adouls.

(*b.*) Un droit de mutation, au maximum de 2 pour cent, sur les ventes immobilières.

* * * * * *

(*d.*) Un droit de passeport à percevoir sur les sujets marocains.

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read me a passage from a letter which he received some days ago from Mr. Abensur (of the firm of Pariente, and one of the largest claimants against the Maghzen) in which he stated that he was very glad to think that their claims were to be examined by the commission at Tangier, as he considered that a settlement was thus far more likely. They have begun to get sceptical as to the letters issued from the Shereefian Court at Fez, which in many cases seem to be born dead. I expect to leave with the mission for Tangier on Monday, the 31st.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

[20929]

No. 189.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received June 5.*)

(No. 126.)
Sir,

Tangier, May 29, 1909.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 89 of the 2nd instant I have the honour to report that Cid Guebbas informs me that he has received the reply of the Spanish Government to the Sultan's letter of complaint in regard to the refusal of the Spanish Minister to discuss the question of the withdrawal of the Spanish troops from Mar Chica and Cabo de Agua.

Cid Guebbas said that M. Merry del Val called upon him shortly after his return from Fez, and complained in strong terms of the action of a picket of Tangier extra-urban police in stopping a Moor accompanying the baggage train of the Spanish Mission, and carrying a gun belonging to one of the Spanish Secretaries. Cid Guebbas explained that the police were not aware that the gun belonged to a Spanish Secretary, and that they were merely carrying out their instructions to prevent Moors from approaching Tangier with guns.

M. Merry del Val then expressed his displeasure at tenders having been invited for the keeping of bathing machines and restaurant on the beach. He observed that Spaniards had hitherto had such establishments, and would therefore be considered as having prior claims; and he inquired who had instigated the Makhzen to invite tenders. Cid Guebbas replied that no one had instigated the Makhzen, who had acted as they considered best.

M. Merry del Val then produced the reply of his Government to the Sultan's letter, saying that it was a refusal to receive the Moorish Mission. He proceeded to animadvert in strong language on the action of the Sultan in addressing himself direct to the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs. After he had continued for some time in the same strain Cid Guebbas stopped him with the remark that the reply of the Spanish Government was doubtless contained in the letter just delivered, and that if it was to the effect of the language being used by M. Merry del Val it was not necessary to deliver the reply verbally as well as in writing but that if M. Merry del Val's language was not in accordance with the written reply of his Government he must request him to put in writing any observations he might desire to make, as he could not undertake to record from memory and transmit to the Sultan observations of that nature.

Cid Guebbas told me that the interview had been most unpleasant, as M. Merry del Val seemed anxious to create difficulties, and had been unmeasured in his language. He himself had been careful to reply with courtesy.

There were two letters delivered by the Spanish Minister both addressed to Cid Guebbas, one of several days earlier date than the other. They were in Spanish accompanied by an Arabic translation, which, however, was so bad as to be scarcely intelligible. The letters had therefore to be retranslated before their meaning was clear. The earlier letter, which was a reply to that of the Sultan, was quite courteous in substance and tone; it alluded in moderate language to the incorrectness of ignoring the Spanish representative in Morocco and communicating direct with Madrid, but expressed the willingness of the King to receive the Moorish Mission. Owing, however, to important engagements which necessitated His Majesty's absence from Madrid for some time it would be necessary to put off the mission for the present. The second letter, which was of several days later date though delivered at the same time, criticized somewhat severely the action of the Moorish Government in addressing itself directly to the Spanish Government.

Cid Guebbas had forwarded both letters to the Sultan, together with proper translations which he had made.

Upon the advice of the French Chargé d'Affaires (the extra-urban police being under French instructors) the non-commissioned officer in charge of the picket complained of has presented himself at the Spanish Legation to make his apologies.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

[20931] No. 190.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received June 5.*)

(No. 128.)

Sir, *Tangier, May 29, 1909.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 54 of the 13th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith translation of two letters addressed by Sid Guebbas to the doyen of the Corps Diplomatique urging the application of the regulations regarding the tax upon town buildings as from the 1st January, 1909, at Tangier, and the 1st July at the other ports.

The foreign representatives have maintained their decision that these regulations must come into force at all the ports simultaneously.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 190.

Sid Guebbas to Count Martens-Ferrão.

(Louange à Dieu seul.)

(Traduction.)

(Compliments.) *Tanger, le 18 Rabih II, 1327 (9 mai, 1909).*

ENSUITE nous avons reçu votre lettre en date du 7 mai courant, nous apprenant que la condition indispensable pour que le Corps Diplomatique consente à la taxe sur les constructions urbaines est que le règlement soit appliqué à la même date dans tous les ports; que son application à Tanger (seulement) ne donnant pas satisfaction à vos honorables collègues, vous nous engagez à prendre les mesures nécessaires pour l'exécution du règlement à une même date dans tous les ports; ce dont nous avons pris note.

Nous informons votre Excellence que s'il était possible au Makhzen chérifien de généraliser cela dans tous les ports il n'aurait pas tardé un moment à le faire, car ceci est dans son intérêt et dans l'intérêt de son pays; mais, l'état de la population n'est pas inconnu, et spécialement étant donné qu'elle n'est pas encore habituée à cela, et il est possible qu'elle se porte à des actes troublants.

Les habitants de Tanger, par contre, à la suite de leur contact avec les Européens en connaissent les avantages. En outre, si le règlement sera appliqué d'abord à Tanger et que ce fait sera connu généralement et que tout le monde en connaîtra le mode et les avantages et s'y habituera, c'est alors qu'il sera possible au Makhzen chérifien d'en généraliser l'application.

En tout cas, le Makhzen n'a pas l'intention d'ajourner l'application dans les autres ports pour un long délai, mais uniquement pour un laps de temps pendant lequel le fait sera connu généralement.

Nous vous informons de ce qui précède pour que vous en preniez note et le communiquiez à vos honorables collègues.

MOHAMED BEN MOHAMMED-EL-GUEBBAS.

P.S.—Nous vous prions de hâter la réponse avant que le temps passe.

M. B. M-EL-G.

[20804] No. 190*.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 373.) *Foreign Office, June 5, 1909.*
(Telegraphic.) P.

YOUR despatch No. 218: Union des Mines Marocaines.

Please ascertain whether project of Union has the full support of the French Government.

Inclosure 2 in No. 190.

Sid Guebbas to Count Martens-Ferrão.

(Louange à Dieu seul.)

(Traduction.) *Tanger, le 26 Rabih II*, 1327 (17 *mai*, 1909).
(Compliments.)

ENSUITE, en référence à ce que nous avons écrit à votre Excellence en date du 18 Rabih courant au sujet du règlement sur les constructions urbaines, nous informons votre Excellence maintenant qu'un ordre chérifien a été édicté pour mettre en exécution le règlement susdit à Tanger, à partir du 1er janvier, 1909, et dans les autres ports chérifiens à partir du 1er juillet, 1909. La cause de ce retard dans le délai est pour que le monde s'y habitue.

Nous vous prions d'en informer le Corps Diplomatique ainsi qu'une prompte réponse consentant à cette application, dont vous n'ignorez pas les avantages.

Veuillez nous informer qui est le désigné, de votre part, comme membre pour la commission prévue dans le règlement susindiqué, et nous vous remercions.

MOHAMED BEN MOHAMED-EL-GUEBBAS.

[21244] No. 191.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 7.)

(No. 132. Confidential.) *Fez, May 28, 1909.*

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 106, Confidential, of the 11th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith a translation of the memorandum which the Sultan promised to give me embodying his views with regard to the application of article 60 of the Act of Algeciras.

You will doubtless have seen in the "Times" the statement of His Shereefian Majesty's views on the subject, which were communicated to Mr. Harris by Si Abbas-el-Fasi by His Majesty's command for publication in the "Times." They are practically the same as those communicated to me by His Majesty.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

Inclosure in No. 191.

Si Aissa to Mr. Lister.

(Translation.) *5th Jumad I*, 1327 (*May* 25, 1909).
(After compliments.)

I RECEIVED your letter referring to the memorandum which you state our Lord, at the audience you had with His Shereefian Majesty on the 9th May, promised to send you, embodying his (rightly directed) views regarding your request for the application of article 60 of the Act of the Conference of Algeciras, and you state that you have reported to your Foreign Minister the conversation you had with His Shereefian Majesty, and that you had informed him of the promise made by His Majesty that he would apply the above-mentioned article on the arrival of the Shereefian forces at Rabat.

I have informed His Majesty of your letter, and he (compliments) has instructed me to reply giving the substance of the promised memorandum, which is to the effect that the issuing of Shereefian authorisation to apply the said article is not possible for the present before order is thoroughly restored in the Kabylas and before the Shereefian forces leave Fez to investigate the condition of matters and to take measures to secure tranquillity and order as was said in the reply to the French and Spanish Ministers. The same reply was given to you with the further Shereefian assurance that, though the journey (undertaken by the Shereefian forces) be only to Rabat, the Shereefian authorisation in that sense under the conditions laid down in the article will then be issued.

May you, &c.
AISSA-BEN-OMAR.

[21075] No. 192.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 7.)

(No. 199.) *Berlin, June 1, 1909.*

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith translation of a protocol giving effect to The Hague award regarding the Casa Blanca deserters affair, which was signed at the Imperial Foreign Office on the 29th ultimo by Baron von Schoen and Baron de Berckheim, the French Chargé d'Affaires.

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

Inclosure in No. 192.

Protocol respecting the Casa Blanca Deserters Affair, signed May 29, 1909.

Berlin, May 29, 1909.

(Translation.)

WITH regard to the Casa Blanca affair, the following protocol was signed on Saturday afternoon at the Foreign Office by Baron von Schoen, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and Baron de Berckheim, the French Chargé d'Affaires :—

Whereas the Imperial German Government and the French Republic, having agreed on the 10th November, 1908, to submit to a court of arbitration especially convoked all the questions arising out of the incidents which occurred at Casa Blanca on the 25th September, 1908; and

Whereas both parties bound themselves to express mutually their regret at the action of the officials in accordance with the decision of the arbitrators with regard to the facts of the case and the legal aspect of the question; and

Whereas the court of arbitration at The Hague on the 22nd May, 1909, declared and pronounced the following:

"The secretary of the Imperial German consulate at Casa Blanca, through a serious and evident mistake, wrongfully made an attempt to embark on board a German steamer deserters of the French Foreign Legion who were not of German nationality.

"The German consul and the other officials of the consulate are not reponsible for this, but the consul made an unintentional mistake by signing their passports.

"In these circumstances the German consulate had no right to afford protection to the deserters of German nationality, yet the legal error committed in this connection by the German consular officials can neither be regarded as an intentional nor an unintentional mistake on their part.

"The French military authorities acted wrongfully in not respecting as far as possible the protection actually afforded to the deserters in the name of the German consulate.

"Even apart from the obligation to respect consular protection, the circumstances did not justify the French soldiers in threatening with a revolver or in continuing to beat the Moorish consular soldiers.

"The other claims raised by both parties cannot be considered."

The Imperial German Government and the Government of the French Republic, each in so far as it is concerned, declare that they express their regret for the action of their officials which the Court of Arbitration censures.

Executed in duplicate in Berlin on the 29th May, 1909.

VON SCHOEN.
Baron VON BERCKHEIM.

[21231] No. 193.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 7.)

(No. 106.) *Madrid, June 2, 1909.*

Sir,

ALTHOUGH the Spanish Foreign Minister has been at pains to deny that the Spanish mission to Fez suffered any greater check in its negotiations with the Sultan

than did the French mission, there can be little doubt that Señor Merry del Val has returned to Tangier, and is likely shortly to return to Madrid in a disappointed frame of mind. It may be expected that his influence will be exerted to further the schemes of the small but not insignificant body of Spaniards who desire to extend the authority of their country beyond the limits of the existing "presidios" on the north coast of Morocco, and that he will endeavour to induce his Government to mark by a forward movement their sense of the ungracious attitude adopted towards their representative by Mulai Hafid.

Señor Maura, the Prime Minister, supported by Señor Allendesalazar, Minister for Foreign Affairs, is believed to be opposed to anything like a policy of adventure in Morocco. On the other hand, Spanish military opinion is still chafing at the inglorious task which the Spanish military contingent has been called upon to perform at Casa Blanca, and would willingly supply the army with more active employment by entrusting it with the duty of holding the Riff country, and protecting the Spanish, and even the French, mining companies, which are about to resume work in the mineral region behind Melilla. This would involve the occupation of the strategic points inland.

M. Révoil, French Ambassador, has warned the Spanish Government against any movement of this kind. He welcomes the resumption of work on the mines, but thinks that adequate protection could be afforded to French and Spanish miners by means of native "goums," which it should be easy for General Marina, Governor of Melilla, to raise among the surrounding tribes. He would regard an advance inland by Spanish soldiers as a movement requiring clearly the previous concurrence of the French Government, under the Franco-Spanish secret convention of the 6th October, 1904. The Spanish Government, he considers, is too much given to regard the entire Riff country as a happy hunting ground in which Spain is at liberty to range about as she pleases. His Excellency is also doing what he can to dissuade the King from countenancing operations of the kind believed to be in contemplation by the forward party. M. Révoil is probably right in his belief that His Majesty is naturally inclined to favour the aspirations of the army. So far he has received, both from the King and from the Government, fairly satisfactory assurances, but he is still somewhat uneasy; and, indeed, it is not unnatural to suppose that the increasing authority of France at Fez and Tangier may suggest to the Spanish mind that something must be done to remind the world that Spain as well as France claims to occupy a special position in the country.

The Spanish mining syndicate, though now distinctly hostile to co-operation with the German, is still holding out against a coalition with the French mining interests in the Riff country. A similar negative result has attended the advances recently made to it by the international mining syndicate.

I have, &c.
MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[21232] No. 194.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 7.)

(No. 107.) *Madrid, June 4, 1909.*

Sir,

THE French Ambassador gathers from his conversations with the Spanish Foreign Minister that the negotiation by which Spain seeks to secure a recognition of the special position which she claims to hold in Morocco is still proceeding in Berlin. Germany refusing to sign the formula which was drawn up for this purpose in Paris unless she could obtain some Spanish commercial concession in return, matters were apparently coming to a deadlock when Herr von Schoen put forward, as M. Révoil is informed, an alternative proposal. The joint Franco-German formula, it seems, is to be dropped and, in the place of it, Germany consents to address single-handed to the Spanish Government a note which shall contain a few expressions satisfactory to Spain as regards her status in Morocco. No *quid pro quo* is demanded in exchange.

M. Révoil is far from satisfied with this arrangement, which he thought Señor Allendesalazar seemed inclined to accept, and he believes that the French Government will object to a reinvestiture of Spain by Germany alone, and will claim to take part in any steps which may be taken in Berlin to that end.

I have, &c.
MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[21354] No. 195.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received June 7.*)

(No. 78.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Paris, June 7, 1909.*

UNION des Mines marocaines.

With reference to your telegram No. 373 of the 5th instant, I am informed by M. Louis that the French Government fully approve of the project and objects of the company. M. Louis says that the French Ambassador in London is in possession of all the details of the undertaking, and he hopes that His Majesty's Government will support it.

[21619] No. 196.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received June 10.*)

(No. 109.)
Sir, *Madrid, June 7, 1909.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 106, Confidential, of the 2nd instant, I have the honour to report that the Spanish press has occupied itself during the last few days with the rumour that a Spanish military occupation of the Riff country was impending. The "Imparcial," which loses no opportunity of causing embarrassment to the Government, went so far as to specify the regiments alleged to have received orders to proceed to Melilla.

The official "Epoca," in a leading article, denies that any such expedition is in contemplation. It states at the same time its disagreement with those who would object to employing "a single man or a single peseta" in asserting the just rights of Spain in Morocco.

Meanwhile there is a growing feeling that Señor Merry del Val has mismanaged his mission to Fez. The Opposition press has opened a campaign against him. In a recent issue of the "Imparcial" he was reported to have expressed himself to a press correspondent at Tangier in very undiplomatic terms regarding the Sultan. Señor Merry del Val, who arrived in Madrid the day before yesterday, denies the accuracy of the language attributed to him. The "Epoca" has also published an official contradiction.

The French Ambassador, who states that his Government have many good reasons for complaining of the attitude assumed by Señor Merry del Val in Morocco, considers that the latter's position is now so precarious that no effort on his part is necessary in order to secure his early removal from the post of Spanish Minister to Morocco.

I understand that the Moorish mission, which is to continue the negotiations initiated at Fez by Señor Merry del Val, is expected in Madrid towards the end of the present month.

I have, &c.
M. DE BUNSEN.

[21354] No. 197.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. White.

(No. 36.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, June 11, 1909.*

I HAVE ascertained that the French Government are giving their full support to the International Mining Syndicate, and His Majesty's Government have decided to do the same. Please consult and act in concert with your French colleague.

[21891] No. 198.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received June 12.*)

(No. 135.)
Sir, *Fez, May 29, 1909.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 117 of the 19th ultimo, I have the honour to report that the chief men of the Beni 'Mtir tribe, accompanied by their women, came

into Fez this morning and sued for peace. I understand that His Shereefian Majesty received them kindly, and granted pardon to the tribe. He told them to return to the districts they had abandoned, and promised that they should be no more molested by the army. They will be informed shortly of the terms which His Majesty intends to impose.

The neighbouring Berber tribes have also written to assure the Sultan of their loyalty, and to disclaim having taken any part with the Beni 'Mtir.

I am informed that the Sultan intends to adhere to his demand that the Beni 'Mtir, in addition to a payment of 100,000 dollars, should furnish a contingent of soldiers. It seems foolish and unnecessary, as, except when fighting in their own country and in defence of their homes, they make poor soldiers, and they will certainly bolt as soon as the Sultan leaves Fez for Rabat.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

[21892] No. 199.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received June 12.*)

(No. 136.)
Sir, *Tangier, June 5, 1909.*

WITH reference to Mr. Lister's despatches Nos. 34 and 42 of the 10th and 28th February in regard to the proceedings of Tacquin on the yacht "Moonstone" off the coast of Sus, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch I have received from His Majesty's Consul at Casa Blanca reporting the landing of arms by Dr. Tacquin's party on the Sus coast from a Spanish steamer chartered in the Canary Islands.

Mr. Consul Madden states that he has been informed that the expedition has the support of the King of the Belgians as well as of some financiers in London, Paris, Berlin, &c. If there is any foundation for this report, the true nature of Dr. Tacquin's expedition can hardly have been realised.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

Inclosure in No. 199.

Consul Madden to Mr. White.

(No. 101. Confidential.)
Sir, *Casa Blanca, June 2, 1909.*

WITH reference to previous correspondence on the subject of an expedition to the Sus in the yacht "Moonstone," carrying the British flag, under the leadership of the Belgian doctor, Tacquin, who was accompanied by Mr. J. L. Ratto, a British naturalized subject, I have the honour to state that, according to reports received here, it appears that the yacht was lately in the Canary port of Arecife, whence the members of the party on board chartered the Spanish steamer "Millan Carrasco" to go to the vicinity of Wadnoon. This steamer, having on board Dr. Tacquin, Mr. Ratto, and a third person, proceeded to the Sus coast, where after several days of bad seas landed cargo there, the nature of the cargo not being disclosed. The version brought here by the steam-ship "Millan Carrasco" which called at this port a few days since, is, so I am told, that a prearranged set of signals was made to the shore, but no reply or notice could be obtained from the natives. The cargo was landed and the party returned to the steamer for the night, going on shore again next morning, when it was found that all the goods had been carried off, no signs of life being seen on land. Consequently, the steamer conveyed the party back to Arecife.

It can only be surmised that the Belgian expedition, which was all arranged for by Dr. Tacquin at Mogador through the intermediary of Ratto, was either the victim of a ruse on the part of its native friends or else that the goods landed had been prepaid, which is not an unlikely theory, as natives know Europeans to be fairly trustworthy in dealing with them.

From what I have learnt, this Belgian expedition had at first considerable support in some of the principal European capitals, and was known to the French Government,

who, it is said, did not disapprove of the scheme for the opening up of the Sus. The King of the Belgians, too, promised considerable monetary help in the event of success.

Latterly, however, it would seem that the expedition had only the support of some financiers in London, Paris, Berlin, and other places, the King of the Belgians having a share in it as well. Only the sailing yacht "Moonstone" was, so far as I know, employed in the work.

I have, &c.
A. M. MADDEN.

[20807] No. 200.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 67.)
Foreign Office, June 14, 1909.

Sir,

WITH reference to your despatch No. 104 of the 31st ultimo, I transmit to your Excellency herewith copies of correspondence, as marked in the margin,* respecting the Union des Mines marocaines.

You will see from this correspondence that His Majesty's Government have decided to support the "Union," and in these circumstances they cannot promise to support Mr. Macpherson's syndicate until they have fuller information and are satisfied that the interests of the two groups are not conflicting.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[21354] No. 201.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 263.)
Foreign Office, June 14, 1909.

Sir,

WITH reference to your telegram No. 78 of the 7th instant, I have to inform your Excellency that I have authorized His Majesty's Minister at Tangier to support the Union des Mines marocaines and to act in concert with his French colleague on the subject. I request that you will communicate in this sense with the French Government.

The areas over which the union desire to obtain "permis de recherches" were not specified in article 1 of the draft projet enclosed in your despatch No. 218 of the 3rd instant. It would be interesting to learn which these areas are, and whether they in any way interfere with the working of the Spanish mines in the Melilla district. I should be glad, therefore, if you could obtain from M. D'Arcy a copy of the projet in its final form, as it will be presented to the Sultan of Morocco.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[22370] No. 202.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 15.)

(No. 113.)
Madrid, June 11, 1909.

Sir,

TO-DAY'S press contains an announcement throwing light on the rumours of impending military movements in the neighbourhood of the Spanish possessions on the north coast of Morocco, to which I have alluded in recent despatches. It is given out that the Council of State met yesterday afternoon to consider the demand of the Government for a credit of 3,281,408 pesetas (about 117,000*l.* at the present rate of exchange) to cover the cost of reinforcing the Spanish garrisons in the region in question, and that, after two hours' debate, the credit was granted by a strictly party vote of seven to four. The Conservative Councillors of State supported generally the Government policy implied by the demand for the supplementary credit; the Liberal councillors unanimously opposed it. Señor Sanchez Toca, the well known Conservative

* Nos. 185, 195, and 201.

[20932] No. 204*.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Lister.

(No. 76.) *Foreign Office, June* 15, 1909.

Sir,

I HAVE received your despatch No. 129 of the 24th ultimo respecting the proposal of the Sultan to collect from foreigners and protected persons at Fez those extraordinary taxes and dues from which they have hitherto been exempt, and I approve the action which you have taken in the matter.

I may recall to your mind that in 1893 the French Legation at Tangier, in proposing the imposition of certain taxes on exports designed to raise a revenue for the Tangier Sanitary Commission, contended that the Moorish Government would have the right to levy these taxes on foreigners without the consent of the Powers. His Majesty's Government took an entirely opposite view, and in the Foreign Office despatch No. 113 of the 9th October, 1893, Sir E. Satow, at that time His Majesty's Minister at Tangier, was informed, after a reference to the treaty stipulations governing the situation, that the contention that British subjects might be taxed in Morocco without the consent of His Majesty's Government was wholly inadmissible; and he was instructed to state that His Majesty's Government would not consent to any tax unless it was equitably levied and did not press unduly upon British subjects.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

free lance, in voting for the Government, explained that, though he was opposed to a policy of adventure in Morocco, he was unwilling to embarrass the Government by voting against them. Señor Moret, leader of the Opposition, is reported to have stated to an interviewer that he had himself advised the Councillors of State belonging to his party to withhold their consent to the proposed credits.

There is much speculation as to the object which the Government has in view, whether merely a reinforcement of the garrisons, or possibly something in the nature of a military demonstration. The French Embassy is inclined to think that the true explanation of the contemplated military action, whatever may turn out to be its nature, lies in the desire of General Linares to gain a character for activity in his new office as Minister of War. Señor Allendesalazar did not allude to the subject in the course of an interview which I had with him yesterday. He merely said that the Moorish Mission was expected in Madrid early in June, and that he was going to take advantage of the interval before their arrival by giving himself a little rest in his country house near Bilbao.

I am inclined to think that in making a show of activity in the "presidios" the Government desire to impress the Sultan and the Moorish Mission with a sense of the ability of Spain to respond effectively to the slight which her Minister suffered in Fez, and that the use they make of the credit now sanctioned by the Council of State will depend on the attitude assumed by the Moorish Envoys.

I have, &c.

M. DE BUNSEN.

[22342] No. 203.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received June* 15.)

(No. 24.) *Madrid, June* 14, 1909.

(Telegraphic.) P.

TANGIER telegram No. 63.

Spanish Government officially explain supplementary credit of 3,000,000 pesetas as intended merely to provide for the reinforcement of the garrisons in Northern Morocco. They disclaim any idea of undertaking an advance into the interior, and declare that the Spanish troops will merely keep the peace in the neighbourhood of their fortresses, where the Sultan is unable to exercise authority.

[22464] No. 204.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received June* 15.)

(No. 25.) *Madrid, June* 15, 1909.

(Telegraphic.) P.

MELILLA. My telegram No. 24 of yesterday.

The royal decree granting supplementary credit is published this morning, and states that the amount is required to purchase transport and other war material, to keep three mixed brigades in a state of due preparation, and to reinforce the Melilla garrison.

[22591] No. 205.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received June* 17.)

(No. 116.) *Madrid, June* 14, 1909.

Sir,

THE following official communication has been made to the press in explanation of the credit of 117,000*l.* which, as reported in my despatch No. 113 of the 11th instant, has been sanctioned by the Council of State:—

"Recent announcements concerning the affairs of Morocco, and the commentaries suggested by them, have occupied the attention of the Council of Ministers. The council deplores that suppositions remote from the truth should have given rise to a certain restlessness in public opinion, rendering more difficult the action of the Government, whose object it is to serve the interests of the nation, apart from all party bias.

"The conduct observed by the Government during the last two and a-half years, and the unvarying line of policy in which they have persevered, should suffice to discredit the statements which have been put forward, attributing to the Government quite unreasonably designs opposed to their previous conduct and policy, and this at the very moment when circumstances have arisen requiring that their attitude should be confirmed, and that they should be congratulated on having adopted it.

"What has happened in the regions adjoining our fortresses in the north of Morocco is merely that, in the absence of the effective authority of the Sultan, and in view of the infringement of the treaties in which Spain is primarily interested, the Moors, who by appearing as the friends of Spain have shared the losses to which our possessions have been exposed, are soliciting Spanish protection against other Moors, in the hope that the prevailing anarchy and paralysis of all useful labour may thus be put a stop to. And inasmuch as Spain is bound to defend her rights and legitimate interests, besides being called upon to make good, in the present state of affairs, the deficiency of the authority of the Sultan in those regions, the Government must be prepared to fulfil these elementary duties. There is no foundation whatever for all the talk ascribing to them any other intentions."

In the course of an interview the Minister for Foreign Affairs is reported to have made the following further declarations :—

"Behind our fortresses each tribe does what it pleases. There is no recognised authority, either legitimate or even *de facto*. So far Spain has preserved a semblance of order. But at any moment disturbances might occur. Far from embarking on a policy of adventure, the officers in command of our possessions are doing their best to restrain the tribes by means of pacific counsels. At the moment when we are being accused of haughtily refusing even to discuss the evacuation of the Restinga and Cabo de Agua, we are preparing a friendly reception for the Sultan's envoys to Madrid. How can we trouble about evacuation before a single step has been taken by Morocco in fulfilment of her treaty obligation to maintain public tranquillity at the gates of our fortresses? How can we be reasonably expected to accept as a sufficient guarantee a mere promise that the necessary Moorish force will be told off for this purpose? And even if the Sultan be able to send such a force, what assurance have we that it will not degenerate into a starving rabble, such as we were not long since compelled to receive within the walls of Melilla, and to relieve at great expense to the Spanish Treasury?

"This is the point of view which, under instructions from his Government, Señor Merry del Val boldly maintained in his conferences with the Sultan at Fez. It is to be hoped that the Moorish Mission will recognise the reasonableness of our attitude. We shall examine their proposals in a broad spirit of justice, but we cannot depart from what we conceive to be the essential basis of our situation in Morocco."

The Liberal press, though criticising the Government severely for having postponed their demand for a supplementary credit till after the adjournment of the Cortes, is not on the whole unfavourable to the Government policy of strengthening the garrisons at Melilla and Ceuta.

I have, &c.
MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[22592] No. 206.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.— (*Received June* 17.)

(No. 117. Confidential.)

Madrid, June 14, 1909.

Sir,

I LEARN from M. Martin, French Chargé d'Affaires, that M. Révoil, before his departure on leave of absence, had a satisfactory interview on the 12th instant with King Alfonso on the subject of the measures which are being taken to reinforce the garrisons of Ceuta and Melilla. The King assured his Excellency that nothing in the nature of an armed expedition in the Riff country was in contemplation. A movement of that kind would have required a much larger credit than the 3,000,000 pesetas actually asked for. It had merely been felt that the fortresses in question were under their proper strength and that, especially at Melilla, the garrison would not be in a position, without reinforcements, to intervene effectively in the event of

[22862] No. 207*.

Mr. Carnegie to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received June* 19.)

(No. 239.) *Paris, June* 18, 1909.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith, with reference to my despatch No. 237 of the 16th instant, a copy of a letter from the President of the Union des Mines marocaines.

M. Darcy states, in answer to the enquiry addressed to him, that the text of the projet communicated to His Majesty's Embassy is that which will be submitted to the Sultan of Morocco, and he specifies the districts in which operations are contemplated.

I have, &c.
L. D. CARNEGIE.

Inclosure in No. 207*.

Union des Mines marocaines to Sir F. Bertie.

Paris, le 17 *juin*, 1909.

M. l'Ambassadeur,

VOUS avez bien voulu nous faire connaître que votre Gouvernement, dont le bienveillant appui a été sollicité en faveur de l'Union des Mines marocaines, souhaitait être éclairé sur les deux points suivants :—

1. La formule communiquée par notre lettre du 2 juin courant sera-t-elle celle qui sera soumise au Sultan ?
2. Où se trouvent les périmètres visés dans celle-ci ?

La réponse à la première question est affirmative. Quant aux périmètres, ils sont répartis comme suit :—

Un dans la région de Ceuta-Tetuan.
Trois dans le Riff.
Trois dans la Chaouia.
Deux dans le Djebilet.
Un dans le Chiadma.
Neuf dans le Haut-Atlas.
Trois dans le Sous.

Veuillez, &c.
Président du Conseil d'Administration,
DARCY.

order being disturbed in the mining districts, where both the French and the Spanish syndicates concerned had now resumed work and might at any moment stand in need of protection against a raid by some discontented chieftain or tribe.

I gather that the French Ambassador, who has hitherto watched very anxiously the situation in the Riff country, is, for the moment, free from serious apprehension with regard to that region. Count Tattenbach, German Ambassador, on the other hand, is distinctly uneasy. He confessed to me in conversation a day or two ago, that he strongly suspected the French of having insisted on Spain making a forward move on the lines of the French occupation of the Showia country. I assured his Excellency that, in my own belief, French influence was much more likely to be exercised to restrain the Spaniards than to urge them on. Count Tattenbach said he was glad to hear me say so, but that he could not help feeling a little nervous lest some infringement of the Algeciras settlement should be impending. His Excellency's view is inspired, I suspect, by Señor Villanueva, a Spanish Deputy and ex-Minister round whom is gathered the small group of politicians whose device is " not a man nor a peseta for Morocco." Señor Villanueva led the attack on the foreign policy of Señor Maura's Government throughout the session of the Cortes which has just come to an end. In the present instance, he has not been followed by the bulk of the Liberal party. Most of the Opposition leaders who have been interviewed on the subject of the supplementary credit have been careful to say nothing that would embarrass the Government. Their chief, however, Señor Moret, if correctly reported, has adopted an attitude not dissimilar from that of Señor Villanueva. He went so far as to declare that, if the Government policy led Spain into war with Morocco, his first act, on returning to power, would be to conclude a peace which would make amends to that country for such an assault on its independence.

I have, &c.
MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[22725] No. 207.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received June* 18.)

(No. 118. Confidential.) *Madrid, June* 14, 1909.

Sir,

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs mentioned casually to me in conversation a few days ago that Germany had now recognized, in the form of a written communication, the special political position which Spain claims to occupy in Morocco. He did not offer to show me the document in question, but, by the courtesy of the French chargé d'affaires, I have been permitted to read a copy of it, as received by him from Paris.

The original document appears to have been left with Señor Allendesalazar about a week ago by Count Tattenbach, German Ambassador, in the form of a *note verbale*. It is to the effect that, while unable for various reasons to sign the tripartite declaration between France, Germany, and Spain which had been at first contemplated, the German Government willingly admits that, in signing the declaration of the 9th February, 1909, with the French Government, it had no idea of disputing or in any way infringing upon the special political status which is conferred upon Spain by her treaties with Morocco, and has since been recognized in the General Act of Algeciras. The Spanish reply, drawn up in a similar form, takes act of this fresh recognition of the rights claimed by Spain in Morocco.

I have, &c.
M. DE BUNSEN.

[23105] No. 208.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received June* 21.)

(No. 143. Confidential.) *Tangier, June* 15, 1909.

Sir,

THE news which reaches me from various sources at Fez tends to show that the relations between the Sultan and the Great Viziers are growing more and more strained. The Commissioner for Foreign Affairs told me the other day, in strict

confidence, that since their arrival and their assumption of office he had only received two despatches signed by them, all other communications bearing the Sultan's seal. This was quite a new departure, as at the time that Abbas-el-Fasi and Abdullah-el-Fasi, mere creatures of the Sultan, were acting for them all despatches bore their signatures.

I understand, moreover, that the notorious Hadjieb, who is hated by El Glawi and Si Aissa, is in higher favour than ever with the Sultan. El Glawi, on the ground of ill-health, has not been up to the palace for the last week or ten days.

Dr. Verdon tells me that he has lately had several confidential conversations with Si Abbas-ben-Daoud, who, although inclined to exaggerate, is an intelligent man, and constantly in the company of Si Aissa-ben-Omar and his entourage. He says that El Glawi, Si Aissa, and M'tougui are all united in their dislike of Mulai Hafid and his methods, and have settled upon a plan of action should he go too far. He does not believe that it is merely ill-health that keeps El Glawi away from the court, and finally, after considerable pressure, he told Dr. Verdon that he thought it not impossible that El Glawi might seize the person of Mulai Hafid, and set up a younger brother of Abdul Aziz (Mulai Hamid) on the throne. Ben Daoud thinks El Glawi could do this if he wished, as he is very powerful and much feared; he is, moreover, at the head of a large body of troops, who came up with him from the south, and are absolutely devoted to him and the other great kaïds.

Reports have reached Tangier from Casa Blanca that Mulai-el-Kebir has been proclaimed Sultan by the Zair and the Zemmour tribes, and that he is marching at the head of a considerable force to the assistance of the Beni 'Mtir. Dr. Verdon, on the other hand, writes that Mulai-el-Kebir has persuaded the Zemmour to proclaim Abdul Aziz, declaring that he is acting as his khalifa. He has, moreover, produced letters purporting to be addressed by the ex-Sultan to the Zemmour, the Beni 'Mtir, the Beni 'Mguild, and other Berber tribes. I feel convinced that these letters must be forgeries, but they may produce important results. In any case it appears probable that, should Mulai-el-Kebir advance in the direction of the Beni 'Mtir, Si Ma Haboub, who is devoted to him, may go over to him with part of the mehallah. This was an eventuality which the Sultan feared at the time of Mulai-el-Kebir's flight, and consequently removed Si Ma Haboub from his command and brought him back to Fez.

I have, &c.

REGINALD LISTER.

[23222]

No. 209.

Note by the Spanish Ambassador.—(Communicated June 21.)

(Confidential.)
(Translation.)

London, June 16, 1909.

WITH reference to his letter of the 29th April last to Sir E. Grey's reply of the 3rd May following, and to the Foreign Office note of the 8th of the same month, relative to the proposed Spanish-German declaration in regard to Morocco, the Spanish Ambassador has the honour to inform the Secretary of State, confidentially and in fulfilment of the instructions received from his Government, of the solution which has been given to the matter.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the German Empire insisted that it is not possible to sign the declaration unless the Spanish Government should undertake to grant a concession which has no relation to the question, and which for some time past has been repeatedly refused. He also stated at the same that the Franco-German-Spanish declaration could not be replaced by an exchange of notes, because the latter procedure, just as much as the former, would be certain to give rise to protests in the Chambers and amongst public opinion in Germany; and, further, that, in the present political situation in Morocco, it might, although without reason, be interpreted as an act of interference of the part of Germany and call forth fresh discussions in regard to German policy which the Imperial Government firmly desired to avoid.

This declaration was made by the German Ambassador at Madrid in the terms of the enclosed copy (Inclosure No. 1). The Spanish Government replied to it by instructing their Ambassador at Berlin to make in his turn a verbal communication to the German Secretary of State and to leave a copy with him. The text of this communication is contained in Inclosure No. 2. In it act is taken of the recognition accorded once more by the Imperial Government to the special political

interests of Spain in Morocco, and, interpreting it in this sense, the declaration of Count Tattenbach is accepted in the same spirit of cordiality as that which inspired it.

Señor Pulo carried out his instructions, and telegraphed afterwards that the German Secretary of State had thanked him warmly for his communication and had recognised as correct the interpretation given to Count Tattenbach's declaration, authorising the Ambassador, with very friendly expressions, to declare that this was the case.

Inclosure 1 in No. 209.

Note communicated to German Minister at Madrid by German Government.

JE vous prie de déclarer verbalement au Gouvernement espagnol ce qui suit:—

Le Gouvernement Impérial, obligé de tenir compte de l'opinion publique en Allemagne et au Maroc, qui pourrait donner à la déclaration proposée une interprétation autre qu'elle ne comporte, et par conséquent serait inquiétée, se voit, à son grand regret, dans l'impossibilité de signer le protocole en question. Vous êtes toutefois autorisé à déclarer expressément, une fois de plus, au Gouvernement espagnol qu'il va de soi que l'arrangement du 9 février entre l'Allemagne et la France ne touche en aucune façon aux droits de l'Espagne au Maroc. Le Gouvernement Impérial reconnaît, comme il a toujours reconnu, que l'Espagne, par suite du développement historique et de l'existence de ses possessions territoriales, sur la côte marocaine, possède certains intérêts politiques particuliers au Maroc, sanctionnés d'ailleurs par l'Acte d'Algésiras. L'arrangement du 9 février n'a pour but que d'écarter la possibilité de frictions entre l'Allemagne et la France, et d'apaiser, dans l'intérêt général, la situation au Maroc. Il va de soi que cet arrangement n'est d'aucune façon dirigé contre l'Espagne, avec qui l'Allemagne désire continuer avoir les relations les plus amicales.

Inclosure 2 in No. 209.

Note verbale communicated to German Secretary of State by the Spanish Ambassador at Berlin.

(Translation.)

COUNT TATTENBACH made to me on the 2nd instant the declaration, of which the German Secretary of State had given your Excellency notice, with regard to the scope of the Franco-German Agreement of the 9th February last, relative to Morocco. Without entering into an examination of the motives for which the Cabinet of Berlin consider themselves unable to give instructions to Prince Radolin to sign the declaration which was once contemplated, the Spanish Government take act of the recognition accorded once more by the Imperial Government to the special political interests of Spain in Morocco. When the Powers convoked by His Shereefian Majesty decided three years ago upon the reforms required at that moment by the State of the Moghreb these special political interests of Spain were taken into account, amongst other things, when a special share and mandate were accorded to our country in connection with the reforms in question. The Act of Algeciras—as Count Tattenbach, speaking in the name of his Government, said—sanctioned, therefore, by applying them to a concrete matter, the interests referred to, without, it is clear, in any way limiting the right of calling them into play in connection with other circumstances and ideas consistently with the respect always observed by the Spanish Government for other legitimate interests, and for the principles that the Powers have established by common accord as the basis of their conduct in Morocco. Interpreting it in this manner, Count Tattenbach's declaration was welcomed by me with the same spirit of cordiality as that which inspired it.

[23295] No. 210.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received June* 21.)

(No. 66.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, June* 21, 1909.

THERE would appear to be little doubt that Mulai Mohammed died last week, and that his body was taken out secretly and buried. Since his arrival at Fez he had been kept in confinement in the Palace. By his death the position of the Roghi should be strengthened.

[23486] No. 211.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received June* 22.)

(No. 67.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, June* 22, 1909.

THE gravity of the situation at Fez increases daily. The forces of the Pretender and the hostile tribes have succeeded in almost surrounding the town. The breach between the viziers and the Sultan has widened to a marked degree. His Majesty refuses to consult them, and apparently will not realise the critical nature of the situation. He continues to send orders to the troops, but they are all referred back by the latter to El Glawi for confirmation.

Si Aissa-ben-Omar informed Mr. MacLeod in the course of a long confidential conversation which took place on the 16th instant, that the attitude of the Sultan filled him with despair. His Excellency even went so far as to ask in very guarded terms what attitude the Powers would be likely to adopt in the event of the strained relations between the viziers and the Sultan, resulting in an open struggle. He admitted that the rumours of the Sultan's drinking were well founded, and said that he considered that that fact added a great element of danger to the situation.

The Fez people are unanimous in their hostility to the Sultan. M'Tongi inveighs openly against him, and offers up prayers to God that Morocco may be taken in hand by the French or any other Christians, and that quickly. There does not appear to be any anti-European feeling in Fez.

I cannot believe that the present state of things can continue, and European interests would certainly suffer gravely in the event of the Sultan triumphing over the viziers.

There has been a very general revulsion of feeling in Northern Morocco at all events, in favour of Abdel Aziz, and I am personally of opinion, should there be a change of Sovereigns, that the best solution would be found in his restoration this time with the full support of France. It must, however, be borne in mind that the great viziers were principally instrumental in deposing Abdel Aziz, and it might prove impossible to reconcile them to his restoration. It is also possible that a candidate has already been selected by them. A 12-year-old son of Abdel Aziz, and the ex-Sultan's younger brother are both now at Fez, and their choice may very probably have fallen upon one of the two.

I would add very confidentially that Count de Sainte-Aulaire shares my views, but has begged me most earnestly not to allow this to be mentioned in Paris. He already last year got into hot water with the authorities at the Quai d'Orsay for urging that more effective support should be given to Abdel Aziz. Events have shown that his estimate of the situation was the correct one.

[23487] No. 212.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received June* 22.)

(No. 68.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, June* 22, 1909.

THE situation at Fez, which formed the subject of my immediately preceding telegram, shows no improvement.

A despatch from M. Gaillard, dated the 20th, and sent by special messenger, has just reached Count de Sainte-Aulaire. It states that, in the opinion of Commandant Mangin, the situation is highly critical from a military point of view. The country up to within some 5 miles of the gates of the capital has been laid waste by the Pretender's

No. 215*.

[23729] *Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received June* 26.)

(No. 144.) *Tangier, June* 18, 1909.

Sir,

ON my return to Tangier I asked the French chargé d'affaires how matters stood with regard to the issue of the firman which is to regulate the question of mining in Morocco, and which formed the subject of your despatch No. 58 of the 15th ultimo. M. de Saint-Aulaire tells me that M. Porché has now completed the règlement which he has drawn up on the subject, the main lines of which were approved by the Sultan at Fez. It is now being copied, and will very shortly be submitted to the Corps Diplomatique for their approval.

On the 11th instant I received your telegram informing me that His Majesty's Government had decided to support the International Mining Syndicate, and I wrote at once to His Majesty's consul at Fez to inform him of the fact, and to instruct him to place himself at the disposal of the representatives of the various groups now at Fez, should they require his assistance. I learn from Mr. Harris that the gentlemen who arrived at Fez on the 9th instant are of opinion that it would be better not to open negotiations with the Sultan until after the mining law has been published, recent experience having taught them that little reliance can be placed upon the contracts entered into by His Shereefian Majesty.

One of the Mannesmann brothers has also arrived at Fez, and I learn from Mr. Harris that the tactics of the Maghzen are to induce one syndicate to bid against the other. The "Dépêche Marocaine" of to-day states that M. Mannesmann, at his first interview with the Sultan, made a present to His Majesty of 1,000 louis, but that since that the Sultan has declined to receive him!

The German Minister called upon me the other day. He is evidently still anxious lest any misconstruction should be placed upon his action and that of Dr. Vassel in connection with the struggle going on between the Union des Mines marocaines and Messrs. Mannesmann. He is also considerably upset by a letter he had received from Mr. Harris, who was convinced that he had not been acting straight in the matter and wrote in pretty strong terms. Dr. Rosen told me that the German Government in the past had always supported Messrs. Mannesmann; that when on his recommendation they promised their support to the International Mining Syndicate (now called the "Union des Mines marocaines") they seemed to have forgotten the existence of the former firm, and at all events omitted to square them; that consequently now the situation has arisen in which they are practically pledged to support both. He had done all he could to induce the Mannesmanns to come to terms with the Union des Mines marocaines, but the negotiations had fallen through owing, Dr. Rosen said, to the fault of Messrs. Mannesmann.

He had now instructed Dr. Vassel to present the representative of the German group of the Union des Mines marocaines to the Sultan if called upon to do so, and to do the same for M. Mannesmann, but in neither case to do any more. As I stated in my despatch No. 83 of the 27th April, Dr. Vassel acted as interpreter for M. Mannesmann on more than one occasion in the spring, and although Dr. Rosen tried to explain this away by saying that the viziers were unable to understand the interpreter brought by Mannesmann, and preferred to do business through a man they knew, there is no doubt that the impression produced upon the Maghzen was that the German consul was supporting the claims put forward by Mannesmann.

Mr. Harris seems to think that the representatives of the French and German groups of the Union des Mines marocaines will leave Fez very shortly.

I have, &c.

REGINALD LISTER.

forces, and a mehallah, which is nothing better than a mere rabble, on whose loyalty, moreover, little reliance can be placed, has been dispatched by the Sultan to oppose them. The mehallah is not accompanied by any of the European instructors.

There are now no troops left in the town, and though no doubt the movement is primarily directed against the Sultan, and is not anti-European in character, M. Gaillard is of opinion that a situation may at any moment arise when the lives of Europeans may be endangered.

The belief is expressed by M. Gaillard that the younger brother of Abdel Aziz has already been selected by the viziers as their candidate for the throne. His accession would involve a regency which would remain in their hands, as he is not yet of age.

[23487] No. 213.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Lister.

(No. 37.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, June* 23, 1909.

SITUATION at Fez. Your telegram No. 68 of the 22nd instant.

His Majesty's Government trust to Mr. MacLeod to run no unnecessary risk, and to take such steps as you and he may deem necessary and possible to ensure the safety of British subjects.

[23685] No. 214.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received June* 24.)

(No. 69.)

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Tangier, June* 24, 1909.

YOUR telegram No. 96 of the 11th September, 1907.

American Minister has asked that His Majesty's consul at Fez may be instructed to protect American citizens and interests during continuance of disturbances in the neighbourhood of capital. As Fez was only omitted from previous list owing to fact that consul had left, I have so instructed Mr. MacLeod.

[23722] No. 215.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received June* 25.)

(No. 70.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, June* 25, 1909.

IT would appear from the most recent reports from Fez that the tension existing between the Sultan and viziers, referred to in my telegram No. 68, has slightly relaxed.

[23731] No. 216.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received June* 26.)

(No. 146.)

Sir, *Tangier, June* 20, 1909.

AS I had the honour to report in my telegram No. 64 of to-day's date, the commissioner for foreign affairs informed me this morning that he had received the written answer promised by the Spanish chargé d'affaires (see my telegram No. 63 of the 12th June) to the protest which he had addressed to him against the action of the Spanish authorities in the neighbourhood of Melilla and Ceuta.

This answer states that up to the present no Spanish troops have been moved out of the towns. The Spanish and French mining companies outside Melilla have been taking steps to repair the damage done to their property and to their railway, but so far no troops have been employed. Should, however, the persons engaged in this work of reparation be in any sort of danger, or should the tribes who have shown friendship for them be molested or threatened, troops would be moved out at once to protect them. With regard to the construction of the road outside Ceuta, it is maintained that only Riffians are being employed, but as Guebbas pointed out to me this is a mere quibble, as all the workmen are being paid by the Spaniards.

Si Guebbas has replied that until the Shereefian firman regulating the whole mining question in Morocco has been issued, the French and Spanish companies have no legal status whatever. The Spaniards, were they to move out troops to protect them in the prosecution of their mining operations, would consequently be supporting an illegality. He could not, moreover, admit that the Spanish Government had the right to protect one Moorish tribe against another. The Spanish Government were constantly speaking of their desire to prevent disturbances and justifying their aggressions on that score; he wished, however, to point out that they were really increasing and extending the zone of disturbances by taking action which led the tribes to believe that the Maghzen was powerless to enforce its authority. He concluded by expressing his conviction that the Spanish Government would give orders to put a stop to operations which constituted a direct contravention of the Act of Algeciras, and thus save the Moorish Government from the necessity of submitting the whole matter to the signatory Powers through the medium of the doyen of the Corps Diplomatique at Tangier. It would be most regrettable that the Maghzen should be driven to such a step which could only increase the strain on the relations between the two Powers on the very eve of the departure of the Moorish mission for Madrid.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

[23732] No. 217.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received June* 26.)

(No. 147. Confidential.)

Tangier, June 20, 1909.

Sir,

SINCE writing my despatch No. 143, Confidential, of the 15th instant, I have received daily reports from Fez which paint the situation in ever-darkening colours.

Encouraged, no doubt, by the disaffection amongst the Berber tribes, by the open revolt of the Zairs and Zemmours, the renewed hostility of the Beni M'Tir, and possibly, also, the reported dissensions between the Sultan and his Viziers, the Pretender has reappeared upon the scene, and is acting with an audacity almost unparalleled in his past record. The Hyaina tribe have thrown in their lot with him, and at the end of last week he sent his khalifa Jellali to summon the Cheraga tribe to recognise him and march with him upon Fez. On their declining to do this he burnt a number of their villages only a few hours distant from the capital.

Kaïd Abdel Krim Chergui, one of the principal men of the tribe, and a brother-in-law of Menebhi, but an incapable general and a notorious coward, was hastily sent out at the head of a mehalla composed of local tribesmen, and supported by some 900 of the horsemen brought up by the southern Kaïds.

Menebhi came to see me at about 8 o'clock this morning in a great state of excitement, having received a letter from Chergui's brother, dated the 18th, and sent down by special messenger, saying that the mehalla had been completely defeated at a spot some 8 miles north-east of Fez, that their camp had been plundered and everything carried off, tents, guns, horses, &c., that Fez was practically surrounded, that all the tribes were up against the Sultan, and the situation was desperate. He seemed to anticipate that El Glawi, Aissa-ben-Omar, and M'Tougui, who are disgusted with the Sultan's treatment of them, would probably leave him to his fate and return with the troops remaining to them to the south.

Menebhi is of course inclined to exaggerate, so I went round to the Kasbah and saw the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs. He told me that all official business was going on as usual at Fez, and that no allusion was made to the serious situation in the letters which he received from the Maghzen. He admitted, however, that from private letters he gathered that things were going pretty badly, and he did not attempt to deny that Chergui had been defeated by the Pretender's khalifa. He was inclined, however, to minimise the gravity of the situation.

I have since received a letter from the consul at Fez, dated the 16th instant, in which he tells me that Chergui attempted to attack the camp of Jellali, that he was repulsed with severe loss, and that his camp was plundered by his own followers. The horsemen from the south seem to have fallen into an ambush; they defended themselves for some three hours, but, after losing very heavily, were forced back,

whereupon the local contingent, who had failed to support them in the action, robbed them of all they had, horses, clothes, arms, &c., and finally looted the camp.

Mr. MacLeod says that there has been no panic at Fez, and that for the present there appears no immediate danger, as the Pretender's khalifa is not strong enough to follow up this success. The Sultan still remains invisible. He did not attend prayers last Friday on the ground of ill-health, and has seen nobody except the French instructor Mangin. The French consul informs Mr. MacLeod that His Majesty is not really ill, but sulking. He is furious at the turn events have taken, and has been consoling himself with the contents of a case of champagne supplied by a Spanish dentist.

The most disquieting element in the situation is undoubtedly the estrangement between the Sultan and the Viziers. It appears that on the last occasion when His Majesty sent for them El Glawi spoke his mind very clearly to him, and in his last letter Mr. MacLeod confirms the opinion expressed to Dr. Verdon by Ben Daoud that they may be forced in self-defence to take some extreme measure, and possibly depose the Sultan and place some much younger brother on the throne. El Glawi still has a considerable force at his back, and Mulai Hafid is hated at Fez.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

P.S.—Menebhi's scribe came to see me last night, and told me that Guebbas was in reality terrified at the news received from Fez, but was trying to conceal his anxiety and minimise the gravity of the situation to the legations.

R. L.

[23733] No. 218.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received June* 26.)

(No. 148.)

Tangier, June 20, 1909.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's consul at Casa Blanca, reporting the sentences passed on the deserters from the French foreign legion who formed the subject of the incident which occurred at Casa Blanca last September.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

Inclosure in No. 218.

Consul Madden to Mr. Lister.

(No. 107.)

Casa Blanca, June 12, 1909.

Sir,

THE seven deserters of the French foreign legion (two of whom only were Germans), and who formed the subject of the deserters' incident of the 25th September last, and have been in prison here since, awaiting trial, were on the 10th instant condemned by French court-martial to various terms of imprisonment with hard labour and military degradation. Three of the men received sentences of ten, eight, and six years respectively, while the four others were accorded the minimum punishment of five years each, in view of the temptations to desert held out to them.

The evening before the sentences were pronounced the French general was dining at the Austrian consulate. Herr Brandt, the honorary Austrian consul, was, at the time of the incident, one of the principal offenders, as he harboured a deserter in his own house, so a French staff officer tells me.

A deserter from the Spanish tabor (regiment) took sanctuary in the British Cemetery, Casa Blanca, the other day. The man had, so I learnt, deserted a month ago, and had been robbed by the Arabs of his police uniform, but returned to town. I received a visit from the Spanish lieutenant-colonel to request me to have the

deserter handed over, and I at once sent the consulate soldier to give the man up to the police authorities, but to first advise him to go back quietly to the Spanish camp, which he did.

I have, &c.
A. M. MADDEN.

P.S.—According to the local French press, the two German deserters aforesaid were condemned to five and six years' imprisonment each.

A. M. M.

[23757] No. 219.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 26.)

(No. 124.)
Sir,

Madrid, June 22, 1909.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 121 of the 17th instant, I have the honour to report that Señor Merry del Val, Spanish Minister at Tangier, now on leave of absence at Madrid, informed me yesterday in conversation that he had been directed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs to relate to me verbally what the Spanish Government believed to be the true state of the case as regards the complaint of the British vice-consul at Tetuan against the Spanish consul.

The upshot of his explanation was that the Moorish tribesmen in question took refuge at the Spanish consulate; that asylum in such cases cannot properly be refused; that subsequently the refugees desired to leave the town; that the consul had no reason for retaining them; the British vice-consul had made no request to that effect, nor was it true that the basha had made any communication to him on the subject. The basha, it was understood, had since declared that he had intimated to the Spanish consul the desire of the British vice-consul to proceed against the tribesmen for their complicity in the capture of Mr. Clark Kennedy last summer. The Spanish consul denied that he had received any such intimation from the basha.

Señor Merry del Val claimed that the word of a Spanish official must of course be accepted as against that of a Moorish basha.

I said that his account of the affair was a mere repetition of the very unsatisfactory explanation already given by Señor Figuerola, of the Spanish Legation at Tangier. I added that it took no note of the categorical statements of the British vice-consul, and that I could not accept it as an adequate reply to the formal note of protest which by your direction I had addressed to the Spanish Government.

I begged Señor Merry del Val to inform the Foreign Minister of the view of this case which I continued to hold, and to state to his Excellency that I was awaiting a written reply dealing fully with the points raised in my note.

I have, &c.
MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[23738] No. 220.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 26.)

(No. 248.)
Sir,

Paris, June 25, 1909.

IN the course of the discussion of the supplementary estimates in the Senate yesterday, a question was put to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in regard to the present position of France in Morocco. In reply, M. Pichon stated that as a result of M. Regnault's visit to Fez, an understanding had been reached in principle between the French and Moorish Governments in regard to the position of France in the Chaouia district, the régime on the frontier between Algeria and Morocco, and the financial obligations of Morocco towards France.

Negotiations were now proceeding in Paris between the French Government and a Moorish mission, and the points under discussion included the method to be adopted for the reimbursement of the war expenses incurred by the French Government, to which the Sultan had definitely agreed.

As regards the position of Mulai Hafid, M. Pichon said that he was for the moment

the Sultan recognised by France, as by all the Powers, and it was accordingly with him that they were treating. In the event of his being replaced by another Sultan, the French Government held that the engagements entered into by him would be equally binding on his successor. The changes which might take place in Morocco need not give rise to any anxiety, and France would refuse to intervene in the internal quarrels which might arise in Morocco, just as she had abstained from taking the part of Mulai Hafid against Abdul Aziz.

The French Government did not contemplate any new action in Morocco. They would confine themselves to maintaining and safeguarding the rights and interests of France in that country, which remained to-day what they had been yesterday. In the pursuit of this end they met with no opposition from other Powers, all of whom, without exception, had recognised the special position of France, her rights, and her obligations.

They would not deviate from the well-defined course which they had hitherto pursued, and if Mulai Hafid should fall, they would conduct negotiations with his successor.

I have the honour to inclose herein the text of M. Pichon's speech, extracted from the "Journal Officiel."*

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

[23685] No. 221.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Lister.

(No. 85.)
Sir,

Foreign Office, June 30, 1909.

I HAVE received your telegram No. 69 of the 24th instant, and I approve your action in instructing His Majesty's consul at Fez to protect American citizens and interests during the continuance of disturbances in the neighbourhood of the capital.

I have informed the American Ambassador in London of the above.

[24657] No. 222.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 1.)

(No. 129.)
Sir,

Madrid, June 28, 1909.

I AM at last enabled by the Minister for Foreign Affairs to furnish you with the reply of the Spanish Government to the complaint against the action of the Spanish consul at Tetuan which is embodied in the inclosure in your despatch No. 41 of the 15th April.

From the inclosed translation by Sir Somerville Head of the Foreign Minister's note, it will be seen that there is an absolute conflict between the narration of events as contained respectively in the reports sent in by the Spanish consul and in the statements made by the Basha of Tetuan to the British vice-consul. According to the Spanish version, the Spanish consul was quiet unaware of the fact that the British vice-consul desired the arrest of the tribesmen till after the departure of the latter from Tetuan.

According to the British version, the Spanish consul must have been perfectly well informed on this point.

Señor Allendesalazar requests me to assure you that the wishes of the British vice-consul would certainly have been taken into account had they been known to his Spanish colleague.

The Spanish note alludes to the assistance which it claims to have been rendered by the governor of Ceuta in securing last summer the liberty of Mr. Clarke Kennedy. I do not find in the Morocco print any confirmation of this pretension, or, indeed, any account of the circumstances attending the capture and release of Mr. Clarke Kennedy.

I await your further instructions.

I have, &c.
MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

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* Not printed.

Inclosure in No. 222.

M. Allendesalazar to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(Translation.)

Ministry of State, June 24, 1909.

Sir,

I HAVE received your Excellency's note of the 17th instant, reminding me of that of the 29th April last, relative to certain Kuf tribesmen in whose arrest His Britannic Majesty's Government is interested.

My desire to arrive at an exact knowledge of the facts was the cause of the delay in replying to your first note, which delay I sincerely regret, but which I am sure you will consider justified in view of the reason I have just given.

The Spanish representative at Tangier having inquired into the matter with the attention which the Government and its officials always give to any question raised by the British Government, it is evident, from the information supplied by the Spanish consul at Tangier, that there are many inexactitudes in the account of the facts as related by the basha of that city.

It is shown that the Spanish agent never attributed the character of protégés to the Moors who took refuge in his house. Neither was he informed at all that these men were the object of proceedings on the part of the British vice-consul at Tetuan; and, lastly, he never agreed to the prisoners being handed over to him on condition of his awaiting the receipt of instructions by the basha from Tangier.

The tribesmen of Uled Haddu, as is proved, sought refuge at the Spanish consulate, believing themselves to be in imminent peril of arbitrary arrest on the part of the governor of Tetuan. Our consul, knowing the relations between the commandant of Ceuta and that tribe, which were of such great assistance in securing the liberty of Mr. Clarke Kennedy last summer, and, being fully aware of the frequency of cases of abuse of power committed under every kind of pretext by the Moorish authorities, considered it his duty to grant the favour they begged. Nevertheless he notified the basha of what had occurred, and, claiming the right of asylum, obtained from him the promise that the refugees would not be molested. Trusting the word of the Moorish authority, he allowed the tribesmen to leave the quarters of the consulate, and it was with genuine astonishment that he learnt shortly afterwards that, in spite of the promise he had obtained, the soldiers of the basha had arrested one of the tribesmen, and had endeavoured to seize the other, who managed to take refuge for the second time in the Spanish consulate. Señor Lopez Ferrer betook himself at once to the house of the governor and demanded the immediate surrender of the prisoner, which he obtained on reminding the basha of the promise which he had given that morning, but without committing himself in any way to await the receipt of instructions from Tangier, and without being informed of the interest which it seems the British vice-consul had in the capture of Uled Haddu. The tribesmen passed the night in the Spanish consulate and set out at dawn to return to their village without being hindered by the Shereefian authorities or meeting with any resistance. It was not till the afternoon of the day of their departure that Mr. Bewicke come to Señor Lopez Ferrer and expressed the wish that the tribesmen should be surrendered to him, as being implicated in the abduction of the British subject above mentioned.

Under these circumstances, and by setting forth the facts of the case in agreement with the statement of the Spanish consul at Tetuan, which for the Spanish Government is incontrovertible, I feel convinced that your Government will clearly understand that the action of that Spanish agent was devoid of any intention which can be interpreted as being inspired by the desire to facilitate the escape of criminals, and much less by that of frustrating the intentions of the British authorities, of whose interest in the matter Señor Lopez Ferrer could not have been aware until after the tribesmen had left the sanctuary of the consulate which they had sought in accordance with a custom that is usual in Morocco.

I therefore beg your Excellency to be so good as to inform Sir Edward Grey of the above explanation, and to assure him that, had the Spanish consul at Tetuan known in time of the wishes of the British vice-consul, he would undoubtedly have taken them into account, as is natural in the case of the agent of a Power on terms of cordial friendship with Spain, and the matter being, as your Excellency rightly observed, one in which is concerned the safety of Europeans in the Moorish Empire.

I avail, &c.

MANUEL ALLENDESALAZAR.

[24884] No. 222*.

Dr. Wilkinson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 2.)

Sir,

Paris, June 30, 1909.

I AM requested by the Ambassador of His Shereefian Majesty Moulai Abdel Hafid to inform you that the mission is contemplating visiting London.

As the mission has with it no one except myself who speaks English, and is to a certain extent dependent on the hospitality of the Governments which it visits, I was requested by his Excellency Sidi Abdullah Fezi to ascertain if any arrangements would be made with a view to securing the mission's personal comfort when they arrive in London.

The members of the mission are Si Abdullah-el-Fezi, Si-el-Moghir, and Si Abd-el-Radu Bengàluit, and their suite comprises about fourteen servants, &c.

I might add that here the Government has supplied them with a residence and their "moona." In fact, they are treated exactly as M. Regnault and his staff were treated in Fez and Mr. Lister.

I should therefore be, on their behalf, extremely indebted to you if you would direct some idea to be given me as to what arrangements they may expect on their visit.

I may add that his Excellency Si Abdullah Fezi informed me that he expected that their business here will be concluded in about twenty days, or one month.

I have, &c.

LANCELOT WILKINSON, *F.R.G.S.*,
Physician in Ordinary to His Shereefian Majesty the Sultan, Chief Medical Officer to the Moorish Government, and Surgeon-General to the Shereefian Army.

[25075] No. 223.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received July* 3.)

(No. 71.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, July* 3, 1909.

THERE has been some outward improvement in relations between viziers and Sultan. His Majesty is enraged at reports of Moulai Mohammed's death, and maintains that they are entirely devoid of any foundation.

[25076] No. 224.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received July* 3.)

(No. 72.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, July* 3, 1909.

DURING a visit which I paid to-day to Count St. Aulaire he read me a telegram which he had just received from his Government to the effect that news had reached them from Berlin that the Italian Ambassador at that Court had, in the course of conversation with the Imperial Chancellor and also with M. de Schoen, dwelt upon the alarming state of affairs existing in Morocco. He had appeared to think that the gravity of the situation was such as might very possibly render the intervention of the Powers necessary and involve the dispatch of warships. M. de Schoen subsequently repeated to the French Ambassador what he had been told by the latter's Italian colleague, and M. Jules Cambon availed himself of the opening thus given him to state that it was upon France and Spain that the duty devolved to intervene in Morocco, should the situation become such as to necessitate intervention. M. de Schoen, though he declined to admit that any actual mandate had been given to the two Powers, seems to have agreed in a general way with the view taken by M. Cambon.

Count St. Aulaire has informed his Government, in reply, that he is at a loss to understand what can have given rise to the idea of the dispatch of war-ships. While the situation at Fez was, without doubt, serious, the security of the ports was quite undisturbed, and the only point at which disturbances might arise was in the Anjera, where Raisuli was having some difficulty with the tribesmen.

The action of the Italian Ambassador, and especially the fact that it had been taken at Berlin, had, M. de St. Aulaire said, caused him considerable surprise.

[25078] No. 225.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received July* 4.)

(No. 26.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, July* 4, 1909.

MOROCCO. Tangier telegram No. 72.

The action of the Italian Ambassador at Berlin is confirmed by the French chargé d'affaires, who further informs me that the Italian Ambassador here has held similar language.

M. Silvestrelli was told that there was no justification for the step he suggested. On this point the Spanish Government are in entire agreement with France.

I have repeated the above to His Majesty's Minister at Tangier.

[25237] No. 226.

Consul MacLeod to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received July* 5.)

(No. 24. Confidential.)
Sir, *Fez, June* 18, 1909.

RESUMING the narrative of my despatch No. 23 of the 30th April, I beg now to relate the course of events here since then.

Early in April the Sultan's brother Mulai Kebir fled from the camp of the Vizier Glawi and Aissa Ben Omar near Rabat, into Zair and Zemmur, with what ultimate intention exactly is not even yet quite certain. It seems clear, however, that on going to certain farms of his near Rabat, to ask for his rents and tenants' accounts,

the tenants replied that the rents had been embargoed by the Sultan, and they could not give the accounts except by the Sultan's order. In Morocco, such an action is usually the first step towards the arrest of a man and the confiscating of his property, so Mulai Kebir had some reason to feel apprehensive.

The viziers meantime had heard that the Sultan was becoming jealous and suspicious of them, and so, without actively promoting Mulai Kebir's flight, they used no vigilance to anticipate it, and I daresay at heart were not very sorry that a rival, or a danger, should arise who should make them still more indispensable to the Sultan, or the capture of whom would entitle them to His Majesty's good graces. After offering, fruitlessly, some rewards for Mulai Kebir's apprehension, they proceeded towards Fez.

Learning of the deadlock which had come about in Beni M'Tir, and feeling sure the Sultan was acting under some misapprehension, they proceeded to the mehalla there and issued a letter to that tribe inviting them to submit to the Sultan, and offering their services to bring about a settlement.

Their appearance in force, and their letter, elicited an offer from the Beni M'Tir to submit to the Sultan, restore the arms, &c., captured by them on the 17th April, and pay a fine of 100,000 dollars. They stipulated only that the Sultan would not insist on their giving levies of men as soldiers.

The terms offered would have afforded a signal triumph for the Sultan, but His Majesty, angry both with the viziers and the Beni M'Tir, refused to abate his demand for soldiers, countermanded the viziers' orders about suspending hostilities, and ordered the mehalla to advance further into Beni M'Tir.

After some fighting, wherein the troops were successful, the mehalla occupied the kasbah of Hajeb—not, however, until the Beni M'Tir had removed from that district every creature or thing which could walk or be carried, except the guns captured on the 17th April. Of these, however, they took away the breech blocks and ammunition.

Meantime Mulai Kebir had been agitating, in a vague way, in Zair and Zemmur, and in fear of the mehallas in Beni M'Tir being affected by this agitation, the Sultan put first his master of ceremonies, and afterwards his chamberlain (the "hajib"), in command in Beni M'Tir. The master of the ceremonies later on, with some troops, was sent to Mequinez (of which in the last reign he was governor) to try to negotiate with the Zemmur for the surrender of Mulai Kebir.

Various negotiations have since taken place with the Beni M'Tir, a few chiefs of whom, of the side nearest to Fez and Mequinez, accepted the Sultan's terms, even as to soldiers. There is no sign yet, however, of their being able to raise the required soldiers, and towards the fine only some 500 head of cattle, with say, at most 20,000 dollars, or a fifth merely of the promised indemnity have yet been paid.

The Beni M'Tir nearest to the Fez–Mequinez road have, however, returned in some measure to their homes, and have begun to resume traffic with Mequinez, but whether they have really submitted, or are merely trying to secure the remains of their crops and to procure their necessities in the way of European wares, remains to be seen.

The departure of the Moorish Mission for Paris, early in May, need not be treated here further than to remark that nobody here believes the Ambassadors have any power soever to contract a loan, or do anything save to insist upon the French (apparently unconditionally) evacuating Shawia, Casa Blanca, Bu Denib, and Oujdah.

The Spanish Mission, under M. Merry del Val, left Fez on the 16th May, having done no business soever, the Sultan having stated grandiosely that he would treat of nothing until the Spanish Government withdrew their troops from the lands between Melilla and Cape de Agua, and that he would send a mission to Madrid to press that demand.

The British Mission left Fez on the 2nd June.

At the end of May the Pretender appeared to be less active, and so the Sultan withdrew the mehalla from Metafi (see p. 6 of my despatch No. 2 of the 30th April), and sent it to Beni M'Tir. Thereafter the Pretender resumed his operations vigorously, and presently reduced all Hiayna to his rule; his lieutenant, Jellali—a black slave with a force of about 1,000 men and four guns—summoned the Sheraga and Ulad-el-Hadj to submit to him. These tribes refused, and, on some of their villages being burned, appealed for help to the Sultan, who thereupon sent a mehalla of about 1,000 horsemen with two guns to the borders of Sheraga. This force was composed of about 500 Sheraga and Ulad Jama, and 500 southern horsemen, part of these who came with the viziers, and was under Abdelkrim Eshergui, governor of New Fez,

Sheraga, and Ulad Jama. Simultaneously one of the Beni M'Tir mehallas, *i.e.*, the one formerly at Metafi, was made up to about 2,000 strong and recalled to Fez.

On the 15th June Eshergui attempted to attack the Pretender's mehalla, but after some hours' fighting was put to flight with some loss in men, and his camp was looted, partly by the enemy and partly by his own men, and its two guns were captured by the Pretender's lieutenant. This all happened about 2 miles north of the confluence of the rivers Inawen and Sboo, that is to say, about 8 miles north-north-east of Fez.

The result has been to have Ulad-el-Hadj and Sheraga, for the time being at least, under the Pretender.

At the court it is believed that the Pretender's idea is to take the country north of Fez, tribe by tribe, until he reaches Mequinez, thus cutting off communications between Fez and the ports, while the Sultan's first preoccupation is the recovery of Sheraga, Ulad Juma, Hiayna (western half of it), and Ulad-el-Hadj.

One hard successful stroke at the Pretender's lieutenant would probably accomplish this.

The most disquieting element in the situation, however, has been a growing estrangement between the Sultan and the viziers, and between the Sultan and Kaid Mtugi.

The Sultan consults them about little or nothing, and often many days pass without their even seeing him, during which time he issues orders and makes payment to the troops and to civil officials directly, mostly by means of palace slaves, of whom the hajib is the chief.

From the evening of the 9th June till to-day the Sultan remained secluded in the palace, seeing none of the viziers, and only seeing Dr. Murat (French civil doctor) once, and Commandant Mangin twice—on all three occasions very early in mornings.

Sickness was alleged to be the reason, but it is matter of common knowledge, unfortunately, that the real cause was a bout of drinking in which the Sultan was indulging. This so highly disgusted and alarmed the viziers and the public that, had he not appeared at Friday prayer to-day and resumed his usual routine of life, a dangerous movement might have arisen against him.

The viziers have real cause for alarm on such occasions, for in a drunken fit of temper he might order them, or anybody, to be flogged or put to death, and naturally they deeply resent his attitude towards them. They remark bitterly that he has told people they are merely ignorant country kaids, incompetent to give advice, especially in foreign affairs, and the viziers ask angrily what capacity the hajib or Sid Abdullah-al-Fessi, for instance, have for affairs, or what services they ever did or could render to him, whereas it was the viziers who put him on the throne, and it is their power which sustains him throughout the country.

It is much to be hoped that a sincere reconciliation will take place, for a prolongation of such mutual distrust can hardly fail to end in a struggle, such as might be either the end of Mulai Hafid as Sultan, or the disappearance of the most solid, capable, and reasonable elements of his Government.

I have, &c.
J. M. MACLEOD.

[25238] No. 227.

Consul MacLeod to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received July* 5.)

(No. 25. Confidential.)

Fez, June 21, 1909.

Sir,

ON the evening of the 19th instant I had a private interview of about an hour and a quarter's duration with the Sultan.

He was seated on a rug in a huge storeroom at the Palace, amid a bewildering collection of all manner of European articles, from garden tools and candelabra to rifles and the silver-gilt jugs recently presented by His Britannic Majesty's Government. He looked rather yellow and his eyes were markedly bloodshot.

Close to him, dozing, sat one of the two old women who constantly attend him inside the Palace. He seemed in much perplexity, but at the same time was in a particularly friendly humour.

Between the discussions of the matters about which I had come, the talk turned to his relations with Spain, about which he was much perplexed, particularly because his mission to Madrid was on the eve of departure from Fez.

He declaimed vehemently against the refusal of the Spanish Government to withdraw their troops from Keldana, and the Spanish Minister's proposals in general at Fez lately, and reiterated all his old complaints of the general unreasonableness, harshness, and total want of the least conciliatory spirit on the part of the Spanish Minister, and ended by asking me whether it was not incontestable that he (the Sultan) was perfectly in the right. He was asked (as regarded Melilla district, in effect) to give up Moorish territory. Was ever such a demand ever listened to by one nation from another? As an instance of the eagerness of the Spanish Minister to fasten a quarrel on him, the Minister had actually taken offence because—as was his habit, and as Mr. Lister himself and I had probably seen him do—he had taken up a pair of field-glasses and looked through them during a conversation with the Minister.

I answered that he placed me in a great dilemma. I had no instructions, and so I could not speak on these matters at all officially. I was not Spanish consul that I should uphold the Spanish case, and if anything I might say tended that way His Majesty would suppose I was the Spaniard's friend and not his, and would be offended—and the fact was we were good friends with both Spain and Morocco."

The Sultan eagerly replied, "Oh, I quite understand that; but I want you to discuss these things—and anything you like—with myself in absolute candour. Nobody talks to me like that, and I assure you I will be pleased, and not offended, by anything you say, for I am convinced you wish me well." I should here observe that whatever the Sultan's faults may be, want of keenness in his work is not one of them. He appears to think of little else, and to worry himself moodily over the problems he has to solve. He seemed full of pent-up thoughts and wishful to relieve his mind by talking things out thoroughly with somebody.

The opportuity therefore seemed a specially good one, so I ventured to say in a sympathetic say, "Would you like me to tell you what I think myself about the Spanish business, and about yourself and your policy, interior and foreign, and, in short, maybe say many many things which perhaps may be most disagreeable, and all of which I haven't the slightest right to say to you?"

"Tell me everything," he replied, eagerly. "Keep back nothing!".

"Very well," I answered, "if you please. I shall then forget for a little that you are the Sultan, and I shall speak freely from my heart as a man does to his brother." Here the Sultan caught hold of my wrist, and said with much emotion, "Do so, do so."

"Well then," I said, "this is pretty much what I hear everybody—your own people, foreigners, foreign Governments, Ministers, consuls, everybody saying, and I quite agree with them. They say the greater part of your troubles are caused by yourself. You are a very very hard, stubborn man!" (Here he grinned complacently.) "You take your own view of everything—which is often very narrow—and you refuse to believe that anything has, or can have, any aspect but just that in which you yourself see it. You refuse, in practically everything, to believe that anybody else can be really right. Then, quite wrongly, you imagine that everybody, and particularly every nation, is your enemy." (Here the Sultan protested of course, but with great amusement, and I went on.)

"I know, of course, you yourself don't see this, and that's just why I'm telling you. Let us take your foreign relations; but, indeed, your ways about interior things are just the same. Is it not a fact that you invariably treat them as a game, in which you should (and it is thus, is it not, which you do?) seek to manœuvre the other party into a position from which he cannot escape—in short, you want to beat him?" ("Yes," the Sultan said, "that is so; and why not?") "Now," I went on, "that is where you go quite, quite wrong. The very first thing in such things is to avoid, before everything, ever putting the other party into such a position." (The Sultan seemed rather disconcerted. I felt sure this was quite a new idea.) "If the other party be a foreign Power, he won't stay in any corner, but will jump out by force. In short, he'll fight."

I enlarged upon the care and success with which his father, the Sultan Mulai Hassan, had observed this rule.

"What else is he (the other party) to do? and why shouldn't he? He, too, quite sincerely, thinks himself quite right, and he has the means to uphold his view. Why should he," I asked laughingly, "act differently from what you yourself would do if anybody jammed you into a corner?"

Here the Sultan began again about the Berbers. Why should those tribes of Northern Morocco not give soldiers? Why should only the south give soldiers?

Was it not scandalous that through districts only an hour or two's march from Fez people could only pass by paying safe-conduct money?

I said all that was quite true, but the point was whether or not this could be mended right away? "This brings me to some more of your wrong views. Now to me you appear to think that your people and foreigners expect you to govern the tribes and manage foreign affairs as well, after eighteen months' experience, as your father did after twenty years; isn't that so?"

The Sultan said quite gravely, "Yes." "Yes," I went on, "the truth is just the opposite. The art of government has to be learned like any other accomplishment, like reading or writing. People, intelligent people at any rate, don't expect of you what you seem to expect of yourself. They will be quite content if you avoid making too many mistakes, and, above all they want first of all, to see things settle down. If in fifteen years you did as much as you are trying to do in a few months, they would be more than pleased, and I've no doubt if you would take time enough you would succeed all right. You must have your soldiers trained first of all. That takes time." The Sultan here interrupted, "But the soldiers cost just the same, whether they're in town or in the country, and there's no better training for soldiers than fighting."

I dissented from this, and pointed out that half-untrained men only got beaten: brought discredit on the Government, and described the success we had had in recovering the Soudan by means of troops whom it took years of slow, patient work to train.

Returning to the Spanish business, I pointed out that (so it seemed to me) the Sultan viewed the territories which by the last Sultan's misgovernment had come to be occupied by foreign troops in the same light as the rest of Morocco.

These territories really had been like derelict vessels—lost and abandoned by their crews. For instance, the lands near Melilla had been in possession of Buhamara for at least six years. From him they had, in point of fact, lapsed, as to actual possession, to the Spaniards. Not a yard of land over which the present Sultan had himself come into possession, and ruled, had been touched. That these foreign Governments, far from seeking to hold or annex these lands to their own countries, were willing to treat amicably for their restoration to Morocco on terms to be agreed upon, shewed, not hostility, but great friendliness indeed on these Governments' part. Such terms could, if the Sultan would be as reasonable as his neighbours, easily be arranged, with dignity and credit to both parties, and nobody would be better pleased thereby than the Sultan's own subjects. As for no nation ever parting with what it thought was its territory, that was not the fact. We English had willingly ceded many territories. (The Sultan here looked very surprised and asked, "What about the Transvaal?") I pointed out that the Transvaal paid us no tribute and had, voluntarily by us, been made self-governing; that we had twice given up Afghanistan; and only a few years ago had by a friendly bargain ceded Heligoland to Germany. The Soudan had belonged to Egypt. The Mahdi took it from Egypt, much as Buhamara had taken the Melilla districts. England and Egypt joined to recover the Soudan, and it now belonged to the two Governments.

In all such questions a middle way had to be found, and should be found in this one too.

The Sultan here broke in, "But what about our feelings? How can we look on and lose our territories?" I answered, as sympathetically as I could, that I quite understood them; but his difficulties, I entreated him to reflect, were not to be compared in that respect with those of foreign Governments. "Try to think what your difficulty would be," I said, "if you had to guide your affairs so as to please millions and millions of people all eagerly scrutinising every day, in their newspapers, everything you did and ready to remove you from office the moment you failed to meet the ideas of the most of them.

"The principle, therefore, which civilised Governments have adopted is to suppose that each side is in the right and to arrange matters by each side giving up a little—or even a lot—of what it thinks its rights. They try to avoid using force (which as a rule only maddens people), but you," I laughed, "seem to prefer force to anything else."

"How! How! What do you mean? What force have I used against foreigners?"

I answered, "You used force with the Spanish Minister. Instead of giving him the various things which you admit he had a right to ask, and refusing the others, you told him that you would withhold everything admittedly due by you until he

submitted to do the one thing you required, *i.e.*, the withdrawal of these troops—that is force, surely, and why should any one endure it who can resist it?"

The Sultan said he had never seen it in that light. It had all seemed to him like bargaining.

I said I quite believed that.

He then reverted to the Spanish Minister being so "hard" a man, and the Spanish consul here, too, had very little sense. About the consul, I said he was very young and inexperienced, but I knew him and his father very well, and I was sure he meant well by the Sultan. As for the Minister being so hard, why it had seemed to everybody here "that two hard men had knocked against each other, and," I added laughingly, "you must be less like wood and iron and more like 'elastic.' Then about the glasses incident, since he had asked what I thought, I must tell him candidly that he was—he really was—in the wrong. I knew that he had not had any notion of offending the Minister, and certainly I had often seen him look through these glasses when talking cheerfully with other persons. But I see the other side too. There was the Minister, speaking very seriously, and representing some 17,000,000 of people, to your Majesty, also the representative of many millions. Surely he was entitled to your whole attention? It was a mistake; and, please God, you and the Spaniards will yet be good friends and it will be rightly understood by them."

The Sultan seemed distinctly distressed—but not in the least angry by this—and so, in the most earnest tones I could use, I went on to say I was sure I had not offended him in anything I had said. It was, he would see, just because I felt so strongly for him and for his country, that I was moved to say everything I could think of for his welfare.

The Sultan, with evident emotion, answered that indeed he had seen this, and assured me he was in no wise offended, but quite the reverse. That he was sincere in so saying was as once shown, for I went on (after two refusals in the course of this interview) to try to induce him to agree to the terms upon which Dr. Verdon had finally offered to remain in his service, and he accepted the terms in full.

Further, last evening Sid Aissa Ben Omar (Vizier for Foreign Affairs) told me that yesterday morning the Sultan had repeated to him and to the Grand Vizier, all I had said, and had spoken of me in terms both kindly and complimentary. Sid Aissa himself was full of congratulation, declared it was all true, and so forth. "But," I asked, "will it do him any good?" To which Sid Aissa shook his head, and remarked, "I doubt if anything will do him any good. He is simply 'swelled with sovereignty'" (in Arabic, "Shaban-al-Mulk," a very pithy phrase). "He has got the Sultanate far far too quickly and easily."

The Grand Vizier, I hear, has expressed great pleasure at what I said, but adds that the Sultan had kept repeating, with a chuckle, "You see, even the consuls 'admit' that I am hard, and that I do succeed in putting people into corners."

I have, I fear, written at very inordinate length, but I have been anxious, by means of full details, to display, as clearly as possible, the character of the Sultan for your information.

It is to be hoped he will come to realise at once that it is just these abnormal qualities in him—enthusiasm, ambition, stubbornness, and petty craftiness—which have made him a successful pretender, which will ruin him as a ruler. The plausible half-truths he puts forward, and the grotesquely logical extremes in which he bases his conclusions, all are the faults of a mind formed by reading and thinking, without practical experience of men and affairs.

It remains to be seen, of course, whether he will take to heart any of the truths I told him, and which I know none of his entourage, nor even foreigners here, have yet ventured to put before him. I am not at all hopeful that he will do so. I had, of course, to think whether such language would be likely to meet with your approval. I concluded that you would disapprove my losing an opportunity for doing my utmost to dissuade the Sultan from the misguided, fatuous, ruinous course he is following.

The situation was that the viziers dared not tell the Sultan the plain truths of the position, lest he should (as he certainly would) have suspected them of having been "got at" by the French or the Spaniards. The Sultan, with his false ideas of his dignity, could not bring himself to come down, as he mistakenly imagined, in the eyes of his viziers and of his subjects and foreigners, and the result had been an estrangement between him and his viziers, which had brought the whole government nearly to a standstill and was rapidly bringing on a serious crisis.

A plain, homely explanation by someone who obviously had no personal interest

to gain might, I hope, clear the ground and enable the Sultan and viziers to come into proper, sensible relations at once with each other, to the obvious advantage of all concerned—Morocco, France, Spain, and indirectly ourselves.

Not to have availed of such an opportunity would, I felt, have been to throw away a first-fruit of the excellent relations with the Sultan and viziers which Mr. Lister's mission at Fez apparently had established.

Since writing the foregoing I have seen the Grand Vizier Glawi, and he thanked me in the warmest terms for what I had said, and, in answer to doubts I expressed, he assured me that the Sultan would not forget, but would take these things to heart; and ended, "He knows it's all true, and so do we, and now he and we can talk properly to each other."

I told my French colleague of the language I held to the Sultan, and he expressed entire satisfaction with it.

I have, &c.
J. M. MACLEOD.

[25211] No. 228.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received July* 5.)

(No. 151. Confidential.)

Tangier, June 27, 1909.

Sir,

IN my telegrams Nos. 65, 66, and 67 of the 20th, 21st, and 22nd instant, I attempted to summarise the situation at Fez, as reported to me in daily private letters from His Majesty's consul and Dr. Verdon. Those of the 17th and 18th June contained news of a particularly serious nature, leaving little doubt as to the intentions of the viziers and of M'Tougi, should the present deadlock continue, and showing that, in the opinion of the latter at all events, some sort of European intervention was really to be desired. On the 2nd instant, the day on which the two letters reached me, I had a long conversation on the situation with the French chargé d'affaires, to whom I read extracts from the letters, and we discussed, as we have often done before, the question of the possible candidates for the throne. He has never concealed from me his opinion that the French Government made a great mistake in not seeing Abdel Aziz through his difficulties last year, and we have always agreed that, should a change of Sovereigns become necessary, the best solution would be found in the restoration of the ex-Sultan, but this time with the full support of France. M. de Sainte-Aulaire has, however, always begged me not to mention his views in Paris, as he has already got into hot water at the Quai d'Orsay for advocating a more energetic support of Abdel Aziz. Owing to his name and his birth he is looked on with some suspicion by the present Government, although his ability is recognised. On this occasion I repeated what I had said before, though I took care to make it clear I was merely expressing my personal opinion, not that of my Government. M. de Sainte-Aulaire said that I knew his views; that they tallied absolutely with mine, but he again begged that he might not be quoted to his Government.

In the evening I saw him again, and he read me a despatch which he had just received from his consul at Fez, dated the 20th and sent by special messenger, which was even more pessimistic in tone than those of Mr. MacLeod and Dr. Verdon. I reported the substance of M. Gaillard's information to you in my telegram No. 68 of the 22nd June.

Count Sainte-Aulaire dined with me last Friday, and told me that he had reported our conversation to his Government, and had informed them of the personal opinion I had expressed with regard to the possible restoration of Abdel Aziz. I said that I had hoped he had made it clear that this opinion was purely personal, and he assured me that he had. He had maintained silence as to his own remarks and his confirmation of my opinion for the reasons he had stated to me before. He had, he said, received a reply that day from M. Pichon to the effect that the French Government fully shared my views with regard to the restoration of Abdel Aziz, and that the latter, if once more called to the throne, might count upon the absolute support of France. The wording of the telegram, however, made it clear that the French Government did not intend to take any step which might facilitate the restoration. In this I suppose that they are right, as it would be disastrous if the impression were created that a Sultan was being imposed upon the country by France. At the same time it seems a pity that an understanding of some sort could not be come to with the viziers; at this

moment the future lies virtually in their hands, and unless the right course is followed matters may only go from bad to worse. Unfortunately in Morocco loyalty and the respect for confidences are unknown qualities, and this fact renders delicate negotiations such as might now be undertaken by the French practically impossible.

I have to-day received Mr. MacLeod's despatch No. 25, Confidential, of the 21st instant, reporting his conversation with the Sultan. I confess that I share Si Aissa-ben-Omar's view that it will have done little good, and I fear that its principal effect will have been to confirm the Sultan's already high opinion of his own cleverness, "and success in putting people into corners." In a private letter which I received from Mr. MacLeod on the subject, he writes: "I could see from his" (the Sultan's) "whole attitude that he had not the slightest idea of conciliating French, Spaniards, Berbers, or anybody, nor of paying the Maghzen's debts by taking a loan or otherwise."

I duly received your telegram No. 37 of the 23rd instant, and communicated its substance to His Majesty's consul at Fez. Yesterday morning the French chargé d'affaires came to see me, and said he wished to discuss with me the instructions which should be sent to the consuls at Fez as to their action in the event of the situation becoming such as to endanger lives of Europeans.

I told him of the telegram I had received from you. He said that he too was of opinion that no risk should be run, and that he proposed to instruct M. Gaillard to err if anything on the side of prudence. In the event of the situation becoming more critical the consuls ought not, he considered, to hesitate in leaving Fez with their respective colonies. He added very confidentially that the French Government would not be sorry to see an exodus made necessary; it would prove to Europe how hopeless the present state of affairs was, and facilitate any intervention on their part which might be deemed advisable. I said that I understood this view, but that I feared that the German consul would prove an obstacle. He would probably remain on till the very end, and Dr. Rosen, whose personal feelings have changed but little, notwithstanding the official rapprochement between the two Governments, would do all in his power to make out that the exodus had been a mere manœuvre of the French to discredit the Sultan in the eyes of Europe. I have, however, sent the enclosed instructions to Mr. MacLeod with a private letter, in which I have very confidentially explained to him the situation, and the dangers by which it is beset.

Count Sainte-Aulaire also read me a later despatch which he had received from M. Gaillard stating that a large meeting had taken place of the Zemmour and Gherouan tribes, at which Moulai-el-Kebir had been proclaimed Sultan, and that he was now marching on Mequinez, the various markets through which he passed on the way accepting him as Sultan. The Sultan, on the other hand, had told M. Gaillard only the day before that he had every hope of capturing his brother, as Ben Aissa, the Basha of Fez, was waiting to seize him at Mequinez, and could count absolutely upon the loyalty of the tribesmen there.

Menebhi told me yesterday afternoon that, from letters which he had received from the immediate entourage of El Glawi, he gathered that the latter's interview of two hours with the Sultan, on which high hopes were being built, had really only widened the breach between them; this is quite possible, but with Menebhi it must be remembered that the wish is apt to be father to the thought. There is a certain amount of gossip going on in the town to the effect that Abdel Aziz will very shortly be proclaimed Sultan, and I told Menebhi that he should advise the ex-Sultan in his own interests to keep very quiet, and to decline to see anybody, giving illness or anything else as an excuse. Above all, I said, he was very unwise to receive the editor of the "Dépêche marocaine," as he had been doing lately.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

Inclosure in No. 228.

Mr. Lister to Consul MacLeod.

(No. 10.) *Tangier, June* 26, 1909.

Sir,

FROM the reports which you have addressed to me during the last ten days, and from those which have been received by the French chargé d'affaires from his consul, I gather that a situation may be created at Fez at any moment in which the lives of Europeans may be in danger. I have reported the fact to His Majesty's Principal

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and I have now received a telegram from him, in which he says that His Majesty's Government rely on your judgment to run no risk unnecessarily, and to take whatever measures you and I may consider possible and necessary for your own safety and that of other British subjects at Fez. I have discussed the question at some length with the French chargé d'affaires this morning, and we both realise that it is almost impossible for anyone not upon the spot to give an opinion. I have, however, absolute confidence in your judgment, and feel sure that you will do whatever is right. You will of course act in accordance with your colleagues, and more especially with M. Gaillard, to whom Count Sainte-Aulaire is writing in the same sense to-day. I would, however, impress upon you the necessity of acting with great prudence, and of not hesitating to take the extreme step of leaving Fez, should the situation justify it.

I am, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

[25212] No. 229.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received July* 5.)

(No. 152. Confidential.) *Tangier, June* 27, 1909.

Sir,

WITH reference to your despatch No. 75 of the 14th instant, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch which has been addressed to me by His Majesty's consul at Fez, reporting the negotiations which have taken place between the representatives of the British, French, and German groups of the Union des Mines marocaines and the Sultan.

Mr. Harris, in a private letter dated the 22nd June, tells me that the actual situation is briefly as follows: The Sultan, at an audience the previous day, invited the representatives to make propositions to Aissa Ben Omar. Mr. Harris tried to persuade His Shereefian Majesty that it might be better to wait until after the publication of the mining law, but he preferred that it should be done at once. The representatives have no proposals to make now as they consider the local situation too serious to allow of any immediate negotiation; they also fear lest the arrangement they might come to with the Sultan might not prove to be in accordance with the mining law. Meanwhile they are reporting to Paris and asking for instructions. The French and German representatives left on the 22nd, and Mr. Harris is remaining. His opinion, in which they both concur, is that it would be preferable for the representatives of the Union des Mines marocaines to attack any concession which may be granted to Mannesmann, rather than than to obtain a concession of their own, which, if legal, might also legalise Mannesmann's, and which, if the contrary, would be worthless, and would have entailed a considerable outlay.

Mr. Harris tells me that the viziers advised the representatives strongly to follow to follow this course as the Sultan's seal and signature were worthless.

Mr. Harris is very grateful for the support of His Majesty's Government. He tells me that Dr. Vassel has been most helpful in the recent negotiations.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 229.

Consul MacLeod to Mr. Lister.

Fez, June 21, 1909.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your Excellency's despatch No. 7 of the 13th instant in regard to the International Mining Syndicate (Union des Mines marocaines).

I at once informed the delegates of the various groups of the syndicate, the Sultan, the Vizir for Foreign Affairs, and my colleagues, that His Britannic Majesty's Government had decided to support the syndicate.

After a stay of some three weeks here the delegates, after consultation with the Vizir for Foreign Affairs, came to the conclusions given in the Confidential memorandum enclosed herewith, which was furnished to me by the British delegate, Mr. W. B. Harris.

Mr. Harris remains at Fez for the present, but the other delegates, Commandant Mauméné (France) and Dr. Moehlon (Germany), leave for Tangier to-day.

Accompanied by my French and German colleagues and myself, the delegates were received this morning by the Sultan. The Vizir for Foreign Affairs was present.

Each of the consuls presented the delegate of his nationality, and stated that his respective Government supported the syndicate, assured His Majesty that its members were of high standing, and recommended them and their proposals to His Majesty's consideration.

The Sultan replied that if they would submit a memorandum of their proposals it would have his attention.

They answered that, if His Majesty so preferred, they proposed to do so after the promulgation of the mining law for Morocco.

The Sultan replied that he would prefer the proposal to be made now, and that he would decide whether it was advisable to continue negotiations at the present or to wait for the promulgation of the mining law. To this the delegates agreed, and Mr. Harris observed that he was remaining in Fez for a time, and would be ready to act in the matter.

The Sultan then asked the other delegates whether Mr. Harris represented them also, and they replied "Yes."

The Sultan then said he understood that our various Governments "guaranteed" the syndicate. My French and German colleagues said "Yes." As the word the Sultan used means (strictly speaking) "stands surety for," I pointed out that while recommending the syndicate, His Britannic Majesty's Government—and, I had no doubt, the other Governments also—did not "guarantee" the concern in the sense of taking any financial responsibility.

The Sultan answered that he quite understood this, and my colleagues said that their Governments also took no financial responsibility in the matter.

After some informal conversation on general matters the delegates and consuls took their leave.

In explanation of my reservation about financial responsibility, I would remark that His Majesty is notoriously overbearing and high-handed in negotiations on everything, and in any future differences with the syndicate, he might, quite conceivably, without payment of this or that foreign claim, on the ground that he understood the foreign Government in question was responsible financially for the syndicate.

It will be observed that in, to-day, assenting to submit a proposal now the delegates have abandoned their previous decision (see Inclosure No. 2, paragraph 1) not to do anything until the mining law be promulgated.

They are having a meeting to-day to decide upon what to submit to the Sultan.

It looks to me as if His Majesty is trying either to get some money at once, or to procure a proposal which he will be able to compare with the mining law draft he is understood to have under consideration just now, or, perhaps, to secure both of these objects.

I have, &c.
J. M. MACLEOD.

P.S.—I should explain that Mr. Harris was spokesman, in Arabic, for the delegates at this point.

I think he—over-eagerly—used the words "if His Majesty so preferred," merely intending to be polite and ingratiating to the Sultan, for I gather that the delegates had not beforehand decided to recede from their position of the previous day. The Sultan adroitly caught up that phrase and held the delegates to it.

In view of this change of position, Sid Aissa Ben Omar is most anxious that the language he held to the delegates yesterday be kept quite private, as the Sultan might be offended with him, did he know in what sense, with whatever excellent reasons, he had advised the delegates.

P.P.S.—*June* 22.—The position now is that the delegates have referred to Paris for instructions as to the proposals to be submitted by Mr. Harris.

The German and French delegates left for Tangier to-day.

J. M. M.

Inclosure 2 in No. 229.

Memorandum of written Statement regarding the Union des Mines marocaines made by Mr. Harris to Consul MacLeod, Fez, June 20, 1909.

Sid Aissa Ben Omar to International Mining Syndicate.

(Confidential.)

AT farewell interview, Sid Aissa Ben Omar stated to Commandant Mauméné, Dr. Moehlon, and Mr. W. B. Harris that he considered their decision not to negotiate until after the publication of mining law was quite right.

Any concession granted until said law was published would only lead to accusations and difficulties, and that he congratulated delegates on not having attempted by means of presents, bribes, &c., to obtain advantages which in the end might, and would inevitably, cause discussion and trouble.

Any advance of money given to the Sultan at present would be ill-spent, and could only lead to eventual further demands on part of Sultan.

Besides, the state of affairs and the situation of the Sultan render any negotiations at this juncture very ill-advised.

That there is an opinion on part of Maghzen (he could not give Sultan's view) that any concession given before mining law would prove worthless.

When mining law is issued, our perfectly straightforward behaviour over the matter here would, he was sure, stand us in good stead both with Europe and with the Maghzen.

Finally, he authorised delegates to report this conversation to the Union des Mines marocaines.

[25213] No. 230.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 5.)

(No. 153. Very Confidential.)

Tangier, June 28, 1909.

Sir,

AT my request Mr. Irwin called yesterday afternoon on the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, and had a talk with him on the situation. Si Guebbas appeared in very much better spirits than he had been last week. The Pretender's raid, he said, for it was really nothing more, was now over, and his lieutenant had retired to a respectable distance from Fez. The nervousness which had at one moment prevailed at Fez had now quite passed away, as was proved by the price of barley, which had sunk from 2 dollars to 4 pesetas. The disturbance amongst the Berber tribes was, of course, annoying, but the Berbers had never put a Sultan on the throne, and he attached little importance to the movement in favour of Moulai-el-Kebir. There was a Moorish proverb to the effect that Berbers could break but they never could mend.

In reply to a question with regard to the situation at court, Guebbas said that all had resumed its normal aspect, that a considerable amount of business was being transacted, and that orders signed by the Viziers were coming down daily to Tangier.

What might prove serious, if true, was a reported quarrel which had arisen between the Seraghna and the Rehamna, two of the great tribes of the south, the former of which supported Abdel Aziz in the past, while the latter have always followed the lead of the great Kaids.

Guebbas then told Mr. Irwin that the Government heard Raisuli was shortly coming to the Anjera district just outside Tangier with a large force to chastise the tribe, who had grossly maltreated the Kaids whom he had sent to exact tribute, actually killing two of them. Guebbas said that any action of this sort was most unfortunate at this moment, and asked Mr. Irwin if I could not write privately to Raisuli to ask him to abandon his idea. Mr. Irwin said he must refer the matter to me, but he did not think for a moment that I would consent to do so. Raisuli no longer had any connection with the British Government, and it was an unheard-of thing for the British Minister to intervene so directly in the internal affairs of Morocco. Moreover, I had no intimation from Raisuli that he had any intention of the sort attributed to him by Guebbas. I shall of course decline to write, and should not have reported the incident to you had I not just received a private letter from His

Majesty's consul at Fez, in which he informs me, partially in cypher, "for my most private guidance, that Harris said that Menebhi and Raisuli are intriguing busily to raise the extreme north-west tribes in order to proclaim Abdel Aziz, and that Glawi is quite aware of it."

The thing is to discover whether Raisuli's intended attack on the Anjera has given rise to the idea that he is raising a force to place Abdel Aziz on the throne, or whether he is making the chastisement of the Anjera a pretext for arriving near Tangier with a large force ready to act in the event of the movement in favour of the ex-Sultan. Personally, I am of opinion, as I think I said before, that no movement which begins at Tangier can possibly succeed. It must come from Fez and from the Viziers. At the same time, Raisuli is a strong man and has considerable power again, and Menebhi's name still carries weight. Mr. MacLeod's phrase, "and that Glawi is quite aware of it," is somewhat enigmatical, and might be taken to mean either that he knows what they are up to with the idea of frustrating their intrigues, or, on the other hand, that he is privy to them.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

[25269] No. 231.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 5.)

(No. 132. Confidential.) *Madrid, July 2, 1909.*

Sir,

I ASKED the French chargé d'affaires to-day how the negotiation with the Moorish Mission in Paris was getting on. M. Martin said that progress was slow, but that the negotiations were being conducted in a perfectly friendly manner, and that a satisfactory formula would probably be found to express the readiness of the French to withdraw from the occupied points of Morocco territory upon the fulfilment by the Sultan of certain conditions which there is little prospect of his being able to carry out.

Meanwhile it is announced that the Moorish Mission to Spain has postponed its departure from Tangier to meet the convenience of King Alfonso, who is at present undergoing a cure at Biarritz. His Majesty is not expected in Madrid to receive the mission till about the 12th instant.

Little has lately been written in the press about the Spanish reinforcements for Melilla. It is hinted that possibly there will be no necessity to send any after all, and that the much talked of demonstration may be reduced to the holding of a few military exercises near Melilla in the autumn.

I have, &c.
MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[25076] No. 232.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 312.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, July 5, 1909.*

TELEGRAM No. 72 from Tangier.

French Ambassador has given me similar information, and has requested that you should be instructed to inquire of Minister for Foreign Affairs what grounds there were to render necessary such special measures as he had suggested, pointing out that, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, any additional measures for the police protection of foreigners in the seaports of Morocco should be taken by France and Spain, to whom the task of reorganising the police had been confided.

You should act in concert with your French colleague in making this communication to the Italian Government.

[24884] No. 232*.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Lister.

(No. 38.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, July 5, 1909.*

MOORISH Mission now in Paris propose to proceed to London in a few weeks' time if satisfactory arrangements are made for them. See your despatch No. 104 of the 10th May.

His Majesty's Government consider visit unnecessary and undesirable, and date mentioned may cause difficulties in regard to their reception. Do Moorish Government wish that mission should come, and for what special purpose?

Announcement of visit has been made by Dr. Wilkinson, with whom we wish to avoid having any dealings. Has he any official status with mission? If latter comes to London we intend to make use of Mr. White's services.

[25686] No. 234*.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Lister.

(No. 39.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, July 8, 1909.*

MOORISH mission to London.

Your telegram No. 74.

Please ask Guebbas to find out definitely from Fez whether mission has been instructed to come to London, and, if so, for what purpose. If possible, you should intimate that we consider the visit unnecessary, and you should make it clear that we can have no dealings through Wilkinson.

[25686] No. 233.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 7.)

(No. 74.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, July 7, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to report that, beyond the telegram which he has received from Si Mokri, in Paris, the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs has heard nothing of the dispatch of the mission to London, which formed the subject of your telegram No. 38 of the 5th instant. When I was at Fez I gathered in conversation with the Minister for Finance that in return for my mission to Fez a visit to London might be made by the Moorish mission, which was just leaving for Paris, but that its object would be merely complimentary. At the time I observed the King and Ministers would all be absent from London after the end of July. I agree with you in thinking that there is no necessity for the visit, and that it is not desirable.

I would add privately that in my opinion it would be advisable to refuse to receive any notification made through Dr. Wilkinson. He has been a source of constant trouble to Mr. MacLeod at Fez. He is continually under the influence of drink or morphia, and must, I think, be rather crazy. I took care to have no dealings with him whatever.

When I arrived at the legation at Fez I found him waiting to receive me, on the pretence that he had been sent by the Sultan with a message of welcome. I was excessively surprised in view of all I had written about him to the Court, and subsequently, on enquiring of the viziers, ascertained that the whole story of the message was an invention. After that I ignored him altogether during my stay at Fez.

Some weeks ago the Sultan repudiated his contract with Wilkinson, and the latter left Fez after quarrelling with His Shereefian Majesty.

[25693] No. 234.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 7.)

(No. 99.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Rome, July 7, 1909.*

MOROCCO.

Mr. Lister's telegram No. 72 and your telegram No. 312.

Mr. Wyndham saw Secretary-General of Italian Foreign Office and made a communication in accordance with your instructions.

M. Bollati explained that suggestion as to the possible necessity for special measures had been made by M. de Schoen, and that the latter's conversation with the Italian Ambassador at Berlin had been purely academic.

French chargé d'affaires, in reply to his enquiries on the subject on Saturday, was given a similar reply by the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Mr. Wyndham also questioned M. Bollati as to the action of the Italian Ambassador at Madrid, but he was unable to give any explanation.

[25912] No. 235.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 9.)

(No. 76.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, July 9, 1909.*

BEING confined to my bed by illness when I received your telegram No. 39 on the subject of the possible visit of the Moorish mission to London, I requested Mr. Irwin to see the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs and carry out your instructions. This he did this morning, explaining clearly the situation, which Sid Guebbas quite understood. His Excellency promised that he would dispatch a note on the subject at once to the Court.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON F.O. 371

[25839] No. 236.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 99.) *Foreign Office, July 9, 1909.*

Sir,

WITH reference to my telegram No. 312 of the 5th instant, I have to inform your Excellency that the French Ambassador called at the Foreign Office on the 3rd instant, and read to Sir Charles Hardinge a telegram from the French Minister for Foreign Affairs.

It appears that some days ago Signor Tittoni, upon whom the recent anti-Austrian demonstrations in Lombardy in connection with the fiftieth anniversary of the battle of Solferino have made a deep impression, proposed to the German Government that, in view of the insecurity prevailing in the ports of Morocco, each Powers having subjects residing in those ports should send a ship of war and make a naval demonstration.

M. de Schoen told the French Ambassador at Berlin that he had said to M. Pansa, in reply, that although the German Government would be quite ready to send a ship of war if needed, he had received no reports to show that any unusual danger existed in the ports for foreign subjects, and that it was upon the French and the Spaniards that the moral obligation rested of maintaining peace and order in the sea-ports. Moreover, he added that such action on the part of Germany would be liable to misrepresentation.

The French Ambassador appears to have told M. de Schoen that he did not understand Signor Tittoni's motive in thus endeavouring to re-open the Moroccan question; that, whatever might be the situation in the interior, there was no cause for alarm in the sea-ports where the French and the Spaniards had undertaken charge of the police, and that if Signor Tittoni had any complaint to make of the insecurity on the sea coast, he should have addressed himself to the French Government. The latter would, therefore, resent the despatch of war-ships to Moorish ports as a reflection upon the efficiency of the Franco-Spanish police.

The French Ambassador in London had been instructed to bring these facts to my knowledge, and to ask that you might be instructed to speak to Signor Tittoni, to enquire what grounds there were to render necessary such special measures as he had suggested, and to express the view of His Majesty's Government that any additional measures for the police protection of foreigners in the sea-ports of Morocco should be taken by France and Spain, to whom the task of reorganizing the police had been confided.

Sir Charles Hardinge told M. Cambon that we had recently had no complaints of insecurity in the sea-port towns; that it was certainly the view of His Majesty's Government that if additional police protection were necessary, it would be the duty of France and Spain to grant it, and that no possible good could come from a naval demonstration by the Powers; and he added that he would inform me of the wishes of the French Government as to the instructions to be sent to you.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[26034] No. 237.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 10.)

(No. 28.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *San Ildefonso, July 10, 1909.*

SITUATION near Melilla.

My immediately preceding telegram of to-day.

Spanish Government are informed that hostile tribesmen yesterday morning attacked and drove back to Melilla a locomotive which was proceeding to the railhead. Spanish troops which were at once dispatched to occupy threatened points and inflict punishment were attacked by a Moorish force and suffered 30 casualties, including one officer. Melilla will be reinforced within the next week by two Spanish brigades.

[26254] No. 238.

Consul MacLeod to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 12.)

(No. 27.) *Fez, June 28, 1909.*

Sir,

CONTINUING the narrative of my despatch No. 24 of the 18th instant, I have the honour to report that, on the 19th, things at court began to resume their normal aspect. The viziers began again to have public audiences of the Sultan.

His Majesty sent for the Governors Abdelkrim Eshirgui and Saïd Bagdadi, and other leaders of the mehalla whose camp was captured by the Pretender's lieutenant, severely reprimanded them and committed them to custody at the palace, from which they emerged only by paying him what the Sultan reckoned compensation for the Makhzen effects lost by them, estimated at some 15,000 to 20,000 dollars in all.

They were then sent to join a new mehalla which was formed about a mile north of the city. The Sultan then issued Mauser rifles to about 150 men of his black body-guard, and sent them to this mehalla with orders to inform him several times daily of what went on, to abstain themselves from fighting, but to follow up when fighting occurred, and shoot down any men who should attempt to run away.

Very early on the 20th this mehalla moved to Hajira Kahela, about 7 miles north-north-east of Fez, where it still remains under orders merely to patrol the road and repel raids. Simultaneously bodies of the Pretender's new supporters from Hiayna appeared in Ulad-al-Hadj and Sheraga, and plundered and burnt farms and villages to within 2½ miles of the city. Desultory fighting occurred between the raiders and the inhabitants, supported by horsemen from the mehalla. The raiders, having accomplished their ends, retired, followed for a couple of miles by the Sultan's people, who made out they had gained a victory.

As the smoke of the burning farms, many of which belonged to Fez citizens, could be seen from the city, and fugitive women and children took refuge in Fez, the raid naturally caused a certain amount of consternation.

On the 22nd the Moorish Mission to Spain under Sid Ben-el-Muar (senior member), the Amin Zniber, and Sid Benasser Ghannam left Fez. The last named was well known in the last reign as assistant Commissioner for Foreign Affairs at Tangier, has gone on former missions to Europe, and is said now to bear a special message of congratulation on the recent birth of a daughter to the King and Queen of Spain.

For some days it was reported currently that the Sultan's brother Mulai Mohammed had died by violence. These rumours were occasioned by a somewhat mysterious funeral which took place from that end of the Sultan's palace, where he was confined. The guards at the palace say now, however, that he is still alive in custody, but the affair still remains obscure, no person apparently caring to risk asking the Sultan to produce the prisoner. Even should Mulai Mohammed have died a natural death, it will be a misfortune for the Sultan, inasmuch as the Pretender will be able the more easily to continue to impersonate that Prince.

On the 22nd three Zimmur tribesmen arrived with an offer from Mulai Kebir of surrender, if guaranteed his personal security. The Sultan accepted the offer, and dismissed the messengers with gifts of clothes in the Moorish fashion when emissaries have been welcome.

Meantime the situation in Beni M'Tir had begun to improve. The divisions of that tribe nearest to the Fez–Mequinez road returned to their villages, commenced harvesting their crops (such as the soldiers had left), and began, and have still continued, to pay up the contributions demanded of them by the Sultan.

On the 24th Sid Abbas-al-Fessi, chief secretary to the Grand Vizier, and who had been dangerously ill for some days, died. It is significant of the improving relations between the Sultan and his viziers, that His Majesty has left the Grand Vizier the choice of a successor to Sid Abbas.

On the 26th the Governor Saïd Bagdadi, without consulting the other leaders in the mehalla, led a body of Ulad Juma tradesmen to a surprise attack on the camp of the Pretender's lieutenant, with the hope of capturing him. The attack miscarried, however, and twenty-two of the Ulad Juma were killed, of whom the heads of some fourteen were carried off as trophies to the Pretender, together with some eighteen prisoners.

In Zimmur Mulai Kebir remains inactive, that tribe and its neighbours not feeling inclined at this time of harvesting and threshing to enter upon hostilities with the Sultan or with each other, and such scanty reports as reach Fez from that

quarter are to the effect that the Zimmur are not enamoured of their self-invited guest, and would be very content to see him reconciled with the Sultan. These tribes are, however, very touchy about their rights of protecting refugees, and so might want satisfactory security for his safety before letting him go, and such negotiations of course, take much time. Once they are concluded, the Beni M'Tir mehallas will be free to return, and the Sultan will be able to take the offensive against the Pretender, at least to the extent of recovering Western and Central Hiayna.

I have, &c.
J. M. MacLEOD.

[26117] No. 239.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received July* 12.)

(No. 158. Confidential.)

Sir, *Tangier, July* 3, 1909.

AS I had the honour to report in my telegram No. 72 of to-day's date, the French chargé d'affaires read to me very confidentially this morning a telegram which he had received from his Government informing him that the Italian Ambassador at Berlin had spoken both to Prince Bülow and to M. de Schoen of the very alarming state of affairs existing in Morocco. He had said that it appeared to him more than probable that international intervention would become necessary, and alluded to the possibility of the dispatch of men-of-war to Moorish waters by the various Great Powers. M. de Schoen had replied that he had received no such alarmist news from Dr. Rosen, and subsequently mentioned the incident to the French Ambassador. M. Jules Cambon seized the opportunity to say that, if intervention became necessary, it would have to be entrusted to France and Spain, but that so far as he knew there was no danger to Europeans at the ports. M. de Schoen seems to have more or less agreed with this view, although he would not admit that France and Spain possessed any real mandate.

Count Sainte-Aulaire said that he had been much surprised at hearing of this incident. I told him that the Italian Minister had been to see me one day, and had spoken of the situation at Fez. I had told him that, in my opinion, so long as the very strained relations continued between the Sultan and the Viziers, the situation must be considered serious and liable at any moment to become more acutely so, especially as almost every day brought news of some fresh defeat of a Shereefian mehalla, some fresh defection among the tribes, and some fresh successful raid of the Pretender. M. Nerazzini had then told me that my view coincided absolutely with his own, and that he had indeed telegraphed in that sense to his Government. M. de Sainte-Aulaire and I can only imagine that his telegram was misunderstood at the consulta, and that a confusion had arisen between Fez and the ports. The latter have never been more secure than at the present moment, and the only danger of a disturbance in the neighbourhood of Tangier lies in the possibility of Raisuli coming to blows with the refractory Anjera tribe. M. de Sainte-Aulaire has replied in that sense to his Government.

The German Minister also called upon me at the beginning of the week and asked me what I thought of the situation at Fez. I told him much the same as I had said to M. Nerazzini. He quite agreed as to the standing danger constituted by the breach between the Sultan and the Viziers. I said that, although there appeared at present to be no feeling against Europeans, I thought that the situation might at any moment become critical for them, as, were fighting or looting to begin in Fez, and the population to get at all out of hand, or were tribesmen to be brought in from without, their lives might be in danger. I had consequently, with your approval, instructed Mr. MacLeod to act with great prudence and to run no unnecessary risks, not even hesitating to leave Fez with all British subjects should the situation appear to warrant such an extreme step. I had also told him to act in all matters as far as possible in concert with his German and French colleagues. Dr. Rosen affected to agree with all I said, and said he should send similar instructions to Dr. Vassel. If he has really done so it will greatly assist the French should an exodus be decided upon (which at present seems most unlikely); but unfortunately one cannot always rely upon his word.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

[26115] No. 238*.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received July* 12.)

(No. 156. Confidential.)

Sir, *Tangier, July* 1, 1909.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 153, Confidential, of the 28th ultimo, I have the honour to transmit translation of an almost identic letter which was received by me and the German Minister at the end of last week purporting to come from the chief men of the Anjera tribe. I discussed the matter with Dr. Rosen, and we arrived at the conclusion that the only thing to be done was to communicate the letter to the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs for such action as he might consider necessary. As I stated in my above-mentioned despatch, I declined to write myself on the subject to Raisuli. Dr. Rosen and I also circulated a copy of the letter of the Anjera chiefs among the representatives of the Powers at Tangier.

On Monday last Mr. Irwin had some conversation on the subject with Menebhi, and the latter spoke with great good sense. He quite realised that it would be most regrettable if at this particular moment any serious disturbance took place in the Anjera, and he volunteered to write to Raisuli and represent to him that it would be wiser to put off his coming. Mr. Irwin agreed to his doing this, but made it clear to him that the British Legation must be kept out of the matter altogether, and that the advice must come only from himself. This Menebhi fully realised. Subsequently, however, he decided not to write himself, as he feared that the letter, if it ever fell into wrong hands, might be misrepresented and used against him. I understand, however, that his secretary wrote to Raisuli in much the same sense. Raisuli has now answered that he had already stated that he was coming to Tangier by the Sultan's orders to confer with Guebbas, and that he would be very glad to receive Menebhi's secretary had he anything particular to say. Raisuli is expected to arrive at Zinat this morning, and I believe Si Kassim, the secretary, went out last night to see him. He is to do his best to induce Raisuli to take no action for the moment against the Anjera.

Mr. Irwin has derived the impression from his various conversations with Menebhi that there is no foundation for the statement made by Mr. Harris that Menebhi was intriguing with Raisuli to raise the north-west tribes and replace Abdel Aziz on the throne.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

Inclosure in No. 238*.

The Kabila of Anjera to Mr. Lister.

(Translation.)

(After compliments.)

THE chief men of the Kabila wish to visit your Excellency, but fear lest they should be seized on account of Raisuli. They wish you to speak to the Naib Guebbas, so that they may come in perfect safety. How is it that you are one of the great foreign Powers and you have seen Tangier cut off from us now for a long while? By God, if anyone of us is seized in the town or in its neighbourhood we will shoot or kill every foreigner we see outside the town.

We take refuge with you so that you may assist us by writing to our lord (compliments) and to the said Shereef (Raisuli) to leave us in peace.

As for those Anjera men who have gone to him, they are highwaymen, and have taken the property of others; but as for the chief men of the Anjera, who have the affairs of the tribe in their hands, they absolutely refuse to accept him.

Answer us saying what you can do.

Peace.

June 21, 1909.

We have written a similar letter to the German Legation.

[26118] No. 240.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 12.)

(No. 159. Confidential.)

Tangier, July 4, 1909.

Sir,

AS I had the honour to report in my telegram No. 71 of yesterday's date, the Sultan is furious at the reports of the death of Moulai Mohammed, and of the conclusions drawn by the foreign press.

He sent for Mr. Harris on the morning of the 29th ultimo, and gave him his solemn oath, in the presence of El Glawi, that his brother was alive and well. His Shereefian Majesty, Mr. Harris says, was labouring under the very greatest excitement, and was almost insulting to him as being a journalist. He apparently got over his temper, and they seem to have parted on good terms. He has, however, insisted on Mr. Harris sending a telegram to the "Times" contradicting the report of Moulai Mohammed's death, and has asked him to stay at Fez a fortnight longer as his guest. Mr. Harris tells me that at parting the Sultan shook hands with him, an almost unheard of thing, before all the court, and said that he had so few friends that he begged him not to leave him! Mr. MacLeod's reading of the incident is rather different, and he believes that the Sultan is keeping Mr. Harris on at Fez until he has actually seen the telegram in the "Times."

Mr. Harris claims to have asked the Sultan point-blank whether he had poisoned Moulai Mohammed, to which His Shereefian Majesty replied that if he chose to poison all his brothers it had nothing to do with anybody except himself! Mr. Harris observed that that was possibly so, but that Sultans who committed wholesale murders of their nearest relatives were not as a rule respected in Europe, and that evil consequences might follow.

Unfortunately, again, as in the case of Dr. Rosen, Mr. Harris' version of incidents is not always strictly accurate, and the "sensational" has an irresistible attraction for him.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

[26119] No. 241.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 12.)

(No. 160. Confidential.)

Tangier, July 4, 1909.

Sir,

WHEN I saw the French chargé d'affaires yesterday, as reported in my immediately preceding despatch, he read me the latest despatch which he had received from his consul at Fez. M. Gaillard shares the view held by Mr. Macleod, that for the moment matters are not likely to come to a head, chiefly owing to the difficulty of finding a suitable successor to Moulai Hafid, and also to the fact that no candidate would be particularly anxious to succeed to the present complicated and almost desperate position of the Makhzen. The Viziers realise this. Moreover, the Sultan has still a considerable force at his disposal, and they cannot afford to risk a failure. It appears that the whole matter was finally thrashed out at a meeting between the three great kaïds, El Glawi, Aissa ben Omar, and M'tougi. Aissa subsequently told M. Gaillard that there was no doubt that the best solution would be found in the restoration of Abdel Aziz. As, however, Moors, more perhaps even than other nationalities, think first of themselves, they are very anxious to ascertain beforehand what their position would be were the ex-Sultan to be replaced upon the throne, and whether they would be maintained in power. This, Aissa ben Omar said, would be far easier for the French to ascertain and to arrange than for them! A somewhat delicate task! M. Gaillard says that they are continually facing him with suggestions of this sort, and questions almost brutal in their precision, which he finds it extremely difficult to answer, "as," he writes, "they have not the fine *nuances d'esprit* of Ben Sliman."

In this connection M. de Saint Aulaire read me a summary of various conversations which M. Pimienta, the correspondent of the "Temps," who to some extent looks after Abdel Aziz's money affairs, has had lately with the ex-Sultan.

His Majesty is following events with the greatest interest, but with remarkable *sang froid*. He declares that his wish really would be to lead a quiet private life, far

removed from the cares of Empire, of which he has had such a bitter experience. He is, however, above all a patriot, and if he were called by the Moorish people or the Powers once more to take the reins of Government, he would not hesitate to obey the call. He maintains that he is the only rightful Sultan, and moreover possesses a letter written in his father's own hand declaring that he only of his sons should succeed him. This, he says, if given to the Ulemas, would weigh greatly in his favour. He does not, however, consider that the time is yet come for the change. He is no doubt regretted, but not yet sufficiently so, and Hafid should be given time to fill the measure of his duplicity and cruelty, but that, he says, is only a question of months. He discusses, quite dispassionately, the chances and advantages of the other possible candidates for the throne. Moulai el Kebir would be worse, he says, than Hafid, and the candidate he favours is Moulai Yusef, a man of about twenty-six, whom he describes as gentle and intelligent. The Viziers, he considers, constitute one of the main difficulties in the way of a solution, especially El Glawi. He is a very powerful and ambitious man, and what he would like would be a Sultan who would be a mere puppet in his hands, but such a position is untenable for a Sultan of Morocco. He would at once lose the respect of all his people, and matters would only go from bad to worse. (This is not quite borne out by experience, as in his own case the only years during which he was a power in the country were those of his minority, in which Ba Hamid was all-powerful.) Moreover, he says, the southern Viziers, powerful as they are, are nothing more than great rural kaïds, and quite unfit to deal with questions of foreign policy.

On one point he is very clear, namely, that he would only accept a restoration on one of two conditions: either that France and the Powers abandon all idea of reforms in Morocco and allowed her to muddle along in her own way as she has done for hundreds of years, or, if they wished for reforms, that they should afford to him or to any other Sultan whom they chose to put up the protection and force necessary to ensure their execution. This, he says, would not entail a military occupation, and could be more easily done than is generally believed.

There appears to me to be a considerable amount of justice and good sense in what Abdel Aziz is represented to have said, but of course it may all reflect M. Pimienta's views and those likely to be agreeable to the French legation, rather than those of the ex-Sultan. Still I imagine it is more or less what he thinks. Both he and Menebhi have been anxious that I should have luncheon and spend the afternoon with them on the mountain, but in view of the present delicate situation, I have thought it advisable to refrain, rather in their own interests than on my own account! Menebhi quite understands this.

Mr. Irwin, who knows the country very well, and on whose opinion I place great reliance, thinks that people seem inclined to be hyper-nervous as to how a change in Sovereigns will be received in the country. His view is that the ordinary Moor is always ready to accept the *fait accompli*.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

[26124] No. 242.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received July* 12.)

(No. 165.)
Sir, *Tangier, July* 5, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a summary of events of interest for the past week.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

Inclosure in No. 242.

Summary of Events of Interest in Morocco during the past week.

CONSIDERABLE reductions have taken place in the Spanish garrison at Casa Blanca. On the 22nd ultimo, seventy-five men with their officers left by chartered Spanish steamer for Ceuta, where they will rejoin their regiment, which forms part of the Ceuta garrison. Only twenty-five Spanish regulars, under the command of a lieutenant, now remain in Casa Blanca, presumably as a matter of form. The

[26121] No. 241*.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received July* 12.)

(No. 162. Confidential.)
Sir, *Tangier, July* 4, 1909.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 156, Confidential, of the 1st instant, I have the honour to report that Si Kassim, Menebhi's secretary, saw Raisuli at Zinat two days ago.

He appeared in the most excellent spirits, and full of confidence as to his position and future. He had, he said, received definite instructions from the Sultan to try and settle his differences with the Anjera by negotiation. If, however, these gentler methods failed and force proved necessary, His Shereefian Majesty had told him to apply to him before taking further action.

The Sultan seems also to have told Raisuli's head man in this district, who had been up to Fez, that he had appointed Raisuli Governor of the Anjera, and Governor of the Anjera he should remain, no matter what the tribe themselves and the Powers might say. The government of the country, he said, would become impossible if the latter were going to meddle with the appointment of every governor.

Raisuli also appears to have applied to the Sultan for permission to reinforce the post of R'faif, at the juncture of the boundaries of several of the mountain tribes on the Fez road. This post has, at moments during the years of the Raisuli disturbances, been very strongly held; the garrison had dwindled lately, but is now, by the Sultan's orders, to be raised by Raisuli to 800 men. He is to come into Tangier and confer with Guebbas as to the ways and means for the execution of these various orders. He has written me several very friendly and even gushing letters, and I shall, no doubt, receive a visit from him.

When at Court I told El Glawi that all my information tended to show that he was doing very well in his new post, that the proper levies were being collected, and that he had shown great energy in enforcing order throughout his jurisdiction.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

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departing Spanish soldiers received an official send-off from the French military authorities, and while they were being conveyed to their steamer in French boats, the Spanish national anthem was played by the French band. The Spanish Moroccan police were drawn up at the quay under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Sylvestre.

It will be remembered that the Spanish garrison, after the bombardment of Casa Blanca, consisted of 500 men, but they never took part in any of the fighting with the Arabs on land.

Vice-consul Neroutsos reports that Moulai Kebir has arrived at Agouray, a place near Mequinez, about two hours' march from the encampment of the Sultan's Mehalla, under Bu Awda, whither he was escorted by the Zemmour tribe. Nothing is yet known of his intentions, but the Zemmour tribesmen report that he had at first meant to go direct to Mequinez, but subsequently changed his mind.

Kaïd Anflus, with his brother Embark, and Kaïd Gilooli, arrived at Mogador on the 24th ultimo. They are ostensibly on their way to join the Sultan's army, but have apparently not yet decided whether to go in person or merely send their Khalifas.

[26516] No. 243.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received July* 14.)

(No. 133.)

Sir, *San Ildefonso, July* 9, 1909.

THE Moorish Mission arrived at Madrid yesterday morning, and is to be received within the next few days by King Alfonso, who has returned for this purpose from his cure at Biarritz.

Its main object is said to be to procure the reversal of Señor Merry del Val's declarations at Fez to the effect that Spain could not even consider the evacuation by her troops of the points on the coast which they occupied last year between Melilla and the Algerian frontier. The present condition of affairs in the Riff country is, however, scarcely such as to induce the Spanish Government to give way on this point. According to the Spanish newspapers, the resumption of work on the railway from Melilla to the mines has been attended by several disagreeable incidents. On the 1st July a barricade is reported to have been raised across the line at the fourth kilometre. A few days ago a Spanish railway engineer was attacked by an armed native belonging to the village of Mezquita, near Melilla. A native policeman from the Spanish outpost at the Restinga was similarly assaulted. The assailants were traced to two villages which I am unable to identify. An armed expedition was at once dispatched by General Marina, governor of Melilla, to punish the villagers. The tribes are described as falling into two hostile groups, consisting respectively of the friends and enemies of Spain. The former desire the speedy progress of the railway and the resumption of mining operations; the latter are said to be raising a "harka" to resist the Spanish and French engineers and the Moorish labourers in their employ.

The Ministerial press lays stress on these events as justifying the foresight of the Government in preparing three brigades for the reinforcement of Melilla and the protection of the surrounding region in case of need. None of these troops have yet been sent across the straits, but a considerable part of the credit of three millions of pesetas has been spent on mules and military supplies.

It is, of course, pointed out by the newspapers that while anarchy is increasing in the Riff country, the Sultan is less than ever in a position to fulfil his treaty obligations by restoring order in that part of his dominions.

I am, &c.
MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[26519] No. 244.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received July* 14.)

(No. 136.)

Sir, *San Ildefonso, July* 11, 1909.

FULL details are now to hand of the assault on Spanish labourers, followed by the occupation of commanding points behind Melilla by the garrison of the fortress, which I briefly reported in my telegrams Nos. 27 and 28 of yesterday.

At 8 A.M. on the 9th instant a small group of labourers was beginning work on the railway at the point where the line crosses the Sidi Musa, a small stream running into the western end of the Mar Chica, within a few kiloms. of Melilla. They were suddenly attacked and put to flight by a body of Moors, leaving four of their number

dead on the ground. The alarm was quickly given. Colonel Banos, with two companies of infantry, at once set out from Melilla in pursuit of the aggressors. He was closely followed by General Marina, Governor of Melilla, with the Disciplinary Brigade, six companies of the African Regiment, a squadron of Chasseur cavalry, and a few field and mountain guns. General Real was left in charge of the fortress. Soon after 10 A.M. these troops came into action. The enemy occupied the heights commanding the course of the railway line. They were successfully dislodged from three heights in front and from others lying further to the right. By 1 P.M. the entire group of hills, including the Atalayon, which occupies a promontory running into the Mar Chica, were held by the Spanish forces. The Spanish loss is given as one officer killed and some thirty in all killed and wounded.

It is stated that General Marina had already applied to Madrid for reinforcements when this engagement was forced upon him. They will, no doubt, be speedily sent. Three brigades, as you are aware, were to be got ready for service at Melilla with the proceeds of the credit of 3,000,000 pesetas recently sanctioned by Royal decree. One of these brigades, stationed at Barcelona, has now received orders to prepare for immediate shipment. The Government transport, "Almirante Lobo," is already on its way from Cadiz to Barcelona, and other vessels have been chartered for the conveyance of these troops to their destination. It is said that a second brigade will shortly follow.

Thus, in another quarter, and without the bombardment of the city, have been reproduced with considerable similarity, the circumstances which, two years ago, led to the advance of a French army into the Showia country. The action of the French at Casablanca met, from the first, with severe reprobation from the press and public opinion of Spain. It remains to be seen to what extent the Spanish Government may now find itself compelled to follow the French example by advancing into the interior. I believe that they would be drawn very reluctantly to any great distance from their base. The Prime Minister, Señor Maura, is certainly opposed to any policy of adventure. The Minister for Foreign Affairs holds the same views. The necessity, however, of undertaking the protection of the Spanish and French mines in the neighbourhood of Melilla may well involve some further advance by the Spanish forces from the positions they now occupy. It is suggested in the press that Nador, the intended junction of the Spanish and French railways, leading from the mines to Melilla, and perhaps even Zelouan, the abandoned headquarters of the Roghi, will have to be held by Spain if anything like tranquillity in the surrounding country is to be ensured. Any further advance might encounter opposition from the French, who are not likely to forget that Taza lies outside the recognised Spanish sphere of influence under the Secret Convention of 1904, and that the approaches to that important place, commanding as it does the direct route from the French possessions to Fez, must be kept clear if France desires to keep open her easiest line of advance from Algeria to the Moorish capital.

The garrison of Melilla is given at 6,000 men. The brigade from Barcelona will about double this force. The brigade is stated in the newspapers to consist of six battalions of 850 each, a squadron of 125 mounted troops, three mountain batteries of four guns each, 970 horses and mules, with engineers, telegraph and signal corps, ambulances, &c.

I have, &c.
M. DE BUNSEN.

[25983] No. 245.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 303.)
Foreign Office, July 14, 1909.

Sir,

I HAVE to inform your Excellency that the French Ambassador called at the Foreign Office on the 7th instant and read to Sir Charles Hardinge a telegram from M. Barrère, giving an account of the latter's conversation with M. Tittoni.

M. Tittoni denied that the Italian Ambassador at Berlin had proposed, or had received instructions to propose, a naval demonstration by the Powers in view of the insecurity prevailing in Moroccan ports. He said that there had been a misunderstanding which he would endeavour at once to clear up.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[26115] No. 245*.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Lister.

(No. 93.)
Foreign Office, July 15, 1909.

Sir,

I HAVE received your despatches Nos. 156 and 162 of the 1st and 4th instant relative to the difficulties between Raisuli and the Anjera.

I approve your action in declining to intervene in the matter.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[26789] No. 246.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received July* 16.)

(No. 137.)

Sir, *San Ildefonso, July* 13, 1909.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 136 of the 11th instant, I have the honour to report that, during the two days following the murderous assault on the Spanish navvies employed on the railway, General Marina has been occupied in consolidating his position in the hilly ground stretching inland from the fortress, and in dispersing with occasional artillery fire the groups of hostile tribesmen which still ventured to show themselves within reach of his guns. These are said to be composed mainly of Moors belonging to the Benibuifruor and Beni-sidel tribes living in the region of the mines which is to be tapped by the new railway. The Beni-sicar and Trajana tribes, interposed between the enemy and Melilla, are regarded as in the main friendly.

The Spanish occupation of the district in which the outrage occurred would seem to be now pretty complete, with the exception of the Gurugu Mountain (840 metres high), which threatens the right flank of the Spaniards and is still untaken.

Meanwhile active preparations are proceeding at Barcelona for the embarkation of the selected brigade. Several chartered vessels of the Trasatlantica Company were dispatched on Sunday with a full complement of troops and munitions, their places being taken alongside the quays by others, which are rapidly filling up. Supplies are also proceeding directly from Cadiz to Melilla. The arrangements indeed are so complete that it is pretty evident that the Spanish Government must have recognised some time before the assault on the workmen of the 9th July that a military movement was likely to become necessary. It has been sought to explain away the credit of 3,000,000 pesetas and the preparation of the three brigades by giving out that nothing was in contemplation beyond some army manœuvres which might possibly be held this year near Melilla. More serious work, however, would now seem to have been in the minds of Señor Maura and the military authorities.

It is now generally thought that, for the present, the brigade embarking at Barcelona will suffice to secure Melilla and to prevent any further serious attack by the tribesmen. But the other two brigades are being held in readiness, and a Royal decree has been published empowering the Minister of War to call in as many reserves as may be necessary to fill up the gaps made by the expeditionary force.

Bearing in mind the Casa Blanca precedent, it is impossible to say what may be the possible development of events. The Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs expresses to the French chargé d'affaires his belief that the sharp lesson administered by General Marina will suffice to inspire awe amongst the tribesmen and to restrain them from renewing their attack. The press on the whole is favourable, only the extreme Radical papers objecting to the dispatch of the expedition. The promptness of the action taken and the good behaviour of the Spanish troops under fire have given great satisfaction, and some national enthusiasm has been aroused, though not unmixed with enquiries as to the probable amount of the bill of costs which the nation will be called upon to pay.

The attitude of the Government is shown in an official communication to the press to the following effect:—

"The council of Ministers resolved to congratulate the military governor of Melilla and the forces under his command on the rapidity, boldness, and efficacy of the corrective administered by them to the perpetrators of a wicked attack on Spanish workmen. The council has the fullest confidence in General Marina, and will continue to supply him with means to prevent similar outrages, to ensure at whatever cost the respect due to the subjects and interests of Spain, and to afford effective protection to those inhabitants of the district who claim Spanish protection and friendship. The Government intends to persevere in its policy of maintaining and strengthening the ties of amity which unite them not only with the Sultan of Morocco, but with the tribes and villagers of the entire zone to which the influence of our North African possessions naturally extends."

Señor Maura has given his views in an interview. He states that, while desiring neither war nor conquest, Spain is compelled either to abandon all idea of intervening in the politics of Morocco or to take upon herself the duty of keeping order in the Riff country. This had been the only object of the preparations made by the Government.

Events had unfortunately justified but too fully their foresight. To act otherwise "would have been to imperil the very existence of Melilla, and to leave it to others to do what Spain should naturally have done herself."

I have, &c.
M. DE BUNSEN.

[26899] No. 247.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received July* 17.)

(No. 141.)
Sir, *San Ildefonso, July* 14, 1909.

THE Moorish Ambassador, Sid Ahmed Ben Muaz, attended by his councillors, Ben-Znibar and El Ghannam, opened on the 12th instant, at the Ministry of State, the negotiation with which he is charged by Sultan Abdul Hafid.

The Spanish Government were represented by Señor Allendesalazar, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Señor Pina, the new Under-Secretary of State, and Señor Vallin, Chief of the Diplomatic Department of the Ministry.

The following account of the proceedings has been communicated to the press:—

The Chief of the Mission submitted papers explaining some of the points which have to be discussed at Madrid in continuation of the Fez negotiations. The Minister for Foreign Affairs undertook to study them. The Ambassador expressed his regret at what has occurred in the neighbourhood of Melilla. Señor Allendesalazar replied that he too was very sorry that, owing chiefly to the absence of any Moorish authority in that region, the Makhzen had not been able to prevent this attack on Spanish navvies who were working for the general good, and the military governor of Melilla had been compelled to take in hand the punishment of the aggressors which should have been inflicted by the forces of the Sultan.

I have, &c.
M. DE BUNSEN.

[27125] No. 248.

Consul MacLeod to Mr. Lister.—(*Received at Foreign Office July* 19.)

(No. 48.)
Sir, *Fez, July* 6, 1909.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 45 of the 29th ultimo and further reference to your Excellency's despatch No. 10 of the 26th ultimo, I have the honour to report that M. Gaillard, French Consul, yesterday evening expressed to me considerable apprehension in regard to what might be the situation here five or six weeks hence.

He said that the southern soldiers in all the Mehallas were deserting in considerable numbers, that no improvement was in progress in army administration, that the Sultan, for the next five or six months, would receive no substantial remittances from the ports, that disaffection was growing amongst the Sherarda and Ulad Aissa tribes to the north-north-west of Fez, that public opinion both in Spain and France was beginning to urge for the Sultan to be dealt with in such manner as would lead to things being put on a proper footing, and that there was little or no sign of the Sultan adopting a reasonable attitude.

If things, as was becoming more probable, came to such a crisis as to necessitate the use of force, it was possible that the Sultan might be supported by the most ignorant and fanatical classes, or, at any rate, that the latter and tribes would then be disposed to commit excesses in which Europeans' interests and even lives might be endangered.

For these reasons, M. Gaillard suggested that it would be well to explain the situation quietly to our respective nationsal, so that any of them who might wish to do so could begin to leave Fez by degrees while as yet they could do so without undue haste or inconvenience; and, in any event, they would not be able to complain that they had not been forewarned.

I agreed with M. Gaillard in what he foresaw being possible, though I was not sure that Europeans as now live here, all very prudent people, would, in the changed attitude of the Moorish public generally, be exposed to much, if any, danger, at any

rate as long as the Sultan remained at Fez. There are, of course, the chances, however, that the Sultan might leave for the south soon if he concluded with the Beni Mtir.

I said, therefore, that I would tell each of the British subjects here in a quiet way how matters stood.

Later I discussed the matter with the German Consul, Dr. Vassel, who agreed with all the foregoing, and said he would talk to the Germans here in the same manner.

He pointed out that there might be much difficulty in persuading his people to leave unless they were guaranteed payment of their expenses and losses, and urged that the Powers, whose course would be simplified, and whose ends would be promoted by the withdrawal of Europeans from the interior, should undertake that these Europeans be reasonably indemnified. They had had to leave at the Buhamara crisis, December 1902, and after the bombardment of Casa Blanca two years ago, and none of their claims in those connections have been paid.

I would observe that we have no merchants at Fez, but the British missionaries here had to leave during the Buhamara crisis, had all the anxiety and discomfort of preparing to leave in January 1905—when the withdrawal of British and French residents was ordered but countermanded—and of the withdrawal actually effected two years ago. On the second and last occasions, part of their expenses were included in mine and paid by His Majesty's Government, but the first withdrawal and return were at their own cost, as was also their return on the last occasion.

The British residents here, including myself, are twelve in number, and the cost to them in all, of going and returning to the coast, would probably be about 150*l*.

I have, &c.
J. M. MACLEOD.

[27053] No. 249.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received July* 19.)

(No. 152. Confidential.)
Sir, *Rome, July* 7, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to report that, on receipt of your telegram No. 312 of the 5th instant, Mr. Wyndham, during my temporary absence from Rome, called on M. Legrand, the French chargé d'affaires, to concert with him regarding the communication to the Italian Government on the subject of the language reported as held by the Italian Ambassadors at Berlin and Madrid on the affairs of Morocco.

M. Legrand told Mr. Wyndham that he had already on Saturday, the 3rd instant, spoken to M. Tittoni on the subject of the suggestions reported as having been made by M. Pansa. M. Tittoni expressed great surprise at M. Legrand's remarks, and assured him that he had absolutely no knowledge of the incident referred to, and that no instructions had been sent to the Italian Embassies abroad regarding Morocco.

On Monday, the 5th instant, M. Legrand called on the secretary-general, who told him that M. Pansa had talked to M. de Schoen on the Morocco question, but that he had never made any suggestions of the nature reported which had come from M. de Schoen himself.

After having seen M. Legrand, Mr. Wyndham called on M. Bollati and made the communication as instructed by you. The secretary-general gave the same answer as he had already given to the French chargé d'affaires, stating that M. Pansa's conversation had been purely academical, and that the proposals complained of had been made by the German Secretary of State. M. Bollati gave no explanation regarding the language reported as held by the Ambassador at Madrid, and suggested that these remarks must have been merely an echo from Berlin.

M. Legrand believes that M. Tittoni's statement regarding his ignorance of the incident was true, and that he had no intention of reopening the Morocco question. His Excellency is not always conversant with what is taking place in his department, and is at present much occupied with parliamentary questions. It is not unlikely that M. Bollati, on his own account, may have sent general instructions to the Ambassadors in Berlin and Madrid to discuss the position of affairs in Morocco, and that the suggestions in question may have been the result of this exchange of views.

The French chargé d'affaires said that it was very difficult to ascertain the exact truth, but he was much obliged for the action taken by this embassy, which he thought would make the Italian Foreign Office more careful in dealing with delicate questions.

I have, &c.
RENNELL RODD.

[27061] No. 250.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 19.)

(No. 161.)
(Extract.)

Rome, July 13, 1909.

I HAVE only been able at the very last moment before the departure of the messenger to see the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who has again been absent from Rome, and I took the opportunity to ask him if he could give me any explanations of the representations alleged to have been made to the German Government by the Italian Ambassador at Berlin regarding a naval demonstration by the Powers in the ports of Morocco, which formed the subject of your despatch No. 99 of the 9th instant.

Signor Tittoni said he was quite at a loss to comprehend how the misunderstanding could have arisen, for such he must believe it to be, on the part of M. de Schoen. He could give me the most positive assurance that he had sent no instructions to Signor Pansa on the subject of Morocco, and the latter was much to old a diplomatic hand to have initiated a proposal of such a character without instructions.

I asked him if I might be authorised to assure you that such a scheme as was attributed to him was in no way contemplated by the Italian Government or in harmony with their policy, and he replied I might most certainly do so.

[27124] No. 251.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 19.)

(No. 167. Confidential.)

Tangier, July 11, 1909.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a memorandum drawn up by Mr. Rattigan reporting two conversations which he has had, the one with Menebhi, the other with the French chargé d'affaires, on the situation. I am afraid that I am inclined to share the view expressed by M. de Sainte-Aulaire that it is more than likely that the Sultan will try to get rid of Abdel Aziz, and treat him as I cannot help thinking he has treated Moulai Mohammed, notwithstanding all his assertions to Mr. Harris to the contrary.

Mr. MacLeod informs me that when he questioned El Glawi on the subject his answers were most unconvincing, and he quickly changed the subject, and that Aissa-ben-Omar frankly said he had no idea whether Moulai Mohammed were alive or dead. I hear that the Sultan sent the other day for Mr. J. Kirby Green, a son of the late Sir John, who is acting as correspondent for the "Daily Mail," and asked him to contradict the report of Moulai Mohammed's death which had appeared in his paper. Mr. Green, however, stoutly refused to do so until the Prince had been shown to him in the flesh. So far he has not laid eyes on him!

Moulai-el-Kebir appears to have sent in to ask for "aman" (pardon), which the Sultan granted, and all was arranged for him to go to Mequinez, but at the last moment he thought better of it, and announced his intention of making the pilgrimage to Mecca. He is, I believe, at present with the Zair tribe about 40 miles from Rabat.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

Inclosure in No. 251.

Memorandum by Mr. Rattigan.

I CALLED last Friday evening on Menebhi, who informed me that he had very bad news from Fez. He then read to me a letter which he had received from the Shereef K'Tiri, an important personage in Fez, to the effect that the situation was very

critical. The khalifa of the Roghi, who had been encamped just beyond the Sebu Bridge, within a few miles of the capital, had now divided his force into three columns; one of these was at the moment engaged in burning and looting on the hills north of Fez and within about a mile of the walls, another had made a detour and was advancing on one of the southern gates of the town, and the third was remaining near the Sebu with a view to occupying the mehalla which had been hastily collected and sent out after the recent reverses.

Meanwhile there was considerable panic in the town, and there were signs that the general excitement of the population might lead to rioting. The mehalla was known to be very weak, and would, it was believed, flee in disorder at the first shot. There were already more than 200 deserters from its ranks in the town, and the alarmist reports disseminated by them did not tend to allay the general panic. Till now it had been felt that the Roghi would never attempt to enter Fez, but letters had lately been received from him stating that he shortly intended to do so, and this had greatly increased the fear of the inhabitants.

I asked Menebhi whether it would be possible for a man in the position of the Roghi, who was known to be an impostor and a person of humble origin, to have hopes of making himself Sultan. Menebhi replied that it was a mistake to suppose that he was of very humble origin; as a matter of fact he was a Shereef, though even were he not of Shereefian family that would not be a insuperable objection to his becoming Sultan. Several of the earlier dynasties had been founded by men who were not of Shereefian descent. Menebhi appeared, in fact, to think that were the Roghi strong enough to overthrow the present Government, there was nothing to prevent his ascending the throne.

I subsequently called upon Count Sainte-Aulaire with a view to ascertaining whether he had received any confirmation of Menebhi's bad news. He read to me a despatch which had just arrived from M. Gaillard, in which the latter stated that the situation was *stationnaire*, though he himself remained pessimistic. He did not, however, refer to the division of the Pretender's forces, nor to their further advance on the capital. On the contrary, he stated that the mehalla sent out to oppose the Roghi's khalifa had now crossed the Sebu River, though he expressed the opinion that it would no doubt be driven back in the near future. He did not mention that there was any unusual excitement or panic in the town.

(Very Confidential.)

I then mentioned to Count Sainte-Aulaire a report which I had just heard from Menebhi to the effect that a band of eight assassins had been sent by Moulai Hafid to murder Abdel Aziz, and thus do away with another possible rival. Menebhi had learnt, he said, from a very reliable source that these men had now arrived in Tangier, and were awaiting the first favourable opportunity to carry out their orders.

Count Sainte-Aulaire quite believed this story, and he stated that he had expected that some such attempt would be made from the fact of Moulai Hafid's insistence on the dismissal of Abdel Aziz's negro slaves, who were known to be devoted to him, and whose presence would of course render any plot of this nature more difficult of execution.

Menebhi informed me that he had lost no time in putting the ex-Sultan on his guard, and he hoped that such precautions would be taken as would render impossible any attempt on his life. He added that, from what he had heard, his own life was not too secure, though it is difficult to see in what way his death could be of much advantage to Moulai Hafid.

FRANK RATTIGAN.

[27125] No. 252.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 19.)

(No. 168.)

Tangier, July 11, 1909.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from Mr. Macleod relative to the position of Europeans at Fez.

It will be seen that the German consul suggested to Mr. Macleod that some arrangement might be arrived at for the payment by the Powers of the expenses

of their respective nationals in the event of a journey to the coast being rendered necessary. Mr. Macleod estimates that the expenses of the twelve British residents would amount to some 150*l.* for a journey to the coast and back.

I have, &c.

REGINALD LISTER.

Inclosure in No. 252.

Consul MacLeod to Mr. Lister.

(No. 48.)

Fez, July 6, 1909.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 45 of the 29th ultimo, and further reference to your Excellency's despatch No. 10 of the 26th ultimo, I have the honour to report that M. Caillard, French consul, yesterday evening expressed to me considerable apprehension in regard to what might be the situation here five or six weeks hence.

He said that the southern soldiers in all the mehallahs were deserting in considerable numbers; that no improvement was in progress in army administration; that the Sultan, for the next five or six months, would receive no substantial remittances from the ports; that disaffection was growing amongst the Sheraida and Ulad Aissa tribes to the north-north-west of Fez; that public opinion both in Spain and France was beginning to urge for the Sultan to be dealt with in such manner as would lead to things being put on a proper footing; and that there was little or no sign of the Sultan adopting a reasonable attitude.

If things, as was becoming more probable, came to such a crisis as to necessitate the use of force, it was possible that the Sultan might be supported by the most ignorant and fanatical classes, or at any rate that the latter and tribes would then be disposed to commit excesses in which European's interests, and even lives, might be endangered.

For these reasons M. Caillard suggested that it would be well to explain the situation quietly to our respective nationals, so that any of them who might wish to do so, could begin to leave Fez by degrees while as yet they could do so without undue haste or inconvenience; and, in any event, they would not be able to complain that they had not been forewarned.

I agreed with M. Caillard in what he foresaw being possible, though I was not sure that Europeans as now live here, all very prudent people, would, in the changed attitude of the Moorish public generally, be exposed to much, if any, danger, at any rate as long as the Sultan remained at Fez. There are, of course, the chances, however, that the Sultan might leave for the south soon if he concluded with the Beni Mtir.

I said, therefore, that I would tell each of the British subjects here in a quiet way how matters stood.

Later I discussed the matter with the German consul, Dr. Vassel, who agreed with all the foregoing, and said he would talk to the Germans here in the same manner.

He pointed out that there might be much difficulty in persuading his people to leave unless they were guaranteed payment of their expenses and losses, and urged that the Powers, whose course would be simplified, and whose ends would be promoted by the withdrawal of Europeans from the interior, should undertake that these Europeans be reasonably indemnified. They had had to leave at the Buhamara crisis, December 1902, and after the bombardment of Casa Blanca two years ago, and none of their claims in those connections had been paid.

I would observe that we have no merchants at Fez, but the British missionaries here had to leave during the Buhamara crisis, had all the anxiety and discomfort of preparing to leave in January 1905, when the withdrawal of British and French residents was ordered, but countermanded, and of the withdrawal actually effected two years ago. On the second and last occasions part of their expenses were included in mine and paid by His Majesty's Government, but the first withdrawal and return were at their own cost, as was also their return on the last occasion.

The British residents here, including myself, are twelve in number, and the cost to them in all of going and returning to the coast would probably be about 150*l.*

I have, &c.

J. M. MACLEOD.

[27127]

No. 253.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received July* 19.)

(No. 170. Confidential.)

Tangier, July 11, 1909.

Sir,

RUMOURS of serious fighting between the Spanish troops and natives outside Melilla reached me through Menebhi yesterday afternoon almost simultaneously with Sir M. de Bunsen's telegram No. 28 to you. As I stated in my telegram No. 77 of to-day's date Mr. Irwin saw the commissioner for Foreign Affairs this morning, and I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a memorandum reporting his conversation. I also enclose an article from the "Dépêche Marocaine" giving details of the incident.*

I have, &c.

R. LISTER.

Inclosure in No. 253.

Memorandum by Mr. Irwin.

ACTING on your instructions I called on Sid Guebbas this morning and asked him if he could add anything to the news which had appeared in the press as to the recent events at Melilla. His Excellency said that private telegrams were received in Tangier yesterday morning fron Moors at Melilla reporting the assassination by the tribesmen of some Europeans working on the railway leading to the mines, and that General Marina had taken out some troops to maintain order. Fighting had followed between the Spanish troops and the tribesmen who were divided into three parties, and some dead and wounded Spanish soldiers had been brought into the town, as also eighteen tribesmen. His information from Madrid was to the effect that the Spanish troops had established military posts round Melilla, the most distant being at Atalayon and Nador, and added that the Spanish troops had driven the tribesmen from the mountain named Sidi Hamed-el-Hadj. (This is probably the same as Sidi-el-Hhach on the map.)

In the late afternoon he received a visis from the Spanish chargé d'affaires, who, he said, expressed his regret at what had happened at Melilla, and gave him some details of occurrences there. M. Padilla laid stress on the precautions taken by Spain in having troops ready at Melilla to meet such a contingency as the present one, and pointed out that events had fully justified Spain in the measures taken, and he added that had the Maghzen properly appointed governors and kaids to maintain order this would never have occurred.

Sid Guebbas on the other hand again pointed out to him, as he had previously done in writing, that the incident was entirely due to the unlawful acts of those who were engaged in exploiting mines in that district. He told me he understood that large Spanish reinforcements were being sent to Melilla. He was of opinion that owing to the presence of the Moorish mission in Spain, the present moment would not be an opportune one to bring the question before the signatory Powers to the Act of Algeciras; he was therefore confining himself to reporting the matter to the Sultan and awaiting instructions.

He told me confidentially that from enquiries he had made and from conversations he had had with a Spaniard, whose name he did not give, he was convinced that this incident had been brought on by Spain, who wished to pursue the policy followed by France in occupying Oudja and Casa Blanca, and, further, that the King of Spain was in favour of military action there, His Majesty being very devoted to his army and anxious for it to distinguish itself.

A. I.

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* Not printed.

[27129] No. 254.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received July* 19.)

(No. 172.)
Sir, *Tangier, July* 11, 1909.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 162 of the 4th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith a memorandum by Mr. Irwin of a conversation he had this morning with the Moorish Commissioner for Foreign Affairs on the probable attitude of Raisuli towards the Anjera.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

Inclosure in No. 254.

Memorandum by Mr. Irwin.

DURING my conversation with Sid Guebbas this morning I referred to the question of the Anjera and the letter they had addressed to the British and German Legations. He told me that he had had a talk with Raisuli, who assured him that he only intended to use gentle measures, and that there was no question of using force against them. I again urged him, in your name, to spare no effort to keep Raisuli to that course, as any troubles in this part of Morocco would very probably have very far-reaching effects. His Excellency recognised this, and promised to do all in his power to keep Raisuli to his word, although he thought there was no likelihood of his attempting coercive measures.

His Excellency had received a request from the German Minister for information as to what measures he proposed to take in view of the letters received from Anjera. His Excellency assured Dr. Rosen that, as Raisuli was not using force against them, it was unnecessary to take any action. Dr. Rosen, however, has, it appears, reported the matter to the Makhzen, and the French chargé d'affaires has written to M. Gaillard at Fez to make representations on the matter to the Makhzen.

[27324] No. 255.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received July* 19.)

(No. 79.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, July* 19, 1909.

PROPOSED Moorish mission to London.

My telegram No. 75 of the 7th instant.

I this morning received a visit from the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, who told me that the Sultan's answer was to the effect that when I was at Fez I had been told verbally that the mission would proceed to London, and that it would now be sent. As to any doctor nothing was known to His Majesty. The statement that I was informed of the proposed visit while at Fez is entirely without truth. The facts of the case are as follows:—

One day during the course of conversation with the Minister of Finance, the latter mentioned quite vaguely that it was possible that the mission might go on to London from Paris, and I replied that, should this be decided on, the mission should arrive in London not later than the end of July. The matter dropped, and when, shortly before leaving the capital, I asked the Vizier for Foreign Affairs whether any decision had been arrived at, I was informed by him that nothing had been said to him about it.

I am now sending a note to court in which the above facts are set forth.

You will receive by bag details of the most unsatisfactory attitude taken up by the Sultan and Maghzen, both in regard to repudiation of engagements with Balding and Verdon and towards British protégés in general. In view of this attitude I am of opinion that it would be inexpedient to receive the mission.

I have already hinted to the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs that in the event of this unsatisfactory attitude being maintained it was quite likely we should decline to receive the mission.

[27331] No. 256.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received July* 19.)

(No. 80.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, July* 19, 1909.

SOME time ago the Sultan instructed Sid Guebbas to protest against Spanish action in Riff to signatory Powers of Act of Algeciras. Commissioner, after consulting with head of Moorish mission to Madrid, came to the conclusion that the moment was most inopportune for such a protest, and did not therefore act on his instructions. He came to see me this morning in a very agitated frame of mind, and told me that Sultan is very angry with him for not carrying out instructions; His Majesty states that incidents of the 9th July would never have taken place had protest been made, and has now ordered commissioner to lose no time in making protest, after taking the advice of myself and my German and French colleagues on the question.

Mr. Irwin, who saw commissioner, did not express any opinion, and Sid Guebbas then proceeded to French Legation.

Count Saint-Aulaire pointed out to me that the position is one of some difficulty for him. French company is concerned in question, and Spaniards are sparing no efforts to prove that French are no less involved than they. He consequently wishes to avoid appearance of approving too thoroughly Spanish action. At the same time he is of course obliged to maintain united front with Spain.

He merely advised Sid Guebbas that he must of course carry out any definite instructions he had received from the Sultan, but gave him the private advice not to make the protest too strong. Count Saint-Aulaire said he would tell Dr. Rosen that he had given no advice to Guebbas, so begged me to treat above as confidential.

I have just received a visit from German Minister, who tells me that he suggested to Sid Guebbas that he should consult with Moorish mission now in Madrid as to likelihood of arriving at a solution. Guebbas is acting on this advice.

In view of the instructions conveyed in your telegram No. 28 of the 3rd May, since which date the attitude of the Sultan has become far more unsatisfactory, I have refused to give any advice or assistance.

[27559] No. 257.

Note respecting the Moroccan Mining Regulation.—(*Communicated by M. Cambon, July* 20, 1909.)

LA rédaction du règlement minier qui doit être appliqué au Maroc, conformément à l'article 112 de l'Acte d'Algésiras, soulève de nombreuses difficultés; le Gouvernement allemand a attiré l'attention du Gouvernement français sur les graves inconvénients qui résultent de la prolongation de la situation actuelle et lui a proposé d'échanger leurs vues au sujet des délicats problèmes que pose la législation minière au Maroc.

M. Pichon estime que le meilleur moyen d'arriver à une solution aussi prompte que possible, et d'éviter les longueurs de la procédure diplomatique à Tanger, consisterait à établir au sujet du règlement minier du Maroc un accord entre la France, la Grande-Bretagne, l'Allemagne, et l'Espagne. A cet effet, les quatre Cabinets de Paris, Londres, Berlin, et Madrid constitueraient une commission de spécialistes qui se réunirait à Paris et à laquelle le projet de règlement préparé par l'ingénieur du Maghzen, M. Porché, servirait de base de discussion. Cette commission, qui entendrait M. Porché, travaillerait à titre purement officieux, car on devrait éviter de paraître légiférer sur le Maroc en dehors de Tanger et de Fez. Le texte qu'elle adopterait serait soumis aux légations à Tanger, où il ne pourrait plus guère rencontrer d'objections sérieuses, et en même temps adressé au Maghzen comme l'expression des vues des États les plus qualifiés pour le recommander au Sultan.

L'Ambassadeur de France est chargé de communiquer cette proposition au Secrétaire d'État pour les Affaires Étrangères et de lui demander si le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Roi est disposé à l'accepter.

Ambassade de France, Londres,
ce 20 *juillet*, 1909.

[27560] No. 258.

Note communicated by M. Cambon, July 20, 1909.

SI la commission franco-anglo-hispano-allemande pour le règlement minier du Maroc est constituée, le délégué français sera M. Aguillon, inspecteur général des mines, et très connu pour sa compétence particulière dans ces questions.

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 20 *juillet*, 1909.

[27324] No. 259.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Lister.

(No. 40.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, July* 20, 1909.

MOORISH Mission to London: your telegram No. 79.

The King will be leaving London for Goodwood and Cowes at the end of this week, and immediately afterwards will start for Marienbad. This is amply sufficient ground for postponing indefinitely the visit of the mission to London, and if the question is reopened you should express the regret of His Majesty's Government that for the above reason it is now too late for the mission to be received.

[27331] No. 260.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Lister.

(No. 41.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, July* 20, 1909.

MOORISH protest against action of Spain in the Riff. Your telegram No. 80 of the 19th July.

I approve your attitude of non-interference in the matter.

[27621] No. 261.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 21.)

(No. 30.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *San Ildefonso, July* 21, 1909.

MELILLA.

I concur in the view expressed by Mr. Lister in his telegram No. 80 of the 19th instant, that it would be inopportune to encourage protest on the part of the Moorish Government to the signatory Powers of the Algeciras Act against Spanish action in the Riff country.

Punitive measures were rendered absolutely necessary by the Moorish assault on Spanish navvies, and the Sultan seems less than ever able to assert his own authority in that region.

Spanish Government are fully alive to danger of advancing further into the interior.

[27512] No. 262.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Lister.

(No. 42.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, July* 21, 1909.

MOORISH Mission to London: your telegrams Nos. 83 and 84.

I think it would be advisable not to mix up this question with that of unfriendly attitude of Mulai Hafid. It would also be difficult to avoid receiving the mission in the event of the Sultan's yielding to representations such as you suggest. The reasons stated in the Foreign Office telegram No. 40 of the 20th instant ought to be quite sufficient to obtain an indefinite postponement of the proposed mission.

[27438] No. 258 A.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 20.)

(No. 83.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, July* 20, 1909.

MOORISH Mission to London. My telegram No. 79.

In his excitement yesterday Guebbas misrepresented tone of Sultan's message which Mr. Irwin has now seen. It is quite courteous, but Sultan maintains his intention of sending mission.

I would suggest that I should reply to the effect that it is impossible for His Majesty's Government to receive mission now owing to lateness of date, the absence of the King from London, and the inability of His Majesty to alter his plans; further, that as such questions as there are between the two Governments are purely local, they can be better discussed on the spot.

I should like to add that the attitude of the Makhzen towards British subjects and British-protected persons has, to my deep regret, not been such as to justify my attempting to persuade His Majesty's Government to alter their decision.

[27512] No. 258 B.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 20.)

(No. 84.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, July* 20, 1909.

MOORISH Mission to London.

Sultan has sent me, through Mr. MacLeod, a message similar to that delivered by Guebbas. He desires mission to return my visit as soon as possible, but he will make date suit King's convenience. He requests that I will arrange matter with Guebbas.

I await your instructions, as this somewhat alters situation. I think it would be a pity to miss this opportunity of administering a much needed warning, as suggested in my telegram No. 83.

[27124] No. 263.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Lister.

(No. 99.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, July* 22, 1909.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 167 of the 11th instant, enclosing a memorandum by Mr. Rattigan reporting conversations with Menebhi and the French chargé d'affaires in regard to the position of the Pretender and Mulai Hafid's reported intention to murder Abdul Aziz.

If you consider it advisable, you may co-operate with Count St. Aulaire, if he thinks that anything can be done to ensure the safety of the ex-Sultan.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[27125] No. 264.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Lister.

(No. 100.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, July* 22, 1909.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 168 of the 11th instant, inclosing a despatch from Mr. MacLeod relative to the position of Europeans at Fez.

It would, in my opinion, be inconvenient and unnecessary that the Powers should come to any kind of arrangement such as that proposed in the event of it becoming necessary for Europeans to leave Fez for the coast. If the lives of British subjects at Fez are in danger, Mr. MacLeod must assist them in any way he can to escape, and His Majesty's Government would no doubt eventually endeavour to recover from the Moorish Government any expenditure incurred by or on behalf of the fugitives.

I request that you will send a copy of this despatch to Mr. MacLeod.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[27829] No. 265.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received July* 23.)

(No. 86.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, July* 23, 1909.

I LEARN from His Majesty's consul at Fez that, in consequence of a strong protest by the French consul, orders for the collection of extraordinary dues (referred to in my despatch No. 176 of the 18th July) from foreign protégés have now been cancelled by the Sultan. Mr. MacLeod states that the French consul went so far as to threaten the Maghzen with seizure of port custom-houses if they should persist in their intention of collecting these dues.

[27862] No. 266.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received July* 24.)

(No. 146.)
Sir, *San Ildefonso, July* 21, 1909.

DURING the last week the landing at Melilla of the Barcelona Brigade, which had been delayed for several days by a high sea, was continued uninterruptedly. The last detachments left Barcelona on the 18th instant, so that it may be said that the entire brigade was shipped within little more than a week of the occurrence of the incident at Melilla which made its despatch necessary. General Marina has now under his command a force of some 12,000 men. So far he does not appear to have attempted any material advance beyond the positions which he occupied on the 9th instant within 3 or 4 miles of the fortress. The centre of the Spanish position is Jebel Sidi Hamet, the high ground just beyond the creek Sidi Musa, running into the Mar Chica, which was the scene of the murderous assault on the Spanish navvies. The right flank is constantly threatened by the enemy from the Gurugu mountain. This is apparently the key to the entire position, and it is generally thought that the

Spaniards will be compelled to seize and hold it, as soon as they feel strong enough to do so. To the left lies the Atalayon hill, projecting into the Mar Chica. This point appears to have been the main object of a renewed attack by the tribes in force on the 19th instant. Their strength is given at about 2,500 infantry and 1,000 cavalry. Severe fighting occurred, the enemy repeatedly charging to the canon's mouth, according to the Spanish newspaper accounts. The Spanish loss was some twelve killed and twenty-four wounded. The killed included a lieutenant-colonel and a major, captain and lieutenant of artillery. General Marina was reinforced at the front by some of the newly arrived troops and seems to have succeeded in holding his positions.

The intelligence of the renewed activity of the enemy has created an uneasy feeling in Spain. Reliance had been placed on Ministerial assurances that the tribes were showing signs of being thoroughly overawed. Offers of submission were reported to have been made by important kaïds. The expectation had become general that no very serious military operations would be necessary. Some authorities went so far as to say that the military and naval forces assembled at Melilla were largely in excess of the requirements of the case. The attack of the 18th has dispelled these hopes. Another brigade is being hastily prepared at Madrid for embarkation at Malaga. The King of Spain hurried from San Sebastian to Madrid to hold a Council of Ministers. It is felt that Spain cannot now recede, and that a greater display of force has become inevitable.

Meanwhile the position of the Moorish Mission at Madrid is becoming almost ludicrous. No more inopportune moment could have been chosen for formally demanding the evacuation of the Spanish positions in the Riff. Yet this is understood to be the main purpose of the Sultan's Ambassador. A semblance of negotiation is still kept up, and efforts are made to amuse the Mission by showing them the sights of the town and reviewing troops in their presence. The hope is general that they may soon see fit to return to Fez for fresh instructions bearing some relation to existing circumstances.

I have, &c.
MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[27920] No. 267.

War Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received July 24.*)

THE enclosed copies of the report by the military attaché with the British mission to Fez are forwarded, with the compliments of Colonel Count Gleichen, for the information of Sir Edward Grey. Two copies are sent, in case it should be considered desirable to dispatch one to His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tangier.

Those appendices which are not attached are being published or reproduced. Copies will shortly be available, and can be furnished if required.

War Office, July 23, 1909.

Inclosure 1 in No. 267.

Report by the Military Attaché with the British Mission from Tangier to Fez and back, April–June 1909.

(With 7 Appendices.)

[Report and Appendices (A), (B), (C), (E), (F), and (G), not printed.]

Inclosure 2 in No. 267.

APPENDIX (D).

Notes on varioas Persons at Fez.

Abbas-el-Fasi.	Commandant Mangin and other French officers.
Abdallah-el-Fasi.	The Minister of War.
Aissa-ben-Omar.	The Mokris.
Sergeant Balding.	M'tugi.
The Basha of Fez.	The Sultan.
Kaïd Belton.	Dr. Verdon.
Glawi.	Dr. Wilkinson.
Hazib.	
Consul McLeod.	

*Abbas-el-Fasi,** late Acting Grand Vizier, belongs to a good Fez family. He is a capable little elderly man, but not very trustworthy, though friendly enough outwardly. He was said to be lining his pockets heavily during his term of office, than which nothing was more likely.

Abdallah-el-Fasi, late Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, is son-in-law to Abbas-el-Fasi. He is most conceited about his diplomatic powers, and succeeded well in the usual intrigues with reference to the French and Spanish missions. He went with the mission to France shortly after our mission arrived in Fez. He also is reported to be making a good deal of money out of his appointment. In person he is thin and hawk-like, suffers from neuralgia, has bad manners, and is dirty in his person and his house.

Si Aissa-ben-Omar, Minister for Foreign Affairs, is a charming old Arab gentleman, owning huge estates in Abda. He appears to be of the old sporting type, fond of hunting and shooting, and will always break off a political conversation to listen to what someone else is saying about hawk or hound or a new gun. Until his arrival at Fez he knew nothing whatever about foreign affairs, but he is shrewd and wide-awake, and has picked up in a very short time the leading aspects of Moorish relations with foreign Powers. He was extremely friendly to all the mission, is apparently fond of Englishmen, and was most open in expressing his views, even about his Sovereign, to our Minister.

Lance-Sergeant Balding, 11th Hussars, is much of the same type of man as Kaïd Belton (see later). He works, however, under the French Mission, and is not likely, therefore, to get "carted." A new French non-commissioned officer has, however, recently been put over his head, and he is not very well satisfied at present. He was in the two recent fights and did well in both (17th April and 16th May). He did very well with Sultan Abd-el-Aziz, and in the latter's last fight behaved with great pluck, losing nearly everything. His twelve years in the army are up in September, and he does not intend to re-engage. (He lost his South African medal and regimental papers in the Shawia fight last year, and hasn't had an answer yet to his application for a restitution of the former.) (Was sent to him care of Legation, Tangier.)

The Basha of Fez (Mohammed-el-Miknasi ?) who combines with his duties those of the Kaïd M'Shwar, or master of the ceremonies, is a stumpy dark little man with pig's eyes. He is half Arab, half Berber. He was unsatisfactory in business dealings with the mission, but when remonstrated with apologized, on the grounds of inexperience, He is a Mikṇasi (Meknes man), has influence there, and has latterly been sent thither on behalf of the Sultan.

Kaïd Belton is an Englishman of the smart non-commissioned officer type, son of a Cumberland farmer; he enlisted in the Imperial Yeomanry during the Boer War, got his stripes, was sent as a representative non-commissioned officer to the Coronation, and subsequently got a commission in the "Midland Rifles" (Cape Colony). Has been here (Fez) for eleven months, and has done well from the soldiering point of view; but the Sultan repudiates his written contract, under which he was to get 360 dollars a-month, and after giving him no pay for four months, now offers him pay at the rate of only 100 dollars per month. He is energetic, smart, and a good soldier, with plenty of intelligence, and deserves every assistance. He has,

* Died about June 15, 1909.

however, I understand, rather quarrelled with his bread and butter by holding aloof from the French Mission, and not being very diplomatic with reference to them.

His camp was in better order than would have been expected; his men like him, and he is quite straight.

He belongs to the Legion of Frotiersmen; but as he probably will not stay long in the Moorish service he will soon be looking out for another job. According to another account the Sultan is fond of him, and gave him his "baraka" (blessing) thrice in front of the troops (but no pay!).

El Glawi, the Sultan's Grand Vizier, who was chiefly responsible for supporting him at a critical moment and setting him on the throne, is a Berber of the Berbers. He is a great feudal lord of the Atlas country south of Marrakesh, and can command many thousand retainers.

Personally he is charming in manner, and gives one the impression of being a grand seigneur. He does not waste time in compliments, but, very unlike the ordinary procrastinating Arab, gets to the business in hand at once, and is frank, yet at the same time perfectly courteous. He is about 46, with a yellowish complexion, high cheek-bones, a small pointed beard, and a curiously shaped mouth.

He was extremely friendly to the mission, and showed every sign of wishing to be well in with England. His attitude towards his Sovereign seems to be one of loyalty, tempered by caution, distrust, and fear.

The Hazib, or master-general of supplies, was originally a slave and then a watchmaker. He is liked by the Sultan because of his rigid economy; but he is hated by everyone else, for he is very niggardly with all supplies and pay entrusted to him for distribution. He is popularly supposed to be lining his nest well.

Consul J. McLeod is a very hard-working, conscientious little man, who enters so much into details that he occasionally runs the risk of overdoing it. He is a hard-headed intelligent Scotsman, who knows the people, the language, and the country well, and has excellent judgment. He is very self-reliant, and has a taste for maps and procuring information of all sorts, both military and otherwise. A most useful man in every way.

Commandant Emile Mangin, head of the French military mission, is an officer of the Tirailleurs Algeriens, and has had a distinguished career in Algeria and at Casa Blanca. He was appointed at first to assist in organising the police, and subsequently came to Fez about October last. He is very hard-working and capable, and has already done a great deal. But he informed me it was heart-breaking work, for even if his designs were not thwarted at every point, and he was allowed to carry out some reforms, those reforms invariably fell to pieces directly his back was turned, owing to the carelessness, corruption, or mismanagement of the Moorish officials.

He is a very civil and obliging officer, and placed every detail at my disposition (*vide* report on Moorish army). He is no relation of the Mangin of Western Sahara fame.

Captains Brémond and Le Glay, and Dr. Bellot, of the same mission, are good, hardworking officers, and very friendly to us. They call for no special remark.

The Allaf, or Minister of War, is a very dark-coloured son of El Glawi; quite young, barely 20; he is a pure figure-head. He was most friendly to the mission, but knows nothing whatever about the army, nor does he pretend to. He is very fond of the fair sex.

The Mokri family is a highly respectable one, of Algerian origin. The Minister of Finance is honest (as far as a Moor can be), far-seeing, capable, and trustworthy. He has had considerable experience in dealing with Europeans, having been at the Algeciras Conference and on the mission to Paris in 1909.

His brother holds a nondescript position about the Court, and has a good deal of indirect influence for good.

His nephew (?) is Acting Minister of Finance whilst his uncle is away, and appears to do well.

All are friendly to Europeans and intelligent.

Kaïd M'tugi, the third great kaïd of the south, is an old Berber with a big grey beard, a lame leg, and a foxy eye. He tries to be amiable, but is not really to be trusted. From the accounts we had of him, he appears to be cruel and unscrupulous, avaricious, rich, and cunning, and he certainly is of the type of *vieux marcheur* as well, for he has a wife or two in every town, and an immense and casual harem besides, of which he takes great care. His country lies to the south of the Marrakesh–Mogador road, north of the Atlas.

The Sultan is a man of about 36, but looks much older. He is heavy-looking, and has not the charm of Abd-el-Aziz, but he improves on acquaintance, and is more intelligent than he looks. He is a strong man, and knows his own mind. He does not lose his head in an emergency, and he is not afraid to act boldly when required (*e.g.*, he is the first Sultan who has ever marched straight from Marrakesh across a hostile country to Fez; his action in the Kittani affair was decided and successful, and he did not hesitate to collect and throw almost the whole of his army into the balance against the Beni M'tir).

He sees that, in order to get the country into order, he must have money, and, in order to have money, he must have a good army to enforce his measures. But the army again costs a great deal of money, so he finds himself turning in rather a vicious circle. Accordingly he squeezes everyone he can in order to provide the necessary funds, is rigidly economical, and enforces taxes and cuts down expenses in every direction. This method of action, coming immediately after the careless and good-natured expenditure of his brother, has rendered him extremely unpopular, especially at Fez, for being a man of the south, he dislikes the northern capital, and has not scrupled to tax the Fezzis to their utmost capacity.

It must also be said that he is not straight in money matters; he makes contracts and promises involving money, gets the money's worth out of the contractors, and then repudiates his contracts and breaks his promises, or gets out of paying, somehow, on the flimsiest pretexts. (Thus, he has behaved disgracefully in the matter of salaries of various Englishmen in his service, and in other cases besides.)

But though he is hated, he is also feared, for he has power, and can enforce his will. Nevertheless, if a rival of his own (Fileli) or the Drisi family should arise and proclaim himself Sultan, thousands of his disaffected subjects would flock to the rebel standard.

He is quite alive to the necessity of keeping in good relations with the European Powers, and has no intention whatever of proclaiming a "jehad," for he sees that the help of Christians is necessary for the development of his country.

He may turn out to be a great Sultan, but, on the other hand, his rough methods of over-riding opposition and inconsiderate way of dealing with his subjects might quite possibly lead to his overthrow.

Dr, Verdon, of Australian birth, about 43 years old, has been attached to the Moorish Court for the last eleven years, but has only been definitely (?) taken on by the present Sultan during the last few months. He is a first-rate man, sensible, most intelligent, and, I believe, a good doctor. He knows the country well, and gets on well with the Moors; but like all Europeans in their service is always behindhand in the receipt of his pay. He was attached to the Mahalla in the Beni M'tir country, and did well there. He is married.

Dr. Wilkinson, self-styled physician in chief to the Sultan of Morocco, is a fraud. He is also three sorts of mania, viz., a lunatic, a dipsomaniac, and a megalomaniac. The less said here about him the better, for he has just got the "sack."

[27975] No. 268.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received July* 24.)

(No. 87.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, July* 24, 1909.

MOORISH loan.

His Majesty's consul at Fez has been informed by Sid Aissa-ben-Omar, Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, that the Sultan is now ready to accept a loan. The question of security is, of course, the difficulty, but Sid Aissa expects that the Sultan will accept the best terms he can obtain.

[28086] No. 269.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received July* 26.)

(No. 176.)
Sir, *Tangier, July* 18, 1909.

THE attitude of the Sultan and of his officials, inspired no doubt by their Imperial master, towards Europeans and persons enjoying foreign protection grows daily more hostile and unjustifiable. Instances of arbitrary acts are reported almost

daily to me from Fez and other cities, and I now transmit a despatch which I have received from Mr. MacLeod recounting the latest exploits of the deputy governor of Fez. Whilst I was at the capital Mr. MacLeod had occasion to complain of the unsatisfactory attitude of the governor (who subsequently left for Mequinez in connection with the movements of Moulai-el-Kebir), and of his absolute neglect of the representations made to him. By the Sultan's orders I was entertained by the official in question, who also performed the duties of Lord Chamberlain, and I took the opportunity of speaking very severely to him. I told him that it was only in his latter capacity that I came to his house at all, and that I intended to complain very seriously of his action as governor of Fez that very day to the Vizier for Foreign Affairs. He expressed the greatest contrition, assured me that he had at once submitted Mr. MacLeod's remonstrances to the Sultan, and that if he had not answered sooner it was merely because it was impossible to get His Shereefian Majesty to attend to the matter—not from any neglect on his part.

He concluded by begging me to forgive him: I must, he said, remember that he was nothing more than a rough Berber kaïd, and quite ignorant of the ways of Europeans. I could hardly refuse to accept this handsome apology, all the more so as I was enjoying (?) his hospitality.

His deputy appears to be worse than he was. Immediately on the receipt of Mr. MacLeod's despatch I sent Mr. Irwin to Guebbas to remonstrate most strongly. He told him that I was astonished at the reports which reached me from Mr. MacLeod; that I could only imagine that the Makhzen at Fez had gone mad; that I must request him to write at once very strongly to the court to point out to them the errors of their ways and try to bring them to reason. The patience of His Majesty's Government had proved to be considerable, but it was better that they should realise at once that it was not everlasting. This might lessen the violence of the shock which, if things continued in their present state, they must inevitably receive one day or another. I was, moreover, all the more surprised that such behaviour on the part of his officials should be tolerated by the Sultan at the very moment when he was trying to make arrangements for El Mokri to visit London. The idea of dispatching a Moorish "complimentary" mission to London at a moment when British rights and privileges were being violated in every imaginable way appeared to me a little too incongruous: it partook of the nature of a bad joke, and could not be taken seriously so long as the present attitude was maintained. Guebbas expressed the greatest regret at what had occurred, and sent me a message begging me to write a strong note to him setting forth all my various causes of complaint, which he would forward at once to court with his own comments. I had not originally intended to make any protest in writing, as the cases reported by Mr. MacLeod had in the end both been settled to his satisfaction. I shall, however, now do so, but not until I have actually received the cheque for the last instalment of the Raisuli money. The order for payment, sent by El Mokri from Paris, reached Guebbas yesterday, and I hope to get the cheque to-day. All promises given to me by the Sultan at Fez, and enumerated in the memorandum, copy of which was enclosed in my despatch No. 139 of the 10th ultimo, will have then been fulfilled: the Raisuli money will have been paid in full, the letters for the collection of the debts of the Saffi merchants have all reached me, and also those for settlement of the other small cases; my hand will consequently be far freer. At the same time I regret to say that from a private letter which I have received yesterday from Mr. MacLeod the Sultan appears to be behaving as badly as possible with regard to Dr. Verdon and Sergeant Balding, and in the case of the latter to have gone back absolutely upon the arrangements made by Aissa-ben-Omar with Mr. Irwin for the payment of his arrears of pay. Mr. MacLeod still hopes when he sees the Sultan to prevail upon him to stick to the arrangement made by his Ministers, and until I hear the result of his interview I shall not write more on the subject, but I confess that I am the reverse of sanguine.

I am in constant communication with the French chargé d'affaires on the question of the Sultan's attitude towards protected persons, but for the moment we have decided not to bring it before the foreign representatives.

Since my despatch No. 129 of the 24th May the question has gone through various phases. The final position appears to be that the Sultan has decided not to farm out the dues of the slipper and "haik" (garments of wool, silk, and cotton worn by the Moors) markets, and has installed collectors of his own. Mr. MacLeod has, moreover, been informed by the Vizier for Foreign Affairs that the Sultan has issued fresh orders that all persons, whether under Moorish jurisdiction or not, were to pay the imposts.

The French consul has protested, in writing, very strongly on this subject, but the Sultan absolutely declines to budge an inch. The French are much more severely hit by this decision than the protégés of either Great Britain or Germany, as a far greater number of merchants enjoy French protection, especially those dealing in leather and skins; and M. Gaillard has written to the chambers of commerce of Oran, Marseilles, Paris, and other French towns interested in trade in Morocco calling attention to the contempt for commercial treaty rights shown by the Sultan, and to the dangers to which His Majesty's attitude exposes their trade. This has no doubt been done to stir up an agitation in French commercial centres and so strengthen the hands of the Government. M. de Sainte-Aulaire is most indignant at what is going on, and has written a very strong note on the subject to Aissa-ben-Omar. He assures me that, according to the present arrangement, the imposts are only to be levied upon the French protégés, and not upon German or British, and that in this the Sultan is following the old game of attempting to create jealousy and sow dissension among the Powers. I think, however, that M. de Sainte-Aulaire is wrong, and that the measure is to apply to all alike; only in practice it will hit the French far harder than the others for the reason given above. It is on that account that he does not wish to bring the matter before the diplomatic body at this moment, as he thinks it more than likely that the German Minister might say he has nothing to complain of, and could not associate himself with any sort of protest to the Makhzen. Such a split in the European camp is evidently to be avoided at all costs.

M. de Sainte-Aulaire is more than ever convinced that the present régime is quite hopeless, and must continue to be so as long as Moulai Hafid remains upon the throne. His arrogance and infatuation amount to madness—when he is not mad he is drunk—and I am inclined to share M. de Sainte-Aulaire's view that not even "des coups de canon" would bring him to reason.

What I consider exceptionally serious is the financial situation. There is no money in the country, and the few financial transactions which take place are practically fictitious; moreover, it appears doubtful whether the few important merchant bankers, such as Braunschwig, Renschausen, Hassan, &c., can much longer stand the strain of non-payment of the large sums owing to them, and Mr. Hodgson told me the other day that he lived in dread of hearing that one of them had smashed. This would render the existing crisis very much more acute.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

P.S.—In connection with the independent attitude which the German Minister might possibly assume with regard to the question of the taxing of protected persons, I would add that His Majesty's consul at Fez, in a despatch dated the 23rd ultimo, informed me that the German consul, departing from an understanding to which the consuls came (however informally), made a private reservation to the Sultan on the subject, saying that he did not mind what other protégés had to pay, but that he would be much obliged as a favour if His Majesty would give the two collectors a hint not to ask these imposts from German protégés. The Sultan appears to have answered that he could not without verification accept the treaty extracts cited by Dr. Vassel, but must have a Makhzen copy of the treaty by which to check the extracts. No such copy could be found at the palace, and orders were given for one to be sent for from Tangier.

R. L.

Inclosure in No. 269.

Consul MacLeod to Mr. Lister.

(No. 51.)

Fez, July 12, 1909.

Sir,

DURING your Excellency's visit to Fez, I mentioned the hostile attitude which the governor and his deputy here had taken up in regard to various British-protected persons.

I have also reported the extraordinary course the Makhzen has taken in compelling protected persons to pay dues and imposts not payable by them either by treaty or by custom.

The inspirer of these actions is, undoubtedly the Sultan himself, and two days ago the French consul informed me that the Sultan had sent orders to the pasha,

Mohammed Bagdadi, of Alcazar, to compel all persons, whether protected persons or not, to pay whatever moneys the Makhzen demanded; and, if the protected persons declined to pay, the pasha was to seize and confiscate their properties, cattle, and the like.

Some ten days ago the British protégé Hadj Allal Lamarti (my cook) complained to me that he had hired a house for himself, near mine, from the owner, one Hadj Jellali-ben-Hadj Omar Mukhddem, of the Aissawa. A lease was made before notaries. The term was one year, tenancy to begin on the 1st of (this) current Moorish month; the rent 7 dollars a month and 6 months' rent (42 dollars) were paid in advance. The key was handed to Hadj Allal, who took possession of the house and, seven days ago, installed his womenkind in it and some of his effects. They had just begun to clean the place, when the mukaddum of the quarter and soldiers of the deputy governor arrived, said the house was wanted for the Makhzen's use, and straightway ejected Hadj Allal's womenkind and effects, without his being present and without even asking his consent.

I complained most temperately to the deputy governor, Sidi Dris Drisi, who said the house would at once be returned to Hadj Allal. He did not give up the place, however, so, after two days of renewed requests, I applied to Sid Aissa-ben-Omar. The latter twice ordered the deputy governor to give up the house and on each occasion he promised to do so, but in fact still retained the house. An emhazni, a messenger from Marrakesh, who had no belongings and could quite well have gone to a fundak, was installed in it meanwhile. During the succeeding days I twice in person spoke to the deputy governor about it, the latter time in the presence of Sid Aissa-ben-Omar, and again he promised it would be restored, but never did so.

I therefore, to-day, again complained most strongly to Sid Aissa-ben-Omar, and he sent one of his soldiers with my scribe to tell the deputy governor to give up the house forthwith. It then appeared that the emhazni originally installed in the house had left it three days ago, and that the deputy governor (far from restoring us the place) had now lodged another man in it, together with three women. The deputy governor (as on previous mornings) said he would give us the house "this afternoon." The deputy governor's previous promises obviously had been a mere string of wilful untruths.

I sent back Sid Aissa's man and my scribe to ask for the place to be given back instantly for it was impossible to accept any further trifling, and if it were not given up forthwith I would have no recourse left but to report to your Excellency by special courier on his conduct. To this the deputy governor, in most insolent terms, answered that I could do what I liked, and, turning to the scribe, shouted: "And as for you, get out of here." The scribe answered meekly that he could not take such an answer, for I would be sure to send him back again, to which the deputy governor replied: "Well, if you do, I'll answer you just as I've done already. Get out of my sight!"

A few days ago this same deputy governor sent me word that a certain noted "terribly" bad character was the tenant of a café owned by Hadj Tahir Mikwar, and he wished to arrest him. I answered that I had nothing to do with this man, and he was arrested—nobody objecting—forthwith, but was released two days later on making the deputy governor a present of ten loaves of sugar.

Last night, further, he arrested three couriers of the British post office—Bel Mikee Filali, Maati Filali, Bu Razok Filali—without (as required by article of the Madrid Convention, 1880) giving me any notice.

I sent word to the deputy governor this forenoon that I had heard of these arrests, but did not know on what grounds they had been made. The men admitted they had been quarrelling with some Wazzani men. It might be so, but as he had given no notice of the arrests I must ask for the men to be released and tried. To this he answered that the men had been quarrelling with some Wazzani sherefs, and had had to be disarmed of a pistol, bayonet, and sword they carried, and, I believe quite untruthfully, that they had never stated they were British couriers.

I replied that couriers often carried such weapons, and I must insist on the men being released and on their cases being properly investigated.

This he has again refused, and there the matter stands.

I would like to call special attention to the case of Hadj Allal Lamarti. There was no sort of provocation for it, and the wanton insolence and arrogant denial of justice displayed over it from beginning to end, make it the clearest and most flagrant case of its sort I have yet experienced.

The threat which I was finally driven to use about the house matter had, however,

an excellent effect, for two hours later the deputy governor went in person to the house in question, cleared out the occupants, and handed over the place to Hadj Allal Lamarti.

As regards the couriers, I expect the deputy governor will release them in a very few days, and this correction for their undoubted quarrelling will do them no harm.

I have, &c.
J. M. MacLEOD.

[28087] No 270.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received July* 26.)

(No. 177. Confidential.)

Sir, *Tangier, July* 18, 1909.

I HAD a long conversation yesterday with the French chargé d'affaires on the subject of the Melilla incident, and the relations between Morocco and Spain. M. de Saint Aulaire said that he was convinced that his Government were much embarrassed and annoyed "embéts," by the turn events had taken, though they had not actually said so in their communications to him. He fully believes that the Spanish authorities at Melilla purposely permitted the resumption of work on the railway, being convinced that a collision with the Moors was inevitable; indeed, that they were most anxious that it should take place as it would enormously strengthen the position of the Government in refusing to entertain the demand, which was the "raison d'être" of the Moorish Mission that Spain should evacuate the points occupied by her last year, on the pretext of the necessity to protect the lives of her subjects employed there, and to maintain order in the neighbourhood of the Presidios. In support of this view he told me that the director of the French Mining Company adjacent to the Spanish railway, realising the danger of the situation, had offered General Marina a guard of some hundred natives whom he appeared to have at his disposal, but that the general had refused, saying that the whole responsibility rested with him, and that he anticipated no unpleasant incidents. He sent the workmen out under the guard of three or four soldiers, whose presence was merely a matter of form.

This sounds very plausible, and there may be some truth in it; moreover, the sudden change of attitude of the King of Spain, and his decision to upset all his plans and receive the mission, in spite of his somewhat curt refusal in the first instance, gives colour to the idea that he and his Government may have realised after their first outburst of irritation that their hands would be strengthened if they received the mission, and if, during the stay of the latter at Madrid, an incident took place, as they knew it inevitably must, of the nature of the attack on the Spanish workmen on the line. At the same time I can hardly credit the Spanish Government with so much Macchiavellian forethought and cynicism, although, as Sir M. de Bunsen points out in his despatch No. 137 of the 13th instant, a copy of which he has been good enough to send me, it is pretty evident from the completeness of the arrangements made that the Spanish Government must have recognised some time before the outrage of the 9th July that the military movement was likely to become necessary. Moreover, the attempts to explain away the credit of 3,000,000 pesetas and the preparation of the three brigades were very lame.

M. de Saint Aulaire will not admit that the Spanish situation in the Riff, or rather its origin, can be identified with that of the French at Casa Blanca. In the latter case French workmen were brutally massacred when engaged upon a work undertaken by virtue of a perfectly legal contract entered into with the Maghzen in one of the principal open ports of the Empire, whose security was supposed to be amply assured by the Moorish Government. The Spanish workmen, on the other hand, were engaged upon a railway, the construction of which was, in the view of the Maghzen, absolutely illegal, undertaken in a country which was admittedly insecure. This view the Maghzen had never ceased to express, and only as recently as the middle of last month (see my despatch No. 146 of the 20th ultimo) Cid Guebbas had repeated it most solemnly to the Spanish chargé d'affaires, and had declined, on the part of the Makhzen, to assume any responsibility should the support given by Spain to enterprises which reposed on an illegality lead to reprisals.

M. de Saint Aulaire, however, admits that Spain cannot now, after the murder

of her subjects, be expected to take the purely legal aspect of the case, and that the practical effects of the Riff assault will probably be much the same as those of Casa Blanca.

In the course of our conversation M. de Saint Aulaire told me very confidentially that Cid Guebbas had asked him point blank whether any arrangement had been made in the secret treaty between France and Spain as to the attitude to be adopted by the two Powers in the event of an incident such as that of the 9th July. M. de Saint Aulaire said he had been placed in a very awkward position, but he had replied vaguely, and succeeded in drawing the conversation off this very dangerous ground. He was more than ever convinced that the Moorish Government had full cognisance of the secret clauses of the treaty of 1904, or, at all events, of their substance. They had undoubtedly been communicated to the German Government by the Spanish Government, who had never been more than half loyal to the French, and the Germans had divulged them to the Moorish Government as proof that Spain and, above all, France, who was so loud in her asseverations that she was determined to support the integrity of the Shereefian Empire, had already come to terms as to the partition between them of that Empire whenever, thanks to their machinations, it fell to pieces.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

P.S.—I cannot quite understand Sir M. de Bunsen's reference to Taza in his despatch above referred to. It is some 100 miles distant from Melilla, and there could never, I imagine, be any question of its being occupied by the Spaniards.

R. L.

[28088] No. 271.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received July* 26.)

(No. 178. Confidential.)

Sir, *Tangier, July* 18, 1909.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 172 of the 12th instant, I have the honour to report that Raisuli called upon me yesterday morning. He appeared to be in fine feather and altogether a very different bird from the somewhat draggle-tailed specimen who came to see me in March, immediately after his renunciation of British nationality.

He assured me that all was going well in the Anjera and that the hostility to him was confined to two or three villages. This, however, he said, had been made the most of by Guebbas, who was anxious to obtain the governorship for his son; he even went so far as to maintain that the letters sent to me and the German Minister had actually been inspired by Guebbas! The latter was now doing all in his power to obstruct whatever he (Raisuli) wished to arrange. The Sultan had consented to the garrison of R'faif being raised to 800 men, but when Raisuli went to ask for the soldiers, rifles, ammunition, &c., Guebbas had replied that he could have the men, but not a single rifle or cartridge as he had had no instructions to give them. This attitude of course was ridiculous, as if the soldiers were to be of any use they must be armed, however, Guebbas had remained perfectly obdurate and he had been obliged to refer the matter back to the Court.

I told Mr. Irwin to try and draw Raisuli out on the subject of the situation at Fez, &c., and if possible get him to give us his views. He did not require much encouragement and launched forth into a diatribe against the Sultan. The situation, he said, was a hopeless one and could not possibly continue. The Sultan not only had embroiled Morocco with all the foreign Powers but had made himself detested throughout the Empire. His arrogance and infatuation knew no bounds; he was convinced that he owed the throne solely and entirely to his own marvellous qualities and ability, that he was the most powerful potentate in the world and that he could treat foreigners and Moors exactly as he pleased; in fact, he said, there was only one thing left for him to lay claim to and that was the Godhead. The remnants of the Mehallas, such as they were, he said, were absolutely disloyal to him and sided with the viziers; they also deeply resented his treatment of Menebhi who had always been a favourite of the soldiers and whom, as one of Hafid's principal supporters at the time of his proclamation, they expected to see promoted to the chief command. The whole country,

with the exception, he modestly said, of the districts under his jurisdiction was seething with discontent, and there was not a man in Morocco who would not rejoice to see Hafid deposed even though a donkey were set up to reign in his stead. He had personally, he said, never believed in Hafid as a Sultan, and would never have espoused his cause had it not been for the urgent appeals of Menebhi. Now Menebhi hated him worse than anybody else.

Situations in Morocco cannot be gauged by the same standards as in European countries, but I cannot but think that we must be prepared for some considerable upheaval when the five most prominent men of the Empire—Glawi, Aissa, 'Mtougi, Raisuli, and Menebhi—entertain feelings of such violent hostility against their sovereign and are at so little pains to disguise them.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

[28090] No. 272.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received July* 26.)

(No. 180. Confidential.)

Sir, *Tangier, July* 18, 1909.

IN a private letter, dated the 13th instant, His Majesty's consul at Fez informs me that for some days past Herr Mannesman has been engaged in what appear to be very serious negotiations with the Sultan and Aissa-ben-Omar. Mr. MacLeod expects that their object may be to advance His Shereefian Majesty a large sum of money on security of future concessions of mines, or on a lien upon all mining royalties, which may enable the Sultan to carry on financially until his next serious supplies of money come in from the ports in four or five months' time. Mr. MacLeod has communicated his suspicions to his French colleague.

Similar information has reached Mr. Harris from Dr. Verdon, with this addition, that the latter states that Dr. Vassel has assisted at all the interviews, and that Mannesman is reported to have the support of the German Government in his present attempt. The first half of this may be, and probably is, true, as the movements of a man like Vassel in Fez are all watched and known, and it says little for Dr. Rosen's loyalty after the assurances he gave me (see my despatch No. 64 of the 4th April). The latter half I am not inclined to believe.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

[28091] No. 273.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received July* 26.)

(No. 181.)

Sir, *Tangier, July* 18, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a summary of events of interest for the past week.

The attitude of Kaïds Wold Anflus and Gilooli and of the Governor of Marrakesh is somewhat equivocal, and I fear it looks as though trouble of some sort were brewing in the south.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

Inclosure in No. 273.

Summary of Events in Morocco during the past week.

IT is reported from Mogador that Kaïd Gilooli left there on the 4th instant for the castle of Kaïd Wold Anflus. The latter has, it appears, abandoned his intention of divorcing his wife, a sister of Gilooli, which step would have certainly caused trouble between the two kaïds. Gilooli will, it is stated, proceed to join the "harka" or expeditionary force on the 8th of this month.

Mr. Lennox reports from Marakesh on the 3rd instant that the governor, Hadj Thami-el-Glawi, had informed him that he had written to all the khalifas of the Hooz tribes, and even to Kaïd Wold Anflus, requesting them to hold at his disposal 100 armed horsemen, ready at any moment to be sent to him should he require their services. Mr. Lennox was unable to ascertain the object of this step.

A grand review was held at Casa Blanca on the 14th instant by General Moinier, in celebration of the French National Fête. Some 2,500 men marched past before a large crowd of spectators, presenting an imposing spectacle. A feature of the review was the presence of the new Moroccan goumiers, who have been raised in the Shawia by the French. Mr. Madden states that they appeared well trained, and marched past very well. Six hundred of them were on parade, half mounted and half on foot.

Rumours of serious trouble in the district of Alcazar continue to arrive. It is difficult to obtain exact details of the disturbances, but it appears that they originated in a quarrel between the Shereefs of Wazzan and the khalifa of Kaïd Bagdadi. It was reported a few days ago that in the course of some desultory fighting the khalifa had been defeated and killed.

[28404] No. 274.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 27.)

(No. 88.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, July 27, 1909.*

MOORISH loan.

My telegram No. 87 of the 24th July.

I learn from the French chargé d'affaires that the Sultan asked the French consul at Fez to request his Government to use their good offices with Spain, with a view to persuading the Spanish Government to limit their action in the district of the Riff. M. Gaillard had answered that something must be done in return by the Sultan for European interests in this country, and above all that he must accept a loan. No news has reached Count Sainte-Aulaire of El Mokir having received any definite orders in regard to a loan. He considers that when the Sultan sees how very effectively the action of Spain is being limited by the Riffians themselves it is possible that his present mood may not continue.

[28417] No. 275.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)

(No. 148.)
Sir, *San Ildefonso, July 25, 1909.*

THE crowded columns of the Spanish press do not convey a very clear idea of the progress of the fighting behind Melilla. The censorship is at work, and official communications are bare and scanty. It is, however, pretty clear that hostilities are proceeding, almost without interruption. There is a daily tale of Spanish losses. The proportion of officers killed and wounded seems to be abnormally large. It is not easy to get at the precise numbers engaged. The arrival of the Barcelona brigade was said to have doubled General Marina's original force of 6,000 men; but out of those 6,000 all told he had to garrison, besides Melilla, the Spanish fortress of Alhucemas and the outposts at the Restinga and Cabo de Aguas, which give so much offence to the Sultan. A military paper estimates the entire force under the General's orders at 10,000, or, say, 8,000 effectives, and the force engaged with the enemy, respectively before and after the arrival of the Barcelona brigade, at 2,000 and 4,000. A body of troops is kept in reserve at the racecourse ("hipodromo") a mile outside the fortress.

The constant aim of the tribesmen is to cut the communications between the reserves and the Spanish advanced lines at Jebel Sidi Ahmet-el-Hadj and the Atalayon Hill. Their possession of the Gurugu Mountain, a little to the rear of the Spanish right flank, enables them to carry out these tactics with some effect. Desperate encounters have taken place near the first and second railway stations ("casetas") and on the rising ground behind them (Sidi Musa), but the Spanish troops have not been dislodged from their positions. Doubtless, when further reinforcements arrive, points will be seized which will render those positions more secure. Possibly an advance into the enemy's country may be necessary, at least as far as Seluan.

In addition to the Barcelona brigade a considerable part of the Madrid brigade of chasseurs ("cazadores") has already been disembarked at Melilla. The remainder will follow within a few days. A third brigade of reinforcements is also under orders to sail for Melilla, namely, the 1st Brigade of the so-called Division Reforzada, a corps which is kept permanently on a war footing. No reservists will, therefore, have to be called out to fill the ranks of this brigade. Its four battalions will number 1,000 men each, as compared with the 850 men composing the six battalions of the Barcelona and Madrid brigades already dispatched.

Trouble being also anticipated at Ceuta, the Algeciras brigade is calling in its reserves, with a view to possible service in that region. This is one of the three brigades of chasseurs selected for special service in connection with the credit of 3,000,000 pesetas granted to the Government by royal decree on the 13th June. The first of these three brigades was that of Madrid, the second that of Algeciras, and the third that of Barcelona.

Advantage is of course being taken by the Opposition parties of the unwelcome conflict in which the Government finds itself so suddenly involved. By the more serious Liberal politicians Señor Maura is accused of having allowed himself to be drawn on by the French into aggressive action, the end of which it is impossible to foresee. There is, moreover, a large body of malcontents, including the Socialist and Republican organizations and the rabble of the streets, which clamours for the immediate recall of the troops already sent and the cessation of all further consignments. Its more unruly elements have lately broken out into open riot at the southern railway station of Madrid. They mobbed the departing troops, broke the lamps and windows of the railway carriages, and sought by every means to impede the departure of the trains. On the morning of the 22nd instant, the police being entirely unable to preserve the peace, troops had to be ordered out of the carriages they had just entered, formed up on the platform, and made to disperse the mob with fixed bayonets.

Similar manifestations of a milder kind have not been wanting at Barcelona. I hear from Mr. Consul Maclean that at Bilbao the feeling is very bitter against the war, as the Melilla expedition is now coming to be called. It is, indeed, popular in no quarter, but persons with whom I have conversed seem to be mostly agreed that, however distasteful, the enterprise on which the Government have embarked was really forced upon them, and that, short of giving up every prospect of the future extension of Spanish influence into the country behind Melilla, they had no alternative but to compel respect for the claims of Spain by force of arms.

I have, &c.
MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[27559] No. 276.

Sir Edward Grey to M. Cambon.

Your Excellency, *Foreign Office, July 28, 1909.*

WITH reference to the communications left by your Excellency at this office on the 20th instant, I have the honour to state that His Majesty's Government readily agree to the proposal of the French Government that a commission consisting of British, French, German, and Spanish experts should meet at Paris and discuss the mining question in Morocco.

I shall have the honour to communicate to your Excellency in due course the name of the gentleman appointed as British representative on the commission.

I have, &c.
E. GREY.

[28553] No. 277.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)

(No. 149.)
Sir, *San Ildefonso, July 26, 1909.*

THE almost continuous Moorish attack on the Spanish position behind Melilla appears to have culminated, on the 23rd instant, in a more serious engagement than had yet occurred since that position was taken up by General Marina on the 9th instant. Though the enemy again failed to isolate the advance body of Spaniards

disposed along the heights of Jebel Sidi Hamet, some 6 miles from Melilla, they inflicted, and doubtless suffered, considerable loss. The precise number of casualties is not known, but 260 Spanish wounded were carried into hospital at Melilla. Among the killed was the colonel of the Figueras regiment, which only left Madrid a few days ago, and was hurried directly to the front from the landing place at Melilla. Three colonels have now been killed since the troubles began, and one is reported missing. The proportion of officers killed and wounded continues to be very large.

Public opinion, which did not desire another Morocco war, is deeply impressed by these events. The war is unpopular except in the army itself. The Government, of course, is the scapegoat. The Ministers are hurrying to Madrid from their summer resorts. The King also returns to Madrid to-morrow from Galicia, where he has been attending the opening of the Santiago Exhibition. His Majesty some days ago announced that he would give up his intended visit to England and remain within reach of his capital.

Meanwhile more troops are to be poured into Melilla. General Linares, Minister of War, has stated, in an interview, that General Marina will soon have 24,000 men under his command, Even this force will not suffice to defend the 7 miles of country held by the Spanish troops. It will be reinforced as soon as may be by the entire division of General Orozco, which is kept permanently on a war footing (division reforzada), and by the Algeciras brigade, which was to have gone to Ceuta. This will raise General Marina's force to 40,000 men. More brigades will be got ready in case of need,

Notwithstanding this announcement, the feeling in Madrid and other principal towns against the war is said to be growing rapidly.

I have, &c.
MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[28651] No. 278.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)

(No. 31.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *San Ildefonso, July 29, 1909.*

MELILLA campaign.

On the 27th instant another severe engagement occurred, in which the tribesmen were held at bay by the Madrid brigade to guard a convoy of water to the Spanish advanced posts.

The brigadier-general and the colonels of the Arapiles and Navas Regiments were killed. His Royal Highness the Duke of Connaught is honorary colonel of the former regiment.

The internal situation is causing great anxiety to the Spanish Government. Barcelona and the two neighbouring Catalonian provinces have been declared in a state of siege, and troops have been sent to re-establish order in the city, which has been at the mercy of a mob. The constitutional guarantees have been suspended throughout the country. The King is at Madrid, which is quiet, though troops are being held in readiness in case of necessity. I hope to see the Minister for Foreign Affairs to-morrow in Madrid.

[28662] No. 279.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 30.)

(No. 304.)
Paris, July 29, 1909.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the President of the Republic has reprieved the deserters of the Foreign Legion recently condemned by court-martial at Casa Blanca.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

[28861] No. 280.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 31.)

(No. 35.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *San Ildefonso, July 31, 1909.*

MELILLA campaign.

Minister for Foreign Affairs is informed by Spanish Ambassador at Paris that the French Government, without ceasing to counsel prudence, has now frankly accepted the explanations offered by the Spanish Government, to the effect that the sudden outbreak at Melilla compelled them to take immediate action without previously consulting France, and that the present campaign is nothing more than a local police measure.

[29267] No. 281.

Memorandum communicated by Spanish Ambassador, July 31, 1901.

(Translation.)

IT was already well known, before the sanguinary events at Melilla, that certain private persons had undertaken works connected with the development of mineral deposits in the neighbouring Moorish territory. The Spanish authorities in Melilla had no ground for considering illegal such an enterprise, seeing that, in the absence of the firman provided for by the Act of Algeciras, the interested parties had obtained the consent of the proprietors of the ground and of the chiefs of the Kabilas, and declared themselves ready forthwith to accept the conditions of the said mining regulations on the understanding, of course, that their provisions are in accordance with the said international agreement.

In any case, in dealing with occurrences in Moorish territory, the Spanish authorities at Melilla were bound to abstain from intervention, and have always done so except as regards guaranteeing generally the security of foreigners. The Makhzen, without taking into account these reasons nor considering sufficiently that Spain is not responsible, on the contrary, for their inability to exercise their power effectively in the districts referred to, presumes to involve Spanish Government in the responsibility for these private undertakings. The observations of the Makhzen deal also with the construction or position of two roads in the vicinity of Ceuta—one to Castillejos and the other to Biut and Ain-chicha– begun by the Kabilenos for their private use. The position of the Spanish Government in regard to this work was the same as that shown above, since it is not their business to make observations to the tribes in regard to an enterprise which was being carried out in Moorish territory and by which no Spanish interest or international agreement was affected. In view of the pressure of the Makhzen, and being desirous of giving them all the assistance possible, the Spanish Government decided that the Governor of Ceuta should use his good offices with the Kabilenos, who are in relations with Ceuta, to bring about the suspension of the works, and he was successful in this, on the understanding that he should continue to discuss the question with His Shereefian Majesty. Although the principles and stipulations which serve as a common basis to the policy of the Powers in the Moorish Empire have been fully respected by the Spanish Government in matters which could exclusively affect that Government and the Moors, although the grounds justifying our conduct and the negotiations recently carried on at Madrid on these points have been fully explained to the Makhzen, yet the Sultan's representative at Tangier has consulted various diplomatic representatives as to the reception which they would give to a protest from His Shereefian Majesty on the subject. No one can deny the significance of this step at a moment when the preaching of fanatics and the pressure of Moorish elements foreign to the district (where up to the present a normal development had taken place in accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants of the place and the efforts of the Spanish Government), have brought about the sanguinary occurrences of which your Excellency is aware. The Spanish Government has made adequate representations in this matter to the representative of the Sultan and the Ambassador of His Shereefian Majesty in Madrid. For the rest, faithful to a spirit of moderation, the Spanish Government will continue to limit its action to the repression of the disorders of the tribes. Their desire would have been that the measures taken in the above sense on the (?) 9th instant against the perpetrators of

violence should have put an end to the business. In view of the failure of the Kabilas to fulfil the offers of satisfaction which they made, in view of the repeated attacks, the drawing of foreign tribes into the conflict, the use of measures indicating a plan which is the result of long preparation which is inspired by sentiments of hostility and which has been postponed, according to all appearances, until now in expectation of the completion of work in the fields of this region and the return of those of their compatriots who had gone abroad, the Spanish Government has been compelled to adopt the measures necessary to inflict the necessary punishment and to avoid a repetition of these occurrences. I request that your Excellency will inform the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs by word of mouth of the above since, although our action responds to obvious necessities and deals with matters concerning the tranquillity of a neighbouring region, the Spanish Government desires that the friendly Government of Great Britain should be aware of their real intentions.

Spanish Embassy, London,
July 31, 1909.

[27559] No. 282.

Foreign Office to Board of Trade.

Foreign Office, July 31, 1909.

THE Board of Trade will be aware that by article 112 of the Algeciras Act the Powers agreed that the conditions of the concession and of the working of mines, ores, and quarries in Morocco should be regulated by a Shereefian firman. The article in question continues by stating that in drawing up the firman the Shereefian Government shall be guided by the laws governing this matter in foreign countries.

For some time past the foreign representatives at Tangier have been pressing the Moorish Government to issue the firman without further delay, but at present there seems little prospect of their efforts meeting with success. In these circumstances the French Government, in a communication left at this Office by the French Ambassador, copy of which is enclosed, propose that the four Governments chiefly concerned, *i.e.*, the British, French, German, and Spanish Governments, should appoint a commission of experts to meet in Paris, and to study a draft mining regulation prepared by M. Porché, the Moorish State engineer. In a further communication, a copy of which is also enclosed, the French Government state that if the commission is appointed their representative will be M. Aguillon.

Sir E. Grey considers that the proposal affords the best prospect of arriving at a settlement of the mining question in Morocco, and he has informed the French Ambassador that His Majesty's Government agree thereto. I am to request accordingly that the Board will designate a mining expert who would be a suitable British representative on the commission, and I am to enquire what remuneration should in their opinion be offered to him.

I am to add that it is not anticipated that the work of the commission will last for long.

I am, &c.
W. LANGLEY.

[29023] No. 283.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 3.)

(No. 182.)

Tangier, July 22, 1909.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a memorandum drawn up by Mr. Rattigan of a conversation which he had this morning with the French chargé d'affaires on the subject of the fighting which has been going on in the neighbourhood of Melilla.

I hear from Mr. Macleod that the news of the incidents of the 9th July was received with comparative indifference at Fez, one of the reasons for this being that the Riff has for a long time past been looked upon as cut off from the rest of the Empire. It must also be remembered that anything like patriotism or *esprit de corps* is practically non-existant in Morocco; there is little or no cohesion amongst the

tribes or groups of tribes, and one is always more or less pleased at the reverses of another. No name even exists for the conglomeration of tribes which makes up the Empire; the word Morocco has been invented by Europeans, "Moghreb" simply signifying "sunset" or "west." Moreover, in Arabic there is no term for what we call a "Moor"; he is simply a "Muslim," which might equally mean a Turk or an Indian Mahommedan.

At the same time, I cannot help thinking that the Spaniards have rather a serious job before them, as the Riffians amongst themselves hang very much together, and are a fierce and warlike race. Mr. Irwin tells me that he hears of some 150 who have left Tangier and returned to join their countrymen in their struggle against Spain.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

Inclosure in No. 283.

Memorandum by Mr. Rattigan.

COUNT SAINT-AULAIRE informed me in conversation this morning that he considered the Spaniards were confronted by a very serious situation at Melilla. He had just seen the agent of a French shipping company, who had been an eyewitness to some of the most recent fighting, and who had expressed the most pessimistic views. The Spanish troops had, he said, fought with considerable bravery, but had been very badly led. The officers, it appears, showed a deplorable ignorance of their profession, and the transport arrangements were very bad. The artillery had entirely failed to stop the rushes of the Riffians, but this was no doubt due to the fact that the latter always advanced in scattered formation, as had been the case in the Shawia, and took advantage of every bit of cover. The Spanish losses had certainly been very heavy, especially in the last fight, where three senior officers and a great many men had been killed. Though the Spanish troops had fought with courage, there had certainly been considerable disorder in the ranks, the Riffians at one point of the mêlée had almost got amongst the guns. There had been apparently a critical moment when a demoralising effect had been produced upon the troops by the screams of an unfortunate sergeant who had been seized and was being tortured near at hand. In the end, however, the troops stood firm.

In Melilla itself fears were openly expressed that the suburbs of the town were quite unprotected, and would inevitably be sacked in the event of a determined attack. No doubt, however, the arrival of reinforcements will obviate this danger.

I remarked to Count Saint-Aulaire that the difficulties which faced the Spaniards were apparently very much greater than those with which the French had had to contend in the Shawia. In contrast to the Shawian plains the Riff was mountainous and broken country. Moreover, the Riffians were accustomed from their infancy to look upon fighting as a sport. They were admitted to be very much braver than the southern Arabs, and their shooting was reported to be excellent. In this connection I had learnt from a member of the Spanish legation that the military authorities had been astounded by the incredibly large proportion of officers to men in the casualty lists, and they could only suppose that the Riffians purposely picked off the officers. Count Saint-Aulaire admitted the superiority of the Riffians over the southern Arabs, and went on to say that it would cost the Spaniards a great deal, both in men and money, before they could put things straight in the district. He pointed out that if Spain followed the French in demanding an indemnity from the Makhzen, this would mean the bankruptcy of Morocco for many years to come. He had no doubt this was the intention of the Spanish Government, though it was absurd to compare the situation at Melilla with that of the French at Casa Blanca. In the latter case workmen had been attacked and murdered in one of the principal ports of Morocco when working for a French company, who were engaged upon an undertaking at the invitation and under the authority of the Makhzen. On the other hand, at Melilla Spanish workmen had been killed whilst engaged upon an enterprise which the Makhzen had repeatedly denounced as illegal, and against which they had continued to protest. The Spanish Government had, moreover, received frequent warnings from the Sultan that any attempt to persist in this enterprise would inevitably provoke serious trouble in the district, for which His Majesty declined to accept any responsibility.

I observed that the Spaniards were apparently doing all they could to prove that, owing to the presence of a French company at Melilla, the French were involved with them in the present difficulties. Count Saint-Aulaire admitted that such efforts had been made by the Spaniards, but stated that the French had made it abundantly clear that they considered that they were in no way concerned. They had always officialy ignored the French company in question, and luckily none of the workmen who had been attacked had anything to do with any French undertaking. He concluded by saying that for the present the French attitude was that of a mere interested spectator.

I gathered in conversation with a member of the Spanish legation that the Government apparently took the line of saying that they on their side had repeatedly warned the Sultan of the disturbed condition of the district, and had asked either that the necessary measures for the maintenance of order should be taken by the Makhzen, or that they should be allowed themselves to take such steps as they might consider necessary to secure the tranquillity of the neighbourhood. They had added that, were nothing done, trouble would certainly arise, for which they would hold the Makhzen responsible.

I pointed out that the Sultan's answer would no doubt be that the disturbed condition of the district was in the first instance due to what he had denounced as the illegal action of Spain, and would have *ipso facto* ceased on the withdrawal of the Spaniards from their illegal enterprise in that region. To this my informant demurred, but could apparently find no suitable answer.

I may add that Mr. Irwin learns from Cid Guebbas that the Sultan proposes to send emissaries to the Riff with the object of persuading the tribes to desist from their attacks on the Spanish troops, presumably on condition of some sort of guarantee that they should be protected by diplomatic action of the Makhzen from any further advance of the Spaniards.

FRANK RATTIGAN.

[29024] No. 284.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 3.)

(No. 183.) *Tangier, July* 22, 1909.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of the note which I have addressed to the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs in obedience to your telegram No. 40 of the 20th instant, stating the reasons for which it is impossible to receive the Moorish Mission in London.

I have added the phrase with regard to Dr. Wilkinson, as Mr. Macleod informs me that the Sultan was much upset at the idea that you should have thought that he had employed him in the matter at all.

The "Dépêche marocaine" publishes a report to the effect that El Mokri is expected to return to Tangier at the beginning of next month, and I think it may very likely prove true, as M. de Sainte-Aulaire says that, as far as he knows, nothing is being done in Paris, the Sultan refusing to give any guarantees for a loan, though he admits that he requires money. Sid Aissa Ben Omar also, in conversation with Mr. Macleod, spoke of Mokri as remaining on "idle" in Paris.

I have, &c.
R. LISTER.

Inclosure in No. 284.

Mr. Lister to Cid Guebbas.

(After compliments.) *Tangier, July* 22, 1909.

I DID not fail to communicate to His Majesty's Government the desire of the Sultan, conveyed to me through your Excellency and through His Majesty's consul at Fez, that the Moorish Mission now at Paris should proceed to London and return the visit which I paid to Fez. I have now the honour to inform you in reply, in accordance with instructions which I have received from His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that His Majesty's Government regret that it is now too late for the reception of the mission. The King leaves London at the end of

this week for Goodwood and Cowes, and at the beginning of August leaves England for Austria, in order to take the waters at Marienbad.

I also explained to His Majesty's Government that the Sultan knew nothing of the action taken by Dr. Wilkinson in connection with this matter, and would never have thought of employing him to make such a communication.

[29026] No. 285.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 3.)

(No. 185.) *Tangier, July* 23, 1909.

Sir,

HEREWITH I have the honour to transmit copy of a statement of claims for 1,367,376*l.* against the Moorish Government, which have been submitted by firms of foreign nationality to the Claims Commission now sitting at Tangier. This statement was kindly communicated to me by Mr. Hodgson, of the Banque d'État.

I have, &c.
(For the Minister),
FRANK RATTIGAN.

Inclosure in No. 285.

LISTE des Réclamations remises du 5 Rabi II au 10 Djoumada II (26 avril au 10 mai, 1909) à la Commission des Dettes du Makhzen (intérêts compris).

Noms.	—	Marks.	Livres.	Francs.	Dollars espagnols.	Dollars makhzani.
			£ s. d.			
Moses Pariente, pour compte Bland and Co.	..	Anglais ..	..	..	4,399·75	..
" " pour son compte personnel	..	..	..	1,487,444·34	..	3,016·50
Abraham Benharroch ..	..	Espagnol	99,318 17 7	..	..	385,089·00
Braunschwig et Cie. ..	..	Français	..	..	..	..
" " (pour mémoire: résiliation contrats frappé)	..	..	62,231 9 3	164,850·00	..	331,546·42
Hausser et Joachimssohn	..	Allemand	..	..	..	..
Mendelssohn et Cie. ..	..	..	..	9,814·97	..	968·00
Ministère des Affaires Étrangères d'Allemagne	..	..	..	..	..	141·50
Gebrüder Dorken Gevelsberg ..	..	..	..	..	..	800·00
Jacob Laredo ..	..	..	..	..	..	3,678·55
Neudorfer (consul allemand, Rabat)	..	..	..	4,500·00	..	..
Abraham Benchimol, Tanger ..	..	..	87,533 11 6	2,867·70	..	262·66
Habib Cohen, sensar de Karl Ficke	..	..	..	1,634,788·65	..	..
Ministère des Affaires Étrangères d'Allemagne	..	..	..	33,462·95	..	..
Benchausen et Cie. ..	..	..	..	..	..	1,673·97
Consortium des Banques	..	Français	..	..	..	10,960·00
L'Hermite ..	..	..	..	133,737·80	..	8,465·20
Moses Pariente, pour compte Coriat	..	Anglais ..	273,366 10 0	465,974·81	..	..
Étienne Jayet, pour compte Maxime Allier	..	Français	..	..	..	..
Compagnie marocaine	..	..	..	..	..	..
" " (pour mémoire: indemnité pour les dommages subis dans les travaux des ports de Casa Blanca et de Saffi)	..	..	..	..	..	..
		11,741,904	522,450 8 4	3,937,441·22	4,399·75	746,601·80

		£
11,741,904 marks at 20 to the £	..	587,095
3,937,441 fr. at 25 to the £ ..	..	157,497
4,399 Spanish dollars at 5½ to the £	..	788
746,601 Hassani dollars at 7½ to the £ ..	..	99,546
£ sterling	..	522,450
Total ..	..	1,367,376

[29027] No. 286.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 3.)

(No. 186.)

Tangier, July 23, 1909.

Sir,

HIS Majesty's consul at Fez, in a letter dated the 19th instant, reports that the Sultan has, in deference to remonstrances made by the French chargé d'affaires through the French consul at Fez, countermanded the orders insisting on the payment of extraordinary dues by foreign protégés. Mr. Macleod states that the French consul even went so far as to threaten to seize the custom-houses at the ports were the orders for the collection of the dues from protégés not withdrawn; and he understands that the Sultan denied energetically that he had ever issued the offending order.

This denial on the part of His Majesty will not tend to increase the very limited reliance previously placed in His Majesty's word.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

[29028] No. 287.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 3.)

(No. 187.)

Tangier, July 24, 1909.

Sir,

AS I had the honour to report in my telegram No. 87 of to-day's date, the Vizier for Foreign Affairs has informed Mr. MacLeod that the Sultan is now ready to accept a loan. The difficulty is, of course, to find a satisfactory security for a loan of any importance, but the Sultan will, Si Aissa expects, accept the best terms available.

M. Gaillard, in conversation with Dr. Verdon, confirmed the statement of Si Aissa, and declared that the French banks were prepared to make a big loan if they could obtain the necessary guarantees. He further expressed the opinion that the loan would be negotiated in November, unless His Majesty should again change his mind.

Si Hamed Mokri, brother of the Minister of Finance, informed Dr. Verdon that the mission in Paris had been warned by the banks that if the Sultan desired a loan he should take it at once, as he would not have another opportunity offered him. His Majesty was at first very reluctant to raise a loan of any sort, but had later agreed to do so. Meanwhile the raid of the Roghi had taken place, and the banks in consequence informed El Mokri that the moment was not propitious for the negotiation of a loan. His Shereefian Majesty had, however, now instructed El Mokri to endeavour to secure the same terms from the banks as had at first been offered to him, and it was hoped that he would succeed in doing so.

I have, &c.
(For the Minister),
FRANK RATTIGAN.

[29029] No. 288.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 3.)

(No. 188.)

Tangier, July 26, 1909.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a summary of the events in Morocco during the past week.

I have, &c.
(For the Minister),
FRANK RATTIGAN.

Inclosure in No. 288.

Summary of Events in Morocco during the past week.

UNREST and disorder appear to be spreading throughout the country. The consular officers in Southern Morocco are all inclined to believe that trouble of some

sort is brewing there, while disturbances have been taking place in the Gharb, Wazzan, Anjera, and Ceuta districts.

With a view apparently to restoring tranquillity in Wazzan, the Sultan has placed that region under the governorship of the shereefs of Wazzan instead of that of Bushta Bagdadi, kaïd of Alcazar, under whose jurisdiction it had previously been. It will be remembered that there had been serious fighting between the shereefs and the partisans of Bagdadi, which had resulted in the death of the latter's khalifa.

Rumours arrive from the Anjera to the effect that the tribe are determined not to put up with the governorship of Raisuli, and are planning to combine against him. These rumours, however, cannot be taken very seriously in view of the fact that the recent petition against Raisuli, addressed to the British and German Ministers by the tribe, did not appear to be very genuine. In fact Raisuli has stated in somewhat unequivocal terms that the whole thing was "got up" by his enemy Cid Guebbas.

The events at Melilla are doubtless having their effect on the tribes round Ceuta, who have lately been showing signs of unrest. Their latest exploit has been to destroy the roads which have recently been constructed by the Spanish authorities in the direction of Tetuan and the Anjera.

Mr. Madden learns from Rabat that Moulai-el-Kebir is at present with a tribe called the Ait Ali-ou-el-Hessin in the Zemmour Schluht country, and that he appears to be keeping quite quiet there.

There appears little doubt that the French honorary consul-general, M. Malpertuy, will be transferred to another post before very long. He has for some time past been very sore as to the difficulties placed in his way by the military authorities at Casa Blanca, and has been demanding a change of post. He has now been offered the post of Larnaca, and has accepted, but the nomination will not be signed till October in any case.

FRANK RATTIGAN.

[29030] No. 289.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 3.)

(No. 189. Confidential.)

Tangier, July 28, 1909.

Sir,

THE strong line adopted by the French as reported in my despatch No. 186 of the 22nd instant, continues to have the most beneficial effects. As I informed you, the Sultan at once countermanded the obnoxious orders which he had given for the taxation of foreign protected persons, and is nothing but honey and sweetness to the French consul, whom he sees continually and consults on all points. It appears practically certain that he has made up his mind to accept the loan, although as I reported in my telegram No. 88 of yesterday's date, M. de Saint Aulaire has not heard of any definite instructions having been issued to el Mokri on the subject. Mr. Macleod also informs me that the Sultan's attitude has changed with regard to Sergeant Balding's arrears of pay; that Aissa Ben Omar has quite admitted the obligation of the Maghzen to discharge them, and that he hopes to see them settled very shortly.

Mr. Macleod reports that, as far as he can make out, the Sultan is preparing for a very great effort against the Pretender, and will await the result before coming to any irrevocable decision in his negotiations with either France or Spain. The troops have received further instalments of pay; Kaïd Ma el Haboub has been decorated with the new Order, and gorgeous uniforms, procured from Europe by Dr. Verdon, have been issued to various Kaïds. Negotiations have been opened with supporters of the Maghzen to the north of the Pretender's present position, who are to attack him in the rear while the main body of the Shereefian forces advance against him from the south. A third detachment will march straight into the south of the Hyaina district, which is then expected to declare for the Sultan. A fantastic story has got about that the real Moulai Mohammed, who, it appears, is after all alive, is to be given the supreme command of the troops to oppose the sham Moulai Mohammed (the Pretender). He himself, Mr. Macleod says, obstinately refuses, on the ground that he might suddenly find himself proclaimed Sultan by the enemy! and eventually once more be brought back in chains to Fez. The story has been published in the "Dépêche marocaine,"

but I can hardly believe that it is true, and Mr. Macleod admits that the evidence is very slight.

I also hear from Menebhi that the quarrel between the Sultan and el Glawi has been absolutely patched up, that they are now hand-in-glove, and that he has been told by el Glawi that messengers are being sent to him, charged with a most secret communication. This communication, Menebhi is informed, is to the effect that Guebbas and his son, the Basha of Tangier, are both to be dismissed from their posts, the source of his information being no other than Guebbas himself, who has begged Menebhi to intercede on his behalf if necessary. It seems doubtful whether the French would view with pleasure the dismissal of Guebbas, who is supposed to be in their hands.

This sudden reconciliation between the Sultan and his viziers is most unexpected; only a month ago el Glawi was talking almost openly of the Sultan's deposition, and the Sultan was writing of the viziers as "those sons of sin whom he was only waiting to humble to the dust," but one ought never to be surprised at anything in this country. Of one thing I feel certain, namely, that the Sultan is a man who never forgets or forgives; that the reconciliation, on his side, is merely the result of *force majeure*, and that whenever he is strong enough, he will not hesitate to crush el Glawi. Whether the latter is genuine, his vanity having yielded to the Sultan's blandishments, or whether he too is playing a game and biding his time, I cannot tell.

I have, &c.

REGINALD LISTER.

P.S.—In a private letter received to-day, Dr. Verdon tells me he has had a long confidential conversation with el Glawi, who appears quite at a loss to know what is to be done. One of two things, he said, must happen: either the French must support Hafid and help him to put the country in order, or they must come in themselves and take over the administration. We Mussulmen, he added, are incapable of doing anything for ourselves, and it makes little difference who is Sultan. Dr. Verdon said that to save the country the Sultan should take the loan, give guarantees and be prepared to accept some sort of control of the finances and the army. This he feared Moulai Hafid would never do. El Glawi replied that the Sultan would agree to this. That he, el Glawi would guarantee that he would make him.

El Glawi spoke bitterly against the Germans, who, he said, were false friends.

R. L.

[29236] No. 290.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 4.)

(No. 155.)

San Ildefonso, July 31, 1909.

Sir,

I ENDEAVOURED in my telegram No. 34 of to-day to give the substance of a long conversation which I held yesterday in Madrid with the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Speaking first of the Melilla campaign, Señor Allendesalazar said that, though the necessity for armed intervention in that quarter had been very regrettable, and though a deplorable loss of life had occurred, there was no ground for discouragement. The positions immediately taken up by General Marina when the Spanish navvies were murdered on the 9th instant had been held against the repeated fanatical assaults of the tribesmen without losing a foot of ground. Each successive day found the Spaniards stronger, and, though the numbers of the enemy did not diminish, the stock of warlike munitions so mysteriously accumulated by them was getting steadily exhausted. They had no means of renewing it except by contraband, which now was being made more and more difficult. Spain would have before long some 30,000 men in the field. It was not to be expected that the hostile tribes could hold out much longer against these accumulating forces. As soon as they gave up the hopeless conflict a resolute effort would be made to concert with them some arrangement which would enable Melilla to resume its peaceful intercourse with the interior and to work the neighbouring mines unmolested. Nothing could be further from the thoughts of the Spanish Government than any idea of a punitive march into the country behind.

Meanwhile no international complication had arisen. The incident of the 9th and the consequent dispatch of an armed expedition had been notified to the French Government. A correspondence had ensued, ending in the frank acceptance by

France of the declarations made by Spain to explain her failure to concert measures with the French Government before proceeding to extremities at Melilla. The suddenness of the Moorish outbreak had rendered any such previous discussion impossible. M. Pichon had perfectly understood the situation, and, while continuing to counsel prudence, had informed the Spanish Ambassador in Paris that he had no objection to raise to the police measures taken by Spain to restore order outside the gates of her own fortress. Señor Allendesalazar was quite satisfied with M. Pichon's language as reported by the Marquis del Muni.

His Excellency touched on the disproportionate loss of superior officers as compared with that of the rank and file. The list had been swollen by a general and two colonels, who fell on the 27th. The explanation he gave was that the Spanish army had been profoundly humiliated and discouraged by the events of the Cuban war of independence. It had not yet entirely recovered its former spirit. The officers ordered to the front were determined to set an example of courage and self-sacrifice. In doing so they had exposed themselves needlessly, and many had paid the penalty. It is perhaps safe to assume that there has been at least a lack of enthusiasm in the ranks for a cause which they do not fully understand and in which they are expected to stand up to a fanatical foe. I will not here further allude to the distressing rumours which have been afloat reflecting on the conduct of some of the Spanish troops in the field.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs was full of confidence and serenity in dilating on the situation at Melilla. Turning to the internal situation of Spain his tone betrayed intense pain and anxiety. There was no precedent, he said, in modern Spanish history for the senseless and unpatriotic agitation which had broken out over a considerable portion of the country. Its origin was undoubtedly anarchist, inspired by the international labour organizations of a revolutionary type. These promoters of disorder, wherever an opportunity offered, had resolved to take advantage of the drain of troops from Spain to show their power. A general strike was to be declared throughout Spain on a given day. Before, however, a date could be fixed the Barcelona Socialists and Anarchists initiated the movement on the 26th instant. The labour population of the city responded to the appeal, and in a few hours Barcelona was at the mercy of an armed mob, raising barricades, burning churches and convents, tearing up bridges, arresting the tramway service, preventing the exit and entry of trains, cutting telegraph and railway lines, and resisting with violence the forces of public order. I have already reported in my despatches Nos. 151 and 152 of the 28th instant the brief announcement of these occurrences which was communicated to the press by the Government. Señor Allendesalazar said that, when the full details became known, there would be an outburst of public indignation against the rioters and general approval of the severe measures of suppression which had immediately been set on foot. On the proclamation of martial law in Barcelona and the neighbouring provinces, General Santiago, captain-general of the military district, had taken the matter sternly in hand. Troops had been poured into Barcelona from Valencia and Pamplona; the streets cleared of the revolutionary mob; its stronghold, the district of Clot, surrounded; the main body of the insurgents cannonaded into complete surrender, and a state of comparative order restored. The historic castle of Montjuich was already crowded with prisoners, including many of the leaders of the revolt. It was intended to inflict upon them severe retribution.

In Madrid, beyond the hostile demonstrations at the departure of some of the regiments, there has as yet been no disturbance. A general strike is to be attempted there on the 2nd August, but his Excellency informed me that the leading agitators were already in prison and measures taken to nip the rising, if there is one, in the bud.

The anarchist strike movement has been powerfully seconded by the general unpopularity of the Melilla campaign. Many reservists had to be called in to bring up the marching brigades to war strength. Under the existing law well-to-do families can escape this war service by money payments. The hardship of the poorer classes being alone called upon to fill up the gaps in the line has caused great resentment, and a demand for the speedy passage of a remedial measure is already before the Cortes. Señor Allendesalazar states that the feeling aroused in this respect is out of all proportion to its cause, most of the men summoned back to the ranks having been merely let go on leave for reasons of economy before the expiration of their three years' colour service. There has been nevertheless in many places much interference with the departure and movements of troops on a mission which does not seem to appeal to the patriotic sentiment of the country.

In addition to the forces of anarchism and anti-militarism of the French type

there are arrayed against the Government many who consider legitimate any means of combating what are regarded as their authoritative and reactionary administrative methods. The republican and home rule aspirations of Catalonia may also have exercised an influence on the side of the insurgents.

The combination of these causes in whatever proportion had created quite unexpectedly the present grave and highly discouraging situation. Though the evil centres in Catalonia, there have been sporadic outbreaks in many parts of Spain, to an extent which has rendered it expedient, in the opinion of the Government, to suspend the constitutional guarantees throughout the entire country. The authorities are thus at liberty to arrest, imprison, and expel, on mere suspicion and without trial, any person they may consider an element of danger.

It is to be feared that the effect of the insurrectionary movement and of the measures of civil and military repression to which the Government have felt compelled to resort may be to arrest for a considerable time the progress in material prosperity which Spain has been making since the beginning of the century.

[29237] No. 291.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 4.)

(No. 156. Confidential.)

Sir, *San Ildefonso, August* 1, 1909.

IN my despatch No. 155 of yesterday I mentioned that the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs seemed quite satisfied with the present attitude of France in the matter of the Melilla campaign. From a letter, however, which I have received from M. Revoil, French Ambassador to Spain, it is evident that the course of events in that quarter is being followed with some anxiety by the French Government. I have the honour to enclose a copy of the letter. M. Revoil, as I have more than once reported, had been rendered very uneasy by the measures of preparation which the Spanish Government began to adopt some time ago in anticipation of possible complications in the Riff. He had repeatedly warned Señor Allendesalazar, and even King Alfonso, against undertaking anything in the nature of an armed expedition in that country. The anticipated trouble has now come about, and his Excellency is of opinion that the Spanish Government might have dealt with it without sending an army to Melilla. However this may be, Spain was led to strike back at the aggressor in much the same way as the French themselves did two years ago at Casa Blanca. Doubtless the situation thus created for herself and for Morocco is a very delicate and difficult one. M. Revoil is not free from apprehension lest events may in the end compel France to intervene, however unwillingly, in the struggle.

I have, &c.

MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

Inclosure in No. 291.

M. Revoil to Sir M. de Bunsen.

Ambassade de France, San Sebastian,

Mon cher ami, *le 29 juillet*, 1909.

QUEL chemin parcouru en deux ou trois semaines! Je ne vous ai pas écrit de Paris, parce que j'étais surchargé d'occupations et que je savais, d'autre part, que M. Martin vous tenait au courant.

Nous n'avons pas à nous reprocher de n'avoir pas prodigué les sages conseils au Gouvernement espagnol. Je n'ai cessé de prévenir le Ministre d'État, j'ai mis en garde le Roi lui-même, contre les dangers de l'intervention militaire. M. Pichon a tenu le même langage à M. Leon y Castillo. Hélas! on s'est presque caché de nous pour mener ces préparatifs et entreprendre cette campagne déplorable!

En dehors des renseignements verbaux et vagues que M. Leon y Castillo a fournis à M. Pichon avant l'incident du 9, nous n'avons eu que deux communications écrites du chargé d'affaires d'Espagne à Paris, la première relatant brièvement le combat du 9, et remise le 12; la seconde remise trois jours après, et demandant en

trois lignes que nous nous opposions au débarquement à Port Say (frontière du Cap de l'Eau, en territoire algérien) de 2,000 Marocains qui revenaient, disait-on, de travailler aux moissons dans notre colonie. Nous avons répondu en demandant des explications sur l'action qu'on entendait exercer dans le Riff et qui, par la préparation et l'extension qu'on lui avait données, nous paraissait rentrer dans l'ordre de celles qui étaient soumises, par l'article 2 de nos accords de 1904, au concert préalable avec la France. Cette note, envoyée le 16 juillet, n'avait pas encore eu de réponse à mon arrivée ici. Des entretiens que j'ai eus avec le Ministre d'État le 23 et le 26 il est résulté que le Gouvernement espagnol considérait les opérations militaires entreprises par lui dans le Riff comme des opérations de police dans la zone frontière, réservées à son initiative, tant en vertu de ses traités spéciaux (1894–5) qu'à raison des droits qui lui ont été reconnus par l'Acte d'Algésiras. Le Gouvernement espagnol considérait avoir rempli son devoir en nous prévenant (et comment !) aux termes de l'article 8 de nos accords de 1904.

J'ai montré à M. Allendesalazar que les événements prouvaient à quelle étendue, à quelles conséquences pouvaient aboutir les opérations de ce genre ; que l'esprit dominant de l'article 2 des accords de 1904 était surtout que toute la question du Maroc ne puisse pas être soulevée par l'action spontanée de l'Espagne dans une région où les difficultés étaient fréquentes ; que l'heure n'était plus, semblait-il, aux discussions juridiques, mais imposait une communication constante et une pleine intelligence entre les deux pays, qui avaient au Maroc des devoirs communs et des intérêts analogues.

La réponse à notre note du 16 conçue dans le sens que m'indiquait le Ministre d'État a été, ultérieurement à notre entretien, corrigée, ou plutôt complétée, par une allusion à ce désir de communication constante et de pleine intelligence du Gouvernement espagnol avec nous, et a dû être remise hier. Voilà l'état diplomatique exacte de la question.

Si délicate et si difficile que soit la situation où nous place l'Espagne, nous avons le ferme dessein de ne pas l'entraver ; de ne rien faire qui puisse paraître la subordonner ; de nous contenter de suivre avec une vigilante attention les événements en rappellant à l'Espagne dans les occasions propices autant ses propres intérêts que ses engagements.

Mais combien les événements se précipitent ! et permettront-ils longtemps encore de nous borner à cette réserve expectante ? D'après nos renseignements particuliers de Melilla, la situation y est très grave. Le nombre des assaillants ne diminue pas, malgré les pertes qu'on leur inflige, et les pertes des Espagnols en officiers généraux et officiers sont ce que vous savez, sans compter les pertes en hommes et les blessés, qu'on peut évaluer à l'heure actuelle à plus de 1,500 à 2,000 sans exagération. La position est critique ; la marche en avant à peu près impossible, les préparatifs presque nuls, le désordre dans l'intendance et dans l'organisation déplorable ; tout cela conforme d'ailleurs aux campagnes précédentes ! Où va-t-on ?

Nous avons donné des instructions en Algérie pour qu'on empêche dans la mesure possible le passage de masses armées de la rive droite sur la rive gauche de la Moulouya, mais n'allons-nous pas avoir nous-mêmes sur les bras de sérieuses difficultés ; les " sacrès " marocains—la mort de tant de chefs espagnols notamment—surexcitent les tribus. On sent déjà de notre côté une certaine effervescence, et les attaques recommencent dans le sud oranais.

Nous qui avons été témoins des origines de cette campagne, nous pouvons mesurer aujourd'hui combien il était possible de l'éviter et avec quelle légèreté elle a été entreprise. Ce sont là des impressions que nous garderons pour nous, mais elles germent spontanément dans l'opinion de ce pays si peu éclairée et si contenue qu'elle soit. Les troubles odieux et coupables qui surgissent à Barcelone et sur d'autres points, qu'on nous cache sans doute, apporte à la gravité de la situation, et demain reste plein d'inconnu.

Le Ministre d'État est parti avant-hier soir, et nous sommes ici devant le vide. On assure que le Roi (que je n'ai pas encore pu voir) ne reviendra pas ; que la famille royale va aller le rejoindre à La Granja ou à Madrid. Si vous savez quelque chose, si vous voyez quelqu'un, soyez assez bon pour m'informer.

J'ai tenu à vous exposer très complètement notre conduite et notre manière de voir. Si la situation se prolonge et empire je me rapprocherais de vous, et j'irai où le Gouvernement et le Roi seront.

La presse espagnole persiste à mettre la France en cause—et il n'est pas douteux que les sentiments à notre égard ne se modifient pas—en dépit de la correction et de la loyauté de notre attitude. Cela rend de notre part toute initiative, toute intervention presque impossible ; et je me demande, non sans anxiété, comment nous y pourrions procéder si les circonstances l'imposaient, ou plus simplement, s'il devenait évident qu'elle puisse être utile à l'Espagne et en même temps à l'intérêt général.

Votre, &c.
REVOIL.

[29623] No. 292.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 7.)

(No. 190. Confidential.)

Sir, *Tangier, July* 29, 1909.

I HAD a long conversation two days ago with the French chargé d'affaires on the subject of the Spanish military operations outside Melilla, and their possible consequences. M. de Sainte-Aulaire considers the situation excessively serious for the Spaniards, and is of opinion that all idea of their advancing far inland may now be dismissed. They will, he thinks, be some time before they score any success against the Riffians, and he expects that after the first victory they will be glad to come to terms. If they can get the country under control as far as the mines and establish some sort of fort to protect them, it will be about as much as they will do. The whole thing, he said, was an illustration of the hopeless incapacity of the Spanish Government. They had plunged the country into what was evidently going to prove a costly war, both in men and money, in support of an illegality, although they knew that military action was inevitable and had undoubtedly been preparing for it, their organisation was, according to his information, hopelessly defective, and now the war was proving so unpopular in Spain that they seemed likely to be threatened with a serious revolutionary movement. He went over the old ground of the illegal origin of the operations, and in contrasting them with those undertaken by France in the Shawia made two points : (1) That the French at Casa Blanca were defending the lives, property, and interests of all Europeans, whereas Spain was simply protecting the illegal mining ventures of Spanish financiers ; and (2) that the French occupation of the Shawia was remunerative for the Maghzen (" une œuvre rémunératrice "). The yield of the taxes which were now being collected under French administration would be far larger than ever before, and the customs receipts had increased enormously. In this connection I enclose an article which M. René Millet, former resident at Tunis, contributed to the " Figaro," and which has been reproduced by " Dépêche Marocaine " on the subject of the present situation of the Shawia. M. Millet is, of course, a member of the advanced colonial group, and naturally writes optimistically, but all the reports I receive from Casa Blanca tend to show that his description is not exaggerated. It quite bears out what Mr Hunter told me in the spring.

M. de Sainte-Aulaire spoke of the possibility of Spain's demanding a war indemnity from Morocco, and told me that he had received a visit that day from the German Minister, who, somewhat to his surprise, had expressed the opinion that such a demand should not be allowed by the Powers ; that it would cripple Morocco absolutely ; and that the interests of all nations would suffer accordingly. The operations had been undertaken by Spain in support of ventures by Spaniards which were an infraction of the Act of Algeciras, and Morocco and the other Powers should not be made to suffer for it. Dr. Rosen came to see me yesterday to say good-bye, as he had suddenly made up his mind to go on leave, and held very much the same language. He said he thought the future was very serious. Spain would no doubt hold whatever she eventually succeeded in getting, and then all would depend on the action of France.

I remarked that it might incline France to make the terms on which she evacuated the Shawia rather more onerous, and Dr. Rosen asked me whether I really believed that France ever had any intention of evacuating. I answered that I most certainly did ; that I had been in Paris during the whole of the Morocco imbroglio—Algeciras, Casa Blanca, &c. ; that I was on fairly intimate terms with many of the leading French politicians ; and that I was genuinely convinced that their main desire, prompted no doubt to some extent by considerations of internal policy, was to get out of the Shawia. He said he was delighted to hear me say so, but that he personally remained sceptical.

I cannot help thinking that Dr. Rosen may be leaving for good. He was so very *empressé* in his farewell, and expressed so much regret at not having seen much of

me lately owing to my illness. What appeared even more significant was that he asked me whether I wanted to buy any horses. I imagined that they were extra horses for which he had little use; but, on the contrary, he wishes to find a good home for his own horse and for his wife's hack, on both of which I know that he set great store. He is no doubt a very careful man about money, but I can hardly believe that to save their keep for two months he would sell two very favourite and well-trained horses, especially as they are by no means easy to replace at Tangier.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

July 30, 1909.

P.S.—M. de Sainte-Aulaire tells me that the Russian Minister derived the same impression as I did with regard to the German Minister, though he had nothing so significant to go on as his desire to sell his horses. Dr. Rosen has made several protracted absences before from Tangier, but has never sold any of his horses. It is curious that this sudden departure, three weeks earlier than he had announced, should coincide with the change of Chancellors at Berlin. Dr. Rosen appeared in the very highest spirits. He has of course wished for some time to leave Tangier, and his wish has grown much stronger since the Franco-German agreement.

R. L.

[29625] No. 293.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 7.)

(No. 192.)

Sir, *Tangier, July* 31, 1909.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 99 of the 22nd instant, and have once more discussed with M. de Sainte-Aulaire the possibility of doing anything to ensure the safety of Abdel Aziz, in view of the reports which reached Menebhi of the intention of the Sultan to have him murdered. We both agree that there is nothing more to be done. Menebhi at the time told him to be on his guard, and to give strict orders that no one, who was not known, should be allowed to approach the house. What, in our opinion, gave colour to this report was the fact that at the beginning of April, a few days before my departure for Fez, the Sultan made a determined attempt to remove all his brother's faithful negro slaves, some fifteen in number, on the ground that they belonged to the Maghzen, and were required for the Sultan's black guard. I spoke strongly on the subject at the time to M. Regnault who was here for a few days before leaving for Paris, and said that I hoped he would be able to prevent this, as it seemed an unnecessary cruel measure.

M. de Sainte-Aulaire tells me that he took the matter up, and was able to arrange that only half the slaves should be sent up to Fez. Had they all been removed, Abdel Aziz would have been at the mercy of any assassins sent down by the Sultan. M. de Sainte-Aulaire tells me that at the time he was very much struck by the keenness of the Sultan to get the negroes removed, which was quite out of proportion to their value to him as guards.

I have, &c.
R. LISTER.

[29626] No. 294.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 7.)

(No. 193.)

Sir, *Tangier, August* 1, 1909.

HIS Majesty's consul at Fez informs me, in a private letter, that the Sultan told Doctor Vassel on the 26th ultimo, that he had just received a most satisfactory letter direct from Hadj Omar Tazzy, and that the affairs of that notorious family were practically settled; this no doubt means a large sum of money for His Shereefian Majesty.

Doctor Vassel still affirms positively that Mannesmann will not furnish the

Sultan with money, and I believe that the negotiations have not come to anything, the reason being that the Sultan demands a much larger sum than Mannesmann was able to procure.

I have, &c.
R. LISTER.

P.S.—Dr. Verdon tells me that Si Hamed Mokri, the brother of the Minister of Finance, volunteered a statement to him to the effect that Mannesmann had given the Sultan a sum of from 6,000*l.* to 8,000*l.* in return for mining concessions in certain districts, but no doubt Dr. Vassel would not dignify so small a sum with the name of a loan.

R. L.

[29627] No. 295.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 7.)

(No. 194.)

Sir, *Tangier, August* 1, 1909.

I FEAR that the situation in the Anjera, which formed the subject of my despatches Nos. 162 and 178 of the 4th and 18th ultimo, is far from satisfactory, and that the agitation against Raisuli is spreading to some of the other tribes under his jurisdiction. It appears that the Rojni has addressed letters to them all, telling them that Moulai Abd-el-Aziz was inclined to sell Morocco to the Christians; that Moulai Hafid had proved to be ten times worse in this respect; that Menebhi and Raisuli were his accomplices; and inviting them to throw off the yoke of the latter. He added that he had written similar letters to the Riffians urging them to rise against the Spaniards, that they knew the results, and that the Christians had been driven into the sea! Fired by these letters, six of the tribes appear to have risen against Raisuli, and to have beaten and killed his men. Raisuli has written to Menebhi to inform him of the state of affairs, and has asked him to go to Guebbas and insist upon his sending him at once the troops and ammunition which he had asked for, and which had been granted by the Sultan. Otherwise, he said, it was impossible for him to enforce his authority; he washed his hands of the whole situation, and he should retire to Arzila, leaving the country to anarchy; the road to Fez would be cut, and it was impossible to foresee what the results might be. He further asked Menebhi to inform me of the situation, and expressed the hope that I would bring it to the notice of the French chargé d'affaires.

Menebhi came to see me early yesterday morning, and went straight on to Sid Guebbas. I saw M. de Sainte-Aulaire in the course of the morning, who said that he would mention the matter to Guebbas, and get his version of the story. Subsequently, Menebhi let me know that his interview with Guebbas had been quite satisfactory, and that the latter was sending some 400 troops with rifles and ammunition, and all that Raisuli had asked for. He is a timorous old gentleman, and Menebhi told me he had worked upon his fears, telling him that he would certainly be the first to be massacred were the Anjera and other tribes to get out of hand! Menebhi and Raisuli continue to maintain that the agitation against the latter was got up entirely by Guebbas, who wished to get the governship of the Anjera for his son.

M. de Sainte-Aulaire saw Si Omar yesterday afternoon, who is at the same time Guebbas's son-in-law, brother-in-law, and private secretary, and mentioned the matter to him. Si Omar said that he believed the situation was not quite satisfactory, and at once changed the subject. He evidently did not wish to discuss it.

Si Kassim (Menebhi's scribe) was here this morning. He had seen Raisuli last night, and found him much elated at the prompt acquiescence in his demands. Si Kassim told Mr. Irwin that Raisuli was undoubtedly a hard ruler, but that the Maghzen were constantly calling upon him for money and animals, and that the only way he could procure them was by squeezing the tribes.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

[29628] No. 296.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 7.)

(No. 195.)

Tangier, August 1, 1909.

Sir,

THE British consular agent at Alcazar informs me that the governor, Boushta-el-Bagdadi, has received instructions from the Sultan to proceed at once to Fez, where he is to take over the command of the mehalla which is to be sent to the Riff country for the purpose of pacifying the tribes. His khalifa is to act for him during his absence, but Mr. Carleton says that he would not be surprised if a new governor were appointed very shortly, and he knows of several Moors having offered the Sultan large sums of money for the post!

Mr. Carleton has observed a good deal of excitement among the hill tribes. They are constantly coming down to Alcazar in search of cartridges, and he attributes this effervescence to the reports which are being circulated throughout the country to the effect that the Spaniards have been hopelessly defeated and that Germany and England are supporting the Riffians.

I have, &c.

R. LISTER.

[30508] No. 297.

Moroccan Government South-Atlas Agency to Foreign Office.—(Received August 14.)

(Confidential.)

11 B, *Featherstone Buildings, Holborn, London,*

August 11, 1909.

Dear Sir,

I THANK you for your letter of yesterday and will call on you at about 3·30 to-morrow (Thursday). In the meantime, I send you a very confidential memorandum I hastily prepared last night. If you could spare time to peruse it in the interim it would enable you to understand the position. After my return in May last year, finding London business people then "impossible" as regards Morocco, I submitted a rough idea of my proposals (then) to a very influential quarter in Berlin, and was promised all financial or other help required on condition—

(*a.*) That Mulai Hafid was recognised by Europe (he had not been then).
(*b.*) That I got the agreement definitely promised.

In fact, as Mannesmann and Co. have done over their mining concession, they offered under these condition to put up a large sum before agreement was signed. I have not communicated direct with Berlin since, but the offer still holds good, and I have been approached in Morocco with offers of unlimited support by another powerful German group, who had apparently heard some rumours of what we were after, though the whole thing has fortunately been kept most secret. I don't want to have this a German affair, firstly, because I naturally prefer to be under English control; and secondly, because, before signature is actually attached, I have no guarantee, my German friends, if I disclose my present hand to them and let them do it, won't go to the German Government, who might offer the Sultan a larger sum in cash before signing (the way Mannesmann got his concession) and secure absolute control. In any case they would have to work with me because of my private arrangements with the kaids and chiefs and special local knowledge and influence, so I should do it as a last resource, but I should certainly prefer not to have to do it.

Yours truly,

W. R. STEWART.

Inclosure in No. 297.

Memorandum by Mr. Stewart respecting the Sultan of Morocco's South-Atlas Agency.

(Private and Confidential.)

Description.—South of the Atlas Mountains of Morocco extends a further 400* or 500* miles of Moroccan coast, recognised as such by international treaty, but

* According to which treaty is held good.

containing no ports of entry, though including the best natural harbour, Agadir, on the Moroccan seaboard. Taking the average inland depth at 300 miles, the total area may be put at either 120,000 or 150,000 square miles. The northern half of this forms the wealthy Sus province of Morocco and is a fertile well-watered agricultural land of hills and valleys inhabited by a Berber peasantry. The southern half consists of open rolling tablelands inhabited by Arab pastoralists, and this latter for twenty years, between 1874–1895, formerly possessed an English factory (at Cape Juby) which, however, only operated on a small scale in the extreme south.

Commerce.—The trade of Sus at present goes to and from Mogador and Marrakeeshand is represented by a figure of 750,000*l.* to 1,000,000*l.* per annum. Local overland transport and tolls between Sus and Mogador (its present "outlet" north of the Atlas) are about 300 per cent. on local values; to and from the southern half these charges are almost prohibitive to overland trade at all. Local outlets would undoubtedly treble existing trade, apart from any special developments, such as irrigation, planting, pastoral and farming industries, &c., that might be established. Products are: cattle, wool, hides, skins, almonds, eggs, argan oil, olive oil, barley, wheat, &c. Imports: the same as in the north (full details are available). Barley in particular can be grown in enormous quantities, but at present the overland expenses prevent any export of same. This applies to a good many other articles.

Proposition.—As a result of several years' careful study of this idea to reopen these South Atlas territories direct to European trade by sea, and generally to develop them, the writer, after two previous visits to Morocco, proceeded to Tangier in May 1908 and laid it, in conjunction with his friend and associate in this matter, Mr. J. Kirby Green, of Tangier, before Mulai Hafid, then proclaimed Sultan, but unrecognised by Europe. The latter assented in principle and requested the writer to reopen it with him in detail when he should be recognised by Europe.

Messrs. Stewart and Green in the interim had a form of agreement drawn up by a high legal authority on Moroccan laws and treaties, had it submitted to their friends, the great southern kaids, and then, after Mulai Hafid's recognition, to Mulai Hafid himself who appointed a committee of four viziers to revise it in detail; the final draft was passed in April 1909 and embodied in Arabic, and Mr. J. K. Green, who had been at Fez since December 1908, returned from Fez at the end of May to Tangier to meet Mr. Stewart who returned with him to Fez by special invitation of the Moroccan Sultan and the southern kaids.

Remarks.—The first and original form of the negotiation entered into by Messrs. Stewart and Green with Mulai Hafid was to obtain from the Sultan a concession which should give them the sole right to establish "ports of entry" on his South Atlas territories. As already stated the idea in all its details had been carefully worked out and studied in Europe and Morocco by Mr. Stewart for some seven years; and he had, prior to opening these negotiations, already been in personal touch with the local chiefs who had promised their full co-operation. The advent to power of Mulai Hafid in the spring of 1908, placed on the throne by the great southern kaids of South Morocco and South Atlas, rendered the moment opportune to open official and definite negotiations with the Government and Sultan, and in alliance and co-operation with their friends the southern kaids, who absolutely control the administration of Southern Morocco and the said territories locally, who placed Mulai Hafid on the throne and who now hold the balance of power in Morocco proper, *i.e.*, Si Medani Glawi, principal kaid and shereefian authority in South Atlas and commander-in-chief of the Moroccan army; Si Aissa Ben Omar, kaid of the Abda province and Minister of Foreign Affairs.

It is not necessary to explain the value of the immense prize which, as will be seen below, is practically secured. Its value is well understood in Morocco and in Europe—at any rate, in Germany and France—and has been the subject of European political competition and private "filibustering" for the past hundred years.

Agreement.—Messrs. Stewart and Green finally brought these negotiations to a successful stage in Fez at the end of July 1909 on the following basis :—

Terms of Verbal Arrangement between Mulai Hafid, Sultan of Morocco, Kaids Si Aissia ben Omar, and Si Medani el Glawi, and Messrs. W. R. Stewart and J. Kirby Green, at Fez, in July 1909.*

1. That Messrs. Stewart and Green shall meet the Sultan and the said Kaids at Rabat or elsewhere between the 15th and 30th September, and that the agreement

* All these clauses are clauses of the actual Arabic Agreement passed for signature.

(in form finally and jointly passed at Fez in July 1909) shall be there signed and sealed by the Sultan.

2. That it shall be in the form of appointment of the said W. R. Stewart as the Sultan's agent south of the Atlas (Sus), *i.e.*, as an official of Moroccan Government.

3. That he shall have exclusive powers, on the Sultan's behalf, to establish Government "warehouses with landing places attached" along said coast for buying and selling goods on behalf of Sultan's Sus subjects.

4. That he shall be authorised and commanded on the Sultan's behalf to establish a Government coastguard service along the coasts and at the stations.

5. That he shall have exclusive authority, on Sultan's behalf (as against other Europeans), to carry out any measures for the development of the country authorised by the local chiefs.

6. That he shall have exclusive right on Sultan's behalf to charter ships and re-ship land goods.

7. That he shall have exclusive right to make on behalf of Sultan all necessary and binding and exclusive mineral contracts to enable him to carry out the Sultan's commands with such "financial agents" as he may appoint (provided such be in accordance with Algeciras Treaty).

8. That said "financial agents" shall have right to "all profits that may be, after paying 10 per cent. on value of imports and exports to Sultan" (in other words, ordinary customs dues).

9. That the said W. R. Stewart shall have power to appoint a substitute or delegate to act for (or succeed him) in Sus if requisite.

10. That, before entering into possession of agreement, the said W. R. Stewart or his financial agents shall pay the Sultan 20,000*l.* cash as an advance against said dues and to the kaids 10,000*l.* cash, as a present and discharge of future claims from them.

General Notes.

As no written document could be obtained as security for above verbal agreement, the following compromise was arrived at with regard to clause 10:—

(*a.*) The said W. R. Stewart shall produce evidence to the Sultan and kaids that the said sums have been deposited, in financial agents names, in a bank, and that they would be so deposited available if required. In other words show some guarantee of "business" (as in case of tendering for a foreign contract, &c.).

(*b.*) The signed agreement will then be deposited in the bank so indicated with instructions to release to the said W. R. Stewart or financial agents on cash being paid over.

(*c.*) The said W. R. Stewart or financial agents to be allowed a reasonable time, after agreement is signed and deposited, to submit a certified copy of same to his or their respective Foreign Offices and receive approval of its validity (*i.e.*, that it is internationally legal and binding on Moroccan Government in same way as has been done by Mannesmann and Co., with their mining concession).

(*d.*) If money is not paid over, agreement would be withdrawn and cancelled without liability. If paid over, bank manager hands over agreement which will then be officially notified to the embassies at Tangier by Sultan.

The southern kaids, those mentioned and certain others, being guarantors of this arrangement, it will not be possible for the Sultan, even if he wished to, to alter the arrangements entered into.

Note.—There would be no international opposition to this as the present Sus-European trade would be easily trebled by this, apart from developments in other directions for employment of capital. The agreement has been put in the form it has, to be in accordance with terms of Algeciras Treaty. Once it is signed the "financing" would have to be "international," that is, Anglo-Franco-German, but if the agreement is at the start in English hands, it would necessarily mean English control and largest proportion of shares, influence, trade, direction, policy, and profit. The "Sultan's agent" would delegate, if desired, the administration in Sus to anyone (suitable) nominated by controlling company or British Government, acting as adviser in Europe and visiting Sus as and when required. Mr. J. Kirby Green is available to act as political agent and manager at Tangier (Fez, &c.), or, if desired, to go to Sus.

W. R. STEWART.

London, August 10, 1909.

P.S.—The whole organisation of enterprise (with fullest local information) is complete and ready for putting into immediate operation. All local arrangements are made and waiting, and entire local power of kaids, chiefs, and shereefs is supporting arrangement.

W. R. S.

[30696] No. 298.

Consul MacLeod to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 16.)

(No. 28.)

Fez, August 5, 1909.

Sir,

THE details of events here during the past few weeks would be tedious to relate minutely.

The Pretender made no intelligible effort to follow up his successes in the end of June to the east and north-east of Fez.

To the west the situation improved steadily for the Sultan. The Mulai Kebir movement almost died away, and although Mulai Kebir himself is reported to have tried to strengthen his relations with the Zemmur and Zair tribes by marrying daughters of leading men in those provinces, there have been no signs so far that these weddings have been more than acts of pious ambition on the tribesmen's part to ally their daughters to a Shereef of such high position and descent as Mulai Kebir.

The Beni Mtir continued to pay up, in part at least, the contributions demanded by the Sultan. On his side, the Sultan, with unexpected reasonableness, has contented himself with what could be easily got, and in particular has expressed satisfaction with their yielding, in principle merely, towards his pet project of getting soldiers from these Berbers by the giving of some 100 men as a levy of infantry.

Since the middle of July the troops have been therefore continuously withdrawn from Beni Mtir, and it is expected that only some 600 men to garrison Kasbah Hajeb will be left.

At the end of June the Sultan, evidently seriously alarmed by the reports in the press of dissensions between him and his viziers, began, and has since continued, to modify his attitude towards them very markedly. On the 1st July he entertained them to a sort of banquet, and since then he has received them all in official audiences with decent frequency, and his recent actions show evident proofs that the viziers have begun to be able to exercise a certain amount of salutary influence on him.

After decorating Na-el-Habib, a chief kaïd in the Beni Mtir expedition, with the 1st Class of the "Jellala Hafidiah," and presenting some seven other kaïds of soldiers with showy gold-laced uniforms, His Majesty ordered the returned troops to celebrate, with Powder Play, feastings, &c., the second anniversary of his proclamation as Sultan. This done, these kaïds and their men were formed into an expedition to be sent against the Piayna and the Pretender.

A pretext was then found to let a number of Court people see Mulai Mohammed alive and well, so that the troops and the public could no longer say either that he was dead, or that Buhamara might possibly really be Mulai Mohammed after all.

On the 24th July the Pretender's lieutenant, Jellali, had actually succeeded in "rushing" the Shereefian forces camp (still very small), when a body of reinforcements under Kaïd Bu Owdah arriving opportunely, Jellali's men were driven across Sboo River again, and lost a standard-bearer with his flag and two other horsemen.

On the 30th July the Sultan's forces were divided into three parties, crossed the Sboo into Hiayna, burned a number of villages, and raided Jellali's camp. They captured some twelve large tents, and took five heads (which were exhibited on a Fez gate as trophies) and some three prisoners. From all accounts it seems, however, to have been a somewhat dubious victory, as Jellali himself escaped with practically all his following, and the Makhzen's losses were, to Moorish ideas, severe, perhaps twenty killed, including three colonels, and forty wounded. Some French non-coms., with artillery, were with the expedition, but their services were not used. The troops then returned to their camp. The only result, so far, is the impression produced in Hiayna by the burning of their villages, which may perhaps make them incline to return to the Sultan's rule.

The troops are now in course of preparations to repeat these operations.

The Sultan and the official classes quite appreciate the gravity of recent events at Melilla, but amongst the public in general the Spanish doings excite little interest hereabouts.

The Riff tribes live very aloof, and have very little connection, either commercial or social, with Fez district.

The Sultan's acute financial straits have been unexpectedly somewhat relieved by the receipt of some 80,000 dollars, probably the net product of French collections this season in Shawia.

In a variety of ways the Sultan is showing the last few weeks a somewhat more reasonable disposition. Besides his modified attitude towards the viziers he has, for instance, withdrawn the orders for collection of extraordinary dues from foreign protégés, and now professes himself willing both to come to terms with France for a loan and to effect some sensible, mutually conciliatory arrangement with the Spaniards.

At present the Riff hostilities against the Spaniards have naturally weakened the Pretender's position, as those tribes (rightly enough) blame him for having brought the Spaniards into Guelaya, and, besides, they attract thither large numbers of tribesmen who would ordinarily have been available for him against the Sultan.

The movement, therefore, is particularly opportune for the Sultan to strike a decisive blow at Buhamara, and the Makhzen are making (for them) prodigious efforts in that direction just now.

The general opinion of the most discerning people here is, however, that his forces are not nearly good enough for such a task, and the result anticipated is that, at the most, the Pretender will only be confined for a time to the large mountainous regions of Dsul, Branes, and Ghiata, tribes who never obey, and are more than a match for the Makhzen, and whose notions of their rights will make them, if not obey, at least protect Buhamara.

Buhamara has been really the most weakening of all the ulcer-like complications in Morocco these seven years, and it is difficult to see how any solidly-based improvement in the interior can be effected until he is permanently disposed of. He can acquire nothing much for himself beyond what he already holds, but the alarms and excursions he can carry on are such as to necessitate the Sultan's either remaining at Fez or maintaining there a much larger force than otherwise would be required, and meanwhile thus prevent the Sultan attending to other and far more profitable regions of the country.

I have, &c.
J. M. MACLEOD.

P.S.—I beg to enclose a sketch map in illustration of the operations against Hiayna.*

J. M M.

[30695] No. 299.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 16.)

(No. 199.)

Sir, *Tangier, August* 7, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a summary of events in Morocco for the past week.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

Inclosure in No. 299.

Summary of Events in Morocco during the past week.

SOME small successes have been obtained by the Sultan's mehalla operating against the Roghi. On the 31st ultimo, a fierce attack was made by the latter's khalifa on the Government troops, and things were going badly for the mehalla when some of their cavalry succeeded in turning the flank of the rebel force and getting into the Pretender's camp. The rebels at once fled in some disorder, and it would have been possible to capture a large number of the fugitives, had the Sultan's troops devoted themselves with a little less zeal to pillaging the camp. However, a few heads

* Not reproduced.

have been brought into Fez—the criterion of victory in Morocco—and the success, such as it is, will doubtless have done something to increase the Sultan's prestige with the tribes.

A somewhat extraordinary incident has taken place at Tetuan, where the Spanish consul has again distinguished himself by interfering between the Maghzen and their offending subjects. It appears that a party of the Roghi's adherents arrived by steamer from Melilla on the 31st ultimo. On their being discovered, three were at once arrested, but the two principal personages succeeded in making their escape to the Spanish consulate. The governor of Tetuan immediately demanded that the refugees should be handed over to him, but met with a curt refusal from the consul. In order to prevent a repetition of the former incident when the captors of Mr. Clarke Kennedy had been aided to escape by the Spanish consul, the governor placed guards round the consulate. On the morning of the 4th instant these guards appear to have been fired on by the consul or his chancellier. The incident has created a considerable amount of excitement in the town, and the general feeling in native circles, as also amongst the consular body, is that the conduct of the Spanish consul is absolutely unjustifiable. I discussed the matter yesterday with the Spanish chargé d'affaires, who explained the affair from the point of view of his consul. According to this account of the affair, the consul knew nothing as to whether the refugees were partisans of the Roghi or not. When, however, they took refuge at the consulate, he could not, "as a humanitarian," hand them over to the Moorish authorities, as he knew that the usual severe punishment awaited them. He had therefore asked the governor for a guarantee that if the refugees were turned out of the consulate they should be allowed to depart in peace, but this guarantee had been refused by the governor. I gathered that the matter was now being amicably discussed between M. Padilla and Cid Guebbas.

It now appears that the refugees in question are the Grand Vizier and brother of the Pretender, and it is therefore easy to understand the anxiety shown by the governor of Tetuan to prevent their escape.

I may add that M. Padilla admitted that a shot had been fired at the guards placed round the consulate, but stated that the guards had been mistaken for burglars.

F. R.

P.S. *8th August.*—A prominent official in Tangier has just received news from Fez to the effect that the Sultan's mehalla has met with a further defeat at the hands of the Roghi's khalifa, and has been driven back to the banks of the Sebu River. It seems that the Commander of the mehalla had been warned of the Roghi's intention to deliver a night attack, but paid no attention to this warning, with the result that the camp was surprised on the night of the 3rd instant, and the Government troops driven back with considerable loss. Some eighty men are reported to have been killed, including several khalifas of the important southern kaids. This defeat will no doubt be a serious set-back to the Sultan, and all the good gained in the way of prestige by the former success will be more than counterbalanced by this fresh disaster.

F. R.

[30840] No. 300.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 16.)

(No. 164.)
(Extract.) *San Ildefonso, August* 11, 1909.

I HAD a further conversation, on the 9th instant, with the Spanish Foreign Minister in Madrid. I found his Excellency in the same mood as at our last interview, reported in my despatch No. 155 of the 31st July, namely, one of confidence as regards Melilla, and great uneasiness over the situation created by the Barcelona rising. In Melilla he said things were going on well. General Marina had received full reinforcements. The Moorish attacks had slackened. An advance would very shortly be made, with the result, there was good reason to hope, that the Riffians would see the hopelessness of prolonging the struggle. Spain was engaged in no war of conquest. She wished to live in peace with her neighbours. But she must insist on receiving proper guarantees that her people should not be wantonly attacked in the immediate neighbourhood of the fortress, and that work on the mines should be

allowed to proceed without further molestation from the tribes. It was in the interests of the Riffians themselves to give such guarantees. They would profit largely by a renewal of intercourse between Melilla and the interior. It was also in the Sultan's interest to favour a settlement of the quarrel. The Sultan was quite aware of this, and had dispatched emissaries to persuade the Riff chiefs to abandon their hostile attitude. It was true that the Sultan had never exercised an effective authority in those regions. But words of counsel from Fez might nevertheless prove of some use.

Meanwhile, negotiations were still proceeding at Madrid with the Moorish Ambassador. There had been three formal meetings at the Ministry of State, presided over by Señor Allendesalazar himself. The real work was done in the less ceremonious interviews between the subordinates. The Moorish Mission still pressed for the evacuation of the Restinga and Cabo de Aguas. This was a demand which could not be for a moment entertained in present circumstances. But the presence of the mission in Madrid might not be without some utility in connection with the new arrangements which must necessarily be made in the Riff country. Señor Allendesalazar seemed hopeful of concluding in the end a fair settlement of outstanding questions with Morocco.

[31111] No. 301.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 18.)

(No. 172. Confidential.)

Sir, *San Ildefonso, August* 15, 1909.

I HAVE had several conversations lately with the German Ambassador, who was suddenly ordered back to Madrid from leave in Germany about three weeks ago by special direction of the German Emperor. His Majesty, Count Tattenbach tells me, was getting anxious about the situation in Spain, and desired to have his Ambassador's personal impressions of what was going on. His Excellency will continue for some time to be the only head of a mission actually at Madrid. I am myself within easy reach of La Granja, the rest of my colleagues being either at San Sebastian or on leave. King Alfonso and the Spanish Ministers are detained at Madrid for the present.

Count Tattenbach takes a very serious view of affairs in Spain, and is doubtless reporting in that sense to his Government. The Barcelona rising disclosed a dangerous state of feeling, amounting, in his Excellency's opinion, to profound dissatisfaction with the working of existing institutions. This feeling he believes is not confined to Catalonia, though more apt to break out there than in other parts of Spain. The troubles had been suppressed by force, but a slight relaxation of vigilance on the part of the military authorities, and still more the receipt of bad news from Melilla, might easily make the embers flare up again. His Excellency is not satisfied that things are going on well at Melilla. So far there have been serious Spanish losses, owing to mismanagement by those in command and disobedience on the part of officers too zealous for individual renown. He sees no reason to suppose that the Riffians will relax their efforts to humiliate the Spaniards at Melilla. The former achieved a success, he considers, in the battle of the 27th July, which would naturally encourage them to fight out the quarrel. The Spaniards are believed to be meditating a general advance against the enemy one of these days. Count Tattenbach does not believe that they are capable of carrying out such an operation successfully. Though well supplied with artillery, the absence of roads, the heat, the lack of water, the discouragement of the troops and their insufficient modern training are all elements, he thinks, of very possible failure. But such a failure, if attended by severe punishment, would produce an incalculable effect in the home country. The Government would be hounded out of power, and the Ambassador fears the popular discontent might even reach the throne. There is no leading mind among the opposition groups to deal firmly with such a crisis.

It may be hoped that this sombre estimate of the situation is exaggerated. Count Tattenbach speaks, of course, with authority on matters concerning Morocco, and with the little that is known of what goes on at Melilla I can neither confirm nor dispute his forecast of the result of the campaign, which is distinctly unfavourable to the Spanish cause. I can only say that it is at variance with the confident tone which the Foreign Minister has displayed in recent conversations with myself on the progress of the campaign.

As regards the effect of anything like a disaster to the Spanish army on home politics, it must be admitted that a strong hand would be needed to steer the ship through the troubled waters.

I have, &c.
MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[31496] No. 302.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 21.)

(No. 200.)

Sir, *Tangier, August* 12, 1909.

I COMMUNICATED to Mr. Bewicke the answer of the Spanish Government to the representations made by Sir M. de Bunsen regarding the action of the Spanish consul at Tetuan, in facilitating the escape of Mr. Clark Kennedy's captors, and asked him for any observations he might have to offer. He was away on leave, and Mr. Miller, who was in charge, returned the despatch with no comment, but subsequently wrote me his views on the matter, which I now enclose.

I sent all the papers on to Mr. Bewicke, who was in England, and suggested that he might communicate with the Foreign Office in order to save time. He now informs me that he cannot in any way modify his original report of the affair. He fully maintains the exactness of the account given by him.

In the circumstances I agree with the view expressed by Sir M. de Bunsen in his despatch No. 124 of the 22nd June, that the explanation of the incident furnished by the Spanish Government cannot be regarded as adequate.

As reported in my despatch No. 199, the Spanish consul has again distinguished himself by his action in a somewhat similar incident.

I have, &c.
R. LISTER.

Inclosure in No. 302.

Acting Vice-Consul Miller to Mr. Lister.

Sir, *Tetuan, July* 10, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to transmit the following observations, as a supplement to my despatch No. 10 of the 3rd July, on the reply of the Spanish Government to the representations made to them by His Majesty's Ambassador in regard to the action of the Spanish consul at Tetuan.

It is evident, to my mind, that there are very few inexactitudes in the account of the facts as related by the governor of Tetuan in regard to the Kuff tribesmen who were arrested by governor's orders, and afterwards set free by the Spanish consul.

I have never heard of any case of abuse of power committed by the present Basha of Tetuan—on the other hand, in all cases which I have known he has always, in my opinion, acted justly in the matter, and I believe that has been Mr. Bewicke's experience and other consuls' as well.

The Kuff tribesmen were not harmless peasants who had only come into town on business or pleasure; if that were so, they had no need to seek refuge at the Spanish consulate for fear of arrest.

In an interview I had with the governor on the 18th instant, he told me—when the consul's clerk informed him the Kuff party had taken refuge at the Spanish consulate—he did promise that the refugees should not be arrested unless there was a legitimate complaint lodged against them by either native or European.

The governor still maintains with ardour that the Spanish consul, through his clerk, informed him that Roohan Haddu had Spanish protection, and then after the prisoners were set free he declared that they had no protection.

The governor also informed the Spanish consul that the British consul desired the arrest of Roohan Haddu for the part he took in the capture of Mr. Clark Kennedy.

The governor also told me he handed over the prisoners to the Spanish consul on condition that he would keep them under arrest until he received instructions from Cid Guebbas at Tangier.

What the governor related to me substantially agrees with the report recorded in Mr. Bewicke's despatch transmitted to you.

If the Spanish consul did not know Mr. Bewicke wanted the Kuff tribesmen arrested for the capture of Mr. Clark Kennedy, is it not very significant that no other reason is given in the report furnished by the Spanish consul, why the governor arrested the tribesmen after they left the shelter of the consulate? Surely the governor gave the Spanish consul some reason for acting as he did.

Mr. Bewicke's despatch No. 10, bearing date of the 15th March, a part of which shows plainly enough that Señor Lopez Ferrer knew some time before this particular event took place that the British vice-consul had an interest in the capture of Roohan Haddu.

I feel certain also that Mr. Bewicke did not go to Señor Lopez Ferrer in the afternoon of the day of the departure of the tribesmen from the Spanish consulate and express a wish that the tribesmen should be surrendered to him, as a matter of fact Mr. Bewicke says himself in his despatch No. 10, written on the 15th March, after he knew of the tribesmen's departure to their homes, "I have thought it better not to approach the Spanish consul, we see very little of each other, &c."

The Spanish consul's report, in my opinion, has failed to prove that he acted justly so far as he knew in this case, although I do not know of any motive that inspired him to act unjustly.

Personally, I have always found the Spanish consul very nice to speak to, and he is generally respected, and I believe rightly so, by all classes of the community; even the governor remarked to me on the 8th instant, "The Spanish consul is a good man," and he blamed the consul's clerk as the instigator in setting the prisoners free.

WM. MILLER.

[31498] No. 303.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 21.)

(No. 202.)

Sir, *Tangier, August* 15, 1909.

THE incident which occurred recently at Tetuan (see my despatch No. 199) has, I fear, not helped to improve relations between Spain and Morocco.

Briefly it was as follows: during the course of last week the Pretender's brother, his vizier, and some of their womenfolk reached Tetuan by sea from Melilla, and the governor of the town, having received information of their arrival, caused a search to be made for them, with a view to their capture.

It was found that they had taken refuge in the Spanish consulate, and the Spanish consul refused to give them up when requested by the governor to do so. The governor, fearing that they would be allowed or assisted to escape from the consulate, had guards posted in the neighbourhood to prevent any such possibility, and it would appear that during one night shots were fired on them from the consulate, fortunately doing no harm to anyone.

Three days ago news was received here that the Spanish consul had taken the Pretender's vizier in a carriage to the port at Martin, where he had been embarked in a Spanish Government launch carrying the Spanish flag and put on board a Spanish cruiser, whose destination was not ascertained. Nothing is known as to the whereabouts of the Pretender's brother.

Cid Guebbas told Mr. Irwin that the Spanish consul at Tetuan claimed that the refugees enjoyed the protection of the King of Spain, and that when the Spanish legation was approached on the matter they replied that it could be dealt with more satisfactorily at Madrid by the Moorish embassy which is now there, and that possibly means might be found by which the refugees could be handed over to the Moorish Government under proper guarantees for their safety. Cid Guebbas is of opinion that this is merely a ruse to allow time for the Spanish consul at Tetuan to arrange for their escape.

Cid Guebbas added that, from the information he had received, it appeared clear that these men had been sent from Melilla by the Spanish military authorities on a mission to the Riff tribes west of Melilla to induce them to refrain from joining in the fighting at Melilla, and that their eventual destination was the Pretender's camp in

[31497] No. 302*.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 21.)

(No. 201.)

Sir, *Tangier, August* 14, 1909.

ON the 10th instant the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs handed to Mr. Irwin a letter, translation of which is enclosed herewith, which, contrary to all precedent, the Sultan had written himself to me, announcing his intention of sending a complimentary mission to London to return my visit to Fez. As you will observe, the letter is dated the 22nd June, but Cid Guebbas explained to Mr. Irwin that it had come down with a batch of other letters destined to be taken over by the mission, Shereefian letters to the King, instructions to Mokri, &c. During the negotiations which followed with regard to the reception of the mission these letters all remained in Cid Guebbas's hands. They have now, I believe, been sent to Paris, with the exception of this one, which he was instructed by El-Mokri to deliver to me. I am answering to Cid Aissar-ben-Omar, begging him to convey my respectful thanks to the Sultan for his gracious communication, but calling his Excellency's attention to my communication of the 22nd July, in which I informed him that it was now too late for the mission to be received. I have added that I was submitting His Majesty's letter to you.

I have, &c.

REGINALD LISTER.

Inclosure in No. 302*.

His Serene Majesty the Sultan Mulai Hafid to Mr. Lister.

(Translation.)

[Praise to God alone; and there is no power nor strength save in God the High, the Mighty.]

THE friend, the intelligent, the wise counsellor, who strives for good between the two friendly nations, Minister of the glorious Empire of Great Britain and India, Reginald Lister—after making many inquiries as to your health, trusting that you may continue well—it is our Shereefian intention to send a mission from our Shereefian Court to His Majesty the King of England, to return the visit paid by your Excellency and to convey salutations to the exalted head of your nation the respected King, and to thank him for his benevolent designs and good intentions. The mission is of a complimentary nature, and is to represent our Shereefian Majesty in confirming the sincere friendship (already existing), and in facilitating the attainment of what is desired. We trust that they will receive a favourable reception from His Majesty, from regard to the dictates of the bonds of lasting amity and the maintenance of friendly rights.

We trust that you will help them in this first and last. May your endeavours at all times be praiseworthy.

(Seal of Mulai Hafid.)

Jumadii 3, 1327 (*June* 22, 1909).

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the Hiayna. His Excellency also understood that they carried letters from the Spanish authorities at Melilla, but was unaware of their contents.

I have, &c
REGINALD LISTER.

[31499]

No. 304.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 21.)

(No. 203.)

Tangier, August 16, 1909.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a summary of news for the past week.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

Inclosure in No. 304.

Summary of Events in Morocco during the past Week.

SOME severe fighting has taken place during the past week between Raisuli and the Beni Idder tribe who had been one of the foremost in refusing to recognise his authority as governor. At present no decisive result has been attained, but, as Raisuli has sent back to Tangier for reinforcements, which he begs may be dispatched to him as soon as possible, it would seem that he is not having matters all his own way.

Mr. MacLeod reports from Fez that the family of the late agitator Kitani, who was recently flogged to death in prison, have now been set free. Some five of his Berber adherents remain in confinement, but all others implicated in the affair have been released and pardoned.

General Moinier, commanding the French troops of occupation, left Casa Blanca on the 7th instant on one month's leave of absence, which he is to spend in France. Colonel Branlière will take over the command during the absence of the general. This officer is a colonel of the Foreign Legion, and took part in the later Shawia campaign.

Numerous complaints continue to be addressed to the consulate at Casa Blanca, alleging unfair treatment in regard to the taxes being levied by the French in the Shawia. Mr. Madden is of opinion that the arrangements for assessment leave a good deal to be desired. The French officers refuse to look into the numerous complaints, so that the unfortunate taxpayer finds himself in the hands of the kaïd and sheikh, who do not lose the opportunity of squeezing him in accordance with the traditional methods of the country.

Mr. Carleton has received news from a respectable Shereef to the effect that the Pretender has been completely routed by the hill-tribes of Beni Zerwal Feshtala and two others. This defeat was inflicted without the help of the Mehalla. It must have been severe, as Bou Hamara's private effects, baggage, mules, and tents have been sold in the market at Wazzan. The Pretender is reported to have escaped with very few adherents into the Beni Hemed district. Mr. Carleton considers that the career of this troublesome character is evidently nearing its end.

F. R.

[31507]

No. 305.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 21.)

(No. 173.)

San Ildefonso, August 16, 1909.

Sir,

IT seems to be generally assumed by the critics in the foreign press of Spanish action in Morocco that the Melilla campaign has been wantonly undertaken by the Spanish Government without any better reason than a desire to emulate the achievements of the French troops in the Shawia country, and to give the Spanish army an opportunity of distinguishing itself.

It is no doubt true that the Spanish army felt humiliated by the mere police

duties which it was called upon to perform at Casa Blanca, while its French allies were engaged in serious fighting, and that its influence has been employed to encourage the adoption of active measures in the Spanish possessions. Señor Maura, however, the Spanish Prime Minister, persistently resisted these appeals, and in now at last yielding to them, in so far as the Riff country is concerned, he has been moved, I believe, by other than purely military considerations.

The position of Melilla had become a very precarious one. In the past it was the centre of a flourishing trade with the Moorish hinterland. Caravans from the far interior descended the valleys of the Muluya and its confluent the Za, discharged their burdens at Melilla, and returned to their homes laden with European produce, such as tissues, candles, soap, sugar, and tea. These articles could then be bought cheaper at Melilla than at Nemours, Tlemcen, and Marnia, the nearest French-Algerian emporiums. Ujda, itself supplied from the far interior, dealt only with Melilla, except in cattle and wool, which found greater facilities for export in the Algerian ports. Melilla merchandise was freely bartered for native produce among the tribes of Dahara and Figuig. This increasing trade through the Spanish fortress was checked, and began to wane from the year 1901 onwards. In spite of town improvements, incipient port works, and other outward signs of prosperity, a state of commercial stagnation set in. The stream had been cleverly deflected across the frontier by the new policy adopted about that time by the Algerian Government. The latter set up free markets at Marnia and Beni Unif, through which French merchandise, now duty free, began to flow into the "zocos" of Ujda and Figuig. A return current at once set in to the French side. The native caravans gradually abandoned Melilla, which blindly retained its old scale of "octroi" duties. Candles continued to pay there 4·50 pesetas per 100 kilog., coffee 20, tissues 10, soap 3, sugar 4, tea 20 pesetas, and salt 100 per cent. of its value. The creation in 1904 under French direction of a market at Berguent (Ras el Ain) on the Morocco side of the frontier withdrew from Melilla the few remaining caravans which still found their way there from Debdu, the middle Muluya, and Dahara. General Lyautay, as French High Commissioner on the frontier region spared no effort to emphasise this tendency. His officers were encouraged to act as commercial agents by entering into mutually beneficial relations with the neighbouring tribes. Soon the trade of the entire right bank of the Muluya had been lost to Spain. The new conditions were further confirmed by the French occupation of Ujda and the surrounding region in 1906. Sidi Mohamad (Berkan) became an important market, exercising an attraction across the Muluya on the tribes occupying the left bank. The Roghi gave a mining concession to a French company in the Riff country. Thus was completed within a few years the French commercial invasion of the entire Muluya valley. From the sea to Figuig, from the Muluya to the French frontier the tribes do their business now with the French traders. So strong is the French position in these new markets that revenue for roads and other improvements is already being raised by tolls on the merchandise. Between 1900 and 1907 the trade, exports and imports, of Nemours rose from 16,430 to 271,184 tons.

The above particulars are derived from a confidential Spanish commercial report, which, by the courtesy of the French Embassy, I have been enabled to read in a French translation. The writer concludes with an exhortation to the Spanish Government to arrest the threatened decay of Melilla, and to restore at least a portion of its former prosperity by simply following French example. To do this, Spain, it is urged, must first suppress by military force the anarchy which prevails in the Riff. She must then set up free markets on the French model at Seluan and Ferrahia (I cannot identify the latter place on the map). Finally, she must extend her mining railway to Seluan, and thence by degrees to Taza, and even to Fez, which is only 325 kilom. from Melilla, as compared with 550 to Oran.

The first step in this ambitious programme is now being taken, and it remains to be seen if Spain will succeed in recovering for Melilla any part of its lost importance. Her statesmen are not likely to precipitate a conflict with France by adopting in full the policy advocated in the consular report. But it may well be that considerations similar to those which it advances have moved the Spanish Government to strike a blow for a little elbow-room outside the walls of their fortress. If there is truth in the above account of French peaceful penetration into regions regarded by Spain as falling within the natural sphere of her influence, it would seem to have become necessary for her to make a forward move, unless she were prepared to allow herself to be slowly driven into the sea by the advancing wave of French influence, both commercial and political. She has arrived at the parting of the ways, and must

make her choice. True wisdom might dictate a retreat, but national sentiment, apart from any prospect of commercial gain, is too strong to admit of this humiliating course being taken, at least without a struggle.

The interest of a few wealthy Spaniards in the Riff mines is only one of the many factors of the problem. The mines were perhaps not worth protecting, but if Spain did not claim the task she feared that it would be readily undertaken by France. The isolation of Melilla would then be complete, and its compulsory abandonment only a matter of time.

The withdrawal of Germany from political competition with France in Morocco by the convention of last February left Spain to settle matters single-handed with her French ally. The fear of being overwhelmed by the unequal partnership has forced her into action at Melilla.

This appears to me to be the true explanation of recent events in that quarter. It is natural that the country at large, ill-informed as it is on foreign affairs, should have failed to realize the situation. Hence the early unpopularity of the campaign, which was understood to have been engaged in at the demand of the Spanish mining company.

It has been said, and is sure to be often repeated, that Spain herself engineered the murder of her navvies in order to force on a conflict. Similar accusations were brought against the French when the Kroumir outrages were put forward by them as a pretext for the occupation of Tunis. In the present case it would be fairer to say that the Spanish Government have for some time realised that the enforced resumption of work on the railway as a means of protecting the mines must inevitably lead to a conflict with the tribes. Three brigades were accordingly ordered to prepare for active service in the month of June. The expected "incident" took place on the 9th July. Two days later the first batch of Spanish troops was already on its way to Melilla.

I have, &c.
M. DE BUNSEN.

[31496] No. 306.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 93.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 25, 1909.

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch No. 129 of the 28th June last respecting the action of the Spanish consul at Tetuan in facilitating the escape of Mr. Clarke-Kennedy's captors, I transmit herewith a copy of a despatch, with its enclosure, from His Majesty's Minister at Tangier.*

I agree with the view, expressed both by your Excellency and Mr. Lister, that in the circumstances the explanation of the Spanish Government is quite inadequate. I leave it, however, to your discretion to decide whether there would be any advantage in pursuing the matter further.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[32094] No. 307.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Rattigan.

(No. 148.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, August* 26, 1909.

I AM informed by French chargé d'affaires that French Minister at Tangier has been instructed to make representations to Sultan respecting barbarities to prisoners at Fez. If you have reliable evidence that cruelty is being practised, I authorise you to associate yourself with any protests on the subject, and to instruct Consul MacLeod to join his colleagues in any representations they may make.

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* No. 302.

[32663] No. 308.

Consul MacLeod to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 30.)

(No. 29.)

Sir, *Fez, August 16, 1909.*

ON the 9th instant the Sultan's mehalla moved to Ulad Bilghaina, in North-West Hiayna.

The Pretender's camp was then about 3 miles north of the mehalla. Some unimportant skirmishing occurred during the day. Before dawn on the 10th a convoy of part of the Pretender's harem and stable was captured.

During the morning part of the mehalla marched to attack the Pretender's camp. About half-way thither they encountered the bulk of the Pretender's people marching to attack the mehalla. A long inconclusive fight ensued in which both parties lost severely, and retired to their respective camps. In the late afternoon the Pretender retreated about 4 miles westward to the Kasbah and village of Al Hassin, which is situated in Beni Ouriagel in the middle of a small plain, and almost surrounded by low hills with the River Warga on its south end.

The losses on the Sultan's side had been so severe that the leaders decided not to again use only part of their force—which would enable Buhamara to waste them in detail—but to hazard a general advance of the whole mehalla to capture his camp. This movement was made early next morning, the 11th. As before, they were met about half-way by the Pretender's people, and what must have been quite an obstinate engagement ensued. The Pretender's people were forced back to their camp, into which they crowded and kept up a costly fire on their pursuers, who by this time were becoming very fatigued, as the heat, with a hot wind blowing, was abnormal.

At this juncture the Sultan's artillery, served by the French-Algerian Lieutenant Sedira and French sergeants, occupied one of the hills commanding the Pretender's camp, and presently opened a most destructive fire. The ground in front being cleared, a general rush was made. The camp was stoutly defended by the Pretender's lieutenant Jellali, and even by Buhamara himself. The latter, however, was soon left with only some forty followers, horsemen, and with these fled north-west to the sanctuary of Mulai Taib Darkowi, in Beni Zerual.

The inhabitants there declining to help to protect him by force, he presently—before the horsemen who had been sent in pursuit arrived—fled onwards to the hills of Beni Hamed, and, the night coming on, further pursuit became impracticable. The Sultan has stated to me that the Beni Hamed—a very small tribe—have written to the mehalla that they have surrounded the Pretender and his party, and asked for the mehalla to come for him, but until this is actually effected his capture must be regarded as still doubtful.

Whether the result will be the permanent extinction of Buhamara remains to be seen, but assuredly this has been by far the most damaging, and to his reputation most discrediting, blow he has ever received.

Of his followers above 300 have been brought here prisoners, amongst them his cadi and his master of the horse, together with the heads of about 100 of the killed, including that of his lieutenant Jellali.

The booty captured, in addition to quantities of rifles and ammunition, included fourteen women of the harem, three standards, two guns, Shereefian umbrella, Shereefian State tent, Shereefian State chair, and desk with his correspondence.

The losses on the Sultan's side numbered 113 killed and some eighty wounded of soldiers alone. The killed and wounded of neighbouring tribes assisting the troops are believed to be about the same number at least, but as these go to their homes direct, their exact losses are not known.

The troops and tribal contingents on the Sultan's side numbered some 6,000 to 7,000, those on the Pretender's side somewhere between 800 and 1,200. From the course things took, it is obvious that in the negotiations for the support of the neighbouring tribes (a most essential factor in Moorish warfare) the Sultan must have outwitted Buhamara completely, for both parties claimed to have arranged to get the assistance of the neighbouring tribes of North-West Hiayna and Eastern Sheraga.

Even including the defeat of Mulai Abdelaziz at Seragna last year, the various fights—Makhzen *v.* rebels—in Morocco these last twelve years have been little more than panics, in which one side chanced to run away the first.

This, however one-sided as to numbers, was assuredly a stubbornly-contested

engagement, and the result is attributable very largely to the awe of him with which the Sultan has succeeded in impressing both his officers and men.

While as yet incomplete, the result has been good beyond expectation, and Mulai Hafid has again falsified the predictions of the great majority even of experienced critics, and this victory cannot fail to greatly strengthen his position throughout the whole country.

It remains now to be seen whether Buhamara will be able (as he did after his defeat by Menebhi in February 1903) to reach Dsul, Chiata, and Braines, and in a few months take the field again. The events near Melilla, and his share in bringing them about, cannot however but have greatly injured his prospects amongst the Dsul, Chiata, and Braines, as well as the Riff tribes.

I have, &c.

J. M. MACLEOD.

[32664] No. 309.

Consul MacLeod to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 30.)

(No. 30.)

Sir, *Fez, August 16, 1909.*

ON Wednesday, the 11th instant, I went to the palace and asked an audience of the Sultan to congratulate him on the successes his men had begun to achieve against the Pretender and to urge afresh that Dr. Verdon's services be used to tend the wounded and sick amongst the troops, as no doctor had been sent with the Mehalla.

Pleading indisposition, the Sultan asked me to come on Saturday, the 14th instant.

By Friday afternoon, the 13th instant, the total of prisoners who had arrived from the Mehalla was about 232.

These were paraded before the Sultan, who was seated in his open kiosk in state, accompanied by the Grand Vizier, Glawi, Sid Aissa-ben-Omar, Vizier of Foreign Affairs, Kaïd Mtougi, and a leading highly respected Shereef of Fez, Mulai Dris-ben-Abdelhadi.

Some twenty-four of the prisoners were then selected for special punishment. Of these, twenty were old infantry soldiers, or palace slaves, who had deserted from Oudjah or Fez to Buhamara, and one an infantry drummer—a lad of 16 or 17 years old—who had deserted long ago from Oudjah. The remaining three were Buhamara's master of ceremonies, his master of horse, and a trumpeter, formerly a member of the Sultan's band.

The trumpeter had, then and there, his back teeth pulled out by way of preventing him ever blowing a trumpet again, and was sent to prison.

The remaining twenty-three were thrashed from the palace to Bab Mahrok in charge of the Sultan's master of ceremonies and the Acting Governor Zerowti.

There the Pretender's master of horse and master of ceremonies had their right hands and left feet taken off by a barber, and the rest (including the lad of 16) had their right hands taken off. The stumps were thrust into hot tar to stop the bleeding, two of them succumbing almost immediately. The survivors were taken to prison.

This was all carried out within an hour or so. None of these men were heard in their defence, nor was any but the very briefest enquiry made into their cases.

I reflected that you most probably would not approve my letting such things be done without instant reprobation, and that, although I had no official right to be heard, you would prefer me to lose no chance of at least trying to have these barbarities stopped.

Therefore when I heard of what was contemplated I at once conferred with the French consul (doyen of the consular body) to see whether we could not do something to prevent such inhumanities, but just as we met the news came that they had already been carried out. We discussed next morning about trying to prevent further acts of this kind on the other prisoners, whose arrival was expected that day. We agreed it would be impracticable to remonstrate collectively as the consular body, because the German consul has standing instructions to take no part in any collective action except by express authority of his Government, and his absence would be assuredly not understood in this way by the Makhzen. I understood, however, that the French consul (M. Gaillard) would see the viziers, and perhaps the Sultan also,

and remonstrate; but to-day M. Gaillard tells me he has not yet found an opportunity of doing so.

I called on the Grand Vizier at once, but he could not see me then, and asked me to call again at 4 o'clock.

Returning to my house I heard that another batch of prisoners had arrived. I then went to Sid Aissa-ben-Omar (Vizier of Foreign Affairs), found him asleep, but had him awakened. I explained carefully that I made no claim to speak officially, as of course this was a purely Moorish affair, but from motives both of humanity and for the sake of the Sultan's and Makhzen's character. I remonstrated strongly against these execrable punishments. He answered that the Sultan had desired to shoot all these twenty-four prisoners, but the viziers had induced him to commute the punishment to loss of a hand, or a hand and foot, so as to give the men a chance of their lives. However, he would tell the Sultan all I had said, should any further prisoners be likely to be similarly dealt with.

At 4 o'clock I called on the Grand Vizier. He held similar language to Sid Aissa's, said it was all less than the rigour of Moslem law, and expatiated on the necessity for severity in view of the state to which Buhamara and his people had brought Morocco, their burning of villages in sight of Fez itself, and the deaths and wounds suffered by the Sultan's troops.

He dissented wholly from my contention that it would have been more humane to shoot or decapitate these prisoners, and ended by saying that when he was in Oran the governor chanced to be run over by a carriage and his arm had to be amputated. Everybody congratulated him on his life being saved and on his escaping with the loss of his arm! Moslems were not like Christians as regards death. They believed they died at a time decreed by God, and so death merely was not held in great fear. However, he would at once tell the Sultan all I had said.

He then proceeded to the palace and sat with the Sultan for the rest of the afternoon, in public, in His Majesty's open kiosk.

I followed him to the palace and entered Sid Aissa-ben-Omar's office. Sid Aissa sent a message at once to the Sultan saying I had come for an audience as requested on the 11th instant.

The sight was indeed strange and barbaric for the twentieth century, and for a place within 200 miles of Europe. In the high-walled quadrangle of Bab Bujat, opposite to the Sultan's kiosk and the viziers' offices, the Sultan's infantry guard were drawn up with bugles and drums. Beyond them groups of gaily dressed cavalrymen galloped about firing *feux de joie*. Crowds of people filled the eastern side, and the roofs there were covered with women uttering shrill cries of joy and beating tom-toms. In front of us moved parties of white robed ushers and palace slaves, while facing us stood some ninety-three prisoners roped together in parties of about twenty. At their left, on horseback, sat a black soldier with the head of the Pretender's lieutenant held aloft on a pole. The prisoners had been standing in the sun for over two hours (itself a torture with the temperature then at about 105 degrees in the shade), and they sang in unison a plaintive chant to the words "God give you the Victory, Oh! Mulai Hafid!"

Presently two of them were selected and brought to within 20 yards of where the Sultan was seated, and in a minute or two were sent off with the acting governor of Fez. One was a former slave of the palace, and the other a former colonel of infantry. It was whispered around that the Sultan had ordered them to be decapitated, but I learned later that one had had his right hand taken off, and the other his right hand and left foot. A third man, a leading slave of Buhamara, was selected and was sent off to be flogged only. This happened while I was yet waiting to see the Sultan, but after His Majesty had been joined by Glawi, with whom I had been remonstrating only a little while previously, and it seemed to be the end of the day's business. I was then sent for by the Sultan. The situation was that I felt I must speak strongly to him, but in such wise as (1) not to give him a chance to cut me short by saying it all was none of my business, and next to secure his consent to Dr. Verdon's assisting the sick and wounded soldiers.

The Sultan was seated on a sofa in the portico of his kiosk in full public view.

I said I had come on Wednesday to congratulate him on the course of events about Buhamara, because for many years I had looked forward impatiently to see him defeated.

The Sultan thanked me for this, and then inquired what was the news in Europe. What would the effect be of the change of Ministry in France? I thought the

change would not make much, if any, difference, for of late years nearly all Governments, happily, had kept their foreign affairs continuously on the same lines. I then gave the Sultan a sketch map, done into Arabic from the "Times" of the 31st July, illustrative of the situation at Melilla. He was much interested, and enquired whether there had been any renewal of fighting there. I answered that lately there had only been some sniping at Spanish convoys.

I then mentioned that Wilkinson had returned to Fez, but His Majesty's Government had refused to take up his case, which the Sultan said he was happy to hear.

I then alluded to Dr. Verdon, remarking that he wished to have duties assigned to him. The Sultan answered eagerly that he would give orders that he should have his share at once in tending the invalids from the Mehalla, and told Sid Glawi to see to this.

I then in a graver tone said that of course I made no claim to be heard officially on such a matter, and if he were not desirous of talking about it I would not mention the matter, but to intercede for clemency for persons liable to punishment was an act of charity approved in all religions, especially Islam.

The Sultan answered he quite understood what I meant, and asked me to continue and speak freely, remarking that he liked to hear everybody's views.

I said that, while nobody rejoiced more sincerely than I over the victory, I was more sorry, indeed sick, than I could well express about these punishments. These people and Buhamara's followers, and Moorish tribes generally, had, I knew, to be treated with severity.

We English had had to put down the Indian mutiny with great severity. But to dismember prisoners was another matter. People in Europe had been hoping the Sultan would inaugurate a new and more civilised era in Morocco. Such methods, not used by the Makhzen in living memory, would show surely that it was backward and downwards the Sultan wished to go, and so forth.

The Sultan answered in quite a calm judicial manner that he had, indeed, reflected beforehand on all that. He knew what Europe would think, but this disadvantage was far outweighed by the absolute necessity of bringing these tribes back to a salutary fear of the Makhzen. This was a first necessity even for the safety and prosperity of Europeans in Morocco. Rebels were by Moslem law liable to death by crucifixion. He was trying lesser punishment, and had given these people a chance of their lives. Only some twenty-six—specially bad cases—out of more than 300 prisoners had been so punished. Were not rebels in Russia put to death in great numbers? I interjected "God forbid that your Majesty should take Russia for a model!" And I reminded him of the feeling even yet in England and France towards the Czar, even though the Czar was trying to get rid of these old practices.

The Sultan concluded by saying that we Europeans had no idea of the stubbornness of the Moorish tribes. Ordinary punishments such as ours were no use. Buhamara and his people had brought Morocco into ruin, and only the other day were busy burning villages in sight of Fez itself. They had killed the other day 113 of his soldiers and wounded many more, and yet the punishments they had suffered were less than those Buhamara employed, such (which is quite true) as burning prisoners alive. When all was said, these punishments were well within the law, and the Moorish public would rejoice to see the law once more enforced.

I replied that these penalties were possibly allowed by law—in the last resort, but no humane ruler ever adopted them until ordinary ones had been tried and failed. Nobody had tried ordinary means yet. Mulai Abdel Aziz had tried little more than bribery and palavers with the tribes. A few prompt executions and the enforcement of discipline in his army would have stopped Buhamara at once, or even now. But these recent punishments would perpetuate hatred of himself and the Makhzen, to which the Sultan replied, with a cynical smile, "But who ever heard of anybody liking the Makhzen!" I replied I had hoped he would have had that aim.

It was now getting late, and I felt that argument was only being wasted, so in a very grave way I thanked the Sultan for his indulgence in hearing me, and particularly for the fullness with which he himself had spoken. There would probably be much comment on these punishments, and he had now enabled me to report on the matter in such wise that, whatever they might conclude about it, His Majesty's Government would have at least the Sultan's side of the case fully before them in his own words. An unmistakable wince flitted over his eyes at that, but he thanked me in a moment, Glawi eyeing me sharply the while, and I then took leave.

These punishments have long been in disuse amongst nearly all the Arab tribes of Morocco. By common report Sid Aissa-ben-Omar (an Arab) could, however, be very cruel indeed in his own district.

But barbarities of these kinds are still practised amongst the mountaineers (Jebala) and Berbers, *i.e.*, the aborigines of the country, such as those of Glawi's and Mtougi's districts.

The Sultan, of course, finds them in the records of his ancestors, whose achievements it is his ambition to emulate, and who are held in just abhorrence by civilised people.

The Sultan wishes too, of course, to pose before all the tribes, especially the aborigines, as an even more out-and-out orthodox Moslem than Buhamara.

But making every allowance for all circumstances, the impression left with me is that, however loftily they affect to argue, the Sultan and viziers were moved chiefly by their chagrin at the escape of Buhamara (the result of nothing but their own military incapacity), and merely sought to soothe their own feelings and those of the lowest grade inhabitants of the country by ferocious treatment of such of the rebels as they had secured.

When the Sultan Mulai Hafid asks one to believe him an orthodox exponent of Islam, which says "Cursed is the liar, even in a joke," and by which the use of intoxicating drink is sin, he draws on one's credulity too far.

The Makhzen's plea that they were trying to be "merciful" is the bitterest of mockeries.

The prisoners, mutilated ones included, were left without food or water during the whole of the day and night of their arrival, and not until the following evening was food (one small loaf each) issued to them.

Fifteen of the twenty-six mutilated prisoners have now died in prison, and the rest are in a dying state. The sufferings of these people—untended, starving, thirsty, over crowded into filthy prisons, and in the present great heat—can be more readily imagined than described.

Except amongst the very lowest classes, the impression produced by all this has been of disgust. The inhabitants in general, of Arab descent, say that justice would have been amply satisfied by the shooting or decapitation of the prisoners, and mutter jealously "This is Berber government; Mulai Al Hassan did not do such things!"

But as the victims are not Fez people there is no disposition to resent the Sultan's action.

In the event Dr. Verdon has been enabled to treat some fifty-eight soldier patients a-day, who would probably have been untended had the Sultan, in pique at too strong language from me (for such are Moorish Sultan's ways), avoided the use of this English doctor's services, or had His Majesty's attention, amid his many other preoccupations, not been called to their necessities.

But for this I should have expiated more on the deserved censure these barbarities will receive from the press and foreign Governments, and on the likelihood of the press saying that Mulai Hafid and Buhamara are evidently much the same in their natures and practices.

I have, &c.
J. M. MACLEOD.

[32665] No. 310.

Consul MacLeod to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 30.)

(No. 31. Confidential.)

Sir, *Fez, August* 18, 1909.

REFERRING to my despatch No. 29 of the 16th instant, the fuller information which has now been received through the French non-commissioned officers with the mehalla is to the effect that though successful to a certain extent, by reason of the fear in which the troops and their leaders have acquired of the Sultan, the overwhelming numbers—about 10 to 1—and their having well-served artillery, the action showed the grossest incapacity on the Makhzen's part.

No sort of plan was followed, the troops merely rushing forward like droves of

sheep. No troops were held in readiness to cut off the Pretender's retreat, and he effected his escape, accompanied by some eighty mounted men, with little difficulty.

(Secret.)

It is reported that two Christians had been found and killed in the Pretender's camp.

It is now established beyond doubt that these were a Frenchman, a M. Collet, and his interpreter, a native of the Moorish frontier.

The latter escaped safely, but M. Collet, who was dressed in Moorish clothes and knew no Arabic, was killed and decapitated by some of the Sultan's soldiers, who on discovering that he was an European, are supposed to have burned or hidden his head.

At any rate, careful inspection by the French consular staff of the heads brought to Fez has shown M. Collet's head not to be amongst them, for his features and beard were such as could easily have been identified. He came from the Algerian frontier in quest of mining concessions, the Pretender being then reported to be about to capture Fez, and joined his camp about twelve days before it was scattered.

I have, &c.
J. M. MACLEOD.

[32653] No. 311.

Mr. Rattigan to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 30.)

(No. 205.)

Sir, *Tangier, August* 18, 1909.

AS reported in Mr. Lister's telegram No. 94 of yesterday's date, a decisive defeat has at last been inflicted on the Pretender. Few details have yet arrived as to the actual fighting, but it seems that the Pretender's camp was surrounded by the Sultan's troops, and after a most determined resistance was eventually carried. This success appears to have been due to the destructive fire of the Makhzen artillery, under the command of the French non-commissioned officers, which was posted on the heights dominating the camp. The fighting was of the most unprecedented severity, the losses amounting on the Government side to some 1,500 killed and wounded. The rebel losses are difficult to ascertain, but their casualties are estimated at some 400 killed and wounded, whilst several hundred men were captured and sent in to Fez. As usual, the victors were too intent on looting the camp to take full advantage of their success, and the Pretender himself, with a few of his principal adherents, was allowed to escape. His forces were, however, completely dispersed, and the blow should prove decisive, though it is notoriously impossible to prophesy in this country. Until the capture of the Pretender himself is effected, one cannot be too sanguine that this movement, which has had a most disastrous effect in unsettling the country for the past few years, has now been definitely put an end to.

The usual results of a Moorish victory are now being experienced in Fez, where the most inhuman treatment is being meted out to the captured rebels. Mr. Macleod and Dr. Verdon both bear witness to the barbarous cruelties carried out by order of the Sultan, which recall the worst scenes of the dark ages. On the 13th instant, twenty-four of the chief prisoners were thrashed through the chief streets of the town, and were then drawn up in a row outside the Mahroke gate. Their right hands and left feet were then cut off with a razor by a city barber, and the mutilated limbs plunged into boiling pitch. Three of the victims died from shock and hæmorrhage, and the rest were led back to prison.

Mr. Macleod and Dr. Verdon have both ascertained from a reliable source that the Spanish doctor, Belenguer, lent his services to the Sultan for the punishment of one of the chief captives, who had been sentenced to have his back teeth removed. It is hard to believe that Dr. Belenguer can have been guilty of such infamous conduct, but Mr. Macleod fears that there can be little doubt that this report is true.

Almost the worst feature of these barbarities is that they are being practised on men who practically through no fault of their own were compelled to join Bu Hamara. They are nearly all ex-kaïds trained by Sir H. Maclean, who were sent to Oudjda by Abdul Aziz, and having received no pay of any kind for years, were driven by actual want to desert and join the Pretender, in the hope of being furnished with the necessities of life. Dr. Verdon states that the courage and endurance shown by these unfortunates under torture were extraordinary.

On hearing of what was going on, Mr. Macleod at once went to see M. Gaillard, doyen of the consular corps, with a view to making strong representations to the Sultan against a repetition of such revolting cruelties. M. Gaillard was, however, of opinion that nothing in the way of combined consular representations could be made, owing to the invariable refusal of the German consul to take part in any such representations without consulting his Government. Mr. Macleod and M. Gaillard accordingly agreed, in an unofficial way, to protest strongly to the Sultan against the repetition of further barbarities, and Mr. Macleod lost no time in laying his views before Sid Aissa-ben-Omar. He pointed out to his Excellency that the Sultan, by such inhuman cruelties, would do himself the greatest injury in the eyes of the whole world, and begged him to use his influence with His Majesty to put an end to these atrocities.

Sid Aissa replied that the Sultan had originally intended to shoot all the prisoners, and that their lives had only been spared at the instance of himself, El Glawi, and Mtougui. He finally promised, should any more prisoners be in danger of such punishment, to tell His Majesty what Mr. Macleod had said, whilst pointing out that the latter had been actuated by feelings of humanity and by a desire to prevent the Sultan lowering himself irretrievably in the estimation of Great Britain and of the whole world.

Mr. Macleod was to see the Sultan on the 14th, and had the intention of speaking very strongly on the subject to His Majesty.

In well-informed Moorish circles the defeat of the Pretender is ascribed to the wiles of emissaries from the Sultan, who assured the tribes that Bu Hamara had sold the whole country to the Spaniards, and that the latter had started their aggressive campaign at Melilla at his invitation. These statements were cunningly spread abroad, and resulted in the defection of the Pretender's most important adherents amongst the tribes.

I have, &c.
FRANK RATTIGAN.

[32576] No. 312.

Mr. Rattigan to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 30.)

(No. 208.)

Sir, *Tangier, August* 21, 1909.

I CALLED to-day upon M. Regnault, who has just returned to Tangier from Paris. He informed me that the French Government was very annoyed indeed at the turn events had taken in the Riff, and expressed the firm conviction that the Spaniards, if they had not actually planned the incident at Melilla, had clearly shown by their unwonted preparedness that they were fully alive to the probability of such a situation as now existed being created by the policy they were pursuing.

He stated that, as a friend of Spain, he was sincerely distressed at her embarking upon this adventure in support of an undoubted illegality, and remarked that it was a lucky thing for her that "those who were most interested in Morocco" were not actuated by feelings of hostility towards her.

I gathered he meant by this that the Spanish position could very easily be shown to be quite illegal by anyone who might be interested in doing so.

As to the financial effect of the situation in the Riff, M. Regnault was most pessimistic. He agreed with M. de Sainte-Aulaire that there were a large indemnity by Spain to cover her military expenditure, this would mean the bankruptcy of Morocco for many years to come. The French Government were, he said, ready to cope with a Moroccan debt of 150,000,000 fr., such as at present existed, composed of 80,000,000 fr. of debts, and an indemnity of 70,000,000 fr. to France for the occupation necessitated by the events at Casa Blanca; were Morocco, however, to be saddled with a large indemnity to Spain, the situation would become quite hopeless.

I asked M. Regnault whether he had any hopes of the Sultan accepting a loan of 150,000,000 fr., even if the French Government were ready to facilitate such a large one. He replied that with such a man as Moulai Hafid one could never be sure of anything, but part of the Moorish Mission to Paris were now returning to Fez to lay the situation clearly before His Majesty, and he had hopes that something might eventually be done. He feared, however, that the recent crushing defeat of the Pretender might confirm the Sultan in his high opinion of himself and in his ability to put things right without any extraneous help. I asked M. Regnault whether it was

true that the French Government had agreed to guarantee a large loan, as was being persistently rumoured here. He replied that all his Government were prepared to do was to give "a sort of guarantee" for the sum required for the French indemnity, viz., 70,000,000 fr. For the remaining 80,000,000 they would merely facilitate a loan by their support, and he anticipated no great difficulty in the raising of it. The revenues of Morocco were in a very much more flourishing condition than they had been at the time of previous loans, and he expected that the loan could be issued at very nearly par, probably at 98 at the lowest, with a reasonable interest.

I told M. Regnault that I had recently heard that it was the intention of the French Government to devote the 2,500,000 fr. fine imposed on the Shawia tribes, which is now being collected, to the improvement of the port and town of Casa Blanca. He confirmed this report, and added that France would, of course, in company with other nations, benefit largely from the great increase of prosperity which such a step would inevitable create.

I subsequently had a conversation on the financial situation with Mr. Hodgson, who is of opinion that M. Regnault is somewhat optimistic in thinking that a large Moorish loan at probably 4½ per cent. could be issued at so high a figure as 98, unless the French Government intended to give a definite guarantee. He, moreover, questioned whether M. Regnault, in estimating the Moroccan debt at 150,000,000 fr., had not omitted to take into account the indemnity to Spain for the events at Casa Blanca, which he had heard might amount to some 15,000,000 fr. Mr. Hodgson, however, would appear to me to be fixing this indemnity at an excessively high figure. M. Regnault had mentioned to me that the guarantee given by the French Government for the loan of 70,000,000 fr. due to them would probably take the form of an annuity. Mr. Hodgson's explanation of this statement is that the French Government will probably adopt somewhat the same system as they did in the case of the Boxer indemnity.

By this system Morocco would pay France a certain sum annually; on the security of this annuity France would issue an amount of French rentes equivalent to the sum total of the indemnity, and thereby recoup herself for her outlay. Strictly speaking, a portion of the annuity ought to be devoted to the withdrawal of the rentes issued, but in practice they would probably be eventually absorbed in the general mass of the French national debt, the rentes being a perpetual stock.

The advantage for Morocco would, of course, lie in the fact that a smaller annuity would be required, owing to France borrowing for her, instead of Morocco having to borrow direct.

On the other hand, the French Government might issue a small special loan of 70,000,000 fr. on the security of this annuity at 3 per cent., with a 1 per cent. sinking fund; but Mr. Hodgson considers that they are more likely to adopt the former course.

I have, &c.
FRANK RATTIGAN.

[32877] No. 313.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received September* 1.)

(No. 178.)

Sir, *San Ildefonso, August* 28, 1909.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 165 of the 12th instant, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a further report by Sir Somerville Head on the present military situation at Melilla.

I have, &c.
(For His Majesty's Ambassador),
THOMAS H. LYONS.

Inclosure in No. 313.

Further Summary of Events respecting the Melilla Campaign up to August 27, 1909.

FOR some weeks there has been no action of importance in the neighbourhood of Melilla. The efforts of the commander-in-chief, General Marina, have been devoted to collecting and preparing the materials necessary for a general advance

while awaiting the completion of the canal into the Mar Chica. Convoys to the Spanish outposts at Sidi Musa are daily subjected to irregular fire from the heights of the Gurugu, but the Moors have not yet renewed a serious attack, and their intended movements and present numbers do not appear to be known.

Meanwhile, the Minister of War has ordered the formation of a new division to remain at present in the peninsula, and to be held in readiness in case further reinforcements should be required. This division is being formed by raising to war strength, that is, to 2,000 men per regiment, the following forces:—

1st Brigade—

Infantry Regiment of Cuenca No. 27.
Infantry Regiment of Guipuzcoa No. 53.

These are both stationed at Victoria, and belong to the 12th Division.

2nd Brigade—

Infantry Regiment del Principe No. 3 (stationed at Oviedo).
Infantry Regiment of Burgos No. 36 (stationed at Leon).

These belong to the 13th Division.

Each brigade is to have a machine-gun section. There will also be added two squadrons of Alfonso XIII, a brigade of field artillery, one sapper company, two sections of field telegraph, one field hospital company, and one Army Service Corps company.

The whole division to be under the command of General Sotomayor.

To avoid the odium of calling in the reserves, the rank and file of the regiments concerned are being completed by drafting officers and men from other regiments in garrison throughout Spain. In a similar way the officers and crews of the principal ships of the Spanish navy have been completed and two squadrons placed at the disposal of General Marina to assist in the operations in any way they can.

The possible uses of the Mar Chica have been much discussed in the press, and the following information, gathered from the "Epoca," may be of interest:—

The Mar Chica is a rectangular lake 20 kilom. by 6 kilom. It is separated from the sea by a stretch of dunes varying in width from 400 to 800 metres. Two years ago its level was the same as the sea, but owing to evaporation since the closing of the old canal its surface is now 1½ metres below sea-level. It is calculated that 180,000,000 cubic metres of water will be required to raise the surface to the necessary level, and that when the canal is opened the rush of water inwards will be at a rate of from 2 to 2½ metres a-second, gradually diminishing until the lake is full. This process will take some months. So far the canal has been dug out by manual labour to a depth of 1 metre, and the dredges, which are cutting their way through from the sea, can only work when the weather is calm. The depth of the lake varies considerably, but attains about 10 metres in the centre, and it is considered that cruisers could easily manœuvre in it once they had entered by the canal.

The old canal near Melilla, the only one shown on the map, was closed by a storm some two years ago, and no effort has since been made to reopen it. The one now under construction is the result of studies on the spot by Government engineers at the beginning of this year, and was ordered to be built by the Minister of War, so as to enable communications by the Mar Chica to be established between Melilla and the garrison at Restinga. The plans of the canal were still being studied when the present campaign broke out, and General Marina immediately ordered the works to be commenced. Their completion may take some time. The breadth is to be 5 to 10 metres and the depth between 3 and 5 metres. A deeper canal, presumably to allow the passage of battle-ships, is to be built near the old one close to Melilla.

On the 15th August General Marina issued a general order to his troops, in which, after stating that "the impressionable imagination of our popular classes has created fantastic legends respecting the nature of the enemy we have to fight," he points out the superiority of disciplined forces over a barbarous foe, and urges them to prove their national valour, promising, if they implicitly obey, to lead them to certain victory. "Europe," the General states, "has entrusted us with the honourable task of opening the way of civilisation in this savage country, and we must fulfil it."

The publication of this general order, which was received with applause, though it would appear to confirm the rumours of demoralisation among the troops, naturally

gave rise to the idea that an advance was to be made, if not the next day, at least within the week; but it was not till the 24th that the anxiously expected movement showed some signs of having begun.

A column under General Aguilera composed of the Regimiento del Rey, two squadrons of Maria Christina Regiment, one mountain battery, one army medical company, and a company of Army Service Corps, marched along the strip of land, some 22 kilom., in ten hours to Restinga, where they passed the night. General Arizon, the new governor of Melilla, went by sea. A company of Cazadores proceeded to Cabo de Agua, and the "Carlos V" and "Princesa de Asturias" sailed along the coast as far as the mouth of the Muluya.

The morning of the 25th General Aguilera occupied the Zoco de El Arba, some 7 miles further on, where there is a good supply of water. The idea seems to be to form a base of operations between Restinga and Punta Quiviana, where there are landing facilities. This was the position formerly taken up by the Roghi as his head-quarters in his operations against the tribes. A road leads about 25 kilom. to Zeluan. Zeluan, however, is dominated on the west by El Jemis, some 4 miles off, while some 6 and 7 miles off in the same direction are Mounts Argan and Milon, the latter about 2,500 feet high. These points would be presumably first seized by General Marina with the main body. A railway from Melilla to Restinga is under construction.

At Alhucemas and Penon de la Velez the tribesmen have been continually firing upon the Spanish garrisons, and though there has been no attack of any great importance, yet, from such news as passes the censorship, it would appear that those places are practically besieged, and that provisions can only be landed with the greatest difficulty and under the protection of artillery.

In the course of an interview on the 26th instant the Minister of Public Instruction, Acting President of the Council in the absence of Señor Maura from Madrid, made the following statement:—

"Without revealing the plan of operations at Melilla the Government is aware that the movements of the last few days consist only in taking up positions in preparation for movements on a larger scale. The plan of campaign has been carefully thought out, and it will be steadily developed now that all means of success have been assured.

"At first the campaign aroused apprehension and protests from a small section of public opinion. I believe that this apprehension has now vanished, because it is generally realised that if we did not defend our rights it would not be only a case of abandoning them, but others would come to take our place. This would lead to the breaking up of our country. Fortunately this will not be so . . . , and I am firmly convinced that we shall succeed.

"Meanwhile, the Sultan is at liberty to write letters to the Riffians telling them to cease hostilities. This matters very little to us, for Spain must punish an outrage and defend her future interests. We shall respect the Sultan as Sovereign of his State, for for years he has had no authority in the Riff, and since he can, in practice, guarantee us nothing, it becomes our duty to assure our interests and to carry on the work of pacification and civilisation. . . . . In any event the movement of our troops will not now be interrupted."

S. H.

August 27, 1909.

[33102] No. 314.

Mr. Rattigan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 3.)

(No. 210.)

Tangier, August 26, 1909.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that the pretender, after narrowly escaping capture on several occasions, was at length taken prisoner on the 22nd instant, and sent under a strong guard to Fez.

Ever since the annihilation of his force by the Shereefian troops his life had been attended by the usual experiences of a beaten pretender. Fleeing from tribe to tribe with a small band of trusty followers, he was at length driven to take refuge in a sanctuary of the Beni Mestara tribe. Here he was surrounded by a large Shereefian force under the command of Kaïd Bushta Baghdadi, and, after vainly imploring the

intercession of the tribesmen was forced to leave the sanctuary and taken prisoner. Kaïd Baghdadi had received strict instructions to take the pretender alive, and the latter killed several of his assailants with his revolver before his capture was effected. It is to be regretted that he did not reserve one cartridge for himself, as no doubt the most barbarous punishment awaits him at Fez.

In the case of a former pretender, named Taher-ben-Sliman, who was captured after a series of exploits of a similar nature in the reign of Moulai Hassan, the captive was dragged about in an iron cage as an object-lesson to all who were inclined to rebel against the Government. He was finally shot in prison at the instance of the Grand Vizier Ba Hamed and Menebhi, who, being more enlightened than their fellow-countrymen, desired to put an end to his sufferings. Moulai Hassan, in comparison to the present Sultan, was regarded as by no means a cruel man, and it is certain that the treatment dealt to the unfortunate Bu Hamara will, to say the least of it, not be any more lenient than that of Ben Sliman. It is believed in well-informed Moorish circles that, as a prelude to punishment of a much more severe nature, the iron cage will again be requisitioned for Bu Hamara, and there is unfortunately no one in Menebhi's place to counsel leniency to the Sultan. At Mr. Irwin's request, however, Menebhi has promised to use what influence he possesses over Moulai Hafid to prevent, as far as possible, any barbarous cruelties being practised on the unfortunate captive.

If, as the Sultan informed Mr. MacLeod, the mutilations inflicted on the re be prisoners were really due to a wish to spare their lives, this object has not been obtained. All but six of the thirty-one prisoners tortured in this way had succumbed to shock and hemorrhage by the 22nd instant.

I have written to Mr. MacLeod requesting him to do all he can to prevent a repetition of these barbarities, and have asked Mr. Irwin to impress on Cid Guebbas the necessity of convincing the Sultan that by such cruel conduct he will do himself irreparable injury in the eyes of the whole world. It is, however, to be feared that but slight good will come of these representations, as the Sultan is of a naturally cruel disposition, and is so self-willed and obstinate that he will not listen to advice from anyone.

I have, &c.
FRANK RATTIGAN.

[33221] No. 315.

Consul MacLeod to Sir Edward Grey —(*Received September* 4.)

(No. 32.)
Sir, *Fez, August* 23, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to report that the Pretender, Buhamara, was yesterday, about noon, delivered as a prisoner to the Sultan's mehalla near Mulai Bushta.

Exact details are not yet procurable, but the general facts are that on the 19th, 20th, and 21st the troops attacked the Beni Mzgilda mountaineers, who were between the mehalla and the Pretender, of whom several were killed, some twenty or thirty captured.

Simultaneously the Shereef Mulai Ali of Wazzan had been, by arrangement with the Sultan, trying to persuade, or bribe, the Beni Messara to give up Buhamara, and these efforts appear to have succeeded.

M. Gaillard, French consul, tells me the French military mission have just received a letter from the Algerian Lieutenant Sedira, dated 1·30 P.M. yesterday, reporting that that Buhamara had just been brought into the mehalla, so there would seem no doubt he is really caught this time.

It is expected that the Pretender will be brought into Fez to-morrow morning as publicly as possible, and a cage, which will be placed on a pedestal in the midst of the quadrangle ("Old Meshwar") where the Sultan and viziers sit in public, is now being made ready for him. Meantime exuberant rejoicings have already begun amongst all classes of the public, and salvos of cannon are being fired.

In conversation with Moorish officials I have expressed satisfaction that Buhamara has been caught, but, on account of the barbarities committed on the prisoners by the Sultan, I refrain, until or unless instructed to the contrary, from offering anything in the way of official congratulations on the occasion.

I have, &c.
J. M. MACLEOD.

[33356] No. 316.

Mr. Rattigan to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received September* 6.)

(No. 211. Very Confidential.)
Sir, *Tangier, August* 28, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to report that M. Regnault came to see me yesterday, and expressed at some length his views in regard to the situation in the Riff. He feels more than ever convinced that the Spaniards were led into this adventure merely by the desire to have something to set against the French occupation at Casa Blanca and the Shawia. (In regard to this matter, however, the general impression in diplomatic circles here is to the effect that Spain was bound to take some decisive step of this nature if she wished to assert her position in Morocco.) There was something, M. Regnault continued, in the Spanish character which he was incapable of understanding. Their absurd jealousy and overweening pride made it quite impossible to work with them. He observed that I had been here a long time, and could therefore bear him out in the statement that from the first he had done everything in his power to put things on a friendly basis with them, but all his efforts had been in vain. If the Spaniards had any sense they would see that their interests would best be served by arriving at an absolutely open and friendly agreement with the French. Were this the case, the French would be only too ready to afford the Spaniards their cordial support in obtaining "des avantages de forme et de fond." Their ridiculous pride, however, prevented them from following a policy of this nature. They apparently hated the thought of being indebted to anyone, and would rather go without advantages than obtain them by the help of France. They had a morbid suspicion of France, and invariably saw something Macchiavellian in everything she did. They had got it firmly into their heads that France intended to oust them altogether from Morocco, and nothing, apparently, would convince them to the contrary. He himself was beginning to see the hopelessness of attempting to persuade them to reconsider their line of action.

I remarked that the blame for this attitude of suspicion was in a large measure due to M. Merry del Val, whose Jesuitical training inclined him to such views. He was, moreover, of so cold and reserved a disposition that he was naturally incapable of adopting a sympathetic and open attitude, or of pulling together with the French. M. Regnault admitted that this was true, but said that he feared that the views of suspicion and distrust sown by M. Merry del Val had now engrained themselves to a large extent in the minds of the Spanish Government; he really felt hopeless as to the prospect of ever being able to pull together with them. They had originally sought to take advantage of German hostility to France, and consequently, as a result of the Franco-German agreement, had been left in the lurch. France, however, was quite ready to forgive and forget, if she were met half-way.

M. Regnault is invariably of so restrained and temperate a disposition that these rather heated views are somewhat striking. No doubt the attitude of the Spanish Legation towards France has for some time been needlessly distrustful. I venture, however, to think that Dr. Rosen has been to a large extent their "mauvais génie." His apparent intimacy with M. Merry del Val at one time gave rise to a certain amount of comment, and I think it would not be going too far to say that he would not have exerted his influence towards discouraging such feelings of suspicion and distrust of France as existed in the mind of the Spanish Minister. It is to be regretted that now that this pernicious influence has for the moment been removed, something cannot be done to lessen the distrust of France entertained by the Spanish authorities. Unfortunately it is already rather late in the day for an improvement to take place in this direction, now that Spain has entangled herself in the Riff.

I have, &c.
FRANK RATTIGAN.

[33357] No. 317.

Mr. Rattigan to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received September* 6.)

(No. 212.)
Sir, *Tangier, August* 28, 1909.

WITH reference to Mr. Lister's despatch No. 201 of the 14th instant, I have the honour to report that I have now received a note from Ci Aissa-ben-Omar, stating that,

as requested by Mr. Lister, he has explained to the Sultan the circumstances which rendered it impossible for the Moorish Mission to be received in England for the present.

The Sultan, while fully appreciating the reasons for this decision, desires to know what date would be convenient for the reception of the mission, which he is still anxious to send.

I have, &c.
FRANK RATTIGAN.

[33358] No. 318.

Mr. Rattigan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 6.)

(No. 213. Confidential.)

Sir, *Tangier, August* 28, 1909.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 208 of the 21st instant, I have the honour to report that Mr. Hodgson, of the State Bank, has communicated to me a somewhat extraordinary statement which has just been made by M. Gauran, director of the bank, to one of his colleagues in regard to the proposed Moroccan loan. So extraordinary is this statement that I cannot believe in its accuracy, but as Mr. Hodgson vouches for its having been made by M. Gauran, I have thought it well to bring it to your notice.

M. Gauran states that in a recent interview with M. Regnault, the latter informed him that the loan would only be effected on condition that the Sultan agreed to a proper occupation by France (presumably of the Shawia district) and to a special economic treatment for her. I observed to Mr. Hodgson that the latter condition especially is in absolute contradiction to the terms of the Anglo-French Agreement, and also of the Act of Algeciras, but he maintains that such were the words of M. Gauran. He added that at the bank it was an open secret that the French had decided to prevent the adjudication for the equipment of the Moorish army, which is due on the 2nd September, from taking place. With this end in view, Zaky Bey, the president of the Commission des Adjudications, had been sent down the coast, and care would be taken that he did not get back in time for the adjudication to be held. The interpretation placed by the bank on this move is that France, now that Roghi has been captured, is not anxious to see a well-equipped Moorish army.

As I have observed, the whole story seems to be very far-fetched, but I venture to give it to you for what it is worth.

I have, &c.
FRANK RATTIGAN.

[33361] No. 319.

Mr. Rattigan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 6.)

(No. 216. Confidential.)

Sir, *Tangier, August* 28, 1909.

ON receipt of your telegram No. 48 of the 26th instant I at once sounded as many of the foreign representatives as I could find as to their views regarding a protest by the corps diplomatique against the cruelties inflicted recently upon the rebel prisoners at Fez. They were all of opinion that some protest should be made without loss of time. I therefore went with the Russian Minister to see M. Regnault, now doyen of the corps diplomatique, who, on hearing of the general desire among the representatives for a collective protest, decided to call a meeting for yesterday evening to discuss the question.

At this meeting all the representatives expressed themselves in favour of the proposal, but the Italian, Austrian, American, and Belgian representatives announced their desire to consult their respective Governments by telegraph before signing a collective note. Pending the authorisation of the various Governments, a note was drawn up for signature, copy of which I enclose herewith, and as soon as all the representatives have announced their adherence, it will be transmitted by M. Regnault to M. Gaillard, doyen of the consular corps at Fez, for communication to the Sultan. A copy will at the same time be handed to Cid Guebbas.

Following the usual procedure in such cases, the note will be addressed to the Vizier for Foreign Affairs by the doyen in the name of the corps diplomatique. M. Gaillard, accompanied by all the consuls who are authorised to support him, will hand the note to Cid Aissa-ben-Omar in the presence of the Sultan, and will at the same time explain its contents to His Majesty.

At the meeting I ventured to insist on the necessity of speedy action, as I had already received news from Mr. MacLeod that the pretender was being exposed in an iron cage to the taunts of the Fez populace, and that no doubt some worse punishment was in store for him. It is to be hoped that the replies of the various Governments whose authorisation is required will be received without delay.

Meanwhile, as soon as possible after the receipt of your above-mentioned telegram, I dispatched by special messenger instructions to Mr. MacLeod to associate himself with M. Gaillard in the protest which he had been instructed by M. Regnault to make. Unfortunately the messenger sent by M. Regnault had already left before the arrival of your telegram, so I am not sure whether Mr. MacLeod will receive his instructions in time to associate himself with the protest of M. Gaillard. I had, however, privately told Mr. MacLeod some time ago that I felt sure that His Majesty's Government would approve of anything he could do, pending instructions, in an unofficial way, to put an end to these barbarities. M. Regnault explained that he had not had time to consult me before sending off his special messenger to M. Gaillard.

There is a general impression here that, however reprehensible such cruel punishments may be, they are in accordance with Koranic law. In fact, this was put forward at yesterday's meeting by the Austrian chargé d'affaires as an argument against intervention by the diplomatic body. The researches of Mr. Irwin, however, enabled me to reply that even by Koranic law the punishments inflicted by the Sultan were illegal, as, although the Koran lays down that rebels may be imprisoned, put to death, or have their feet or hands cut off, these punishments are not cumulative. The Sultan therefore was transgressing the law which he had himself invoked, in sending the mutilated prisoners back to prison, where they have practically all died. M. Regnault, moreover, pointed out that the custom of mutilating prisoners had died out since the days of Moulai Ismaïl, a contemporary of Louis XIV.

I have, &c.
FRANK RATTIGAN.

Inclosure in No. 319.

Note verbale to be communicated to the Sultan of Morocco.

LE corps diplomatique s'est ému des châtiments récemment infligés à Fez à des prisonniers; il a décidé d'appeler respectueusement l'attention de Sa Majesté chérifienne sur la réprobation que ces procédés ont provoqué dans le monde civilisé.

Le corps diplomatique exprime le vœu que Sa Majesté chérifienne veuille bien prendre l'engagement solennel de renoncer à des pratiques depuis longtemps tombées en désuétude au Maroc et condamnées par les lois de l'humanité, et qu'elle interdise toute torture, tout châtiment produisant des mutilations ou la mort lente.

Le corps diplomatique est persuadé que Sa Majesté chérifienne voudra bien, en édictant ces mesures, s'associer au désir manifesté par les Puissances dans l'intérêt supérieur de la civilisation.

[32664] No. 320.

Sir Edward Grey to Consul MacLeod.

No. 4.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 6, 1909.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 30 of the 16th August, and to state that he entirely approves your action in protesting to the Sultan against the barbarities inflicted on the prisoners captured in the recent defeat of the Pretender.

I am, &c.
F. A. CAMPBELL.

[33102] No. 321.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Rattigan.

(No. 129.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 8, 1909.

I APPROVE your action, as reported in your despatch No. 210 of the 26th ultimo, in instructing Mr. MacLeod to do his utmost to prevent the torture of prisoners at Fez, and in urging Cid Guebbas to impress on the Sultan the deplorable effect which such acts of cruelty would have upon the opinion of the civilised world.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[32228] No. 322.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Rattigan.

(No. 131.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 8, 1909.

IN June last I informed the Turkish chargé d'affaires in a memorandum, a copy of which was forwarded to Tangier in my despatch No. 66 of the 1st June, that though His Majesty's Government were pleased to permit His Majesty's consul at Casa Blanca to use his good offices for the protection of Turkish interests there, this did not bring Turkish subjects within the jurisdiction of the British consular court, nor entitle them to the extra-territorial privileges secured to British subjects.

The Turkish Ambassador reverted to this question in a conversation with me on the 17th ultimo. He observed that the German Government by extending their protection to Ottoman subjects had secured for Turkey the benefit of all extra-territorial privileges enjoyed by German persons in China, in spite of the fact that there was no treaty between China and Turkey conferring on the latter any extra-territorial rights. The Ambassador enquired whether His Majesty's Government could not obtain the same privileges for Turkish subjects in Morocco.

The two cases are not exactly parallel, as the Chinese Government, whilst not theoretically recognising German consular jurisdiction over Turkish subjects in China, do not, as a matter of fact, contest the exercise of it in practice; whereas His Majesty's Government can hardly expect to be allowed to exercise jurisdiction over Ottoman subjects in Morocco, except with the full consent of the Moorish Government. His Majesty's Government are, however, anxious to oblige the Turkish Government in the matter.

I request that you will favour me with your opinion as to whether the consent of the Moorish Government could be obtained to an arrangement of the nature proposed. I am advised that any difficulties which might be held to be in the way of the exercise of British jurisdiction over Ottoman subjects in Morocco, from the point of view of British law, could, if necessary, be met by suitable provisions being inserted in the new Morocco order in council of which the draft is now in preparation.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[33853] No. 323.

Consul MacLeod to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 9.)

(No. 73.)

Sir, *Fez, August* 30, 1909.

ACCORDING to the more exact information now available it appears that Buhamara met with some resistance by that tribe on reaching Beni Messara, but managed to instal himself in the sanctuary of Bu Amuran, about 8 miles south-east of Wazzan, and opened negotiations for their support. He was, however, unable to proceed any further, and meanwhile the Beni Messara, moved by the Shereef Mulai Ali of Wazzan, deserted him when the Sultan's troops arrived, as did also his remaining followers. He then hid himself in the sanctuary itself. The sanctuary was surrounded by troops, who then set fire to it, whereupon the Pretender came out and surrendered. When he was seen outside, unarmed, he was approached by several of the chief officers of the Sultan, the Basha Abdelkrim Eshirgui, Bu Owdah, Ben

Jellali, Najjim Mahabub, Mohamed and Seyd Bagdadi, and others, amongst whom a furious struggle began for possession of him, each officer being frantic to pose as his captor. They even knocked off each other's turbans, tore each other's clothes, and threatened each other with their rifles. This lasted for about two hours while the whole party were proceeding to the soldiers' camp, the prisoner indulging in all manner of sarcasms both upon this and upon their bad generalship and cowardice, especially "of that our Abdelkrim Eshirgui," and so forth, remarking that for weeks the Mehalla had outnumbered them by ten to one, he should have been caught long before; had any of his men behaved so badly he should have shaved off their beards, and so forth.

At Fez most extraordinary preparations were made for his reception.

Public holidays to last seven days were proclaimed. From dawn on the 24th, when he arrived, salvoes of cannon began to be fired, together with powder play by all the cavalry and Palace slaves. Enormous crowds poured out on the roads and into the old Meshwar of the Palace to meet the prisoner.

In an entirely private way I was amongst the crowd in the Old Meshwar, and so was myself a witness of nearly all that happened there. To have a chance of getting in privately one had to be there before 7 in the morning.

I have seen many spectacles in that Meshwar—reception of foreign missions and the like—but this one far transcended them all, and showed what the Moorish Government really can do when they have a visitor whom they are in the most sincere and highest degree delighted to receive! The reception of the German Emperor at Tangier may have equalled it, but I am sure, even it did not, in enthusiasm and gaudy splendour excel the entry of Buhamara. Gaily coloured new clothes were issued to all the troops on duty.

From 6 in the morning infantry were drawn up opposite the Sultan's kiosk in the Meshwar. The Sultan's brass bands, alternately with bugle bands and Moorish pipe and drum bands, discoursed music. The Kaïd-al-Meshwar, the Minister of War (Glawi, junior), and scores of other high functionaries played powder in front of the Sultan's kiosk in view of the thousands of spectators. The Sultan seated himself with his vizirs inside the Palace gateway at the inside of the Meshwar about 8 o'clock.

Guns boomed from time to time, and the streets and roofs to the east of the Meshwar were filled with men, women, and children of the populace all in their gayest attire, keeping up a din with tom-toms, Moorish pipes, and drums, parties of women even dancing in the streets.

About 10 o'clock a party of horsemen sent off with a camel carrying a square-shaped cage about 4 feet high by 3 feet wide and 3 feet deep in which the prisoner was to arrive.

About 11 o'clock the prisoner's party, surrounded by a huge crowd, reached the top of the hill above the Meshwar, and was saluted with a salvo of cannons, and half-an-hour later, amid more cannon firing, entered the north-west gate of the Meshwar, which it crossed, and finally the camel with the prisoner was halted in front of the Sultan just inside the Palace gateway.

I had a good view of the prisoner as he crossed the Meshwar, but as regards what passed subsequently I have the details from Europeans in the Sultan's service who were inside the gateway.

The prisoner was seated cross-legged in the cage. He seemed fatigued, but every one was struck with the undaunted composure—indeed, almost the dignity—of his demeanour.

In appearance he is of swarthy brown colour, with narrow aquiline features, high forehead, long jaws, square chin, shaggy black hair, and thin black beard with a slight touch of grey—withal a strong handsome face of a typically Arab cast. He looked about 40 years of age. His hands are peculiarly long and thin, and the nails have been left to grow uncut. His only other peculiarity was one of his eyes, which seemed weak and the eyelid of which drooped.

On the whole he corresponded pretty exactly with the many descriptions I have had of him, but all persons who are acquainted with Mulai Mohammed, and who have now seen Buhamara, are unanimous in saying they have not the slightest general resemblance to each other. Mulai Mohammed is one-eyed, though his blind eye is of the opposite side to Buhamara's drooping eye, and both had marks on their ankles. Buhamara said these were marks of fetters—which would have been true of Mulai Mohammed—whereas they were, in his case, merely cauterisings he had had done on one ankle for some ailment.

The Sultan held in his hand the seals of Buhamara, which had been captured in his camp.

When the prisoner was brought forward and the cage taken off the camel, the Sultan said, "What is the meaning of your disturbing the country all these years? Who told you to do it?" To this the prisoner answered with quiet composure, "This is not the place for conversation. First of all I ask for 'Aman' (*i.e.*, security and safety). The Sultan answered, "You have 'aman' for your own person."

Buhamara said "Good," and then at once remarked that he was tired and very hungry—moreover his clothes had been taken by his captors, who had given him the common dirty things he was wearing, and with which he was unaccustomed. He would like some refreshment and clean clothes.

The Sultan seemed much struck with the prisoner's composure, granted these requests, and then retired, whereupon the assemblage began to disperse. The prisoner was then taken to a room close at hand, was given clean clothes and an excellent meal —to which he did full justice.

In that afternoon and during several hours on the three succeeding days, he has been publicly exhibited in a still smaller cage, placed on a pedestal in the centre of the "Meshwar," and under a canopy made of his own "State" tent and amid continued rejoicings, music, crowds, and "Powder Play." The Sultan himself and the Viziers Glawi and Aissa Ben Omar and Kaid Mtugi took part in the Powder Play there next day.

There Buhamara has been seen by numerous men, sent by tribes over whom he used to rule to learn whether he had really been caught. Meanwhile he has been in frequent communication with the Sultan, and has written letters to the officials at Taza in particular, telling them of his having been captured, and directing them to hand over the Government stores there to officials the Sultan is sending. It is said also that he has given information about his money, and about his dealings with Europeans.

I understand he told the Sultan that for some months he had been convinced he could not carry on much longer, and so he had designed to reach the Sanctuary of Mulai Abdselam (*i.e.*, the almost impregnable mountains lying between Tetuan and Alcazar, and in which Raissouli secured Mr. Perdicaris, Mr. Varley, and Kaïd Maclean), and there to negotiate a peace with the Sultan. (It seems to me equally probable he may latterly have had the idea of escaping thence to Ceuta.)

As Mulai Al Kebir has never been actually proclaimed Sultan by any of the tribes where he is in refuge, the result of the capture of Buhamara is that Mulai Hafid is now the undisputed ruler of all Morocco. It is the last, the greatest and the most unexpected of his successes, and will go further to enhance his reputation in the country—and even in Europe—and consolidate his power than anything (except, of course, his ultimate victory over Mulai Abdelaziz and his being recognised by the Powers) he has yet achieved. This increase of reputation may bye-and-bye be of much value to him amongst the Riffs, when he has to mediate between them and the Spaniards.

The troops and officers he has had are practically merely those of Mulai Abdelaziz. They have had no better training nor discipline, and—though better fed—have been worse paid and worse armed. The Makhzen has not, in system or morals or practice, been at all reformed in the interior.

The tribes who followed Buhamara had, of course, begun to see more and more through his imposture. His dealings with the Spaniards—added to his exactions and cruelties—reduced his power still further. That these circumstances, however, have been turned to account, and that Buhamara has been prevented from entering upon a wandering career of brigandage, can only, in fairness, be credited to the Sultan's energy, to the salutary fear of him with which he has imbued his officials and troops, and to his grip and craftiness in managing both the tribes and the Shereefs, who act as intermediaries between the Makhzen and chronically lawless tribes.

His next steps are expected to be the exaction of heavy indemnities from the Hiayna and Fer-Wazzan tribes (the Hiayna, indeed, ought to have captured Buhamara long ago), and the placing of small garrisons at Taza, Kasbah-Msun, and perhaps other points on the road between Fez and Oujdah.

Lately his immediate financial (local) straits have been temporarily eased by money he has received from the south, especially from Huha, but the negotiations of a loan in Paris, and the situation in Melilla, are his chief preoccupations.

With regard to the punishment of Buhamara, the French consul spoke with me

three days ago. M. Caillard said the barbarities committed upon the other prisoners had excited much disgust and indignation—naturally enough—in France. When news of this caging of Buhamara reached France there would be more indignation. But what could he do to stop it? The Sultan, if M. Caillard spoke to him, would only hold such intercession as a proof of the truth of reports which ascribed Buhamara's doings to French instigation.

M. Caillard did not say so expressly, but he hinted vaguely that we were under no such suspicion, so we were freer to make such an intercession.

I answered that the cases of Buhamara and his deluded followers were somewhat different. Buhamara had himself often burned offenders alive. I abhorred such a punishment, even for him, as putting him in a cage, particularly a small cage wherein he could not stretch himself. But to the mere exhibition of him would be difficult to object to strongly, in such a country as this, where it was necessary to prove the capture beyond all question by distant superstitious tribes, amongst whom legends about him would otherwise be apt to remain. The prisoner was only exhibited for a few hours daily, and that would be for a very few days only, and he received plenty of food and clothing, and had a good room to himself, and bedding.

The Grand Vizier had told me it was not intended thereafter to do more than imprison him for life in irons, but perhaps he would be exhibited in a cage in other towns and tribes bye-and-bye. I could not, therefore, see the slightest chance at present of the Sulan's modifying his present treatment, and intervention from me, at any rate, would probably only be resented. (I reflected also that Buhamara is too valuable a prisoner for the Sultan to treat immediately very badly, and that if intercession be desirable in the matter, there is time for me to be instructed in that sense.)

So both M. Caillard and I concluded it would be best to wait for such instructions—if any—as might be sent to us. I would remark, however, that M. Caillard has congratulated the Sultan on the capture (subsequently to the barbarities), which I have studiously abstained from doing. Moreover, he and the Austrian consul, Herr Loehr, a German merchant (and who was wearing decorations), were present—seated, and in a very official manner, inside the Palace gateway near the Sultan when the prisoner was brought before His Majesty, whereas the German and Spanish consuls and I refrained from appearing there.

I have, &c.
J. M. MACLEOD.

[33358] No. 324.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 382. Confidential.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 9, 1909.

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency herewith, for your information, copy of a despatch, as marked in the margin,* which I have received from His Majesty's chargé d'affaires in Tangier on the subject of the special treatment in Morocco which the French will, it is alleged, claim as a condition of any loan to that country.

I do not propose, for the present, to take any notice of these allegations.

I have, &c.
E. GREY.

[33919] No. 325.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received September* 10.)

(No. 365.)

Sir, *Paris, September* 9, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith the leading article of to-night's "Temps,"* which expresses some apprehension at the extension of the basis of the Spanish military operations round Melilla. This extension will, according to the "Temps," cause certain tribes to rise who have hitherto remained quiet, and there is reason to believe that the measures taken by the Spaniards somewhat exceed the exigencies of the situation. Rumours from Fez state that the Sultan is getting

* No. 318.

anxious at the progress made by the Spanish troops, at the agitation which they create, and at the reported intention of the Spanish Government to push on a railway as far as Taza. The article ends by expressing the hope that Spain does not think of transforming a necessary and legitimate police measure into a military campaign, which would be as dangerous as it was unnecessary, and that after having under-estimated the strength of her adversaries she was not now over-rating it.

I have the honour to transmit to you, further, a copy of a statement made by the Spanish Ambassador to a correspondent of the "Temps" on this subject.* The Marquis del Muni declares that the present operations are being carried out with the entire approval of the French Government.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

[34202] No. 326.

Mr. Rattigan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 13.)

(No. 217.)
Sir, *Tangier, September 2, 1909.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 216 of the 28th ultimo, I have the honour to report that the collective note, protesting against the cruel treatment of prisoners at Fez, having been adhered to by all the representatives, was dispatched by special courier last night

I have, &c.
FRANK RATTIGAN.

P.S.—Two small modifications were made in the text of the note enclosed in my above-mentioned despatch, viz.: In the first line the word "supplices" was substituted for "châtiments," and in the 2nd paragraph "l'engagement solennel" was changed to "l'engagement formel."

F. R.

[34203] No. 327.

Mr. Rattigan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 13.)

(No. 218. Confidential.)
Sir, *Tangier, September 2, 1909.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 213 of the 28th ultimo, I have the honour to report to you the following information in regard to the proposed new Moroccan loan, which has been obtained by Mr. Hodgson from the director of the State bank.

According to M. Gauran, the loan is to be issued in two series.

Series I: To produce 80,000,000 fr. for settlement of Makhzen debts, a 5 per cent. stock is to be issued considerably below par (possibly between 80 and 90) secured on the unassigned 40 per cent. of the customs, tobacco monopoly, Makhzen's share of the house-tax, &c. I may point out that these terms are far less favourable to the Moorish Government than those indicated to me by M. Regnault (see my above-mentioned despatch). This series will enjoy preferential rights in respect of its service out of the yield of the assigned revenues, as compared with series II. No details are forthcoming as to a sinking fund.

Series II: To produce 70,000,000 fr. for the payment of the French war indemnity, a 3 per cent. stock, guaranteed by the French Government, is to be issued as nearly as possible at par. The bonds will be taken over by the French Government in settlement of the indemnity. The security will be the same as that of series I, subject to the preferential rights of the latter. Nothing again is known of a sinking fund for this series.

Mr. Hodgson calculates that the interest on these two loans will amount to between 7,000,000 and 8,000,000 fr., which is approximately half-a-million less than the total yield of the unassigned 40 per cent. of the customs in a good year.

The Sultan is stated to have at present some sixteen thousand men under arms, and even after allowing for the disbandment of a large number, owing to the capture

* Not printed

of the Roghi, the expenses of maintaining so large a force will probably take up the whole of the revenues from the ports. On the other hand, now that his position has been so greatly strengthened by the recent victories, the Sultan will with these troops be enabled to enforce taxes throughout the country, which will no doubt amount to several millions of francs. Under the circumstances, it seems to me more than likely that His Shereefian Majesty will reject the somewhat unfavourable terms which are now offered him for the negotiation of the loan.

I have, &c.
FRANK RATTIGAN.

[34204] No. 328.

Mr. Rattigan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 13.)

(No. 219. Confidential.)
Sir, *Tangier, September 2, 1909.*

I RECEIVED to-day a visit from M. Regnault, who gave me some interesting information in regard to the situation in the Riff, which he had obtained from the numerous French war correspondents at Melilla. The latter had almost all accompanied the French army of occupation throughout their operations in the Shawia, and were therefore able to make some interesting comparisons as to the task which lay before the forces of France and Spain respectively, and as to their capacity for dealing with the difficulties which confronted them in each case.

There is no doubt that in numbers, war material, transport arrangements, &c., the Spaniards have now a great advantage over the French expeditionary force. They have, moreover, some sixty guns, half of them quick-firing, while the French never had more than sixteen. Against these advantages must be set the fact that the Riff is incomparably more difficult country for manœuvring than the plains of the Shawia, whilst the Riffians are much more dangerous adversaries than the southern Arabs.

The correspondents are unanimous in describing the Spanish estimates of the Riff forces as vastly exaggerated. Their own estimate of the tribesmen occupying Mount Gurugu and the fighting zone round Melilla is some 6,000 men. Mr. Irwin, who is as good a judge as anyone in Morocco of the strength of the various tribes, also considers it quite impossible for the Riffians to put into the field anything like the numbers estimated by the Spaniards.

In regard to the Spanish troops themselves, the correspondents have expressed the highest opinions. In very disheartening circumstances they have almost invariably shown great courage and cheerfulness, whilst their discipline is far from bad. The younger officers are also worthy of praise for the energy and enterprise they have shown. But for everyone above the rank of captain, and especially for General Marinas, the correspondents express the greatest contempt. They allege that, practically without exception, the officers of higher rank are absolutely inert and apparently ignorant of the elements of their profession. None of them appear capable of executing the simplest plan, and though they have on several occasions given proof of their courage under fire, their hopeless want of energy and love of repose render them worse than useless. As to General Marinas, he is stated not to have the slightest knowledge of what is going on, and continually makes himself ridiculous by the absurd questions he asks of his subordinates. He is even alleged to have gone the length of asking the correspondents for their views as to the best way of taking Mount Gurugu.

M. Regnault is very apprehensive as to the eventual Spanish advance. He does not anticipate that General Marinas will meet with much resistance from the Riffs, in view of the enormous superiority of his force. He fears that the General, led on by the desire for glory, may then advance on Taza. In that case, M. Regnault said, "certainement les Français marcheront," which I took to mean that such a step would involve the partition of Morocco, presumably on the lines of the secret agreement between France and Spain. M. Regnault informed me that he personally did not view with favour such a solution of the Moroccan question. He would much prefer the gradual control of the country, which would result from the present French policy of pacific penetration—in fact, the "tunisification" of Morocco.

I have, &c.
FRANK RATTIGAN.

[34206] No. 329.

Mr. Rattigan to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received September* 13.)

(No. 221.)

Sir, *Tangier, September* 4, 1909.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 216 of the 28th ultimo, I have the honour to report that I have received a despatch from Consul MacLeod, informing me that in an audience with the Sultan on the 30th ultimo the French consul obtained an assurance from His Majesty that no punishments beyond instant death or imprisonment would in future be inflicted on the prisoners.

For the reasons explained in my above-mentioned despatch Mr. MacLeod did not receive his instructions in time to associate himself with the protest of M. Gaillard, but he has asked for an audience in order that he may inform His Majesty of his instructions to join in the representations made by the French consul.

I have, &c.
FRANK RATTIGAN.

[34207] No. 330.

Mr. Rattigan to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received September* 13.)

(No. 222.)

Sir, *Tangier, September* 4, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a memorandum drawn up by Mr. Irwin relative to the measures taken by Raisuli to enforce his authority over the tribes placed under his jurisdiction.

I have, &c.
FRANK RATTIGAN.

Inclosure in No. 330.

Memorandum by Mr. Irwin.

SOME three weeks since Kaïd Raisuli, owing to the too evident signs of restlessness shown by the tribes under his jurisdiction, combined with a desire to rid themselves of his governorship, that were being displayed by them, was compelled to undertake a campaign against them to impose his authority. He applied to the Makhzen for arms, ammunition, and soldiers, and was furnished, after considerable opposition on the part of Cid Guebbas, with some 900 men, two guns, and a quantity of rifles and ammunition.

At first he took up a position on the borders of the Beni Ider tribe, when he very narrowly escaped a serious defeat. He then shifted his camp into the Jibel Habib, and proceeded to attack and burn their villages, in which he was quite successful. He remained there waiting for the tribe to send in to make terms with him, his force being, in the meanwhile, busily occupied in seeking out and sacking the underground granaries of the tribe, Raisuli having given orders that all grain, with the exception of millet, was to be taken as booty by the men of his force.

His inaction, however, was apparently construed by the tribesmen in a different sense, for some few days since they made a determined attack on his camp, for which, however, it would seem, he was quite prepared, and they were repulsed with considerable loss. Raisuli at once gave orders for all grain, including millet, to be taken, and burned some more of their villages. The tribe will thus be left without any grain during the winter, the crops having almost all been gathered in, and they will doubtless experience great privations until the next year's crops are garnered.

This defeat has had a most salutary effect on the other mountain tribes under his jurisdiction, who are said to be hastening to come to terms with him. Nothing is yet known as to what course the Anjera will take.

Raisuli's success must be looked on as another victory for the Makhzen, and will tend greatly to the maintenance of order in this district. It can be said, without any partiality to Raisuli, that he deserves considerable credit for the way in which he has carried out this operation. He is probably the only man in this part of the country who could have attempted it.

A. IRWIN.

[34209] No. 331.

Mr. Rattigan to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received September* 13.)

(No. 224.)

Sir, *Tangier, September* 6, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have just received from Consul MacLeod, reporting the representations made by him to the Sultan in regard to the cruelties inflicted on prisoners at Fez.

I have, &c.
FRANK RATTIGAN.

Inclosure in No. 331.

Consul MacLeod to Mr. Rattigan.

(No. 62.)

Sir, *Fez, September* 2, 1909.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 61 of the 30th August, I have the honour to report that I went to the palace late yesterday afternoon by appointment to see the Sultan.

Whilst waiting I was informed by the French Captain Leglay that only four of the mutilated prisoners were now alive. These were four soldiers of the Makhzen, who had been found with the Pretender. On the 31st instant the Sultan released about 150 of the prisoners (old soldiers of the Makhzen), including these four mutilated men, and they were distributed amongst the regiments now here. Captain Leglay therefore passed the four mutilated men as soldiers into the temporary hospital for the wounded which the French Military Mission have induced the Sultan to establish, and there they are receiving every care from Dr. Bellot, of the French Military Mission.

Dr. Bellot found their wounds in a most shocking and dangerous state, so possibly the men may even yet succumb to their punishment.

The Sultan seemed in depressed spirits, and when I spoke of the mutilations he showed great embarrassment. I said I believed the French consul had delivered to him a message from the French Government remonstrating strongly against these recent punishments. Severity was, indeed, sometimes most necessary, but it never need go beyond—in capital cases—death by some instant means. All civilised nations had long abandoned the killing of people by torture, and the British Government had been astonished by what His Majesty had done, but they were also grieved and disappointed.

Since he had begun to reign, the British Government had begun to hope that he would raise the positions of Morocco and himself in the world, but such doings led to both foreign Governments and civilised people everywhere, who could not go into all details and circumstances, to instantly classify the Sultan with savage and pagan rulers, instead of with religious, educated kings. This was against both their personal and political wishes for Morocco and for himself.

For the welfare of Morocco and for the Sultan's own sake, the British Government wished to associate themselves entirely with the remonstrances the French Government had made and with the request that such punishments be never again inflicted. For myself, he knew my feelings for him, and would believe me that had I had the least knowledge or expectation of what was intended, I should have stopped at nothing towards dissuading him from inflicting these punishments—not only for the sake of the punished men, but for the Sultan's own sake—for he had done himself enormous injury by them, and it would take many years of good government and many good acts to replace him in the repute in the world in which the British as well as the French Government wished him to stand.

To my surprise the Sultan made no attempt to argue the matter, but, somewhat huskily, said, "Very good; I have quite understood you, and will remember what your Government has said."

From the Sultan's demeanour to me, as well as towards the French consul, together with what we hear of his saying to other persons, both Europeans and Moors, he seems really affronted and sorry for what he did, not wholly, perhaps, from humane reasons, but mainly because, full of pride and ambition as he is, he now realises how enormously he has lowered himself in the eyes of the outside world.

In anticipation that the Sultan would again attempt to defend these punishments, I had intended to point out how he had exceeded and violated even Islamic law by inflicting both mutilation and imprisonment, *i.e.*, two punishments for one offence, and that while Bu Hamara and his followers were rebels to Mulai Abdel Aziz, to whom they had given their allegiance, they were not rebels nor traitors to, but merely enemies of, Mulai Hafid, whom they had never acknowledged as Sultan, and to have enlarged on the illegality of not hearing the prisoners in their defence, and the extreme haste shown throughout—all against strict law. Under the circumstances, I thought, however, such further language would sound ungenerous, and might do more harm than good.

In the course of subsequent conversation, the Sultan mentioned (what I had heard elsewhere) that Bu Hamara is ill. The Sultan said he had had a roomy cage made for him, and allowed him as many clothes, &c., as he wished (for he complained continually of shivering and cold), and he had unlimited good food.

Since the fourth day after his arrival the public exhibiting of Bu Hamara has ceased. So long, therefore, as his case is not very pressing, I do not propose to say anything regarding it pending such instructions, if any, as may be sent to me.

J. M. MACLEOD.

[33685] No. 332.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. White.

(No. 133.)

Foreign Office, September 13, 1909.

Sir,

I TRANSMIT herewith a copy of a letter from Messrs. Emanuel and Simmonds* respecting the claim of Messrs. Pariente and Co. against the Moorish Government, which, as you are aware, the latter have acknowledged as due.

You will observe that it is stated in paragraph 9 that the Moorish Government derive annually about 600,000*l.* from the customs revenues, and that there would appear to be no reason why the 480,000*l.*, which remain after deducting the 120,000*l.* payable in respect of the French loan of 1904, should not be allocated to the payment of the Government's creditors. Mr. Abensur, a partner in Pariente and Co., who called at the Foreign Office recently, stated that his firm were in a position to know that these funds were available, and he suggested that the State bank, before handing them over, should, with the concurrence of the French authorities, retain a sum sufficient to cover his firm's claim.

I request that you will inform me whether you consider this course would be feasible, and whether there would be any likelihood of the French authorities agreeing to it. In the event of your answer being in the negative, I should be glad to learn whether you can suggest any other way of facilitating payment by the Makhzen of this debt, which is stated to be causing serious embarrassment to their creditors, who are known to be a firm of old and good standing.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

[34573] No. 333.

Note by M. Cambon respecting draft Moroccan Mining Regulations.—(Communicated to Foreign Office September 15, 1909.)

LE Gouvernement français propose de fixer au 3 novembre prochain la réunion à Paris des membres de la commission officieuse chargée d'examiner le projet de règlement minier marocain, et il serait heureux de savoir si cette date agrée au Gouvernement britannique.

M. Porché, qui est attendu prochainement à Paris, juge nécessaire d'apporter encore quelques modifications au projet définitif de règlement minier; aussitôt ce travail terminé, c'est-à-dire au commencement d'octobre, il en remettra des copies au délégué français, M. Aguillon. Celui-ci en fera alors parvenir un exemplaire au délégué britannique, si, comme l'espère M. Pichon, les renseignements sommaires sur

* Not printed.

le contenu de ce projet de règlement fournis par M. Daeschner à Sir Edward Grey, le 4 septembre dernier, auront permis au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté de fixer, avant la fin du présent mois, son choix sur un représentant.

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 14 *septembre*, 1909.

[35211] No. 334.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 20.)

(No. 109.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Tangier, September* 20, 1609.

GUEBBAS has addressed a letter to the doyen of the corps diplomatique stating that he is [group omitted: ? ordered] by the Sultan to draw attention to the large force sent to Riff by Spain, which causes incessant apprehension, as it is larger than is necessary for its avowed object. Its presence gives rise to anarchy and disturbances, and the Sultan declines all responsibility pecuniary or otherwise for the consequences. His Majesty hopes that a satisfactory solution may be found by the Spanish Government and Moorish mission, but requests Powers to make friendly representations at Madrid.

A long enclosure recapitulates history of events and negotiations in support of the Moorish case.

Guebbas has also addressed identic note to the foreign representatives separately, requesting that they may communicate to their respective Governments at once his letter to the doyen.

[35955] No. 335.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Grant Duff.

(No. 110.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 21. 1909.

THE Spanish Ambassador came to tell me to-day that he had heard from his Government respecting the note which the Maghzen had addressed to the diplomatic body at Tangier, inviting them to make representations to the Spanish Government respecting the operations at Melilla. We were to receive the note soon, and he supposed I knew what the contents were.

The Ambassador then told me that the Spanish Government had 40,000, not 60,000, men engaged in the operations at Melilla. It was necessary to have a force of this size, in order to hold the Spanish positions; but it was not intended for a forward movement into Morocco. The Spanish Government looked upon the matter as a frontier question between themselves and Morocco, and did not consider that it concerned any one else. They had given assurances to the other Powers most interested in Morocco that Spain could do nothing contrary to the Act of Algeciras, and this being so the Spanish Government could not see that there was any ground for anxiety or intervention on the part of the Powers. Spain was only doing what France had done before. The number of Spanish troops engaged was larger only because of the nature of the country, and owing to the fact that Spain had no troops specially adapted for the purpose, such as France had.

I replied that I had not yet received the note, and I assumed that it would have to be answered by the doyen of the diplomatic body at Tangier. My own disposition, however, would be to say that as Spain had given assurances that nothing would be done contrary to the Act of Algeciras the question was simply a frontier one between Spain and Morocco, and that the only way to ensure peace was that the Moorish Government should do all it could to secure peace and security for the Spaniards on their Moorish frontier.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

[35519] No. 336.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 23.)

(No. 111.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, September 23, 1909.*

PROTEST of Sultan regarding Spanish action in the Riff reported in my telegram No. 109.

Cid Guebbas's letter has been put in circulation by the doyen, who expresses the opinion that the matter is one for settlement between the Makhzen and the Spanish Government exclusively, it not being within the province of the diplomatic body.

The circular passed first to the Spanish Minister, who, in expressing his concurrence in the opinion of M. Regnault, points out that the Powers have recognised that Spain and Morocco exclusively are concerned in the question of security and order in region of the frontier, to which category the matter belongs.

The circular was brought to me by M. Merry del Val in person. He informed me that he had been instructed by his Government to do so, and to request me to express my concurrence in the opinion of M. Regnault and himself. I replied that before committing myself to the expression of any opinion in the circular, I should desire to receive your instructions on the subject, and as he was anxious that the circular should not pass to the other representatives before I had made my observations on it, I promised to retain the circular in the meantime. I informed M. Merry del Val that personally I agreed with the views of M. Regnault.

[35536] No. 337.

Mr. Carnegie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 24.)

(No. 380.)
Sir, *Paris, September 22, 1909.*

WITH reference to Sir Maurice de Bunsen's despatch No. 173 of the 16th ultimo, copy of which was forwarded to me in your despatch No. 381 of the 8th instant, in regard to the causes which have led the Spanish Government to undertake the Melilla campaign, I venture to think that an article which appears in the "Dépêche coloniale" of to-day's date, setting forth a French view of the situation, presents some features of interest.

The writer of this article appears to consider that the recent events in the Riff district are the prelude to a great war undertaken with three objects: firstly, of occupying the warlike energies of the Spanish nation; secondly, of rallying the various political parties on the common ground of patriotism; and thirdly, of conquering a colony in which Melilla would become the port for Taza and for Fez.

Since the loss of Cuba and the Philippines, he says, the Spanish officers have had no outlet for their energies, and have consequently been led to embark on revolutionary intrigues. But Spain is passing through not only a military, but also an economic crisis. The rebellion in Catalonia was due rather to economic than to political causes, and the realisation of this fact has led certain Spanish politicians to dream that a current of commerce might be directed from Barcelona viâ Melilla into Morocco.

Melilla is, however, legally nothing but a convict station. Both the Spaniards and the Moors have hitherto always regarded it as such, and not as a market. The markets required by the Moors for the sale of their cattle, their grain, and their wool, and for the purchase of sugar and European stuffs are provided at Tlemcen, Marnia, Nemours, and Port Say. The Moors have been accustomed to trade through these markets with Algeria for the past eighty years. They fully realise their importance to their country as well as to France, and a feeling favourable to France and hostile to Spain prevails throughout Eastern Morocco. It is in consequence of these facts that a great effort is being made in Algeria to develop fully the economic relations between France and Morocco. A railway has been voted between Nemours and Marnia; good roads have been constructed between Port Say, Nemours, Marnia, and Oujda; and a railway is being built between Tlemcen and Marnia.

Melilla is now anxious to secure this Moroccan commerce, which for centuries has belonged to Oran. It desires to become a great trading centre, as is proved by the works now being undertaken there; and it is there that Spain is concentrating a formidable army, which is not merely a reinforcement for the defence of a fortress.

That the views expressed in the "Dépêche coloniale" respecting Spanish action in Morocco are not shared by public opinion generally in France may be seen from the perusal of two articles on the subject which appeared in the "Temps" and the "Débats" respectively last night. The former, in commenting on the note of protest recently addressed by Mulai Hafid to the doyen of the diplomatic corps at Tangier, observes that Spain is only doing what Germany did in China in 1897, and what France did at Casa Blanca and Oujda. Morocco cannot expect to enjoy the advantages of anarchy without incurring its responsibilities. If reference be made to the Act of Algeciras, one sees that Spain may treat directly with the Makhzen, without the intervention of the Powers, in regard to the districts bordering on her possessions. A German paper, the "Freisinnige Zeitung," has expressed the opinion that Mulai Hafid is in the right, and that the Spaniards are exceeding their rights, but that a clerical policy of adventure disregards such questions. It appears to me, says the "Temps," that Spanish policy has acted quite properly in resorting to the measures of reprisal which it has adopted, and that European patriotism should afford moral support to Spain in the accomplishment of her undertaking, the limits of which the Spanish Ambassador in Paris defined the other day (see Sir Francis Bertie's despatch No. 365 of the 9th instant).

The "Débats" observes that the remarks of certain German papers, which talk of the "policy of adventure" pursued by Spain, are as out of season as unjustifiable. The Spanish Government have repeatedly stated that they have no wish to engage in a war of conquest, and there is no reason to doubt their word. The plan of the Spanish operations is well known: it is a simple measure of police destined to "give air to" the fortress of Melilla and to ensure its safety. Under these conditions the action of Spain is perfectly justifiable and can inspire no uneasiness. She is defending her national honour in the Riff; and Europe, confident in her fidelity to her international engagements, follows her action with sympathy, and can only wish her success, for she is really fighting in the cause of civilisation.

I have, &c.
LANCELOT D. CARNEGIE.

[35519] No. 338.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. White.

(No. 52.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, September 25, 1909.*

SULTAN'S attempt to induce Powers to intercede with Spain against prolongation of Melilla campaign.

Your telegram No. 111 of the 23rd instant.

I told the Spanish Ambassador, who called at the Foreign Office on the 21st instant and enquired as to my views, that I had not yet seen the text of the Moorish note, the reply to which, I supposed, would have to come from the doyen of the diplomatic corps at Tangier. Personally, however, I should be disposed to say that, as Spain had promised in no way to contravene the Act of Algeciras, the latter resolved itself into a frontier question between Spain and Morocco, and that for the Moorish Government to do all in their power to establish quiet and security for Spain on her Moorish frontier was the only means of ensuring peace.

I am of course unable to authorise you to make any definite reply before seeing the text of the Moorish note, and should be glad to know when it may be expected.

[35768] No. 339.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 27.)

(No. 229.)
Sir, *Tangier, September 14, 1909.*

THE Italian Minister, upon whom I called yesterday upon my return to Tangier, said that he was glad to have an opportunity of speaking to me on the modifications in the programme of public works proposed by the Spanish Government, reported in Mr. Rattigan's despatch No. 24, Commercial, of the 8th instant. M. Nerazzini appeared much disturbed at the desire of the Spanish Government to withdraw the lighthouse at Tres Forcas from the programme, and to leave its construction for

arrangement between the Spanish and Moorish Governments under the last paragraph of article 66 of the Algeciras Act.

M. Nerazzini said that it was quite evident that the Spanish Government desired to establish themselves at Cape Tres Forcas, and to obtain the whole coast line from that point to Cap de l'Eau, their main object being to gain complete possession of the Mar Chica, which could be converted into another Bizerta, to which it would, indeed, be superior, owing to its position. He said that his Government was deeply interested in the maintenance of the *status quo* in the Mediterranean, and could not regard with equanimity the construction of a strong naval base at the Mar Chica; he had pointed out to them the grave danger, and fully explained the matter, and it was now for them to decide. He attributed their delay in agreeing to the Spanish proposals to this cause, and hoped that His Majesty's Government had also delayed their reply on the same account, as our position at Gibraltar would be seriously compromised by a Bizerta at Mar Chica.

I pointed out to M. Nerazzini that it would entail an enormous expenditure to construct a naval port at Mar Chica, and that it was scarcely likely that Spain would carry out such a work, especially as she already possesses good naval bases quite close; it seemed to me, therefore, that there was really no great cause for alarm.

M. Nerazzini thought that the Mar Chica could be used by torpedo-boats without the necessity of any very great expenditure, but his real fear was, he said, not that the Spaniards would themselves do the work, but that they would dispose of Mar Chica to some other Power. I replied that I hardly thought that would be likely, for though the Spaniards had made but little of their settlements in Morocco, they attached much importance to their possession, and Spanish pride and sentiment would prevent their cession to any other Power.

M. Nerazzini seemed disappointed at my not sharing his fears, and merely repeated that he had cleared his own responsibility by warning his Government, and that the matter was now in their hands.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

P.S.—*September* 18. I have just received a circular from the doyen, communicating to the diplomatic body a letter addressed to him by M. Nerazzini, informing him that the Italian Government agrees to the modifications in the programme of public works proposed by the Spanish Government.

H. E. W.

[35769] No. 340.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 27.)

(No. 230. Confidential.)

Sir, *Tangier, September* 15, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch received from His Majesty's consul at Fez, enclosing a *procès-verbal* of the audience granted by the Sultan to the consular corps at Fez, when they delivered to His Majesty the collective note from the foreign representatives at Tangier protesting against the barbarous treatment of prisoners.

Cid Guebbas informed Mr. Irwin in confidence that the Sultan was much annoyed at the collective note being presented through the consular corps at Fez, and had written to him on the subject, pointing out that he was the proper channel for communication, and blaming him for having allowed the letter to be sent through the consuls. Cid Guebbas stated the formal presentation of the letter by the five consular officials jointly had given rise to much comment at Fez, and had led the populace to believe that it was of a minatory nature. His Excellency attributed the adoption by the diplomatic body of this procedure to the French Minister, who is at present acting-doyen, and who, he thinks, desired to lower the Sultan's prestige.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 340.

Consul MacLeod to Mr. Rattigan.

(No. 63.)

Sir, *Fez, September* 11, 1909.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 20 of the 29th August, I have the honour to enclose herewith copy of the *procès-verbal* of the audience accorded to-day to the consular body here by the Sultan in regard to the recent barbarities inflicted on prisoners, followers of the Pretender.

In the course of the conversation alluded to in the *procès-verbal*, the Sultan remarked that the English, in the Transvaal war (for he had seen photographs of this), destroyed fruit trees (to Moslem nations a great atrocity!), and the Riff people were even now being hit and having their limbs knocked off by shells. The Spanish consul and I pointed out these were things incidental to war, but the Sultan did not seem to distinguish between things done in fight and things done on helpless prisoners after a fight.

For the rest, His Majesty merely reasserted that he had acted in mitigation of the death penalty, and the Grand Vizier related many atrocities committed by Buhamara, and I deprecated the Sultan taking Buhamara as a model.

I do not consider the Sultan's final reply as entirely satisfactory, but it seems as much as can be expected at once, and, I imagine, if he received a further note from the Powers impressing on him the difference between doing things in war and doing them when the enemy has surrendered, or is captive, he would be unlikely to repeat these punishments.

In his conversation, the Sultan remarked also that if the Powers used the consuls here to intervene when they thought he had done wrong, ought not the consuls to do their best in the Sultan's behalf when, as in Melilla district, for instance, just now, His Majesty was being wronged! This was not said altogether ironically, but was, I think, rather an example of the antiquated notions the Sultan occasionally expresses, and which he has gained from his studies of old Moorish books. Of old the Sultans regarded consuls as their servants, and letters in which they are thus addressed are still to be found in old archives. The consuls were regarded pretty much as emissaries from semi-independent tribes—that is to say, they were allowed to intercede on behalf of their tribes, and were expected to promote the Sultan's interests with those tribes.

I may mention also that the consular body were kept waiting to-day three hours after the appointed time of audience.

I have, &c.
J. M. MACLEOD.

Inclosure 2 in No. 340.

Procès-verbal of Meeting of Consular Body held September 11, 1909.

LE corps consulaire a été reçu samedi à midi par le Sultan au Dar Debibagh en présence du Grand Vizir et du Ministre chérifien des Affaires Étrangères.

M. Caillard, doyen du corps consulaire, fit d'abord connaître à Sa Majesté que le corps consulaire de Fez avait été chargé par le corps diplomatique de Tanger de lui donner lecture et de lui remettre une note relative aux traitements infligés aux prisonniers roguistes.

M. Caillard lut ensuite la note et la remit au Sultan.

Le Sultan déclara que la décision qu'il avait prise avait été inspirée par la pitié, l'ablation d'un membre lui paraissant moins grave que la peine de mort. Il fit remarquer que les populations marocaines n'étaient pas en réalité civilisées, et que l'on était parfois obligé d'employer à leur égard des méthodes qui ne sont pas actuellement usitées en Europe.

Après une conversation à laquelle chacun prit part, M. Caillard demanda à Sa Majesté de vouloir bien donner sa réponse.

Mouley Hafid déclara qu'il espérait qu'il n'y aurait plus d'insurrections analogues à celle de Bou Hamara, et qu'en ce qui le concerne, il n'était pas disposé à recourir de nouveau à de pareils châtiments.

Étaient présents :

Allemagne	..	M. le Dr. Pröbster.
Autriche-Hongrie ..	..	M. Löhr.
Espagne	..	M. Cortés.
France	..	M. Caillard.
Grande-Bretagne ..	..	M. MacLeod.
Portugal	..	M. MacLeod.

Fez, le 11 *septembre*, 1909.

[35771] No. 341.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received September* 27.)

(No. 232.)

Sir, *Tangier, September* 18, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to report that M. Herbaux, having been recalled to resume his duties at the Cour de Cassation, has resigned his appointment as French delegate and vice-president of the International Claims Commission at Casablanca. The new French delegate is to be M. Kouri, consul at Mogador, who will enter upon his duties on the 7th October.

I have, &c.
HERBERT WHITE.

[35774] No. 342.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received September* 27.)

(No. 235.)

Sir, *Tangier, September* 18, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to report that when M. Regnault was at Fez the Sultan informed him that it was his intention to establish a factory at Marrakesh for the manufacture of cartridges, and requested him to obtain the services of a French officer, who would reside at Marrakesh and take charge of the factory.

Mr. Consular Agent Lennox now reports that the French officers have arrived at Marrakesh, and that the captain has been allotted the house and garden of Mulai Ali. This is the house that was assigned to the British mission in 1882, and is one of the best in Marrakesh. It adjoins the "Kutubia," or Great Mosque. Mr. Lennox states that other quarters are to be found for the remaining officers, whose numbers and rank he does not state. It is probable, however, that most, if not all of them, are non-commissioned officers.

The consular agent adds that the appearance of these officers in the town in uniform caused much comment amongst the people, who believed that they were officers of the police, of which the rank and file were being introduced secretly. The people, however, remained quiet, and any little excitement caused on their first arrival would doubtless have soon subsided.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

[36645] No. 343.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 4.)

(No. 238.)

Sir, *Tangier, September* 20, 1909.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 128 of the 8th instant, I have the honour to report that I have made enquiries of Mr. J. Kirby-Green regarding Mr. W. R. Stewart's commercial schemes in Morocco. Mr. Green confirmed to a great extent what Mr. Stewart states in his letter, but declared that he had merely acted as agent and interpreter for Mr. Stewart, and that any concessions that might be obtained would not be in his name, but that he would receive a certain number of shares in the company to be formed. He said that the concession sought was practically the exclusive right to trade through the ports of Agadir and Cape Juby, and that it was

thought that difficulties and opposition would be overcome by making the company an international one trading in the Sultan's name. He denied that there was any question of appointing Mr. Stewart to any official position or placing the coastguard or any other Government service under his control. He was merely to be the Sultan's commercial agent, *i.e.*, the manager of the company in the Sultan's name. Mr. Stewart did not see the Sultan, nor was anything definite settled with the vizier, who said that no decision would be taken till the Sultan reached Rabat.

Mr. Green informed me that Mr. Stewart has been a company promoter in South Africa and on the West Coast. He has on several occasions visited Southern Morocco, having formerly been associated with Lord Montmorres, whom, however, he stated, he had left as he did not approve of his carrying on a contraband trade in the south. You will doubtless remember that Lord Montmorres mentions Mr. Stewart in his letters of the 4th and 11th June, 1908, copies of which were communicated to this legation in your despatch No. 91 of the 15th June of that year. Mr. Stewart's object is, I presume, to obtain from the Sultan some sort of concession which he could sell to a company to be formed for that purpose.

It appears to me that our agreement with the late Sultan in regard to Cape Juby would preclude Moulai Hafid from granting any exclusive trading privileges at that place, and the whole scheme would, I venture to submit, be contrary to the terms of articles 1 and 2 of the convention of commerce of 1856, even though the company may nominally trade in the Sultan's name and pay His Majesty either a fixed sum or a proportion of their profits. The shareholders being of various nationalities would not affect the question. Some of the clauses of the agreement also appear to be contrary to the stipulations of the Algeciras Act.

A concession of the nature proposed, should the Sultan be willing and able to grant it, must be disadvantageous to trade in general, and would most seriously affect the trade of Mogador, which would be reduced to very small proportions. It would, nevertheless, be desirable to reopen the port of Agadir, or to open other ports in the south; but if this is done it should be for the benefit of all and not of merely one company, even though it may comprise shareholders of various nationalities.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

[36026] No. 344.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received September* 28.)

(No. 239.)

Sir, *Tangier, September* 22, 1909.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 109 of the 20th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith translation of the letter addressed by Sid Guebbas to the dean of the diplomatic body, drawing attention to the concentration of a Spanish force of over 60,000 men in the Riff, which, his Excellency states, causes the Sultan grave apprehension, as it corroborates the report that the Spanish Government have other objects in view than the mere chastisement of the murderers of the mine labourers, and as it will bring about anarchy and disorder in those regions and even throughout the Empire. His Majesty had therefore commanded him to bring this to the notice of the foreign representatives in order that they may inform their respective Governments, with a view to their pointing out to the Spanish Government in a friendly way the dangers which may arise from their action, which is prejudicial to the interests of all. Sid Guebbas adds that his Government, however, still hopes that the negotiations pending between the Moorish Mission and the Spanish Government may be brought to a satisfactory conclusion. His Excellency concludes by declaring, by order of the Sultan, that the Makhzen will bear no responsibility, pecuniary or other, for the consequences of the Spanish action.

The inclosure in Sid Guebbas's letter contains a detailed recapitulation of events from the occupation of Cap de l'Eau to the present time, and of the various representations made by the Makhzen to the Spanish Legation and replies received.

Sid Guebbas also addressed a letter to each representative individually referring to his letter to the doyen, and requesting him to bring it to the knowledge of his Government with all speed.

M. Merry del Val, who has just called upon me on his return to Tangier, informs me that he also received this latter letter from Guebbas. M. Regnault had sent the circular to him first, but he was keeping it until he should receive instructions

from his Government as to the observations he should make. He presumed the other representatives would merely forward translation of the letter to their Governments and not make any observations on the circular, but he thought he could not let it pass without remark. He told me that the Spanish troops numbered 43,000, and not 70,000 as alleged by Guebbas.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 344.

Sid Guebbas to Dean of Diplomatic Body.

(Traduction.)
(Après les compliments d'usage.)

VOTRE Excellence n'ignore pas non plus que les Ministres des Puissances représentées à Tanger la concentration effectuée par l'honorable Gouvernement espagnol de troupes, dont l'effectif dépasse 60,000 hommes, avec le matériel de guerre, dans la région du Rif. Le fait de pénétrer dans l'Empire chérifien avec des troupes en nombre si considérable doit inspirer de vives appréhensions, car on n'en connaît pas le but, et on n'en peut prévoir les résultats. Lorsque cette nouvelle parvint à la connaissance de Sa Majesté chérifienne, elle en a été très vivement affectée, sachant quelle agitation et quel état d'anarchie cet état de choses amènerait dans la région nord-est de cet Empire chérifien, et même dans tout l'Empire. Il n'est pas douteux que ces événements ne sont de nature à troubler la paix générale; et ce qui a ajouté encore à l'inquiétude de Sa Majesté chérifienne et de tous ses sujets, c'est le bruit qui s'est répandu que l'intention du Gouvernement espagnol ne se bornait pas à poursuivre, comme il l'avait annoncé, le châtiment des auteurs du meurtre des ouvriers des mines aux environs de Melilla, alors que ce Gouvernement n'a nullement le droit d'agir ainsi au point de vue de la justice et de l'équité, ainsi que vous vous en rendrez compte par la note ci-annexée, et qui expose en détail les événements du Rif jusqu'à ce jour. Mais que l'intention du Gouvernement espagnol était de poursuivre d'autres projets étrangers et opposés à ce qu'il avait annoncé, ce qui se trouve corroboré par le fait qu'un effectif effrayant de forces militaires se trouve actuellement à Melilla et dans les environs.

En conséquence, Sa Majesté chérifienne m'a donné l'ordre de porter ce qui est exposé ci-dessus à la connaissance de votre Excellence, pour que vous en preniez bonne note et en saisissiez l'honorable corps diplomatique, dont vous faites partie, afin que chacun de ses membres en saisisse à son tour son Gouvernement, de telle sorte que l'attention du Gouvernement espagnol soit appelée, à titre amical et dans des conditions ne pouvant altérer les relations de bon voisinage entre les deux Gouvernements voisins, sur le danger pouvant résulter de son action dans les régions du Rif, action qui porte atteinte aux intérêts généraux; bien que le Gouvernement marocain continue à espérer de la part du Gouvernement espagnol d'heureux effets des négociations qui se poursuivent entre les membres de ce Gouvernement et ceux de l'Ambassade chérifienne, et à atteindre une solution équitable de ces difficultés, conforme aux traités et accords respectés conclus entre les deux parties.

En terminant, je déclare à votre Excellence, par ordre de Sa Majesté, qu'aucune responsabilité, pécuniaire ou autre, n'incombe au Makhzen dans les événements du Rif, ainsi que doit le reconnaître tout esprit impartial.

Inclosure 2 in No. 344.

Summary of Events from Occupation of Cap de l'Eau to present time.

Louange à Dieu seul!

EN premier lieu l'occupation par les troupes espagnoles de Ras-el-Ma (Cap de l'Eau), dans la tribu de Kebdana, occupation que rien ne justifie, en raison de la grande distance séparant ce point des frontières.

Ensuite, occupation illégitime de Mar Chica, cause principale de l'explosion de l'insurrection dans la région du Rif. Ensuite, mainmise sur l'exploitation des mines de la tribu des Beni Bou Ifrour dans les Gualaya.

Ensuite sortie des troupes espagnoles et attaque des Ouled-el-Madj, de la tribu de Kebdana, sans qu'aucun motif justifiât cette action.

Ensuite sortie des troupes espagnoles de Ceuta et attaque du village de Beni Mzala, de la tribu d'Andjera.

Lorsque l'on s'adressa au Ministre d'Espagne, l'honorable M. Merry del Val, au sujet de ces deux engagements, il répondit qu'il devait se rendre à la Cour chérifienne et que le but principal de son voyage était le règlement des questions des frontières de Ceuta et de Melilla.

A l'arrivée de M. le Ministre d'Espagne à la Cour chérifienne on procéda à l'examen d'un certain nombre de questions. Sa Majesté chérifienne demanda à M. le Ministre d'Espagne de négocier la question du retrait des troupes espagnoles du Cap de l'Eau et de Mar Chica, le Ministre d'Espagne répondit qu'il n'avait pas d'instructions de son Gouvernement pour entrer en pourparlers à ce sujet.

Sa Majesté chérifienne répondit au Ministre d'Espagne que du moment où il n'avait pas d'ordres, toutes les questions en cours de négociation seraient suspendues pour être négociées entre le Gouvernement espagnol et l'Ambassade chérifienne que Sa Majesté décida à ce moment d'envoyer à Madrid pour rendre la visite de l'Ambassadeur d'Espagne à la Cour chérifienne et régler les affaires non solutionnées.

La plus importante de ces questions était celle des frontières des deux [places fortes] susindiquées, et particulièrement la question des mines du Rif pour lesquelles M. l'Ambassadeur d'Espagne avait demandé le privilège d'exploitation; il avait été répondu à ce sujet par une demande d'ajournement de la solution, jusqu'au moment où serait élaboré un règlement sur la matière. En effet, le Makhzen chérifien avait la certitude qu'exécuter de tels travaux à l'intérieur du pays, surtout dans les circonstances présentes, serait provoquer des troubles dans cette région et susciter de dangereuses difficultés entre les deux Gouvernements voisins et amis.

Ultérieurement au voyage de M. l'Ambassadeur d'Espagne à la Cour chérifienne furent commencés les travaux de la route de Ceuta vers Tétouan et autres points en dehors des frontières.

M. le chargé d'affaires d'Espagne à Tanger répondit, lorsque l'on l'entretint de cette affaire, que c'étaient les indigènes eux-mêmes qui travaillaient à cette route et que le gouverneur de Ceuta ne faisait que leur prêter son appui.

On lui écrivit pour faire des réserves à ce sujet et pour dégager le Makhzen de toute responsabilité à l'égard des conséquences de ces opérations.

Lorsque le Ministre d'Espagne revint de la Cour chérifienne et partit pour Madrid, le gouverneur de Melilla manda les notables du Rif et les informa qu'il avait résolu d'autoriser les deux compagnies qui exploitaient les mines sur leur territoire au moment des troubles qui s'étaient produits au Rif à reprendre leurs travaux.

Les notables répondirent au gouverneur qu'ils s'en rapporteraient au Makhzen, mais le gouverneur ne voulut accepter d'eux d'autre solution que celle qui consistait à [laisser] sortir [les ouvriers] dans ce but, au besoin par la force. Les notables firent ressortir au gouverneur les graves conséquences de sa résolution et se retirèrent de chez lui affectés. Ils écrivirent à ce sujet à Sa Majesté chérifienne, qui leur répondit de rester dans le calme et la tranquillité et de ne commettre aucun acte regrettable; Sa Majesté leur faisait connaître aussi que l'affaire serait examinée en ses lieu et place et solutionnée dans des conditions satisfaisantes.

On n'ignore pas que l'assistance prêté par l'honorable Gouvernement espagnol à ces compagnies qui allèguent avoir acheté les mines au prétendant et à ses partisans n'est pas conforme aux voies de l'équité et de la justice, car la question des mines est liée aux clauses spéciales qui la régissent aux termes des dispositions de l'Acte d'Algésiras, qui doit être respecté par toutes les Puissances et notamment par l'honorable Gouvernement espagnol, dont le territoire fut le siège de cette assemblée.

En raison de la lettre écrite par les gens du Rif et du fait que des nouvelles répétées signalaient la formation d'une colonne militaire à Melilla et le rassemblement des troupes dans cette place forte, et l'exode des musulmans qui se trouvaient dans ce presidio.

Des lettres furent le 20 jumada I, 1327, et le 21 du même mois, correspondant au 10 juin, 1909, adressées au chargé d'affaires d'Espagne pour attirer l'attention de son honorable Gouvernement sur le fait que les conséquences de cette expédition seraient fâcheuses; il répondit d'une façon qui ne permettait pas d'obtenir le résultat visé, à savoir, l'arrêt des travaux et la suspension de l'expédition militaire qui avait pour cause l'exploitation des mines contraire aux stipulations de l'Acte de la Conférence d'Algésiras. Une nouvelle lettre fut écrite le 30 jumada I, 1327, correspondant au 19 juin, 1909.

Ces lettres sont conservées et sont toutes conçues en termes très courtois et très

corrects ; elles font connaître que le Makhzen chérifien conserve les droits qui lui assurent les lois religieuses et civiles sur le territoire de son propre Empire, et qu'il est dégagé de toute responsabilité pour les conséquences de cette action, qui outrepasse les traités et viole les lois établies.

Le but principal de toutes ces lettres était de demander la suspension des travaux des mines jusqu'à l'élaboration d'un règlement se rapportant à cette question, et en attendant que l'Ambassade chérifienne dont l'envoi à Madrid était officiellement assuré pût s'employer à traiter toutes ces affaires par des voies diplomatiques et conciliantes, afin que cette question puisse avoir une solution pacifique et un résultat satisfaisant pour les deux parties. En dépit de toutes ces précautions prises par le Makhzen pour éviter toute possibilité d'événements fâcheux pour les deux parties, il arriva ce qui arriva.

En effet, le gouverneur de Melilla ne crut pas pouvoir faire autre chose que d'autoriser les ouvriers des mines à sortir de nouveau pour reprendre leurs travaux, et ceci avant l'arrivée de l'Ambassade marocaine à Madrid.

Lorsque le gens du Rif virent leur territoire envahi sans aucun droit, malgré les avis et les avertissements qu'ils avaient donnés, il se produisit entre quelques-uns d'entre eux et les ouvriers des mines qui sortaient escortés de forces militaires des rixes au cours desquelles moururent des deux côtés quelques individus, dont on a vivement déploré la mort.

Cette affaire se produisit immédiatement après l'arrivée de l'Ambassade chérifienne à Madrid ; le gouverneur de Melilla saisit ce prétexte pour faire une sortie avec les troupes qu'il avait préparées dès le début pour cette expédition, et il occupa les points sur lesquels sont encore installées ses troupes à l'heure actuelle. Il y eut un chiffre important de pertes d'hommes dans ces engagements dont, tout le monde est très affecté, et surtout le Makhzen chérifien.

Dans l'intervalle, le chargé d'affaires d'Espagne écrivit à la délégation chérifienne à la date du 27 juillet, 1909, pour se plaindre des procédés des Rifains ; on lui répondit le 10 réjab, 1327, correspondant au 28 juillet, 1909, et on lui rappella ce qu'on lui avait déjà exposé à plusieurs reprises, à savoir, que le Makhzen n'avait porté aucune négligence pour aviser aux moyens de nature à empêcher de se produire ces événements à tous égards regrettables.

Le principal de ces moyens consistait à demander de différer les travaux des mines qui étaient la principale cause de ces événements affreux ; on avait également déclaré à M. le chargé d'affaires, dans la lettre qu'on lui a adressée, qu'aucune responsabilité ne retombait sur le Makhzen dans cette question du Rif, du commencement jusqu'à la fin.

Aussitôt on envoya des lettres à tous les notables du Rif pour les exhorter à rentrer dans le calme et la paix et de s'en tenir aux prescriptions qu'ils avaient reçues à ce sujet par courier spécial après en avoir au préalable avisé le chargé d'affaires d'Espagne ici et les membres de l'Ambassade marocaine à Madrid, qui en ont eux-mêmes informé les membres de l'honorable Gouvernement espagnol.

Ensuite arrivèrent de nombreuses lettres de Sa Majesté chérifienne destinées à chacune des tribus du Rif, en particulière, en même temps qu'une lettre adressée à toutes les tribus, lettre dans lesquelles notre maître glorieux leur prescrivait de rester dans le calme et la paix et de ne point susciter le moindre sujet d'inquiétude au voisin, en attendant l'arrivée ultérieure chez eux de la Mission chérifienne, pourvue d'instructions verbales, sur la ligne de conduite qu'ils devaient adopter, conforme aux bonnes relations et aux bons rapports qui s'imposent entre voisins.

Le Makhzen avait eu tout d'abord l'intention d'envoyer une mission composée de forces militaires pour ramener le calme dans la région ; puis Sa Majesté chérifienne estima que le moyen le plus utile et le plus efficace serait d'envoyer au préalable les chefs de cette mission qui étaient individuellement désignés comme gouverneurs d'un certain nombre de tribus rifaines ; afin que chacun d'eux pût préparer les esprits de ses administrés et les inciter à observer le calme et l'expectative, et cela sans qu'il soit besoin d'envoyer avec eux une force militaire, eu égard aux circonstances présentes.

Sa Majesté chérifienne prescrivit qu'ils se rendraient tout d'abord à Tanger et qu'il y aurait un échange de vues entre la délégation chérifienne, le chargé d'affaires d'Espagne, les membres de l'Ambassade chérifienne à Madrid et ceux de l'honorable Gouvernement espagnol, sur le mode d'envoi des chefs précités par terre et par mer ; et que ce qui serait arrêté d'un commun accord serait mis à exécution ; à l'heure actuelle la négociation de cette affaire n'est pas encore terminée.

Tout cela le Makhzen l'a fait pour renforcer et améliorer les liens d'amitié et les

bons rapports avec l'honorable Gouvernement espagnol comme il convient entre voisins, et par souci de maintenir en bon état les relations, par désir aussi de rester dans l'observance des droits établis par les traités, les conventions, et les accords, dont le dernier est l'Acte qui a été élaboré à Algésiras, sur le territoire de l'honorable Gouvernement espagnol.

Salut !

D'après l'exposé de la présente note, qui est visée dans la lettre datée du dernier jour de chaaban, 1327, correspondant au 16 septembre, 1909, adressée par la délégation chérifienne à l'honorable corps diplomatique à Tanger par l'intermédiaire de son Excellence le doyen, il apparaît d'une façon certaine qu'il n'y a aucune raison, aucun motif pouvant justifier la concentration d'une force militaire considérable, qui sollicite l'attention, qui inquiète les esprits, et qui est effrayante par son effectif, qui atteint actuellement environ 70,000 hommes campés dans les postes situés entre Melilla et Mar Chica ainsi que dans d'autres postes de la tribu de Kebdana, qui est une des tribus rifaines.

[36026] No. 345.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. White.

(No. 54.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September* 29, 1909.

YOUR despatch No. 239 [of 22nd September : Moorish protest against Spanish military action].

You are authorized to signify concurrence in views expressed by French Minister as to reply to Moorish note.

[36718] No. 346.

Consul MacLeod to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 4.)

(No. 34.)
Sir, *Fez, September* 18, 1909.

WHEN the news of the capture of Buhamara reached Taza, the leading inhabitants met and proclaimed Mulai Hafid Sultan, and sent a messenger to the Grand Vizier Glawi with a letter telling what had been done. Glawi straightway sent in the letter to the Sultan, who thereupon ordered public rejoicings of several days' duration. No attention, however, was paid to the messenger, so, after hanging about Glawi's door for a few days he went home. The Sultan meanwhile decided to appoint Kaïd Najjim—a leading captor of Buhamara—Governor of Taza, and to dispatch him with a few troops to occupy that town. It was anticipated, moreover, that the tribes around Taza would act in the same way as the town had done, letters having been sent to them by the Sultan in that sense.

A reply was written to the Taza people. Their messenger, it was then found, had gone off in disgust, and simultaneously the Makhzen learned that not only were these tribes not replying to Mulai Hafid's letters, but the Ghiata, responding to an appeal of Buhamara's Governor of Taza, had overpowered the inhabitants of Taza, fined them 500 dollars, and made them annul their proceedings.

Neither did Dsul nor Branés send any messages of recognition to the Sultan, and they are reported to have decided it would be safer to fight him, than to trust deputations of their people with him. After his recent treatment of the followers of the Pretender, they could see what sort of man he was, and on their own mountainous lands they could (which is quite true) easily withstand the Makhzen. Some of them even declared they would "just as soon be ruled by Christians," to their minds the highest of insults.

In a talk I recently had with the Sultan, I remarked that it was said he meant to make these tribes pay heavy indemnities for their past conduct, but he replied that, quite the contrary, he meant to go very easily with them.

Dsul and Branés (especially the latter) are the most important tribes between Taza and Melilla, and under the present circumstances around Melilla, it is highly important for the Sultan to be on good terms with them, which of course they quite understand, and so feel the more that they need not hurry to come to terms with him. They know also, of course, that they can expect neither money nor gifts from him. As

regards Branés, the weakness of the Sultan's position may be understood when I relate that a few days ago a certain Mohammed Ben Abbas Al Wurbi, a Branés tribesman in humble circumstances, but born and bred in Fez, and who used to be employed by the Makhzen, or anybody, as a confidential messenger to gain news in Branés (I have often myself so employed him) called to tell me he had been appointed Kaïd of Branés, and showed me his seal and letter of appointment. He explained, however, that he was to reside in Fez, and would issue his orders there, appointing Sheikhs and so forth, through his Khalifa, one Said Al Bernusi (also an ex-messenger of mine) who would come and go between Branés and Fez. Then when Branés people came to Fez, he would settle their differences, represent their grievances to the Sultan, and so forth, but he did not intend to go to Branés unless accompanied by a Mehalla.

I remarked, to his great amusement, that he seemed to have become simply the Branés consul at Fez.

He assured me (and I have no reason to doubt this) he had given no money for the appointment, for the Makhzen had looked about for rich available Branés men, and finding none had offered him the post.

There are some six or seven Riffs here of a similar class to this man seeking such governorships over their districts, over which the Sultan's real power is as merely nominal, or less than nominal, that it is over the Taza tribes.

Divisions of the Mehalla recently operating against Buhamara are now engaged in exacting contributions from the Makhzen tribes of Ulad Jama and Sheraga, and the Sultan is showing renewed interest in the training of the troops at Fez, especially the artillery, all of whom are now drilled twice a-day. The Sultan is extremely bitter against Spain, and occasionally has talked headily to the effect that if the Spanish operations be extended in the least beyond the immediate vicinity of Melilla, for instance, should they move upon Taza or Tetuan, he will have no resource but to declare war upon them and so forth.

His extraordinary tenacity of his preconceived notions is well known, and one of such notions is (or was) that Spain is the feeblest and poorest of the Powers with whom he has important relations, and that therefore (for he does not yet seem to realise the grossness of the inferiority of Moorish troops and Moorish management to those of any European country) he can safely be deaf to all Spanish demands, which need, he imagines, only to be obstinately refused in order to be finally got rid of. The sending of so many as 63,500 men naturally, has given some shock to such ideas, but not very much, for a few days ago the Sultan told the French consul that even with 63,500 men the Spaniards could not possibly penetrate so far into the interior (105 miles) as to Taza.

M. Caillard and other French officials here express privately some apprehension of Taza being really the goal at which the Spaniards aim, and fear that the Spanish design is to prevent any future movement of French troops from Cujdah towards Fez.

From what motive, anger at the course events are taking round Melilla, resentment of the Taza tribes not hastening to acknowledge him, or vindictiveness about the Powers' remonstrances upon his recent cruel treatment of other prisoners, is not yet clear, but for the last two weeks Buhamara has been secluded effectually at the palace, and the information obtained by the consuls so far is so incomplete as to make it imprudent to report conclusively whether he has or has not been put to death. Enquiries are still in progress, however, and I hope to report the result in my next despatch.

I have, &c.
J. M. MacLEOD.

[36719] No. 347.

Consul MacLeod to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 4.)

(No. 35.)

Sir, *Fez, September* 22, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to enclose a narrative of all the information the consuls here have, so far, in regard to the fate of the Pretender Buhamara.

It will be observed that it is not yet possible to say with any certainty what has happened to him, the closest secrecy being still observed at the palace in everything connected with him.

I have, &c.
J. M. MacLEOD.

Inclosure in No. 347.

Memorandum respecting Fate of Prisoner Buhamara.

THE following is all the information the consuls have regarding the fate of Buhamara:—

Monday, August 30.—Sultan assured French consul that recourse would not be had in future to barbarous punishments, involving lingering death.

Wednesday, September 1.—British consul informed Sultan that His Britannic Majesty's Government entirely associated themselves with the French representations regarding those punishments.

Sunday, September 5.—Audience of Sultan was asked by consuls to present diplomatic body's collective note of protest, &c., against recent barbarous punishments.

Wednesday afternoon, September 8.—Consuls were asked near sunset to go to Sultan at Dar Dabibagh, *i.e.*, 2 miles outside city, but it was then too late to do so.

Wednesday evening, September 8.—Sultan stated to Bushaib Dukally, one of the *literati* who read with him, in a private way that His Majesty had now no use for Buhamara, and so he had decided to put him to death.

Thursday, September 9, 8 *to* 11 A.M.—By arrangement with Vizier for Foreign Affairs (but of which the Vizier had—as he assumed the Sultan would be still at Dar Dabibagh, and not at palace, Thursday being the official day of rest—not informed the Sultan) the consuls went to Dar Dabibagh, but found that the Sultan had gone to the palace. The consuls then went to the palace, which they reached at noon, but found that His Majesty had just returned to Dar Dabibagh. The Sultan used one road, which on such occasions is guarded off, and the consuls the other, hence the two parties not seeing each other. The point is, however, that the Sultan was at the palace between 9 A.M. and noon on Thursday, the 9th September.

Thursday, September 9, 8 A.M. *to noon.*—The work of fitting up certain premises adjoining Bab Bujats (palace gate) was stopped, and Buhamara, in his cage, was taken to inner part of palace. What followed is not known for certain, but, according to reports amongst the palace slaves, Buhamara was then exhibited to the harem. He was then withdrawn from his own cage and was put into the cage of a lion. The lion, however, only growled and struck him with his paw, so Buhamara was then taken out and shot by a palace slave. The Sultan, the Hajib, and two palace slaves were present. The body was then burned.

Friday, September 10.—Bushaib Dukally, who meantime had heard of what was alleged to have happened on the 9th September, informed the French consul of what the Sultan had said to him on the evening of the 8th September. (*Note.*—It remains to be seen whether Bushaib Dukally was sincerely friendly to the French consul or was really speaking on the Sultan's behalf, in such a way as not to commit the Sultan officially to the charge of having sought to flout in advance the foreign representations which were about to be made, and yet to make it clear what the Sultan's attitude was in the matter.)

Saturday, September 11.—Consuls were received at Dar Dabibagh by the Sultan, and delivered diplomatic body's collective note of protest against recent barbarous punishments.

Tuesday, September 21.—According to acting German consul's information and to other reports in town, Buhamara is still alive and well.

Wednesday, September 22 (*Note*).—All that can be said definitely is that great secrecy has been observed at the palace in the matter, and that such essential information—in both senses—as we have so far is merely the gossip of palace domestics. It is therefore still too soon to come to any conclusion as to what has actually happened.

Fez, September 22, 1909.

[36665] No. 348.

Mr. E. Grant Duff to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 4.)

(No. 211.)

Sir, *Madrid, September* 25, 1909.

I SAW the Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday at his usual Friday reception, and took the opportunity to enquire whether the Spanish Government attached

importance to the note recently addressed by order of the Sultan of Morocco to the doyen of the corps diplomatique at Tangier complaining of the action of Spain in the Riff.

Señor Allendesalazar replied in the negative. He said that the country where the Spanish troops were now operating had been recognised by the Powers as the Spanish sphere of influence, and Spain had been compelled, for reasons which were well known, to protect her interests in that region.

In answer to a question as to when the Cortes would meet, his Excellency said that the Government would first await the termination of the present campaign. It was impossible to know exactly when the successful conclusion of the present operations might be expected, but he hoped in a week or two.

According to this morning's papers, there would appear to be signs that the Moors are discouraged by their recent losses, and are inclined to come to terms.

I have, &c.
EVELYN GRANT DUFF.

[36646] No. 349.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 4.)

(No. 240.)

Sir, *Tangier, September* 25, 1909.

FROM a conversation with the French Minister to-day, I gathered that he has no definite information as yet as to whether the Sultan will accept the proposals which Cid Abdullah-el-Fasi has put before him, as the outcome of Cid Mokri's negotiations at Paris. These proposals were communicated to you in Mr. Rattigan's despatch No. 218 of the 2nd September, viz.: (1) a 5 per cent. loan of about 80,000,000 fr. to meet Makhzen debts to private individuals, and (2) a 3 per cent. loan of about 70,000,000 fr. to meet the French and Spanish Casa Blanca occupation expenses. M. Regnault explained to me that in this latter case no loan will actually be raised, as it might conflict with the 5 per cent. loan. It was proposed that the Sultan should not be called upon for an immediate payment of the sum claimed, but should pay an annuity calculated at the rate of 3 per cent. on the capital amount, giving as security the balance of the customs revenues, after paying the amounts due on the other two loans, and also the proceeds of the tobacco monopoly and of house and other taxes. The French and Spanish Governments reserve, however, the right of claiming repayment of the capital sum by a loan whenever required.

I have heard privately from Dr. Verdon that he has been told that the Sultan is dissatisfied with the results of Cid Mokri's mission as communicated by Cid Abdullah-el-Fasi, who, His Majesty remarked, brought back only "empty words" in regard to a loan. The less favourable news from Taza and the tribes formerly under the Pretender may, however, cause Moulai Hafid to hesitate before refusing the proposal, as he must realise that instead of being now able, as he expected, to draw large contributions from these districts, he will have to continue to maintain a considerable force to endeavour to reduce them to subjection.

I have, &c.
H. E. WHITE.

[36647] No. 350.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 4.)

(No. 241.)

Sir, *Tangier, September* 25, 1909.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 133 of the 13th instant, respecting the claim of Messrs. Pariente and Co. against the Moorish Government, I beg leave to observe that Messrs. Emanuel and Simmonds are not quite accurate in their figures as regards the Makhzen revenues from the customs dues. I learn from the director of the office of the Moorish loan that the total customs receipts last year amounted to about 10,900,000 fr., from which must be deducted about 1,000,000 fr. for expenses, leaving a net revenue of about 9,900,000 fr., or about 396,000*l*. The sum remaining at the disposal of the Makhzen after paying the amount due to the bondholders would therefore have been about 276,000*l*., and not 480,000*l*., as supposed by Messrs. Emanuel and

Simmonds. This year, however, it is expected that the receipts will be larger, owing in some measure, no doubt, to the more efficient control at the customs houses.

Although, however, the Sultan's customs revenues may not be so considerable as estimated by Messrs. Emanuel and Simmonds, there can, I think, be little doubt that His Majesty has at his disposal more money than he would wish his creditors to believe. The very fact of his commissioning Captain Campini to purchase arms in Italy (see my despatch No. 236 of the 18th instant) and arranging to pay for them in ready money 1,500,000 fr.—which, I understand, is the amount to be expended—tends to show that Mulai Hafid has funds available, which is also borne out by the unwillingness he has hitherto shown to contract a large loan.

I am inclined to think that the Sultan's policy is to avoid such loan if possible, as His Majesty probably considers that it would be for the benefit of his creditors rather than of himself. He would presumably prefer to carry on his Government with such revenue as can be derived from the customs and other taxes, forced contributions from the tribes, sales of governorships and other offices, and presents and small loans received from foreign concession hunters, and he would hope to continue to avoid payment of the Makhzen debts on the score of lack of funds. This system has been followed with apparent success ever since Mulai Hafid's recognition as Sultan, and it is natural that His Majesty should desire to continue it if possible. The time must soon come, however, when the Powers will have to take serious steps to force the Makhzen to meet its obligations. M. Regnault is of opinion that we should wait to learn the Sultan's reply to the proposals for a "loan of liquidation," which Cid Abdullah-el-Fasi has put before His Majesty as the outcome of Cid Mokri's negotiations at Paris.

Should Mulai Hafid accept these proposals, Messrs. Pariente and Co. and the other Makhzen creditors will be paid as soon as the loan is raised. Should His Majesty, however, refuse the loan some serious steps must be taken. The course suggested by Mr. Abensur does not appear to me to be feasible. The State Bank is not under the control of the French authorities, and could not retain the Makhzen funds on the demand of this legation with the concurrence of the French authorities. The only authority recognised by the State Bank is the special court constituted under article 45 of the Algeciras Act, but the court could, I think, hardly make an order on a claim against the Makhzen.

I venture to think that, if the Powers could be brought to consent, the best solution would be for the French to seize the customs revenues at Casa Blanca in the name and on behalf of the Powers and pay all the Makhzen debts therefrom.

I have, &c.
H. E. WHITE.

[36648] No. 351.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 4.)

(No. 242.)

Sir, *Tangier, September* 25, 1909.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 131 of the 8th instant, I have the honour to report that, in my opinion, the Moorish Government would be unwilling to consent to Ottoman subjects in this country being granted the extra-territorial privileges secured to British subjects. Such privileges would free them from various forms of taxation, which would alone be a serious objection in the eyes of the Sultan. Should the Makhzen, however, be persuaded that effective protection, carrying with it extra-territorial privileges, would be extended to Ottoman subjects by some Power, they would, I believe, prefer the protection to be afforded by us rather than by some other Powers, but, Turkish subjects having no treaty rights in Morocco, the Makhzen would be unwilling to grant them unless obliged to do so.

Mr. Irwin saw Sid Guebbas to-day, and took the opportunity of sounding his Excellency on the subject without letting him know that the question had been put forward by the Turkish Government, or that I had received any communication from you on the subject. Mr. Irwin referred to the claims of certain Ottoman subjects which we are unofficially supporting, and was thus able to introduce the subject.

Sid Guebbas informed Mr. Irwin that he had received a letter from the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs in regard to the claim of Hamed-ben-Abdullah, referred to in your despatch No. 5, Treaty, of the 23rd July.

His Excellency evidently thought the Sultan would not willingly consent to full British protection being extended to Turkish subjects. He, however, would not

commit himself by expressing an opinion as to what reply His Majesty would give should such a request be officially put forward.

I should perhaps mention that the French Legation at present also affords assistance to Turkish subjects when applied to, and in the case of instructors in the schools of the Alliance israélite, several of whom are Turkish subjects, I believe a fairly large measure of protection is afforded.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

[36649] No. 352.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October 4.*)

(No. 243.)
Sir, *Tangier, September 25*, 1909.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 239 of the 22nd instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of the circular addressed to his colleagues by M. Regnault, acting doyen of the diplomatic body, communicating to them the letter of Cid Guebbas regarding Spanish action in the Riff, and expressing the opinion that the question is not within the competence of the diplomatic body, and should be settled exclusively between the Spanish and Moorish Governments.

The circular was sent first to the Spanish Minister, who, after consulting his Government, expressed his agreement with the doyen, observing that it was a question of order and security in the frontier district recognised by the Powers as concerning only Spain and Morocco.

M. Merry del Val came to see me on the afternoon of the 23rd instant, and brought me the circular, saying that he had been instructed by his Government to bring it to me, and express the hope that I would add a note concurring in the opinion expressed by M. Regnault and himself, as they were anxious that my support should be secured before the circular passed to other representatives.

I told M. Merry del Val that, although personally I shared his point of view, I did not feel justified in expressing any opinion officially on the circular without instructions from you. I promised him, however, to keep the circular until I was in receipt of your instructions.

There was, of course, no idea of the diplomatic body discussing the question of the reply to be sent to Cid Guebbas until all the Governments have received the text of the note and sent instructions on the subject to the representatives here.

M. Merry del Val handed me a memorandum showing that there were 7,500 men in garrison at Melilla on the 9th July and that 27,824 were disembarked there during July and August. These, with the division of General Soto Mayor of 8,000 men, brought the total to 43,324 men. He stated to me again most decidedly that his Government had no intention whatever of extending their operations in any direction whatever, and that the troops would be withdrawn as soon as the tribes in the immediate vicinity of Melilla had been punished and order restored. He added that they were in a difficult position as to the continual firing on Alhucemas and Peñon de la Gomera, and his Government had not yet come to any decision as to the line to adopt. To ignore the attacks would produce a bad effect, whilst any military action there would be extremely difficult, the landing being bad and the country very broken. I suggested that once the Melilla district was subdued, the trouble at Alhucemas and Peñon de la Gomera would probably cease.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

P.S. *September* 27.—The Italian Minister asked me yesterday evening to let him have the circular, as he had received his instructions from his Government. He has now returned it to me, having written on it that his Government concurs in the opinion expressed by the doyen. I transmit herewith copy of the annotation of the Italian Minister.

H. E. W.

Inclosure in No. 352.

Doyen of Diplomatic Body to Foreign Representatives.

MM. et chers Collègues, *Tanger, le 22 septembre*, 1909.

POUR faire suite à ma circulaire No. 2216, j'ai l'honneur de vous envoyer ci-inclus la traduction, élaborée par MM. les interprètes des légations, de la lettre de Si Mohammed Guebbas et de la note qui y était jointe au sujet des événements du Rif.

Un exemplaire de ces documents est destiné à chaque légation; je vous prie de vouloir bien le retirer et d'en accuser réception sur la présente circulaire.

J'estime que la question soulevée n'est pas de la compétence du corps diplomatique; elle doit être réglée exclusivement entre le Gouvernement espagnol et le Gouvernement marocain.

Veuillez, &c.
REGNAULT.

Je suis d'accord avec notre honorable doyen pour entendre que le point soulevé par le Makhzen dépasse la compétence du corps diplomatique du moment qu'il se rattache à la question d'ordre et de sécurité dans la région frontière reconnue par les Puissances comme intéressant exclusivement l'Espagne et le Maroc.

A. MERRY DEL VAL.

Le 23 septembre, 1909.

Je partage la manière de voir de notre honorable doyen, c'est-à-dire, que la question soulevée n'est pas de la compétence du corps diplomatique, et qu'elle doit être réglée exclusivement entre le Gouvernement espagnol et le Gouvernement marocain.

NERAZZINI.

[36651] No. 353.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October 4.*)

(No. 245.)
Sir, *Tangier, September 26*, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith translation of a note delivered to the French Minister, as doyen, by Cid Guebbas, through his secretary, containing the reply of the Sultan to the collective note addressed to His Majesty by the diplomatic body in regard to the barbarous treatment of prisoners. The present note is dated from Fez on the 14th instant, but bears no signature.

It appears to me that the note must be regarded as very unsatisfactory both in substance and in tone; it contains no sort of undertaking that such barbarous punishments will not be inflicted in future, but merely expresses the hope that the condition of the country may improve, so that such punishments will not have to be inflicted, which would seem to imply that, if such improvement does not occur, such punishments will have to be inflicted. The note maintains that the punishments inflicted were fully justified, and even asserts that Europe affords precedents.

The concluding paragraphs of the note refer to events in the Riff, and appeal to the humane feelings of the diplomatic body to make representations to Spain in regard to the "injustice" committed in that district. The terms employed in regard to Spanish action in the Riff are calculated to cause considerable displeasure at Madrid.

M. Regnault spoke to me the other day regarding the fate of the Pretender, who is reported to have been cast into a lion's cage. It is impossible at present to learn the true facts, and there may be no foundation whatever for the report. M. Regnault appeared inclined, however, to believe it, and he was doubtful whether some step should not be taken to ascertain the truth, for, should the report be true, it would practically be a defiance to the Powers.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

Inclosure in No. 353.

Note communicated to Doyen of Diplomatic Body by Cid Guebbas.

Louange à Dieu!

(Traduction.)

LA note que l'honorable corps diplomatique a transmise à Sa Majesté chérifienne contient l'expression de l'émotion que ses membres ont ressentie (à la nouvelle des) peines infligées aux partisans du révolté, Bou Hamara.

Le fond de cette note, c'est le désir que ces pratiques ne se renouvellent pas, étant donné qu'elles sont tombées en désuétude au Maroc depuis longtemps et qu'elles sont en opposition avec l'intérêt supérieur de la civilisation.

(Nous y répondons comme suit:)

En premier lieu, personne n'ignore ce que le révolté et ses misérables partisans ont causé de dommages de tous ordres au Makhzen, au Maroc et à ses habitants, tuant les gens, soit par simples mises à mort, soit en usant de mutilations et de tortures, les brûlant à l'aide de pétrole, les exposant à la bouche des canons, et déchaînant toutes sortes d'autres maux innombrables.

Or, aux termes de toutes les lois et règles légales, le châtiment doit être en rapport avec les crimes.

Ensuite, si cette émotion dont parle la note est due à un simple sentiment de compassion et de pitié (nous répondons) qu'en tenant compte de ce que méritent les forfaits de ces criminels, il était nécessaire de leur infliger un châtiment exemplaire. Une telle mesure ne manque ni de motifs (justificatifs), ni d'effets, ni d'opportunité.

Les décisions des juges sont comparables aux sentences du médecin qui soigne le corps, et il est nécessaire que l'intérêt prime (les considérations de) bonté.

En outre, l'application des peines légales à ces misérables est en harmonie évidente à un double titre avec les lois de la bonté, et de la miséricorde et elle es basée sur deux procédés d'ordre politique:—

1er Titre: La simple mise à mort consiste à faire cesser la vie elle-même, à l'inverse des autres châtiments qui sont, par suite, plus près de la pitié et plus avant dans la bonté.

En effet, celui à qui on les applique continue à jouir de l'existence, sa lignée n'est pas interrompue, et en même temps il reste un exemple vivant, un avertissement qui se transmet, passe en proverbe et dont le souvenir se conserve chez ses contemporains.

Il est certain que cela fait une impression plus vive, au point de vue de la politique (intérieure), et c'est là le premier des procédés dont nous parlions.

2e Titre: Une des vertus des supplices, c'est celui qui les voit appliquer à qui les mérite sait, à non pas douter, que s'il commettait lui-même un crime, il ne pouvait être quitte du châtiment que cela entraîne par aucun moyen quel qu'il soit.

Aussi, se garde-t-il de commettre ce crime et il continue à vivre en paix, c'est pourquoi l'on dit "les peines sont (fondées sur un sentiment de) miséricorde envers ceux qui sont exempts de crime."

La vertu de ces peines s'est manifestée à tous les yeux au sujet des rebelles qui étaient restés dans leur rébellion et leur attachement opiniâtre à Bou Hamara, le fauteur de troubles. En effet, ils ont certainement eu connaissance des châtiments légaux infligés aux coupables, puisqu'ils ont quitté la voie de la rébellion et se sont engagés dans celle de la bonne direction, en prêtant leur concours au Makhzen glorieux qui leur a pardonné.

Ce pardon a été opportunément accordé conformément au Chrâa.

Le contraire se serait produit si l'on n'avait pas sous les yeux, à ce moment, un spectacle saisissant.

Ce sont là des faits qui impressionnent profondément tout le monde. Dieu soit loué qu'ils aient été suffisants pour le but à atteindre!

Ce procédé est également plus fécond, au point de vue politique, en conséquences immédiates et médiates.

Si cette émotion est due à une autre raison, (nous répondons) qu'il s'agit de questions religieuses musulmanes, et il est notaire qu'on ne peut rien objecter contre des questions de cette nature.

Les circonstances exigent que l'on maintienne et assure le bon ordre par tous les moyens possibles, et de préférence par ceux qui sont conformes aux dispositions de la loi religieuse, en harmonie avec la politique, d'une efficacité immédiate, d'accord même

avec les dispositions en usage chez les différents pays, aux termes desquelles si le moindre danger menace la paix intérieure les tribunaux ordinaires sont suspendus et l'on a recours aux juridictions martiales. Les exemples en Europe de faits de ce genre sont notoires.

Comme le Makhzen serait inexcusable s'il rejettait la moindre des responsabilités qui lui incombent dans les difficultés qui se produisent, il mérite d'autant plus qu'on lui tienne compte de cet état de choses, et l'on sait bien dans quel besoin pressant il se trouve de couper court aux embarras qu'il éprouve par tous moyens conformes à la loi religieuse de ses sujets et appropriées à sa politique.

Nous souhaitons le retour, pour les sujets chérifiens, au sain état de choses qui existait autrefois, dans lequel l'application des peines était tombée en désuétude en même temps que les causes qui les rendaient nécessaires avaient disparues, de telle sorte que l'on ne soit plus obligé à l'avenir pour conduire les sujets chérifiens dans la voie du bon ordre de les pousser à l'aide des fouets de la justice religieuse et de la civilisation supérieure.

De plus, le Makhzen glorieux espère de l'humanité et des saines dispositions morales de l'honorable corps diplomatique, qu'il veuille bien diriger son attention vers les injustices que l'en commet actuellement sur le territoire de l'Empire et faire des observations au sujet de ces actes commis en violation de tous les traités spéciaux et généraux, qui ne sont conformes à aucune règle internationale ni usage humanitaire, qui relâchent les liens de la paix générale et qui portent atteinte à l'indépendance du Maroc reconnu par l'ensemble des Puissances glorieuses.

Et en raison de la grande confiance qu'a le Makhzen chérifien dans les engagements des Puissances, ratifiés par elles, et de leur désir absolu d'en respecter les dispositions, il appelle l'attention du corps diplomatique afin qu'il examine cet exposé, qui lui parviendra par l'entremise du doyen, et qu'il l'étudie dans un esprit d'équité et l'apprécie selon la justice.

Fait à Fez le 1er Ramadan, 1327.

[36652] No. 354.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 4.)

(No. 246.) *Tangier, September* 26, 1909.

Sir,

THE ex-Sultan, Mulai Abdel Aziz, having expressed the wish to see me, I called upon him on the afternoon of the 24th instant. His Majesty told me that he was very anxious to visit Gibraltar, and had made arrangements to go there on the 27th, travelling by one of the ordinary passenger steamers, and stopping at an hotel; his visit would be entirely incognito, and he would only be accompanied by two attendants. He was desirous of seeing all there was to see at Gibraltar, and asked me to acquaint you with his wish to visit that place, and to request that permission might be granted to him to see the fortifications, naval works, &c.

I was somewhat taken aback by the request, and endeavoured to dissuade His Majesty from his object by such arguments as I could use without hurting his feelings or showing discourtesy. I suggested that Mulai Hafid might be displeased, and that his own position might be injured in regard to his pension, &c. Mulai Abdel Aziz, however, replied that he was duly receiving his pension, that his position as regards his brother was satisfactory at present, and that he could see no possible objection to his spending two or three days at Gibraltar.

There was no course left to me but to inform His Majesty that I would communicate his wishes to you. I added, however, that it was unlikely that I could receive a reply before the 27th, and that it would be better in any case not to fix a definite date for the visit for the present.

I subsequently had occasion to see the French Minister on another matter, and told him privately of Mulai Abdel Aziz's desire to visit Gibraltar. M. Regnault told me that he was already aware of it, His Majesty having mentioned it to an employé of his legation. The employé in question had enquired whether His Majesty had informed this legation, and on learning that he had not done so, had pointed out that His Majesty ought to give me notice of his intention.

M. Regnault informed me that Mulai Abdel Aziz's position as regards the Sultan was not so good as the former seemed to imagine. The French legation had obtained in advance the payment of his pension for six months, which would expire at the end

of this month. M. Regnault had instructed the French consul at Fez to request the Sultan to pay the pension for a further term of six months. He had just heard from M. Gaillard that the Sultan had refused and would only pay the pension for two months, saying that the Treasury was poor, and that the amount of the pension would have to be reduced. His Majesty also came back upon his agreement in regard to the jewellery in pawn.

In the circumstances, M. Regnault thought it would perhaps have been wiser or Mulai Abdel Aziz to have postponed his visit for two months, in order that these questions might first be settled, but on further consideration he added that after all, probably in two months the situation would be the same as now, one could not hope to obtain any settlement with the Sultan, who appeared to consider no engagement as binding.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

[33357] No. 355.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. White.

(No. 142.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 4, 1909.

I HAVE given careful consideration to Mr. Rattigan's despatch No. 212 of the 28th August last, reporting that the Sultan has enquired what date would be convenient for the reception in London of a Moorish Mission.

I request that you will address a note to El Guebbas to the effect that no date can be fixed at present for the reception of a mission. This note you should hand to him personally, and you should at the same time inform him verbally and confidentially that it is useless to conceal the fact that the impression created in England by the recent cruelties at Fez has been such as to render the reception of a Moorish Mission impossible.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[37846] No. 356.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. E. Grant Duff.

(No. 123.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 6, 1909.

THE Spanish Ambassador came to assure me to-day that there was no change of policy on the part of Spain with regard to Morocco. He explained that, as some anxiety was being felt on this point in France, his Government wished to repeat here as well as in Paris the assurances they had already given.

The Spanish Government had intended to send reinforcements to the extent of a division, but as their general had said that a brigade would be sufficient, that was all that was being sent. They did not intend to go to Taza or to Tetuan, or to do anything more than was necessary to secure the tranquillity of their frontier. They would not occupy new posts in advance of their frontier, though it was necessary to advance in order to break up the harka, which was still attacking the Spanish troops. As a matter of fact, the last fight had been as severe as any they had had before.

I told the Spanish Ambassador that we did not feel any anxiety as to his Government's intentions. I assumed that they remained just the same, and that the question was simply a frontier question.

He replied that this was exactly the case. His Government were most desirous of bringing the operations in Morocco to a conclusion as soon as possible. They were quite aware that if the Sultan joined in and proclaimed a holy war the whole question of Morocco would be raised, which would be very inconvenient for Spain as well as for everyone else. They also wished very much to have something definite accomplished, and the end in sight before the Cortes met.

The Ambassador also told me that his Government were very grateful for the language used by our vice-consul at Fez. The Sultan had spoken to our vice-consul as if the Spanish army did not count, and it would be easy to clear the Spaniards out of Morocco. But our vice-consul had impressed on him that he was making a great

mistake in thinking anything of the kind. Guebbas had also said the same, and the Spanish Government were very grateful.

I said that our officials would certainly express the same opinion whenever there was an opportunity.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[37101] No. 357.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 7.)

(No. 395.)
Sir, *Paris, October* 6, 1909.

WITH reference to Mr. Carnegie's despatch No. 380 of the 22nd ultimo, I have the honour to report that the French press is beginning to show signs of being affected by the same feelings of uneasiness which has been manifested lately in the newspapers of other countries, especially of Germany, at the unexpected proportions which the Spanish campaign in the Riff country has assumed. The account of an interview accorded by the Spanish Ambassador here to a representative of the "Temps," copy of which I enclose, was published in last night's issue of that paper. The Marquis del Muni stated that the intentions of his Government remained unchanged and nothing further was contemplated than the pacification of the neighbourhood of Melilla. Additional reinforcements had been necessary owing to the increased extent of the field of operations, but, in spite of statements to the contrary, the total force employed did not exceed 50,000 men. There was no question of marching on Taza or of occupying Tetuan and Larache, nor did Spain intend to declare war on the Sultan, but if he attacked her troops they would defend themselves. The Ambassador concluded the conversation by expressing the wish that French public opinion would pay more attention to the official declarations of his Government, which were perfectly sincere, than to vague rumours.

The "Débats" of last night contains an article on the Spanish campaign drawing attention to the surprise and even anxiety which is beginning to be shown in England and Germany, and to a certain extent in France, at the continual demands of General Marina for reinforcements and at the alacrity with which the Spanish Government satisfy them. The number of men now employed in the military operations seem to be out of all proportion to the modest intentions which the Spanish Government have announced. We have already said, continues the "Débats," that we consider such fears and criticism unjustified, as we have complete confidence in the declarations of M. Maura and of M. Allendesalazar; nevertheless, it is impossible to ignore the trend of public opinion in Europe, and there is no doubt that Spain has a "bad press." She should no longer hesitate, and should spontaneously declare the disinterested character of her campaign, her wish to remain faithful to her international engagements under the Act of Algeciras, and her intention to respect the integrity of Morocco. Let her proclaim, in fact, that she only desires to obtain reparation for the insult offered to her flag and a guarantee for the security of her North African possessions. The article concludes by remarking that Spain could hardly do better than she has done. She wished to assure the security of Melilla, and owing to the points of vantage which her troops have now occupied, her object has been attained and that ought to be enough.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

Inclosure in No. 357.

Extract from the "Temps" of October 6, 1909.

LES ESPAGNOLS AU MAROC : DÉCLARATIONS DE L'AMBASSADEUR D'ESPAGNE.

EN présence des nouvelles contradictoires de nouveau répandues sur les projets de l'Espagne au Maroc, nous avons demandé à l'Ambassadeur d'Espagne de bien vouloir me dire si les projets en question s'étaient modifiés ou élargis. M. de Leon y Castillo nous a répondu :—

"Absolument pas. J'ai eu l'occasion de le répéter hier encore en l'absence de M. Pichon à M. Bapst, directeur des affaires politiques au Quai d'Orsay; nos intentions restent les mêmes; elles se bornent à pacifier les environs de Melilla—rien de moins, rien de plus."

"Pourquoi de nouveau renforts sont-ils partis pour le théâtre des opérations?"

"Parce que la garde des positions acquises, des communications et de la base occupe plus de la moitié de l'effectiff, et que le Général Marina, sans les 10,000 hommes qu'il vient de recevoir, ne pourrait plus manœuvrer. Il ne disposera d'ailleurs, tout compris, que de 50,000 hommes, et non de 60,000, ou même 80,000, comme on l'a dit à tort."

"Il n'est pas question de marcher sur Taza?"

"Jamais de la vie. Je ne sais qui a répandu ce bruit absurde."

"Et d'occuper Tétouan et Larache?"

"Personne ne m'a jamais parlé de cette occupation, et je suis convaincu que dans la campagne et dans les circonstances actuelles, on n'y songe pas."

"Des correspondants ont annoncé aussi que l'Espagne allait déclarer la guerre au Sultan?"

"Pourquoi l'Espagne déclarerait-elle la guerre au Sultan? Je sais bien qu'on prête à Moulay Hafid des desseins singuliers. On dit qu'il exciterait les tribus contre nous. Si nous étions attaqués, nous nous défendrions. Quant à déclarer la guerre, nous n'y pensons point."

"Comment expliquez-vous les rumeurs toutes différentes qu'on trouve dans des télégrammes de Madrid?"

"Par cette raison que certaines personnes peuvent rêver d'une politique marocaine plus active. Mais ces personnes, fort répandues dans la presse, ne sont pas le Gouvernement.

"Je me permettrai même, en concluant, de souhaiter que l'opinion francaise, à la sympathie de qui nous attachons un si grand prix, fasse moins de cas de bruits peu autorisés et s'en rapporte plutôt aux déclarations officielles de mon Gouvernement, qui sont absolument sincères."

Au nord et au nord-ouest de Melilla, la tranquillité règne. Entre Selouan et la Moulouya les tribus envoient dans le sud les familles des guerriers et les troupeaux, mais les guerriers demeurent.

Des renseignements de source indigène indiquent que la guerre sainte est prêchée sur tous les marchés contre les Espagnols. Le Caïd M'Talsi est l'âme du mouvement; il déclare que les importantes tribus des Beni-Branes, des Beni-Bou-Riaghel, et des Beni-Touzil vont envoyer des renforts importants à la harka.

Des compagnies espagnoles ont pu revenir de Sidi-Mouça et de la Restinga à Melilla sans être inquiétés.

Notre correspondent à Londres nous écrit:—

"Les dernières nouvelles du Maroc ne paraissent pas avoir entièrement satisfait l'opinion anglaise. La prise de Selouan avait fait croire que les Espagnols approchaient de la fin des opérations. Aujourd'hui, au contraire, l'échec partiel de la semaine dernière et plus encore la demande de renforts importants ont produit une impression fâcheuse. A travers les commentaires flatteurs pour l'Espagne dont le 'Times' entoure le récit des derniers événements, il est aisé de deviner une inquiétude que d'autres journaux, le 'Daily Graphic' par exemple, expriment tout haut et sans ménagement. L'opinion anglaise redoute de voir l'Espagne s'engager dans une guerre contre l'Empire chérifien et annexer sur le littoral des ports comme Tétouan ou Mar-Chica, dont l'occupation serait menaçante pour les intérêts britanniques. Le 'Daily Graphic' ne permet même pas à l'Espagne d'occuper provisoirement ces deux points de la côte, jusqu'à ce que le Maroc ait réglé l'indemnité de guerre. 'Il est en effet certain,' dit ce journal, 'que le Maroc ne saurait payer cette indemnité; par suite, tout territoire saisi comme gage finirait par être annexé.'

"Le mystère dont le Gouvernement espagnol continue à envelopper les opérations militaires dans le Rif contribue d'ailleurs à augmenter ce sentiment de malaise. Dès le début de la guerre, la presse britannique s'est plainte assez vivement de la censure espagnole. Ce mécontentement n'a fait que croître. Si ferme que soit le soutien moral offert par le Gouvernement anglais aux Espagnols, les incertitudes actuelles ne

sauraient se prolonger très longtemps sans faire naître en Angleterre, à l'égard de l'Espagne, une assez vivre défiance."

Notre correspondant à Berlin nous télégraphie:—

"Dans les milieux gouvernementaux berlinois, on suit attentivement les événements marocains. On croit que l'Espagne ne s'aventurera pas dans une guerre à l'intérieur du Maroc et que son expédition n'a pour but que de garantir ses possessions dans le nord de l'Empire chérifien.

"L'Allemagne, me dit-on, reste spectatrice attentive des événements."

[37219] No. 358.

Mr. E. Grant Duff to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 8.)

(No. 215.)

Sir, *Madrid, October* 5, 1909.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 93 of the 25th August, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a note which I have to-day addressed to Señor Allendesalazar, expressing the disappointment felt by His Majesty's Government at the unsatisfactory nature of the explanation given by the Spanish Government of the action of their consul at Tetuan in facilitating the escape of the captors of Mr. Clarke-Kennedy.

I have, &c.
EVELYN GRANT DUFF.

Inclosure in No. 358.

Mr. E. Grant Duff to Señor Allendesalazar.

Your Excellency, *Madrid, October* 5, 1909.

HIS Majesty's Ambassador did not fail to communicate to Sir Edward Grey a translation of your Excellency's note of the 24th June last, regarding the action of the Spanish consul at Tetuan in facilitating the escape of Mr. Clarke-Kennedy's captors.

His Majesty's Government, while greatly appreciating the cordial terms of your Excellency's note, wish me to offer the following observations with regard to the explanations which your Excellency has been so good as to offer:—

In the third and fourth paragraphs of your note your Excellency states that there are several inaccuracies in the account of what took place as related by the Governor of Tetuan; that the Spanish consul never attributed to the Kuff tribesmen the character of protected persons, but merely afforded them asylum, as they were being persecuted; that he was unaware that the arrest of such persons was desired by the British vice-consul; and that he never agreed to the prisoners being handed over to him on condition of his awaiting the receipt by the Governor of Tetuan of instructions from Tangier.

I am to inform you that both Mr. Bewicke, the British vice-consul at Tetuan, and Mr. Miller, the acting British vice-consul, to whom a translation of your Excellency's note was sent, maintain that the statements of the Moorish governor are substantially correct, and, further, that they report that they have never heard of a case in which that official has been guilty of abuse of power. This would appear to show that the tribesmen who sought refuge at the Spanish Consulate were not harmless peasants in imminent danger of arbitrary arrest, but that they had some strong motive for taking asylum, and were in fact fugitives from justice. Their names do not figure on the list of Spanish-protected persons handed to the Moorish authorities by the Spanish consul. It seems, further, difficult to believe that when the Spanish consul demanded the release of Ruhan-ben-Haddn, the Governor of Tetuan should have handed him over unconditionally, knowing at the time that he was one of the persons whose arrest was demanded by the British vice-consul. The Governor still adheres to his statement that he did in fact inform the Spanish consul of the reason for his action in arresting Ruhan-ben-Haddn, and made the condition

when handing him to Señor Ferrer, that the prisoner should be kept under arrest until he could communicate with Cid Guebbas at Tangier. Both Mr. Bewicke and Mr. Miller also declare positively that the Spanish consul, some time before the events under discussion, was aware that the British vice-consulate had an interest in the arrest of Ruhan-ben-Haddn and his accomplices.

In the above circumstances, the reasons which actuated the Spanish consul in first protecting the Riff tribesmen in question and then facilitating the escape of the only one of them whom the Governor of Tetuan was able to arrest, does not appear clear to His Majesty's Government, and I am to express Sir E. Grey's disappointment that the explanation forthcoming is not more satisfactory.

I avail, &c.

EVELYN GRANT DUFF.

[37339] No. 359.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 9.)

(No. 248.)

Sir, *Tangier, September* 30, 1909.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 128 of the 29th May, I have the honour to report that on the 13th June Cid Guebbas addressed a letter to the doyen informing him that the Sultan had given orders for the regulations regarding the tax on town buildings to be brought into operation on the 1st January next, and requesting that steps be taken for the election of the foreign notables to sit on the assessment commissions provided for by article 9 of the regulations.

The diplomatic body, being of opinion that it would probably be some time before the assessment commissions could complete the surveys of the various ports and prepare the lists of taxable properties, and that proprietors might find themselves called upon to pay more than one year's tax as a first payment if they accepted the 1st January as the date on which the taxes become leviable, replied to Cid Guebbas, through the doyen, that the tax would not become leviable until after the assessment commissions at all the ports have concluded their labours, so that they may be leviable at all the ports at the same time.

On the 29th July Cid Guebbas addressed a further note to the doyen requesting that the assessment commissions at the ports be appointed without delay, as the Sultan was anxious that the tax should be levied as soon as possible.

The necessary orders were accordingly sent to the consular officers at the ports, and the various assessment commissions have now been constituted and will enter upon their duties, which, as above pointed out, must take some time.

I have, &c.

HERBERT E. WHITE.

[37342] No. 360.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 9.)

(No. 251.)

Sir, *Tangier, October* 1, 1909.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 246 of the 26th ultimo, I have the honour to inform you that I have learnt from the French Minister that, upon his advice, Mulai Abdelaziz has abandoned his intention of visiting Gibraltar for the present at any rate.

M. Regnault tells me that he has not himself seen Mulai Abdelaziz, but he has caused him to be informed by members of his staff that he considered it very inadvisable that he should visit Gibraltar at the present moment, when the Sultan is raising difficulties as to carrying out his arrangement in regard to his pension, &c., and when reports are being spread that Mulai-el-Kebir has stated that he was working to obtain his restoration to the throne. He pointed out that Mulai Hafid might attribute his journey to Gibraltar to wrong motives, especially as some of the Tazzis are still at Algeciras, and he urged him to put off the visit for the present.

Mulai Abdelaziz, it appears, allowed himself to be convinced by these considerations, and informed M. Regnault that he would not visit Gibraltar for the present. He has not yet, however, communicated with me on the subject.

M. Regnault informed me that Cid Guebbas had spoken to him on the subject of

the visit, and had hinted that Mulai Abdelaziz was practically under guard at Tangier, and that the Sultan might not perhaps allow him to leave the country. M. Regnault, however, told Cid Guebbas plainly that under the terms of the agreement Mulai Abdelaziz is absolutely free to reside in any part of Morocco, and also to leave the country and travel wherever he may please, and that the French Government would not allow his freedom in this respect to be interfered with.

M. Regnault also informed me that he had received a reply from his Government in regard to the Sultan's expressed intention to cut down the pension allowed to Mulai Abdelaziz. The French Government insist that the agreement must be adhered to, and will not permit any reduction of the pension.

I have, &c.

HERBERT E. WHITE.

[37448] No. 361.

Mr. E. Grant Duff to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 9.)

(No. 47.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, October* 9, 1909.

MELILLA campaign.

I am informed by French chargé d'affaires that his Government have been requested by the Spanish Government to try and use their influence with Muley Hafid in order to prevent him inciting tribes of the interior to join the Riffs, who are now in arms.

Señor Allendesalazar told me at weekly reception to-day that, although the Sultan of Morocco might be giving surreptitious aid to the Riffs, he did not think that he was helping them officially.

[37623] No. 362.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 11.)

(No. 255.)

Sir, *Tangier, October* 4, 1909.

THE French Minister has addressed a circular to his colleagues informing them that a Frenchman residing at Arzila having complained of vexatious treatment at the hands of the local authorities, he had requested the Makhzen to issue the necessary orders in the matter. The Vizir for Foreign Affairs had replied that orders had been given for the proper treatment of the Frenchman, but had added a request that he be instructed to leave Arzila, as the Sultan considered that, under the treaties in force, foreigners may only reside in ports open to trade. M. Regnault, in the circular, points out that there is an evident confusion in the Sultan's mind between the right of residence and the right of doing a direct import and export trade at any spot on the coast, and he draws attention to the fact that article 60 of the Algeciras Act authorises foreigners to acquire land at Arzila and in its neighbourhood within a radius of two kilom.

As another instance of the obstructive policy of Mulai Hafid and his evident desire to curtail as much as possible the freedom and privileges enjoyed by foreign subjects and protected persons, I beg leave to transmit herewith copy of a despatch I have recently received from His Majesty's consul at Fez, reporting the Sultan's refusal to recognise protection granted to persons in the Zarhon district lying north-west of Fez. The sacred town of Mulai Edris is situated in this district, and this legation has always, on that account, avoided issuing certificates of protection to persons residing there, but it is under full Makhzen control, and the Sultan is not entitled to claim that its people shall not be protected.

There has for some months past been an increasing tendency on the part of country governors to interfere with protected persons, and several legations, more especially perhaps the French, have lately had to make complaint to the Court regarding the imprisonment or ill-treatment of protégés and confiscation of their property. The Makhzen has, however, shown little inclination to do justice, the representations on the subject received from the legations being left unanswered or an unsatisfactory reply being sent.

I have, &c.

HERBERT E. WHITE.

Inclosure in No. 362.

Consul MacLeod to Mr. White.

(No. 66.)

Sir, *Fez, September* 21, 1909.

AT the instance of M. Cortés, Spanish consul, a meeting of the consuls here took place to-day at the French consulate, M. Gaillard, French consul (doyen), presiding.

M. Cortés said he wished to call the attention of his colleagues to the attitude the Sultan had taken up in connection with the exercise of the right of protection by the Powers. For some time past he had been trying to effect settlement of the complaint of a Spanish subject, Benshocron, in regard to the ill-treatment of his semsar, Al Arbi-ben-Humman-al-Amari, of Beni Ammor, in Zarhon district, by the Sheikh Hadoo-al-Yamani.

The semsar was illegally imprisoned for some months for the purpose of extorting money, but was released at the urgent instance of the Spanish Minister when his Excellency was passing Beni Ammar on his way to Fez last spring. The Spanish Minister left Fez without settling the affair, and thereupon the sheikh again imprisoned the semsar. He remained imprisoned some three months, and then one morning appeared at his house door in a dying state and unable to speak, and expired within two or three hours. It is suspected that the sheikh had had him poisoned. Representations on the subject were renewed to the Sultan but without avail, and now, finally, instead of heeding them, the Sultan had taken that region from the jurisdiction of the basha of Fez, and had promoted the said sheikh to be governor of Zarhon district.

At the same time His Majesty had replied to M. Cortés that neither for the past nor for the future could protection be recognised to any person in Zarhon district.

My Arabic scribe was present with Sid Omar-al-Hadjwy in the office of the Vizir of Foreign Affairs when this decision of the Sultan was told to M. Cortés, my scribe having gone to renew complaints of the ill-treatment of certain farming employés of the British naturalisé, Hadj Hassan-al-Hadjwy, by this same Sheikh Hadoo-al-Yamani. These complaints began some months ago, and I informed Mr. Lister of them during his Excellency's stay in Fez, but settlement was always put off by the Makhzen.

Eventually the Vizir for Foreign Affairs told me it had been decided to relieve the Pasha Hadj Ben Aissa—whose hostility to protected persons and foreigners is notorious—of the command of that district, and so a settlement might shortly be expected. The vizier seems as affronted as any of us now by the Sultan's action in promoting this sheikh, *i.e.*, the very man of whose conduct so many complaints had been made.

The sheikh has now assured Al Hadjwy privately that he will settle with him and his farmer at the ensuing feast, and promised not to molest them in future. Meanwhile he is trying to borrow from Jewish moneylenders 20,000 dollars, which he has agreed to pay to the Sultan for his post.

As our complaints related only to the employés of a naturalisé, our position is materially different to that of the Spanish consul, the persecuted man being, or a Semsar, under Spanish jurisdiction, so if Hadj Hassan-al-Hadjwy is content to arrange his complaint privately, it may be well to let him do so.

The point to which M. Cortés particularly called his colleagues' attention was the preposterous and unlawful attitude of the Sultan in attempting to limit the exercise of protection. Zarhon is a Makhzen district (*i.e.*, not a district chronically in revolt) and the Sultan's attitude is inadmissible either by treaty or custom, for there have been, and still are, protégés there of several nations these many years.

In the course of the conversation which ensued all the consuls related instances of the same attitude by the Sultan of late, which appears to me to have been adopted for the double purpose of enhancing his prestige at the expense of foreign interests and of extorting money, and we all ended by saying we would report to our respective legations on the subject.

I understand that M. Cortés is urging that the Spanish Minister call the attention of the diplomatic body to the hostile disposition which the Sultan has for many months manifested towards all foreign-protected persons, of which the present are only the latest instances, to the end that steps may be taken to put a stop to it, such

as were recently successfully taken in regard to His Majesty's attempt to levy extraordinary imposts, against treaty provisions, upon protected persons at Fez.

I have, &c.

J. M. MACLEOD.

[38110] No. 363.

Home Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received October* 15.)

Sir, *Home Office, October* 14, 1909.

WITH reference to correspondence relative to the nomination of a mining expert to represent His Majesty's Government on the Commission of Experts appointed to consider draft mining regulations to be issued in Morocco in accordance with article 112 of the Act of Algeciras, I am directed by Mr. Secretary Gladstone to say, for the information of Secretary Sir Edward Grey, that he has requested Sir Henry Cunynghame, K.C.B., Legal Assistant Under-Secretary of State, to act as the British representative on this Commission, and that the proposed date of meeting (3rd November) will be convenient.

I am, &c.

E. BLACKWELL.

[38254] No. 364.

Consul MacLeod to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 16.)

(No. 36.)

Sir, *Fez, October* 4, 1909.

IN the month of Ramadan, of which some eighteen days have now passed, it is usual for events at the Moorish Court to move even more slowly than usual. This Ramadan, indeed, such movement as has been visible has—for the Sultan—been in the nature of a general set-back, leading, on his part, to increasing irritation against the Powers, especially Spain and France, and against the Taza tribes.

None of the leading Taza tribes—Ghiata, Dsul, and Branés—have yet (press reports to the contrary notwithstanding) sent in their allegiance, except two septs of Dsul—Angusht and Beni Ferassen—and the tiny Arab tribe of Meknassa. The latter, however, have now placed themselves under the protection of Branés to avert vengeance from the Ghiata for their temerity in acknowledging Mulai Hafid, and these two septs of Dsul probably have been moved by desire of remaining friendly with their neighbours, and thus saving the latter, as nearly adjacent to Fez, from undue pressure by the Sultan. Moreover, from reports I have had from a fairly reliable Riff informant, it appears that the Riff tribes, after the successful Spanish operations between the 20th and the 23rd September in Beni Sicar and Kebdana, appealed urgently to the Ghiata, Dsul, and Branés for assistance.

These tribes, however, replied coolly that "Mulai Mhemed" (*i.e.*, Bu Hamara) had been on good terms with the Spaniards. The Riff tribes had cast out Mulai Mhemed, and so had hostilities with the Spaniards. This was their own fault, and they could settle for themselves with the Spaniards. If, as the Riffs had said, the Spaniards might next invade Dsul, Branés, and Ghiata, these tribes would then defend themselves.

The mehallas recently operating against Bu Hamara between Fez and Wazzan are still engaged collecting imposts from these districts with, however, so far, such small results that I imagine the Sultan's main idea may possibly be chiefly to temporarily reduce his expenses by quartering the mehallas on these tribes.

In the meantime, these exactions have already begun to give rise to foreign remonstrances, as the farmer-partners and employés of foreign protegés are, apparently by the Sultan's special orders, not exempted, and complaints from such protégés are becoming more and more frequent.

The Sultan's attitude towards the Spaniards and the French may be illustrated by two incidents: his promotion to be Governor of Zarhon of a certain sheikh, Hadoo-Al-Yamani, under suspicion of murdering a Spanish protégé recently, and for whose previous ill-treatment of that protégé the Spanish Minister has these many months been trying to obtain redress.

In Figuig (Zenaga) district—which is in the "mutual" zone—there is a mixed jurisdiction, the inhabitants of certain villages being under the French, and those of

other villages being under Moorish rule. To promote friendly relations, it was the practice for the Makhzen to agree with the French when choosing a kaïd for that district.

Last spring, a man called Saidi, whom the French knew to be agitating then against them, came to Fez and asked to be made Governor of Figuig.

The French Minister, then here, mentioned the matter to the Sultan, and His Majesty assured him he quite understood Saidi's character and had no intention of granting him the post. Saidi returned to Zenaga, however, duly appointed as governor, and soon recommenced his old agitation.

The French consul now informs me that he has had to tell the Sultan that this sort of thing will not be tolerated, and that, if necessary (the French having ample force on the spot), Zenaga will simply be taken over completely by the French authorities, and Saidi be sent in custody to Tangier; and there, I understand, the matter remains.

Sid Abdullah-Al-Fessi left Fez a few days ago to rejoin the Moorish Mission at Paris. Absolute secrecy has been observed regarding his discussions with the Sultan about a loan, and no person seems to know what instructions he has taken back. But, judging from the general demeanour of both sides just now, they do not seem likely to come to terms amicably on that matter.

So far as any Europeans here can discern, this anti-European course which the Sultan follows, finds no real support either amongst his entourage in general or amongst the Moorish public. Indeed, I have seldom, if ever, seen the inhabitants here so well disposed to Europeans as just now.

As regards the Spanish operations, the most ignorant classes take little or no interest in them. The more intelligent people naturally speak of the Spaniards with some asperity, but invariably blame the Sultan for not having long ago come to terms amicably with the Spaniards—as was the Sultan Mulai Hassan's method.

What with (1) his total inability, by reason of the Taza tribes' attitude, to assist the Riffs against the Spaniards or to compel the Riffs to submit to Spanish terms; (2) the decision of all the Powers not to intervene in the Melilla affair; (3) his repugnance to taking a loan, together with his inability otherwise to meet the ever-incurring claims against the Makhzen; and (4) the dislike in which—as he, I am sure, quite realises—the country at large has begun to feel towards him, it is not surprising that the Sultan should have been these few days in one of his periods of intense depression of spirits. For several days he would do almost no business, but since the day before yesterday he has resumed work, and yesterday gave an audience of over three hours to the Viziers Glawi and Sid Aissi, which presumably would be chiefly in connection with the refusal of the Powers to intervene in the Melilla affair, and the occupation of Seluan by the Spaniards.

The greatest secrecy is still maintained in regard to the fate of Bu Hamara, opinions varying from day to day as to what actually took place.

The latest surmise, however, is that Bu Hamara is really still alive, and that the Sultan means to parade him, in his cage, during the Moslem festival which takes place at the end of Ramadan.

Whether or not this will happen I do not venture to prophesy, but assuredly such an "impressionist" dramatic stroke would be very much in the Sultan's manner.

I have, &c.

J. M. MacLEOD.

[38190] No. 365.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 16.)

(No. 258.)

Sir, *Tangier, October* 9, 1909.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 254 of the 4th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith translation of the letter addressed on the 6th instant by M. Regnault, as doyen of the diplomatic body, to Sid Guebbas, in reply to the Moorish note regarding events in the Riff.

I hear privately from Fez that the Sultan is "depressed and alarmed" at the reply of the Powers, the nature of which was known beforehand to the Moorish authorities here, and was communicated to His Majesty.

I have, &c.

H. E. WHITE.

Inclosure in No. 365.

M. Regnault to Sid Mohammed-el-Guebbas.

LE corps diplomatique a examiné la note de Sa Majesté chérifienne concernant les événements du Rif, que vous m'avez chargé par lettre en date du 30 Chaaban, 1327, de porter à sa connaissance.

Après avoir consulté leurs Gouvernements, les représentants des Puissances ont estimé que la question soulevée n'était pas de la compétence du corps diplomatique, et qu'elle doit être réglée exclusivement entre le Mahkzen chérifien et le Gouvernement espagnol.

Je vous prie de vouloir bien faire part de cette réponse à Sa Majesté chérifienne.

Le 6 octobre, 1909.

[38191] No. 366.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 16.)

(No. 259.)

Sir, *Tangier, October* 9, 1909.

THE French Minister informs me that the Board for Foreign Affairs has been reconstituted, Cid Guebbas remaining at the head of it, and alone signing letters, &c., but having no power to do anything without the consent of his colleagues. Cid Ghannam returns to the board as senior member after Cid Guebbas, the next in rank being Cid Kubbaj, a Fez Moor who was on the board some years ago, but was removed by Mulai Abdel Aziz on account of the constant complaints in regard to him received from the various foreign legations who found him impossible to deal with. He was subsequently appointed one of the administrators of customs at Tangier, a post he utilised for smuggling on a large scale. Being, however, detected, he was removed from the post and summoned to Fez, where suitable gifts bestowed in the right quarter saved him from further trouble. Another member on the board is Cid Fatmi Bargash, a Rabat notable, and Cid Ben Saïd also retains his place on it.

The creation of this board will probably render it still more difficult to obtain a satisfactory settlement of any questions.

I hear privately from Fez that the Sultan considered Cid Guebbas too Francophil and too ready to comply with demands, and that, acting it is said on the advice of the Grand Vizier, he has selected men with anti-French tendencies to act as a drag upon Cid Guebbas.

I have, &c.

HERBERT E. WHITE.

[38192] No. 367.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 16.)

(No. 260.)

Sir, *Tangier, October* 9, 1909.

SID ABDULLAH-EL-FASI arrived at Tangier on the 6th instant on his way back to Paris from Fez, to which place he had gone to submit to the Sultan the proposal for the loan and other matters which had been discussed by the Moorish mission at Paris.

I took an opportunity this afternoon of asking the French Minister whether he could give me any information as to the nature of the replies Sid Abdullah-el-Fasi is taking back to Paris, and whether the statement on the subject published in the "Dépêche marocaine," copy of which I beg leave to transmit herewith, is in any way correct.

M. Regnault told me that Sid Abdullah-el-Fasi had excused himself from communicating to him the nature of the replies on the ground that they must be first delivered at Paris, and therefore he had no definite information on the subject, but that the reports he had received from his consul at Fez tended to confirm the paragraph in the "Dépêche." M. Gaillard believed that the Sultan would agree to the loan if the terms were modified. His Majesty would not consent to the Govern-

ment properties being given as security, and desired to retain 10 per cent. of the customs revenues for himself. M. Regnault observed that if that meant 10 per cent. of the gross revenue, the amount left as security for the new loan after deducting the 60 per cent. for the old loan and the working expenses would be comparatively small —only about 20 per cent., he said.

The Sultan was pressing for the evacuation by the French troops of all Moorish territory now held by them, and was also insisting that the frontier police should be under a Moorish high commissioner. M. Regnault did not, however, think that these demands were put forward as a condition for accepting the loan.

M. Gaillard, I understand, received no official communication of the reply, he has therefore probably only based his report on information received from persons at the court, and the true nature of the Sultan's replies will not be known until they have been communicated to the French Government.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

Inclosure in No. 367.

Extract from the "Dépêche marocaine" of October 9, 1909.

LA MISSION D'ABDALLAH-EL-FASI : LES CONDITIONS DE L'EMPRUNT.

NOUS avons recueilli hier, de sources privées, quelques indications sur les conditions dans lesquelles le Sultan consentirait à l'emprunt de liquidation du Maroc. Nous les reproduisons à titre d'informations, sans garantie d'authenticité, avec simplement l'impression que si elles ne correspondent pas rigoureusement à la réalité des faits, elles marquent avec une précision suffisante l'esprit dans lequel le Sultan accepte l'emprunt.

La France pour avoir l'honneur de couvrir de ses finances le déficit marocain, devra préalablement évacuer la Chaouïa, évacuer Casablanca, évacuer Oudjda, évacuer les Beni-Snassen. Et si quelques inquiétudes pour la sécurité de ses régions venaient à naître, le Sultan autoriserait des goums marocains, instruits par des sous-officiers français, à faire régner l'ordre dans la Chaouïa.

Quant aux territoires de la frontière algéro-marocaine, le Maghzen—dit-on—apprécierait l'opportunité d'un haut commissaire du Gouvernement pour présider aux mesures de police prévues par les accords de 1901–1902. Ce haut commissaire ne serait plus le Général Lyautey : ce serait un caïd maroquin.

Ces clauses et conditions étant satisfaites, le Maghzen retient 10 pour cent sur les douanes et abandonne 30 pour cent pour gager l'emprunt.

Si ces renseignements devaient se vérifier, il serait possible que la question de l'emprunt subisse quelques retards.

[38194] No. 368.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 16.)

(No. 262.)
Sir,
Tangier, October 10, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch I have received from the acting vice-consul at Tetuan reporting an incursion into Moorish territory made by a considerable force of Spanish troops from Ceuta.

The local French paper, the "Dépêche marocaine," yesterday published a report it had received from its Ceuta correspondent to the same effect, but M. Regnault told me yesterday afternoon that M. Merry del Val had mentioned the matter to him, observing that the report could not be true, as he had received no official news from Ceuta. This morning the "Dépêche" publishes an official denial of the report.

I beg leave to transmit herewith copies of the original report published in the "Dépêche" as well as of the *démenti*.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 368.

Acting Vice-Consul Miller to Mr. White.

Sir,
Tetuan, October 7, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that it was reported here yesterday that a large number of Spanish troops of the garrison at Ceuta made an armed incursion in Moorish territory to a village called Beni-Mizzalah about one and a-half hours' journey from Ceuta.

The governor says the report is quite true, and that he had sent an account of it to Cid Guebbas, and was also writing to the Sultan with reference to the invasion.

The governor also informed me a mare was stolen by a "friend" of the Spaniards, but he could not say whether this friend was a Moslem or a Christian.

I have, &c.
WM. MILLER.

Inclosure 2 in No. 368.

Extracts from the "Dépêche marocaine" of October 9 and 10, 1909.

(1.)

LA SITUATION À CEUTA : UNE SORTIE DES TROUPES ESPAGNOLES.

DES pêcheurs espagnols ont été, il y a quelques jours, molestés à quelque distance de Ceuta par un groupe armé d'indigènes de l'Andjera. Les pêcheurs ont été pillés et quelques coups de fusil échangés, sans pertes d'ailleurs de part ni d'autre.

Les autorités militaires, informées de cet incident, ont ordonné une sortie, qui s'est effectuée hier, à 10 heures du matin.

Trois mille hommes de troupe, appuyés d'une batterie d'artillerie, sont sortis du territoire de Ceuta et en ont franchi les limites, dans la direction du chemin d'El Ksar El Sghir. Les troupes se sont rendues à l'endroit où s'était produit l'incident, désigné sous le nom de Benounech.

Les groupements indigènes, à la vue des troupes espagnoles, se sont dispersés sans résistance et les troupes sont rentrées sans incident notable.

(2.)

LA GARNISON DU CEUTA : UNE RECTIFICATION DU MINISTÈRE D'ETAT.

Nous avons signalé hier, sur la foi d'une correspondance puisée—nous écrivait-on —aux sources les plus sûres, la sortie de la garnison de Ceuta sur le territoire marocain, pour châtier quelques Andjeras coupables d'avoir molesté des pêcheurs espagnols.

Une dépêche du Gouvernement espagnol dément cette information. Nous nous empressons, sur le désir qui nous en est manifesté, de consigner ici ce démenti.

[38195] No. 369.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 16.)

(No. 263.)
Sir,
Tangier, October 10, 1909.

HIS Majesty's consul at Fez reports that the Sultan has recently appointed a number of men of no position as governors of tribes and fractions of tribes in the districts east and north-east of Fez, nearly all of which are more or less independent. The Riff tribes in question, annoyed at the Sultan's instructions not to fight the Spaniards, have absolutely refused to recognise their governors.

The Sultan, anxious to win over the tribes in the vicinity of Fez, has addressed letters to the Branès and Southern Dsul offering to forgive their past misdeeds, and

inviting them to send deputations to Fez at the coming feast celebrating the end of the fast month of Ramadan. No reply has been returned, and it is not known whether the tribes will send representatives to attend the feast.

Persons arriving from the tribes in the Taza district reported that letters have been received from the Riff tribes begging their assistance against the Spaniards, who they say are invading their territory in overwhelming numbers. These letters, however, have evoked no enthusiasm, and the tribesmen are not responding to the appeal. They are said to bear a grudge against the Riffians for their treatment of the pretender.

The pretender's fate is still not known; there are many rumours, but no reliable information can be obtained. The latest reports are to the effect that he is alive, and will be again exhibited in a cage on the feast day.

From the south there is little news. His Majesty's consul at Mogador reports that Kaïd Anflus is said to have sent to the Sultan a sum of 120,000 dollars, or about 16,000*l.*, and Kaïd Giluli sent at the same time 40,000 dollars, or about 5,333*l.* Heavy taxes are also, it is said, being levied in the interior. The Sultan will doubtless, as is usual, receive a considerable sum of money at the feast as offerings from the various officials and governors.

His Majesty's consul at Casa Blanca informs me that, on the initiative of the French residents, an International Hygienic Commission is being formed at that town, on the model of one that has been in existence at Tangier for some years, to attend to sanitation, drainage, street paving, lighting, and scavenging, &c. In the scheme proposed the majority of members will be Frenchmen.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

[36648]

No. 370.

Sir Edward Grey to Tewfik Pasha.

Your Excellency, *Foreign Office, October* 18, 1909.

YOUR Excellency will remember that in the course of conversation on the 17th August last you enquired whether His Majesty's Government could secure for Turkish subjects in Morocco the privilege of being placed under the extra-territorial jurisdiction of the British courts in that country.

His Majesty's Government, who are anxious to meet the wishes of the Porte in every way, have made confidential enquiries on the subject. As a result, they fear that the Sultan of Morocco is practically certain to refuse a request to the effect that Turkish subjects in Morocco should be placed under British extra-territorial jurisdiction. In these circumstances the Ottoman Government will no doubt agree that it would be unwise, by putting forward such a request, to court a refusal which would render the situation more difficult in future, and that it would be preferable for the British Government to restrict themselves for the present to extending their good offices to Ottoman subjects to the extent found practicable without leading to undue friction.

I have, &c.
E. GREY.

[39053]

No. 371.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 23.)

(No. 265.)

Sir, *Tangier, October* 14, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith translation of the note which, in accordance with the instructions in your despatch No. 142 of the 4th instant, I have addressed Cid Aissa-ben-Omar, informing him that no date can be fixed at present for the reception of the Mission the Sultan is desirous of sending to England.

I delivered this letter personally to Cid Guebbas this morning, acquainting him with the contents, and informing him that it was useless to conceal the fact that the impression created in England by the recent cruelties at Fez had been such as to render the reception of a Moorish Mission impossible.

His Excellency fully grasped the significance of the reply, and said he quite

understood the reason which prompted it, adding that he was aware that in other respects also His Majesty's Government had reason to be dissatisfied with the Makhzen. He trusted, however, that we did not attribute to him personally any responsibility in the matter, as he always did his best to settle any questions satisfactorily.

I observed that His Majesty's Government had always desired to maintain the most cordial relations with the Moorish Government, but that recently this had become difficult. I repeated that public opinion in England had been deeply stirred by the recent cruelties, and added that it was unfortunate that nothing had been done by the Makhzen to allay this feeling; the reply which had been given to the collective note on the subject being, as his Excellency must have realised, unsatisfactory.

Cid Guebbas then enquired whether he might report the information I had given him as to the reasons for not fixing any date for the receipt of the Mission. I replied that I had given him the information in confidence, but that he could report it to the court if he thought fit.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

Inclosure in No. 371.

Mr. White to Cid Aissa-ben-Omar.

(Translation.)

After compliments,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your Excellency's letter to His Majesty's Minister of the 5th Shaaban (22nd August) informing him that, since it was impossible for the Moorish Mission to visit England at present, His Shereefian Majesty desired to be informed when it would be possible to send the Mission.

A translation of your Excellency's letter was duly forwarded to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and I am instructed to inform your Excellency that it is not possible at present to fix a date for the reception of the Mission.

May you, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

[39054]

No. 372.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 23.)

(No. 266.)

Sir, *Tangier, October* 16, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to report that I have received a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Fez, informing me that the Sultan has issued orders for again levying a tax of 10 per cent. *ad valorem* on all goods sent from Fez to Berber districts, which His Majesty had abolished before his recognition by the Powers, as reported in Mr. MacLeod's despatch, of which a copy was enclosed in Mr. Lister's despatch No. 129 of the 24th May last. This tax, being levied on foreign goods in addition to the 10 per cent import duty paid at the ports, was always regarded as a grievance by foreign merchants, and was on various occasions the subject of discussion between this legation and the Makhzen. It has doubtless been reinforced now as a means of obtaining contributions to the treasury from the Berber tribes beyond the control of the Makhzen.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

P.S. *October* 18.—I beg leave to transmit herewith copy of a despatch I have just received from Mr. Consul MacLeod, reporting that although the tax in question has not hitherto been levied on foreign subjects or protected persons, an attempt has now been made to levy it from a French protégé.

H. E. W.

Inclosure in No. 372.

Consul MacLeod to Mr. White.

(No. 79.)

Sir, *Fez, October* 14, 1909.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 76 of the 12th instant, I should perhaps have mentioned that the tax in question has not in the past been paid by foreigners or protected persons.

Since it has been restored, I have had no case of its being demanded from any British-protected person.

The French Consul has, however, had a case of its being asked from a French protégé, and the Makhzen replied that, as a personal favour in this instance, payment would not be insisted upon. M. Gaillard replied that he could not recognise any "favour" in the matter. The tax was simply an extraordinary impost not payable by foreigners or protected persons, and M. Gaillard proposes to call the consular body's attention to the matter, to the end that each of us may bring it to the notice of our respective legations.

I have, &c.
J. M. MACLEOD.

[39056] No. 373.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 23.)

(No. 268.)

Sir, *Tangier, October* 16, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to report that a Shereefian letter has been read in the villages of the Fahs (Tangier district), inviting the people to select a notable from amongst themselves to be appointed their governor. The Governor of Tangier, a son of Cid Guebbas, will thus retain only the town of Tangier under his jurisdiction, and will lose financially as well as in prestige, for the post will no longer be a lucrative one.

The decision of the Sultan to still further reduce the district under the Governor of Tangier, which used to include the Anjera and several other hill tribes now under Raisuli, as well as the Fahs, tends to confirm the report that His Majesty is discontented with Cid Guebbas, it is, however, in pursuance of his general policy of subdividing districts.

The old system of selling posts is again in full swing, and the more governorships that can be offered for sale the greater the receipts of the Sultan and court officials. It is the people who suffer, as the new governors, not knowing how long it will be before their posts are resold to rivals, make haste to extort from the people as much as they can to recoup themselves for what they have paid, and to provide themselves with funds for further payments at court as well as for their own benefit.

The natural consequence is that foreign protection is again in great demand, all the people who have anything to lose seeking to associate themselves with foreigners, so as to obtain protection and escape the extortions of their governors. When successful they return to their houses armed with their certificates of protection and decline to meet the demands of their governors, who, however, not infrequently ignore the protection, seize the men and confiscate their property, in the confidence that their action will not be severely viewed by the Sultan. It is not, however, only these newly-protected persons who are thus seized, protégés of old standing have met with the same treatment, giving rise to serious complaints on the part of the legations.

I have, &c.
H. E. WHITE.

[39849] No. 374.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 30.)

(No. 270. Confidential.)

Sir, *Tangier, October* 19, 1909.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 251 of the 1st instant, I have the honour to report that a few days later Mulai Abdelaziz enquired of me by telephone whether I had not yet received a reply from you in regard to his intended visit to Gibraltar. I said that, upon learning from the French Minister that His Majesty had abandoned his intention I had informed you thereof, and consequently I no longer expected any reply on the subject.

The following day Mulai Abdelaziz sent a member of his household to me to ask for explanations, saying he had not understood my reply by telephone. I repeated to him what M. Regnault had told me regarding the postponement of the visit, adding that I considered that he had, in the circumstances, taken a wise determination.

A few days ago His Majesty sent for Mr. Irwin and, after speaking of other matters, said he still had the intention of visiting Gibraltar, and had never told the French Minister he would not go there, and he requested Mr. Irwin to inform me that he proposed to go this week.

Upon receiving this message I called upon the French chargé d'affaires and communicated it to him confidentially, enquiring whether there was any objection to the visit on the part of the French Government. M. de Beaumarchais, who was temporarily in charge of the legation, pending the arrival of Count Saint Aulaire, appeared somewhat embarrassed, and was evidently unwilling that the visit should take place, but gave no reason except that it might injure Mulai Abdelaziz with the Sultan, and that it would place them in a difficult position, as Mulai Abdelaziz had asked to visit a French cruiser before embarking on the British steamer, and they did not want him to do so or even to place a steam pinnace at his disposal for embarking, as it might cause annoyance to the Sultan.

I told M. de Beaumarchais that I would do what I could to dissuade the ex-Sultan from visiting Gibraltar for the present, but that my position was a delicate one, as I was unwilling to offend His Majesty or hurt his feelings in any way by leading him to think that his visit to Gibraltar would be unwelcome to us. Mulai Abdelaziz, under the terms of the agreement with the Sultan, was free to visit Gibraltar or any other place he wished, and I did not think it necessary to consult Mulai Hafid's wishes in the matter. I added, however, I thought Mulai Abdelaziz should do nothing to injure his position or render it more difficult for the French Legation to maintain his rights under the agreement.

At my request Mr. Irwin again called on the ex-Sultan and explained the injury that his proposed visit to Gibraltar might do him, informing him that I had heard privately that Cid Guebbas had reported the matter to the Sultan and requested instructions, and though he was doubtless free to go where he wished, it was impossible to know what instructions Mulai Hafid might have sent. His Shereefian Majesty might even have instructed Cid Guebbas to prevent his embarking, or if he left, to prevent his returning. The Sultan had raised difficulties in regard to the pension, and it was undesirable to do anything which would make it more difficult for the French Legation to insist on the regular payment of the full amount agreed upon.

Mulai Abdelaziz observed that he was free, under the terms of his agreement, to go where he wished, and that he had heard nothing of any difficulty in regard to the payment of his pension, but he knew our advise was given solely in his own interests, and was grateful for it. In deference to this advise, he said, he would not go to Gibraltar at present; the visit would, however, be merely postponed, not abandoned, as he was anxious to see Gibraltar, and hoped to do so before long.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

P.S.—*October* 23. Count Saint Aulaire, when calling upon me on his return from France, brought up the subject of the ex-Sultan's visit to Gibraltar. He said that he saw no reason why the visit should not be paid nor why the Sultan's wishes should be consulted in the matter. Mulai Abdelaziz would always be protected by the French Legation, and should he go to Gibraltar they would see that he was not interfered with and would place at his disposal a steam pinnace from the French cruiser for embarking.

Whatever reason the French Legation may before have had for objecting to this visit, it is evident that they now rather desire it than otherwise, and would do nothing to discourage His Majesty from going. Count Saint Aulaire told me to-day that he had ascertained that Cid Guebbas had not yet received a reply from the Sultan to his letter reporting Mulai Abdelaziz's intention to go to Gibraltar.

H. E. W.

[39850] No. 375.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 30.)

(No. 271.)

Sir, *Tangier, October* 22, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to report that Kaïd Bashir-ben-Senah and the three other kaïds sent by the Sultan on a mission to the Riff left Tangier yesterday afternoon for Melilla on board a Spanish cruiser.

These kaïds have instructions to endeavour to induce the Riff tribes to cease hostilities; they will concert with General Marina as to the best means of obtaining their object.

The Spanish Minister informs me that he believes the Riffians are very near the end of their resources, and that they will soon have to submit. They have failed to obtain any effective support from outlying districts, and now that the rains have commenced their numbers will be reduced by men returning to their homes for the ploughing. They have lost very heavily, as shown by the numbers of fresh graves in their cemeteries, many of the wounded succumbing for want of proper medical treatment. They are also running short of ammunition, and find it more difficult now to obtain it in contraband.

Altogether, M. Merry del Val took a very hopeful view of the situation, and appeared to think the end was near.

If the reports that have reached the Spanish Legation are correct, the kaïds sent by the Sultan should have less difficulty than might be expected in inducing the Riffians to submit. I cannot, however, share the optimistic views of M. Merry del Val, and I shall be surprised if the Spaniards do not have to retain a large force in the country for a considerable time, even if the Moorish envoys succeed in convincing the general body of Riffians to disperse.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

[39851] No. 376.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 30.)

(No. 272. Confidential.)

Sir, *Tangier, October* 23, 1909.

FROM private letters received from Fez during the last week or two it appears that the French consul at that place, as well as the military officers in the Sultan's employment, have lately been talking very openly about approaching French action in this country. M. Gaillard told Dr. Verdon in private conversation that the French will make a "grand effort," and that he was convinced we should see Abdul Aziz again Sultan.

Recent articles in the "Temps" and other papers would seem to show that public opinion in France is now in favour of a more forward policy in Morocco, and the moment appears to have come when the French Government must take a decision as to the line of policy it will adopt. Sid Abdullah-el-Fasi has arrived in Paris with the Sultan's instructions to Cid-el-Mokri, and M. Regnault was hastily and unexpectedly summoned to Paris by telegraph, Count Sainte-Aulaire, who was absent on leave, being instructed to return to Tangier at once to take charge of the legation.

I took the opportunity of Count Sainte-Aulaire's visit on his return to speak of the general situation. He at once spoke freely and frankly, prefacing his remarks, however, by saying that he was at his home in the country when he received his instructions to return, and had had to come here without being able to visit Paris before starting. He said the present state of affairs could no longer be tolerated, and the patience of his Government was exhausted. The articles published in the "Temps" were doubtlessly inspired from the Ministère, as was shown by the publication of the list of grievances, the wording of which was similar to the official document. He said he was not yet fully acquainted with the Sultan's replies, but His Majesty made the evacuation of Casablanca, Shawia, and Oujdah a condition of the loan and gave unsatisfactory replies on other points. Count Sainte-Aulaire did not state what coercive measures might be taken, except that he mentioned the seizure of the custom-houses at all the ports as a means of obtaining the necessary funds for paying off the Makhzen debts if the Sultan definitely refused a loan.

I observed that I presumed his Government would prefer not to precipitate matters or take any action till after the elections. Count Sainte-Aulaire said the elections would not take place till April, and he did not think it would be possible to allow the present state of affairs to continue till then. In fact, I gathered from remarks he made that he considered that the sooner Mulai Hafid made the cup overflow the better.

I have, &c.
H. E. WHITE.

[39852] No. 377.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 30.)

(No. 273.)

Sir, *Tangier, October* 23, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to report that the Sultan has reappointed the notorious Kaïd el R'miki as governor of Alcazar, a Shereefian letter to that effect having been brought to that place by his brother on the 20th instant, and publicly read in the mosque.

This kaïd, as reported in my despatch No. 220 of the 4th September, 1908, was arrested and imprisoned shortly after Mulai Hafid's proclamation on account of his misgovernment, and the Sultan must know that his reappointment will create a very bad impression. The kaïd has, however, it is said, paid a large sum for the post, and with Mulai Hafid money outweighs other considerations.

El R'miki has lost no time in taking steps to recoup himself for the money paid at the Court. His brother brought instructions for the arrest of a number of persons and the confiscation of their property. A French protégé, some of Menebhi's employés and others arrived yesterday evening from Alcazar, having fled to avoid arrest. They report the seizure of their property with that of their employers, and the imprisonment of a number of others, protégés and employés of foreigners of various nationalities, and the seizure not only of their property but also of their families—amongst the persons who have thus suffered they mention a British protégé, Semsar, of Mr. Vice-Consul Forde, of Laraiche. I have as yet received no official confirmation of the report brought by the refugees, but I see no reason to doubt its truth. It is what would be expected from El R'miki on his restoration to power. He has many old scores to pay off, and a large sum of money to make good. Unfortunately it is probable that he is acting with the knowledge and consent of the Sultan, or at any rate the assurance that his conduct will not be severely judged at Court, otherwise, he would scarcely have ventured to give these orders whilst he was still at Fez, not having yet taken possession of his post. An intelligent Moor, of the better class, speaking to Mr. Irwin of the reappointment of Kaïd R'miki and of the recent arrests of persons under foreign protection remarked that the only explanation was that the Sultan desired to see how far the Powers would allow him to go in breaking treaty obligations.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

[39873] No. 378.

Consul MacLeod to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 30.)

(No. 38.)

Sir, *Fez, October* 19, 1909.

WITH reference to the last paragraph of my despatch No. 36 of the 4th instant, I beg to report that the Pretender Bu-Hamara has not been produced at the Moslem minor festival, three days of which have now passed, so everyone here now has concluded that he is dead.

As to the manner of his death there is still no evidence procurable which is beyond the possibility of future disproof, but until such refutation be adduced, one must believe that he was put to death on Thursday, the 9th September, by being shot, after having been placed in a cage with a lion, and the lion inflicting no fatal injury on him, and that his body was thereafter burned.

I am sorry to have to mention, with all reserve as to details, for though everyone believes it, there is yet no irrefutable evidence available, another case of atrocious cruelty by the Sultan.

Some five days ago the Sultan missed one of his books. Suspecting it had been stolen, he had several slaves flogged to extract information, and one of them confessed that the book was in the possession of a certain slave—a lad some 13 years old.

This was found to be the case, but the lad protested it had been given to him by another slave, and that he did not know it had been stolen. The Sultan, however, would accept no explanation, and had one of the lad's hands cut off. So far as is yet known, the lad is still alive.

The punishment—though not, of course, the absence of any proper, open trial—is unfortunately within Koranic law, so Moors cannot very well denounce it wholly, but the indignation and disgust of Europeans here over this last barbarity can hardly be exaggerated.

Even under the mildest Sultans, palace slaves have always been the most brutal and degraded of all slaves in Morocco, and floggings so severe as to cause death must, I feel sure, have occurred sometimes without attracting any outside attention.

Mutilation of any of them, or any thieves, has, however, not been inflicted since at least the reign (1822–1859) of Mulai Abderhman, so far as I have been able to ascertain, at any rate with the Sultan's knowledge or approval.

The general opinion here is, and I entirely concur in it, that no remonstrances will have the slightest effect towards making the Sultan cease such barbarities (indeed, they would probably make him assert his "independence" all the more cruelly) unless the Powers threaten him plainly with some direct punishment of himself if he does not undertake solemnly to abandon such practices, or, at the least, to so hedge them around with legal formalities as to make them too slow and tedious for resort to be likely to be had to them.

I am sure that the Sultan's real beliefs (however unavowable) are that the worse the opinion foreigners form of him, the more will he be admired by his own Moslem subjects, and that when the flouting of European feelings and desires is possible without immediate tangible risk the Sultan will continue to see in that line of conduct an ideal means of self-aggrandisement.

I have, &c.
J. M. MacLEOD.

[39794] No. 379.

Foreign Office to Sir H. Cunynghame.

Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 30, 1909.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to inform you that he has approved your appointment as British delegate to represent his Majesty's Government at an international commission of experts invited by the French Government to meet at Paris for the purpose of considering the terms of a mining law to be recommended to the Sultan of Morocco for promulgation in the form of an Imperial firman, in accordance with article 112 of that Act.

2. You will accordingly proceed to Paris in time to attend the opening of the commission, which has been fixed for the 3rd proximo. His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris has been requested to afford you any facilities and assistance of which you may stand in need. You will, whilst engaged upon this special service, receive an allowance of 1*l.* 10*s.* per diem, and your travelling expenses as well as the cost of engaging a sitting-room at an hotel during your stay in Paris will be refunded to you on your rendering an account of them to the Chief Clerk of this Office.

3. The French Government have communicated a draft law in seventy-four articles, prepared by M. Porché, the Sultan's State Engineer, which they suggest should serve as the basis of the discussions of the commission. A copy of this paper is annexed hereto,* together with a copy of the Algeciras Act.†

4. The draft law appears to have been elaborated with much care and skill, and with the general scope of its provisions His Majesty's Government are in agreement. There are, however, a few points on which I am to offer some observations for your consideration and guidance.

5. Under article 2 of the Anglo-Moorish convention of commerce and navigation of the 9th December, 1856, the Sultan is precluded from sanctioning any monopoly in

* Projet de Règlement.

† Algeciras Act.

his dominions except in respect to "leeches, bark, tobacco, and other herbs used for smoking in pipes." A copy of the convention is attached hereto for your fuller information.* Anything in the nature of a monopoly of mining operations would, it appears to His Majesty's Government, be contrary to the spirit, if not the letter, of this stipulation. It would in any case run counter to a general principle of commercial policy to which they are firmly attached, and it will be desirable that you should endeavour to secure, if possible, the recognition of the general principle of such prohibition in the text of the firman establishing the mining law.

6. Special interest attaches to the matter in view of the fact that a powerful international syndicate, which enjoys the support of most of the Treaty Powers, is contemplating an application to the Sultan for the grant of exclusive rights for a long period of years over a considerable area of the Moorish Empire, as is shown in the papers noted below,† which accompany the present despatch. Whilst, as you will observe, His Majesty's Government have, at the instance of the French Government, intimated their readiness to give their official support to the syndicate, in which British interests are represented to the extent of 10 per cent., they would feel unable to extend such support to any particular scheme that the syndicate may put forward if it should be found that the adoption of such scheme implied the setting up of a virtual monopoly of mining rights in the Sultan's dominions. Having regard to the comparatively small participation of British capital in the international syndicate referred to, it is quite possible that other British applicants may at some future date claim the right to compete for mining concessions in Morocco, and to such competition the field must, in the view of His Majesty's Government, be left reasonably open.

7. To this end, the most appropriate means would appear to be a limitation of—

(*a.*) The duration of prospecting licences;
(*b.*) The area of mining grants;
(*c.*) The power to sell acquired licences or grants to third parties.

8. The first of these three points seems to be met by article 20 of the draft law which restricts the validity of a prospecting licence to a period of three years, which may, however, be prolonged to six years. On the other hand, there is no provision for limiting the area of mining grants. This is a question which was fully discussed on the somewhat similar occasion of the preparation of a mining law for Corea, and the law promulgated in that country in 1906, of which a copy is annexed hereto,‡ contains a proviso in article 4 that mining claims shall in no case exceed a limit of 1,000,000 tsubo, equivalent to about 830 acres. It should be your endeavour to secure the acceptance of some such rule in the present case.

9. As regards the power to sell or transfer rights acquired under the mining law, absolute freedom is explicitly accorded under articles 23 and 36 of the draft law. It is clear that advantage could be taken of this stipulation to amalgamate a number of separate concessions so as to gain for any particular firm or syndicate practically the monopoly of mining rights throughout Morocco. This difficulty could probably be overcome by adopting the principle embodied in article 9 of the Corean law, that no amalgamation (or division) of mining claims may be made without the sanction of the Government, the latter being, in the case of Morocco, precluded, by the general principle of the prohibition of monopolies, from acceding to any requests for amalgamation if a monopoly would thereby be created.

10. The objections to any monopoly rights are further strengthened by the provisions of articles 43–45, under which it is proposed to give to the owner of any mining concession the absolute right to acquire, if necessary by way of expropriation, any land required for the building of such railways or ports as it may be desired to construct for the purpose of exploiting a mine. Coupled with the further stipulations respecting the carriage of goods and passengers for the general public, these provisions appear to His Majesty's Government to involve the possibility of the whole system of railway communication in Morocco falling into the hands of powerful mining syndicates, which would be altogether outside the proper scope of a mining law, and would for obvious reasons be highly undesirable. It is true that, under article 45, the Moorish Government is to have the right of expropriating railway lines so constructed, with the view of their being leased to contractors for working purposes, but this proviso hardly seems to offer adequate guarantees against the possible setting up of a gigantic monopoly of

* Convention, 1856.
† Nos. 185, 195, 201, and 207*.
‡ Corean Mining Law, 1906.

railway construction under the guise of mining concessions. His Majesty's Government hope that some other arrangement, less open to such an objection, may be devised for meeting the requirements of the exploitation of mines.

11. The monopoly question reappears in an unexpected manner in the last paragraph of article 62 of the draft law, under which the Moorish Government is to reserve its right to establish a State monopoly in salt. Any such monopoly would of course be equally at variance with article 2 of the Anglo-Moorish convention of 1856, and the proposed clause should therefore be omitted.

12. Article 59 of the draft law leaves it to the Moorish Government to fix the date from which the provisions respecting the issue of prospecting licences are to take effect. It would be desirable in the interests of possible British competitors that a reasonable time should be allowed to elapse between the promulgation of the law and the date so fixed.

13. There is another point requiring consideration. Among the liabilities to be imposed on the owners of mining grants is a State tax of 3 per cent. on the gross amount of the yield of the mine. With a view to facilitate the collection of this tax, it is proposed, under article 49, to levy it, on account of the Moorish Government, in the shape of an export duty of 3 per cent. *ad valorem*. There appear to be two objections to such an arrangement. In the first place, it would be advisable to avoid the term "export duty," since under various treaties, notably under article 3 of the Anglo-Moorish treaty of 1856, the Sultan is expressly precluded from imposing any export duties whatever except those specified in the schedule annexed to article 7 of that convention, in which minerals do not figure. His Majesty's Government do not wish to contend that an export duty of 3 per cent. on minerals such as the draft law contemplates would in fact differ from a due or tax paid direct by the owner of the mines to the Sultan, a tax which they consider, in itself, proper and justified. But, for the sake of preventing an infringement of the letter of the British convention, it would clearly be preferable that some other manner of collecting the tax should be devised.

14. Apart from this consideration, which is one of form rather than of substance, the proposed arrangement would seem to leave a loophole through which, in certain conceivable circumstances, the mine-owner would be able to escape without paying the tax at all. It may be supposed that, should mining, say for iron, be carried on with real success, the owners of mines who might desire to construct a railway or erect any large plant might think it of advantage to set up works in Morocco for the local manufacture of rails or other iron products. The mining products used for this or a similar purpose in Morocco itself would not in that case pay the export duty, and would in this way escape the tax of 3 per cent. altogether, unless special provisions were made to meet the case. This is therefore a contingency which should be borne in mind when settling definitely the method of collecting the proposed tax.

15. Under articles 51 and 52 of the draft law, the public department to be set up at Tangier for the purpose of administering the law and of dealing with all mining questions is to be invested with powers of police and supervision as regards the safety of mining works and workers. In this connection, the question of the proper enforcement of such regulations as the Department of Mines may from time to time draw up seems to require special consideration.

16. It seems doubtful how far sufficient provision has been made for the rescission of concessions in case of failure to work a mine within a reasonable time, or in case of its abandonment before the expiry of the concession, or of the insolvency of the concessionnaires. You should endeavour to obtain the adoption of more precise rules under this head.

17. Sir Edward Grey leaves it to your discretion and judgment to find a solution of the various difficulties above indicated which shall be at the same time satisfactory from the point of view of British commercial interests and acceptable to the other Powers represented in the Commission.

I am, &c.
W. LANGLEY.

Annex.

Projet d'un Règlement sur les Mines au Maroc.

TITRE I.—*Dispositions générales.*

ARTICLE 1er.

LE présent firman, édicté en conformité de l'article 112 de l'Acte d'Algésiras, a pour objet de déterminer les conditions de la recherche et de l'exploitation des mines dans l'Empire chérifien tant par les sujets marocains que par les étrangers de toute nationalité.

ARTICLE 2.

Sont considérés comme mines pour l'application du présent firman les gîtes naturels des substances minérales et fossiles suivantes :—

Minerais d'où s'extraient tous métaux ou alliages métalliques ; minerais de soufre ou d'arsenic ; sels solubles ou associés à ces divers minerais ;

Graphites et combustibles fossiles à l'exclusion de la tourbe ; hydrocarbures libres ou incorporés à des gangues ;

Terres rares telles que celles de zirconium, thorium, cérium ;

Gemmes et pierres précieuses ;

Nitrates, borates, et sels associés ;

Phosphates ;

Sels gemmes et de potasse et autres sels associés ;

Sources et eaux salées d'où l'on peut extraire du sel.

ARTICLE 3.

Sont considérés comme carrières les gîtes de substances minérales non classées dans les mines.

L'exploitation des carrières est laissée à la disposition des propriétaires du sol ; elle est soumise à des règlements de police pour assurer la sécurité.

Le Maghzen aura le droit, pour l'exécution de travaux d'utilité publique, d'exploiter ou de faire exploiter les carrières appartenant à des particuliers en conformité des règlements sur les carrières et sur les occupations temporaires.

ARTICLE 4.

En cas de contestation sur la classification légale d'une substance ou d'un gîte il est statué par un firman chérifien rendu sur avis conforme du Service des Mines.

ARTICLE 5.

On peut acquérir sur les mines des droits de recherche et des droits d'exploitation.

Ces droits s'appliquent indéfiniment en profondeur à toutes les substances classées dans les mines, dans les limites des périmètres pour lesquelles les dits droits sont acquis.

ARTICLE 6.

Le présent firman établit les droits et obligations des prospecteurs et exploitants envers le Maghzen et les tiers.

Le Maghzen prêtera aux prospecteurs et exploitants son appui dans toute la mesure possible pour l'application intégrale du présent firman ; le Maghzen ne peut toutefois jusqu'à nouvel ordre être reconnu responsable des difficultés quelles qu'elles soient que les prospecteurs et exploitants pourront rencontrer de la part de tiers, et notamment des propriétaires ou possesseurs du sol.

Il n'encourt aucune responsabilité et ne peut être actionné pour aucune indemnité en tout ce qui touche la sécurité des personnes et des biens engagés dans les entreprises minières, non plus que pour tout préjudice survenant à des tiers par le fait et à l'occasion des travaux de mines.

ARTICLE 7.

En cas de retard ou d'interruption dans l'exercice de leurs droits par suite de difficultés prévues à l'article précédent, les obligations des intéressés envers le Maghzen, après dues justifications fournies par eux en temps utile, seront suspendues pendant la durée de ce retard ou de cette interruption, et les intéressés auront droit, s'ils le demandent, à une prorogation de leurs droits pour une durée égale à celle de ces retards ou interruptions.

ARTICLE 8.

La recherche et l'exploitation des mines peuvent être effectuées dans les conditions fixées au présent firman par tout individu ou par toute société régulièrement constituée.

Les demandes présentées au nom d'une société ne sont recevables que si elles sont ou ont été préalablement accompagnées des pièces justifiant de la constitution légale de la société.

ARTICLE 9.

Tout individu ou le mandataire qu'il aurait régulièrement constitué pour agir en son lieu et place, ainsi que le représentant que toute société est tenue de désigner, doivent, pour l'application du présent firman, avoir fait et notifié au Service des Mines élection de domicile au Maroc dans l'une des villes suivantes, à savoir :—

Les ports ouverts au commerce extérieur et les villes de Fez, Marrakech, El Ksar, et Oudjda, ainsi que toutes autres villes qui seraient ultérieurement désignées par décision du Maghzen.

Toutes notifications relatives à l'application du présent firman seront valablement faites aux intéressés au domicile ainsi élu ; à défaut d'élection de domicile, notification sera valablement faite : pour les sujets marocains, au représentant du Maghzen à Tanger ; pour les sujets étrangers, à leur légation.

ARTICLE 10.

Les fonctionnaires du Gouvernement chérifien et ceux des Puissances étrangères en fonctions au Maroc, à quelque classe qu'ils appartiennent, ainsi que leurs parents, ne peuvent, dans toute l'étendue de l'Empire, obtenir, directement ou indirectement, le droit de rechercher ou d'exploiter des mines ni devenir mandataires ou représentants des intéressés dans ces affaires.

Tous actes faits en opposition à cette disposition sont nuls et de nul effet.

TITRE II.—*Des Recherches.*

ARTICLE 11.

Les recherches de mines sont libres dans tout l'Empire chérifien sous l'observation des dispositions du présent règlement, sans que l'explorateur puisse disposer des substances classées dans les mines, abattues dans ses travaux.

ARTICLE 12.

Tout individu ou toute société peut acquérir un droit exclusif de recherche dans un périmètre réservé, à la priorité de la demande régulière, en la forme qui en a été adressée au Service des Mines.

ARTICLE 13.

Le périmètre réservé est un cercle dont le rayon, fixé par l'intéressé, ne peut dépasser 3 kilom. ; ce cercle est tracé à partir d'un centre qui doit être défini par ses distances à des points fixes de la surface de telle sorte qu'il puisse être matériellement repéré sur le sol.

ARTICLE 14.

Pour être recevable la demande doit faire connaître :

Les nom, prénoms, profession, et domicile du demandeur, ainsi qu'éventuellement du représentant qu'il aura à ce spécialement mandaté ;

Et pour une société sa désignation et le domicile élu de son représentant ;

Sous réserve pour les désignations et domiciles des stipulations des articles 7, § 2, et 8.

Toutes pièces justificatives devront être jointes pour établir l'identité et le domicile des individus intervenant comme demandeurs ou représentants et la validité du mandat pour ces derniers.

La demande fait en outre connaître :

Le rayon du cercle et la désignation précise de son centre avec les plans ou croquis nécessaires pour l'identification et le repérage du centre et du cercle.

A la demande doivent en outre être annexés :

Un récépissé constatant le versement à la Banque d'État d'une somme calculée à raison de 20 centimes par hectare compris dans le cercle sollicité sans qu'en aucun cas ce versement puisse être inférieur à 300 fr., et sans qu'en aucun cas cette somme puisse être remboursée ;

Un exemplaire, dans la partie utile, d'une carte publiée du Maroc, au 250,000e au moins, ou la reproduction à cette échelle au moins, d'une carte publiée à l'échelle de 500,000e au moins, avec la représentation, sur cette carte, du cercle sollicité et des lignes définissant son centre.

ARTICLE 15.

L'ordre de priorité est déterminé par l'ordre d'inscription sur un registre spécial du Service des Mines.

S'il est remis ou envoyé le même jour au Service des Mines des demandes, régulières en la forme, se faisant totalement ou partiellement concurrence, l'ordre de priorité est fixé entre elles par le sort.

ARTICLE 16.

Le Service des Mines peut faire compléter les demandes qui présenteraient de simples lacunes de forme sans que l'intéressé perde son droit de priorité s'il fournit les renseignements à lui demandés dans le délai qui lui est à ce imparti.

ARTICLE 17.

Le permis de recherche est délivré par le Service des Mines, ou celui-ci fait connaître à l'intéressé le motif légal qui ne permet pas de le lui délivrer.

ARTICLE 18.

Dès la délivrance du permis et pendant toute sa durée, l'intéressé doit marquer matériellement sur le sol le centre de son cercle, en y maintenant d'une façon continue et bien apparente une inscription dans les deux langues musulmane et diplomatique, faisant connaître le numéro et la date du permis, le nom ou la désignation du détenteur, et le rayon du cercle.

Si le permis est prorogé, soit par renouvellement, soit par suite d'une instruction en permis d'exploitation, mention en est faite sur l'inscription.

ARTICLE 19.

Le permis ne confère de droits à l'intéressé que dans la partie du cercle qui ne porte ni sur des permis d'exploitation, ni sur des cercles antérieurs légalement détenus pendant tout le temps de leur validité.

Serait nul et ne pourrait produire aucun effet tout permis de recherche dont il serait reconnu que le centre se trouve dans un permis d'exploitation ou dans un cercle de recherche antérieur encore valide.

L'explorateur a le droit de faire dans la zone qui lui est ainsi attribuée toutes les installations et tous les travaux qu'il juge utiles à la reconnaissance ou à l'étude du gîte.

ARTICLE 20.

Le permis est valable pour trois années grégoriennes à compter de la date de sa délivrance.

Il peut être prorogé une seule fois de trois autres années si l'intéressé justifie avoir effectué des travaux reconnus suffisants par le Service des Mines.

La demande en renouvellement doit avoir été présentée au Service des Mines cinq mois au moins avant l'expiration du permis originaire. Elle doit être accompagnée d'un mémoire explicatif et du plan des travaux exécutés.

A l'issue des trois ou six ans précités le même attributaire ne peut, pendant trois ans, se faire délivrer un nouveau permis sur les mêmes terrains.

ARTICLE 21.

L'attributaire doit payer par année et par avance une taxe fixe de 20 centimes par hectare de terrains compris dans son cercle de recherche sauf à être détaxé pour la surface du cercle dont il ne pourrait disposer d'après l'article 19, et à charge par lui d'en faire la preuve.

En cas de renouvellement pour une nouvelle période de trois années la taxe est portée, dans les mêmes conditions, à 50 centimes par hectare et par an.

ARTICLE 22.

La taxe doit être payée par semestre.

Faute par le permissionnaire en retard d'avoir payé le terme dû dans le mois de l'avis à lui signifié par le Service des Mines, le permis peut être purement et simplement annulé par décision du directeur des Travaux publics.

ARTICLE 23.

Le permis de recherche en périmètre réservé constitue un droit mobilier.

Il peut être cédé et transféré comme tous droits mobiliers. En outre, toute cession ou tout transfert doit, à peine de nullité des actes et de déchéance des permis, être notifié au Service des Mines dans les conditions fixées à l'article 14 et donnera lieu, outre les taxes ordinaires sur la cession des droits mobiliers, à une taxe spéciale de 300 fr., qui doit, à peine de nullité des actes et de déchéance du permis, avoir été versée à la Banque l'État. Le récépissé doit en être joint à l'avis de transfert donné au Service des Mines.

ARTICLE 24.

A toute époque le permissionnaire peut renoncer à son permis sur simple déclaration notifiée au Service des Mines sans avoir droit à aucun remboursement des taxes par lui payées.

Il doit à la renonciation comme à la déchéance ou à l'expiration de son permis faire disparaître le signal de centre.

ARTICLE 25.

Lors de l'abandon d'un permis, pour quelque cause que ce soit, l'intéressé peut retirer tous les objets lui ayant appartenu ; mais il ne peut ultérieurement réclamer aucun droit ni privilège pour les travaux par lui exécutés, sauf ce qui sera dit à l'article 62 pour l'inventeur d'un gîte de phosphate, de nitrate, ou de sel gemme.

TITRE III.—*Permis d'Exploitation.*

ARTICLE 26.

Aucune mine ne peut être exploitée sans un permis concédé par firman chérifien.

ARTICLE 27.

Le permis d'exploitation ne peut être demandé et obtenu que par le titulaire d'un permis de recherche en périmètre réservé qui est encore valide au moment de la demande.

Il est accordé lorsque après enquête régulière le Service des Mines a reconnu que les travaux de recherche ont fait constater l'existence d'une mine.

ARTICLE 28.

Le permis est constitué par un rectangle d'une surface de 100 hectares au moins, dont le plus petit côté doit être inférieur au quart du plus grand.

L'intéressé définit l'orientation et les dimensions du rectangle qu'il sollicite ; celui-ci doit comprendre le centre de recherche et porter pour les trois quarts au moins sur des terrains pour lesquels l'intéressé disposait du droit de recherche, sans qu'en aucun cas le périmètre puisse empiéter sur des terrains pour lesquels un tiers aurait des droits antérieurs.

Toutefois, avec l'autorisation du Service des Mines, le périmètre pourrait recevoir une autre délimitation pour des terrains qui seraient compris entre les limites de permis d'exploitation antérieures avec lesquels le nouveau permis devrait être limitrophe.

ARTICLE 29.

La demande est adressée au Service des Mines avec toutes les justifications nécessaires ; elle est accompagnée d'un plan au 10,000e portant l'indication du périmètre originaire de recherche et du périmètre d'exploitation sollicité avec toutes les données nécessaires à la reconnaissance et à l'identification des bornes qui ont dû être posées aux quatre sommets du rectangle par les soins de l'impétrant.

ARTICLE 30.

La demande qui est tenue à la disposition du public dans les bureaux du Service des Mines est portée à la connaissance du public par des avis publiés dans les journaux comme il est dit à l'article 55.

Le public est avisé de même de la date à laquelle le Service des Mines procédera sur place à une enquête pour reconnaître la régularité de la demande et l'existence du gîte.

Le caïd ou le pacha est directement averti par le Service des Mines.

A la suite de cette enquête, le Service des Mines provoque ou exécute la rectification de la délimitation du périmètre et du bornage.

ARTICLE 31.

Il est définitivement statué par un firman chérifien qui fixe la délimitation définitive de la mine.

Si le permis doit être refusé pour des motifs légaux, notification en est donnée à l'intéressé. Celui-ci est également avisé des cas où, pour des motifs d'intérêt public, il est sursis à statuer sur l'octroi du permis.

ARTICLE 32.

Lorsqu'un permis d'exploitation est accordé ou définitivement refusé, le droit de recherche dans le périmètre réservé qui a permis d'acquérir le droit d'exploitation est annulé de plein droit.

Le droit de recherche en périmètre réservé persiste au delà des délais prévus à

l'article 20 jusqu'à ce qu'il ait été definitivement statué comme il est dit à l'alinéa précédent.

Si, dans ces conditions, le droit de recherche persist plus de trois ans, l'explorateur doit, à partir de la troisième année, payer la taxe de 50 centimes par hectare prévue à l'article 21, au delà de la sixième année successivement les taxes prévues à l'article 35, § 1.

ARTICLE 33.

Avant que lui soit délivré son titre en permis d'exploitation, l'intéressé, sur l'avis qui lui en est donné par le Service des Mines, doit justifier du versement à la Banque d'État d'un droit fixe de 500 fr.

Faute par lui de justifier de ce versement dans le délai imparti, le déchéance peut être prononcée suivant les formes prévues à l'article 35.

ARTICLE 34.

Le permis d'exploitation constitue un droit mobilier, cessible et transmissible comme tous autres droits mobiliers.

On appliquera, en cas de cession, les règles et taxes indiquées à l'article 23 pour les permis de recherches ; toutefois le droit spécial sera de 500 fr.

En cas de non-paiement de ce droit, le déchéance pourra être poursuivie comme il est dit à l'article précédent.

ARTICLE 35.

Le titulaire d'un permis d'exploitation doit payer par semestre en janvier et juillet, une taxe fixe annuelle par hectare de 1 fr. la première année, 2 fr. la seconde, et 3 fr. à partir de la troisième.

La taxe sera due à partir du 1er janvier ou du 1er juillet qui suivra la remise du firman d'institution.

En cas de rétard et un mois après avis notifié par le Service des Mines, la déchéance peut être prononcée par décision du Maghzen.

La mine déchue est, par les soins du Service des Mines, et après avis donné au public, vendue en adjudication publique avec toutes ses dépendances et installations, y compris les voies de communication qui y sont exclusivement rattachées, au profit de l'exploitant déchu ou des créanciers. La somme provenant de l'adjudication est consignée à la Banque d'État pour être répartie à qui de droit après déduction de tous les frais avancés par le Service des Mines pour arriver à l'adjudication.

En aucun cas l'adjudication ne peut avoir lieu au-dessous de la somme nécessaire pour couvrir ces frais.

Dès la signification de la déchéance il est interdit à l'exploitant de détourner ou enlever de la mine et de ses dépendances tout objet placé à demeure ou non, en dehors des simples approvisionnements, à peine d'être poursuivi personnellement à la requête de l'adjudicataire pour tout détournement fait en opposition avec la présente disposition.

Le Service des Mines peut, dès la déchéance prononcée et notifiée, faire placer à la mine un séquestre pour assurer l'exécution de la disposition qui précède.

Si, après deux tentatives à un mois d'intervalle, la mine n'a pas été adjugée, le permis est annulé par firman chérifien ; le Service des Mines fait enlever les bornes, et les terrains deviennent libres comme si la mine n'avait pas été instituée, l'attributaire pouvant toutefois disposer de toutes les installations de surface par lui établies.

ARTICLE 36.

A toute époque le titulaire d'un permis d'exploitation peut, en en adressant la demande au Service des Mines, obtenir par firman chérifien, la renonciation à son permis ou sa fusion avec un autre permis limitrophe.

Avis en sera donné au public.

Les bornes inutiles devront être déplacées, et il en sera placé de nouvelles aux frais de l'intéressé.

En cas de renonciation le permissionnaire ne peut enlever des travaux souterrains que les objets qui peuvent être retirés sans amener leur destruction ; il peut disposer de toutes les installations de surface par lui établies. Les terrains compris dans le permis deviennent libres comme si la mine n'avait pas été instituée.

TITRE IV.—*Des Droits et Obligations des Explorateurs et des Exploitants.*

ARTICLE 37.

Aucun travail de recherche ou d'exploitation ne peut être entrepris ou poursuivi dans une zone de 50 mètres à l'entour des propriétés closes, villages, groupes d'habitations, puits, édifices religieux, lieux de sépulture ou considérés comme sacrés, ou à moins de 20 mètres des voies de communication, conduites d'eaux, et généralement de tous travaux d'utilité publique et ouvrages d'art, à moins du consentement du propriétaire pour les propriétés privées ou du Maghzen pour le domaine public, les travaux d'utilité publique et les ouvrages d'art.

ARTICLE 38.

Un périmètre de protection peut être établi par firman chérifien autour d'une source. Dans l'intérieur de ce périmètre tout travail de recherche ou d'exploitation ne peut être entrepris ou poursuivi que dans les conditions fixées par le Service des Mines, et peut même être interdit, sans que l'explorateur ou l'exploitant puisse en aucun cas réclamer de ce chef aucune indemnité.

Il en est de même pour des zones qui seraient créées en vue de la défense militaire ; toutefois en ce cas l'explorateur ou l'exploitant peut avoir droit à une indemnité qui sera fixée et réglée comme il est dit à l'article suivant.

ARTICLE 39.

Nul permis de recherche ou d'exploitation ne peut mettre obstacle à l'exécution de travaux d'utilité publique à l'intérieur de son périmètre, non plus qu'à l'ouverture et à l'exploitation de carrières à utiliser pour ces travaux.

L'explorateur ou l'exploitant n'a droit qu'au remboursement des dépenses par lui faites et rendues inutiles par l'exécution des dits travaux ou l'ouverture des carrières, compensation faite, s'il y a lieu, avec les avantages qu'il peut retirer du dit travail.

L'indemnité due sera réglée dans les conditions prévues au règlement sur l'expropriation.

ARTICLE 40.

L'explorateur ou l'exploitant peut utiliser pour le service exclusif de son entreprise, sans avoir de ce chef rien à payer aux propriétaires ou possesseurs du sol, les substances rentrant dans la classe des carrières qu'il abat dans ses travaux de recherche ou d'exploitation.

ARTICLE 41.

L'explorateur ou l'exploitant n'a aucun droit dans son périmètre aux produits végétaux du sol, ni aux eaux superficielles ou souterraines, sauf pour lui à pouvoir utiliser pour son service les eaux sortant de ses puits ou galeries.

Il n'a aucun droit aux monnaies, objets d'art ou d'antiquité que ces travaux mettraient au jour ; il doit donner avis immédiat de ces découvertes au Service des Mines et, en attendant qu'il ait pu les lui remettre, les conserver à l'abri de toute détérioration.

ARTICLE 42.

L'explorateur ou l'exploitant a le droit d'occuper à l'intérieur de son périmètre les terrains nécessaires à ses installations et travaux et à leurs dépendances.

A défaut de consentement du propriétaire ou du possesseur du sol et en dehors des zones prévues à l'article 37, cette occupation, après autorisation obtenue du Service des Mines, sera soumise aux conditions fixées par le règlement sur l'occupation temporaire.

ARTICLE 43.

L'exploitant peut, soit à l'intérieur, soit à l'extérieur de son périmètre, occuper les terrains nécessaires à l'établissement et à l'exploitation des voies de communication ou ports d'embarquement nécessaires pour assurer la sortie de ses produits, la circulation de son personnel, et l'apport de ses approvisionnements comme aussi des galeries nécessaires à l'aérage ou à l'épuisement des eaux.

A défaut du consentement des propriétaires ou possesseurs des terrains il sera procédé, après approbation du plan par le Service des Mines, comme en matière d'expropriation pour cause d'utilité publique.

ARTICLE 44.

Les voies de communication et ouvrages maritimes ouverts en vertu de l'article précédent seront affectés au service exclusif de l'exploitant.

Toutefois, des exploitants limitrophes ou voisins peuvent par un acte qui devra être transmis au Service des Mines, constituer un syndicat pour établir et exploiter en commun une voie ou un port destiné au service exclusif de leurs exploitations.

Le syndicat ainsi constitué pour l'établissement et l'exploitation de l'ouvrage, aura les droits et obligations d'un exploitant de mine.

Tout exploitant de mine limitrophe ou voisine peut demander à faire partie du syndicat. A défaut d'entente entre les intéressés il est définitivement statué par trois arbitres, dont l'un est désigné par le syndicat, l'autre par le demandeur, et le troisième par le Maghzen, à défaut d'entente entre les deux premiers arbitres pour cette désignation.

L'acte syndical doit être communiqué au Service des Mines.

ARTICLE 45.

Les voies de communication et ouvrages maritimes établis en vertu des articles 43 et 44 peuvent, après avis conforme du Service des Travaux publics et suivant convention à intervenir entre le Maghzen et l'exploitant ou le syndicat, être ouvertes au service public dans les conditions que fixera un cahier des charges.

A défaut du consentement de l'exploitant ou du syndicat, le Maghzen peut exproprier les voies de communication ou l'ouvrage maritime pour en donner l'exploitation publique par voie d'adjudication publique en conformité du règlement sur les adjudications. Il peut aussi, par la même voie, céder à un tiers le droit d'exproprier en son lieu et place.

En cas de rachat ainsi effectué, l'exploitant ou les exploitants syndiqués n'auront à payer les transports relatifs à leurs entreprises qu'au prix de revient, frais de péage et de transport compris. Ce prix de revient sera fixé par le cahier des charges de l'entreprise, et à défaut d'entente à cet égard entre le Maghzen et les exploitants de mines, il sera statué par trois arbitres désignés l'un par le Maghzen, l'autre part les exploitants de mines, et le troisième par les deux premiers, ou, à défaut d'entente entre eux, par le corps diplomatique.

ARTICLE 46.

En cas de cession ou de transfert, à un titre quelconque, d'un droit de recherche ou d'exploitation, les installations à demeure établies pour l'exercice de ces droits les suivent dans la cession à moins qu'il n'en soit autrement stipulé dans l'acte.

Nul créancier ne peut saisir isolément ces installations et le droit pour l'exercice duquel elles sont établies.

ARTICLE 47.

L'explorateur ou l'exploitant doit réparation pour tous dommages résultant de ses travaux aux propriétés de la surface ainsi qu'aux recherches ou exploitations voisines.

A défaut d'entente entre les intéressés l'indemnité est fixée par deux experts choisis sur une liste établie par le Maghzen et désignés respectivement par chacune des parties ou par le Service des Mines si l'une des parties n'a pas, sur la demande de l'autre partie, désigné son expert dans la quinzaine. A défaut d'entente entre les deux experts il est statué par un tiers expert désigné par le Service des Mines.

ARTICLE 48.

L'explorateur ou l'exploitant doit réparation pour tous dommages résultant de ses travaux qui atteignent les personnes occupées par lui ou non.

La réparation de ces dommages est poursuivie par les intéressés devant la juridiction compétente.

ARTICLE 49.

Il sera perçu à la sortie de toute frontière terrestre ou maritime du Maroc, en outre des droits qui peuvent résulter de l'application des règlements douaniers, une taxe *ad valorem* de 3 pour cent sur toutes les substances rentrant dans la classe des mines, qu'elles soient brutes ou préparées.

Cette taxe sera réduite à 2 pour cent sur les métaux ou alliages, lesquels en seront exempts lorsqu'il sera établi qu'ils ne sortent que par réexportation.

ARTICLE 50.

Outre les droits et taxes que les explorateurs et exploitants ont à payer d'après le présent firman, les intéressés auront à supporter tous les frais des déplacements des fonctionnaires et agents du Service des Mines que leurs demandes provoqueraient.

Ces frais seront dans chaque cas taxés par le chef du Service des Mines d'après un tarif arrêté par le directeur des Travaux publics et qui devra avoir été publié ; ce tarif déterminera aussi le montant des avances à verser, le cas échéant, à la Banque d'État par les intéressés.

A défaut par l'intéressé d'avoir versé ces avances ou soldé ces frais à la Banque d'État dans le délai à lui imparti, le permis de recherche pourra être annulé et la déchéance du permis d'exploitation pourra être poursuivie comme il est dit à l'article 35.

TITRE V.—*Du Service des Mines.*

ARTICLE 51.

Il est constitué à Tanger un Service chérifien des Mines relevant du Service des Travaux publics de l'Empire.

Le Service des Mines est chargé d'assurer l'exécution du présent firman.

Il exerce une surveillance de police sur les travaux de recherche et d'exploitation en vue d'assurer la sécurité de la surface et du personnel occupé dans les travaux.

ARTICLE 52.

Le directeur des Travaux publics édicte et fait publier les instructions de procédure nécessaires pour assurer l'application uniforme et complète du présent firman.

Le Service des Mines édicte les règlements de police nécessaires pour assurer la sécurité des exploitations.

ARTICLE 53.

Les fonctionnaires et agents du Service des Mines ont à tout moment libre accès et parcours sur toutes les installations et travaux des explorations et exploitants.

Ceux-ci sont tenus de leur fournir toutes facilités pour l'accomplissement de leur mission et de les faire accompagner dans leurs visites, s'ils en sont requis, par les préposés et surveillants dont le concours serait nécessaire.

Ils peuvent se faire représenter les plans des travaux ainsi que les registres d'extraction et de contrôle des ouvriers, qui doivent être tenus par les exploitants, et ils peuvent se faire donner ou envoyer copie de ces documents aux frais des exploitants.

ARTICLE 54.

Toutes les requêtes adressées au Service des Mines doivent lui être envoyées par pli recommandé ou être remises directement aux heures d'ouverture des bureaux ; le service en délivre dans chaque cas récépissé.

ARTICLE 55.

Les firmans chérifiens ou décisions du Maghzen prévus par le présent règlement ne sont rendus qu'après avis conforme du Service des Travaux publics.

Les décisions du directeur des Travaux publics sont prises après avis conforme du Service des Mines.

Ces firmans ou décisions sont insérés au "Journal officiel" de l'Empire, ou à son défaut dans les trois journaux désignés à l'article 3 du règlement relatif aux adjudications effectuées sur les fonds de la Caisse spéciale.

Il en est de même pour les actes du Service des Mines.

ARTICLE 56.

Toutes les taxes spéciales prévues dans le présent firman, telles que droits fixes, taxes par hectare, et taxes de sortie, sont versées à la Banque d'État ; 50 pour cent du produit de ces taxes sont portés au compte courant du Maghzen ; le reste est porté à un compte spécial pour être affecté au paiement des dépenses du Service des Mines et à l'exécution des travaux publics nécessaires à l'exploitation des mines; en cas d'insuffisance de ce compte spécial pour couvrir les dépenses du Service des Mines, il sera fait à ce compte, sur la part revenant au Maghzen, et jusqu'à due concurrence, des avances, remboursables au Maghzen aussitôt que possible. Les versements effectués en application de l'article 50 seront portés au compte du Service des Mines.

ARTICLE 57.

Les mines qui, par suite de l'application du présent firman, adviendraient au Maghzen, seront exploitées, soit par le Service des Mines, soit par des amodiataires qui ne pourront être choisis que par voie d'adjudication publique dans les conditions fixées par le règlement sur les adjudications. Le produit de ces exploitations sera réparti comme il est dit à l'article précédent.

TITRE VI.—*Dispositions spéciales et transitoires.*

ARTICLE 58.

A toute époque le Maghzen peut, pour une durée et pour les régions qu'il détermine, suspendre le droit d'acquérir des droits de recherche ou d'exploitation par motifs de sécurité, sans préjudice des droits régulièrement acquis auparavant, lesquels seuls continuent à pouvoir être exercés dans ces régions, aux risques et périls des intéressés.

ARTICLE 59.

Le présent firman n'entrera en vigueur, en ce qui concerne l'acquisition de périmètres de recherche, qu'à la date qui sera indiquée par décision du Maghzen.

ARTICLE 60.

Pendant un délai de quatre mois à partir de la publication du présent firman auront un droit de préférence à obtenir, dans les conditions qui vont être indiquées, des périmètres de recherche, tous individus ou sociétés qualifiés, d'après le présent firman, pour acquérir au Maroc des droits miniers, qui justifieront avoir été les premiers à effectuer, avant la publication du présent firman, en un point et sur un gîte déterminés, un acte commercial effectif, tel que travaux de recherche ou d'exploitation, ou paiements effectués ou à effectuer pour acquisition de droits miniers à des tiers précédents explorateurs, exploitants, propriétaires ou possesseurs du sol.

Tout individu ou société qui voudra bénéficier de la disposition qui précède devra, à peine de forclusion, avoir adressé au Service des Mines dans les quatre mois de la publication du présent firman, sa demande de périmètre de recherche, les dits périmètres définis et précisés comme il est dit au Titre II.

A la demande devront être joints, pour qu'elle soit recevable, outre les pièces et documents indiqués au dit titre, un mémoire justifiant les motifs de préférence invoqués avec, s'il y a lieu, les actes dont l'intéressé se prévaut.

Ces demandes sont inscrites par le Service des Mines sur un registre spécial.

Le service fait compléter celles des pièces qui seraient insuffisantes ou incomplètes en la forme, en assignant à cet effet à l'intéressé le délai qu'il ne pourrait dépasser à peine de forclusion.

ARTICLE 61.

Toutes les demandes sont soumises à une commission arbitrale composée de trois personnes de l'art nommées par le Gouvernement chérifien d'accord avec le corps diplomatique.

Cette commission décide souverainement si la demande est fondée ou doit être écartée ; et, en cas de concurrence pour des mêmes terrains, à qui la préférence doit être accordée à raison de la validité ou de la priorité des titres invoqués.

La commission arbitrale peut provoquer des intéressés ou du Service des Mines toutes explications et justifications et elle peut réclamer tous les concours qu'elle juge utile.

Le Service des Mines délivre successivement les permis de recherche en conformité des décisions de la commission arbitrale et dans l'ordre, s'il y a lieu, résultant de ces décisions.

Il informe les intéressés du rejet de leur demande par la commission.

Les permis de recherche accordés en vertu du présent titre sont, à partir de leur délivrance, entièrement assimilés en ce qui concerne les droits et obligations qui en dérivent, aux permis du Titre II.

ARTICLE 62.

Par exception aux dispositions des Titres II et III, les phosphates et nitrates, ainsi que les sels gemmes ou autres sels associés dans les mêmes gisements et les sources et eaux salées, ne pourront être exploités qu'en vertu d'adjudications publiques passées en la forme du règlement sur les adjudications publiques, dans des périmètres et pour une durée définis par le cahier des charges de chaque adjudication.

Ils peuvent être l'objet d'explorations en conformité du Titre II.

L'adjudication portera sur la redevance à payer à la tonne du produit extrait.

Le cahier des charges peut astreindre l'adjudicataire à construire et à exploiter pendant la durée de son adjudication, des ouvrages de viabilité ou de navigation qui pourront être affectés au service public dans les conditions fixées au dit cahier des charges.

Les redevances provenant de ces adjudications recevront la même affectation que celle prévue à l'article 56 pour les impôts et redevances de mines.

Le cahier des charges peut allouer, pendant un délai qu'il fixe, une partie de la redevance à l'explorateur qui, par suite de ses travaux de recherche, aurait été reconnu inventeur par le Service des Mines.

Sauf les exceptions stipulées dans le présent article, l'adjudicataire est assimilé pour tous les droits et obligations, et notamment pour le paiement de la redevance fixe par hectare et de la taxe *ad valorem* de sortie, au concessionnaire d'une exploitation de mine.

Sont interdits dans un périmètre d'adjudication par tous autres que l'adjudicataire tout travail de recherche ou d'exploitation de toutes mines.

Les dispositions du présent article ne préjudicient pas au droit que conserve le Maghzen d'établir à son profit le monopole de l'exploitation et du commerce du sel sous réserve de droits d'usage de particuliers, le tout suivant un règlement à établir par la Commission générale des Adjudications et en se conformant aux dispositions de l'article 57.

ARTICLE 63.

Un firman chérifien peut à toute époque, sous réserve des droits antérieurement acquis, décider que, dans une région et pour les substances qu'il fixe, l'exploitation ne pourra avoir lieu que par des adjudications publiques comme il est stipulé à l'article précédent.

ARTICLE 64.

Un firman chérifien peut à toute époque sous réserve des droits antérieurement acquis, et de l'observation de l'article 62, attribuer par privilège à une société, pour une période de trois ans, renouvelable, sur des demandes successives, pour deux périodes de trois ans, le droit exclusif, en se conformant aux prescriptions du présent firman, de faire des recherches et d'obtenir des permis de recherche et d'exploitation dans une région déterminée par le dit firman, à charge par cette société, outre le paiement des redevances ou impôts stipulés par le présent firman pour ses périmètres de recherche

ou ses permis d'exploitation, de s'engager, si elle demande et obtient une ou plusieurs concessions dans le délai de son privilège, à construire et exploiter des ouvrages de viabilité ou de navigation, utiles à l'exploitation de ses mines, qu'indiquera le dit firman.

Le firman constituant le privilège peut, d'accord avec la société, stipuler un partage de ses bénéfices avec le Maghzen. Les sommes qui en proviendront ainsi que celles résultant de l'application des autres taxes prévues au présent firman seront réparties comme il est dit à l'article 56.

Sur avis conforme du Service des Travaux publics les ouvrages précités de viabilité ou de navigation pourront être affectés au service public dans les conditions que fixera le cahier des charges qui en cas de contestation sur les stipulations entre le Maghzen et la société, sera arrêté par une commission de trois arbitres désignés l'un par le Maghzen, l'autre par la société, et le troisième, à défaut d'entente entre les deux premiers arbitres, par le corps diplomatique de Tanger.

A défaut de construire et d'exploiter les dits ouvrages, la société encourrait, outre leur déchéance, la déchéance, des concessions de mines acquises pendant la durée de son privilège. Cette déchéance serait poursuivie comme il est stipulé à l'article 35.

Titre VII.—*Pénalités, Frais, Juridictions, Revision du Règlement.*

Article 65.

Est puni d'une amende de 500 à 5,000 fr.—

1. Quiconque exploite des mines sans en avoir le droit ;
2. Le prospecteur ou l'exploitant qui ne pose pas, déplace, ou n'entretient pas en état le signal ou les bornes de son périmètre.

Article 66.

Est puni d'une amende de 100 à 3,000 fr. quiconque apporte des entraves à la surveillance des agents du Service des Mines.

Article 67.

Est puni d'une amende de 20 à 200 fr. quiconque contrevient aux règlements de police relatifs à la sécurité des mines.

Article 68.

En cas de récidive les amendes sont doublées.

Article 69.

Les amendes sont prononcées par les tribunaux de droit commun à la requête du Service des Mines.

Le montant doit en être versé à la Banque d'Etat, dans le mois de la condamnation définitive il est réparti comme il est dit à l'article 56.

Article 70.

Le Maghzen jouira d'un droit de priorité sur tout autre créancier pour le paiement des sommes à lui dues (redevances, frais divers, amendes) en vertu du présent firman par les explorateurs, exploitants, ou toutes autres personnes.

Il pourra disposer avant tout tiers des substances extraites, du matériel et des installations meubles et immeubles, appartenant au débiteur dans le périmètre de recherche ou d'exploitation, ainsi que des ouvrages de viabilité ou de navigation établis par celui-ci en application du présent firman.

Article 71.

Lorsque, pour l'application du présent firman, il y aura lieu à expertise ou arbitrage, les frais et les honoraires dus aux experts et aux arbitres seront fixés d'après un tarif

établi par une commission composée de deux fonctionnaires du Service des Travaux publics et de deux membres désignés par le corps diplomatique.

Ces frais et honoraires sont, en cas d'expertise, à la charge du débiteur ; en cas d'arbitrage, ils sont impartis aux intéressés dans les conditions fixées par les arbitres. Il peut être demandé aux débiteurs ou aux intéressés le versement à la Banque d'État d'une caution ou d'une avance.

Les frais et honoraires de l'arbitrage prévu aux articles 60 et 61 sont à la charge du Maghzen.

Article 72.

Les explorateurs ou exploitants sont soumis à toutes les lois et à tous les règlements administratifs intervenus ou à intervenir dans l'Empire chérifien. Ils sont soumis aux juridictions ordinaires pour le règlement de tous les conflits pouvant surgir entre eux ou avec des tiers ; ces conflits sont portés devant les tribunaux ordinaires compétents, qui prononcent en vertu des règles de droit commun ; le tout sauf exceptions stipulées dans le présent firman.

Article 73.

Les litiges pouvant survenir entre le Gouvernement marocain et les tiers dans l'application du présent firman seront, sauf dispositions particulières contraires, soumis, sans appel ni recours, à une commission arbitrale composée comme il est dit à l'article 65, alinéa avant-dernier.

Article 74.

Les taxes fixées par le présent règlement ne pourront être modifiées avant un délai de cinq ans à dater de sa promulgation ; les taxes nouvelles seront applicables aux détenteurs des droits acquis en vertu du présent firman.

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Note à l'Appui d'un Projet de Règlement pour les Mines au Maroc.

Le projet de règlement s'inspire dans ses grandes lignes des idées qui paraissent avoir prévalu dans ces derniers temps pour des pays neufs, tels que les colonies allemandes, françaises, et les États hispano-américains qui présentent des conditions quelque peu analogues à celles du Maroc. On a dû toutefois tenir compte en outre pour ce pays, d'une part, de sa situation politique, administrative, et sociale ; d'autre part, de l'Acte d'Algésiras, des principes et des règlements qui en découlent.

Parmi les particularités qui dérivent de ce double ordre d'idées spéciales on signale notamment les articles 6 et 7, qui ont pour objet de bien marquer la portée et les limites du firman ; celui-ci fixe essentiellement les règles des relations avec le Maghzen et les prospecteurs ou exploitants ; mais le Maghzen ne peut s'engager, malgré toute sa bonne volonté, à assurer absolument de la part de tiers l'exercice des droits que l'acte contère à ceux-là ; il ne faut qu'en aucun cas on ne puisse, en principe, demander éventuellement à ce titre une indemnité quelconque au Maghzen.

On signale également les articles 59 à 61, par lesquels on s'est efforcé de régler de la façon qui a paru devoir être la plus rapide, la plus sûre, et la plus équitable tous les titres que des particuliers ont pu acquérir sur les mines au Maroc avant la promulgation du firman. On aurait pu attribuer aux bénéficiaires des droits acquis, à leur choix, soit des périmètres de recherche, partant provisoires, soit des permis d'exploitation définitifs. Comme celui-ci dérivera nécessairement de celui-là ; que rien ne limite le nombre et la situation des périmètres de recherche que l'on peut reconnaître en une région en faveur d'un même attributaire ; que l'institution d'un permis d'exploitation nécessite des opérations sur place relativement longues, il a paru préférable de s'en tenir à l'attribution de périmètres de recherche. Les résultats de fait seront les mêmes ; la procédure sera beaucoup plus simple et beaucoup plus rapide, ce qui est inappréciable.

Si on laisse de côté ces contingences occasionnelles et ces particularités plus essentiellement marocaines pour en revenir au fond même de l'acte, on en peut dire qu'on est parti de l'idée de la séparation des mines et du sol, de la liberté des mines, ou *Bergbaufreiheit*, avec exclusion de tout droit sur les mines en faveur du propriétaire du sol. Cette idée qui domine dans les législation allemandes, françaises, et espagnoles, s'accorde très bien avec la loi coranique, laquelle donne en principe au Sultan le droit de disposer discrétionnairement des mines. La loi distingue le droit de recherche qui s'acquiert à la priorité de la demande pour un temps relativement court et le droit d'exploitation—on a préféré ne pas même l'appeler concession—dont la durée n'est pas limitée ainsi qu'il convient en matière d'entreprise de mines.

Pour le périmètre de recherche on a adopté la forme circulaire que l'Autriche-Hongrie pratique depuis la loi de 1854, dont la commodité a paru plus spécialement appropriée au Maroc, bien que ses inconvénients l'aient fait abandonner dans les colonies allemandes, alors qu'on continue à s'en trouver satisfait dans les colonies francaises.

Il a paru qu'un cercle de 3 kilom. de rayon, donnant donc éventuellement 6 kilom. en direction et une surface de 2,817 hectares, suffisait, alors surtout que, à l'imitation des législations allemandes et espagnoles, rien ne restreint le nombre de cercles tangents ou se coupant que peut avoir un même intéressé.

Il n'échappera pas que avec l'article 19 on laisse en somme l'explorateur, avec quelques nuances dans les termes, exploiter le gîte un peu comme il le voudra. Cela a paru avoir plus d'avantages que d'inconvénients, dans la situation du Maroc. La garantie est dans la brièveté du droit et les taxes que l'explorateur doit payer.

Pour l'exploitation on est revenu à la forme rectangulaire, traditionnelle en quelque sorte, sans qu'on ait eu besoin d'en fixer le maximum puisque le rectangle d'exploitation doit être en principe compris pour les trois-quarts au moins dans le cercle des recherches.

L'essence du système adopté est dans le jeu, en quelque sorte automatique, des taxes qui doit assurer à la fois une exploitation suffisante et une limitation appropriée des surfaces accaparées. Il a paru que la taxe de 3 fr. par hectare, bien que relativement modérée avec les taxes pratiquées par ailleurs, et de 3 pour cent du produit brut suffiraient et s'harmoniseraient suffisamment l'une avec l'autre. On propose de recouvrer ce 3 pour cent à titre de droit de sortie, ce qui sera à la fois très pratique et très commode. On remarquera que cette taxe de 3 pour cent à la sortie correspond justement d'une façon assez sensible à la taxe de sortie de 50 centimes par tonne qui existe déjà sur les phosphates dans les pays voisins de l'Algérie et de la Tunisie Cette taxe de 3 pour cent sur le produit brut—estimée, il est vrai, sur le lieu de production—est, du reste, celle de l'Espagne.

On remarquera que d'accord avec les législations espagnoles en n'a pas fait de différence entre les substances classées comme mines, et l'on a classé de la sorte toutes les substances pratiquement utiles. Les périmètres de recherche ou d'exploitation les comprendront toutes sans distinction. Les périmètres superposés de substances différentes même en y faisant des groupes très larges comme dans les colonies françaises—ne répondent à rien de pratique et d'utilement pratiqué. Là où on les admet en principe il a fallu, en fait, créer des privilèges ou droits de préférence en faveur des plus anciens détenteurs. Au Maroc surtout il sera beaucoup plus pratique et beaucoup plus simple d'admettre le système espagnol.

A côté de ce régime normal de libre acquisition par les particuliers, de *Bergbaufreiheit*, il a paru opportun d'admettre d'autres modes d'attribution comme dans les colonies allemandes. On a donc admis (article 62) pour les phosphates et les nitrates ainsi que pour le sel gemme le régime exclusif de l'adjudication publique que la pratique en Algérie et Tunisie a montré également favorable aux particuliers et à l'État et qui répond très bien à l'une des idées fondamentales de l'Acte d'Algésiras; et l'on a admis (article 63) la possibilité d'étendre éventuellement ce régime à certaines substances dans certaines régions comme on pourrait être amené à le faire, par exemple, pour de grands gîtes de minerais de fer. Ce régime permet notamment très bien, comme le prouve l'exemple de la Compagnie de Gafsa, de résoudre le problème si capital des voies de communication et ouvrages maritimes avec service public, tout en respectant scrupuleusement une des idées fondamentales de l'Acte d'Algésiras.

Pour donner à l'ensemble du régime minier toute la souplesse désirable on a même prévu, à l'imitation des colonies allemandes, un système de privilèges ou de compagnies à privilège (article 64), ce qui peut être spécialement utile et avantageux dans certaines occurrences.

Le régime des "mines" ou des "permis d'exploitation," une fois qu'ils sont appropriés, ne s'écarte pas de ce qui est généralement appliqué actuellement dans les pays dont on s'est plus spécialement inspiré, au point qu'il vaille de s'y arrêter ici sauf pour deux points.

Bien qu'il soit habituellement admis que la "mine" doit être juridiquement un immeuble, ce que justifie en droit son obligation de s'adapter avec des immeubles tels que ceux des installations de surface, il est très possible, comme on l'a pratiqué d'ailleurs, de faire de la mine un meuble. C'est ceq ue l'on propose pour le Maroc à l'article 34 pour éviter les difficultés de juridiction qui pourraient résulter de l'immobilisation et soustraire aux tribunaux religieux la connaissance des litiges.

D'autre part, pour les chemins de fer et les ports que pourraient construire un exploitant ou des exploitants associés il a fallu combiner cette nécessité de l'exploitation des mines, dans tous pays et surtout dans les pays neufs, avec les idées de l'Acte d'Algésiras—de là l'article 45.

[40713] **No. 380.**

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 6.)

(No. 274.)

Sir, *Tangier, October 27, 1909.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 266 of the 16th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch I have received from His Majesty's consul at Fez reporting that a British-protected person has been made to pay a tax on a consignment of sugar and candles sent to Sefroo for sale. The amounts levied came to about $1\frac{3}{4}$ per cent. *ad valorem* on the sugar and about $2\frac{3}{4}$ per cent. on the candles. The consul informed the tax administrator that by the treaties no tax beyond the import duty can properly be levied on goods imported and owned by a British subject or protected person, and he demanded that the amount paid be refunded. The administrator refused, however, to make a refund, stating that the tax was levied by the Sultan's orders, and gave Mr. MacLeod to understand that he would continue to levy the tax in similar circumstances in future.

There can be no doubt that article 4 of the general treaty of 1856 between Great Britain and Morocco exempts British subjects from the payment of this tax on goods imported by them so long as those goods remain theirs, and I think the same exemption may be properly claimed for persons enjoying British protection either as employés of diplomatic or consular officers or as semsars. The former category of protégé are expressly exempted by the terms of articles 2, 3, and 4 of the Convention of Madrid, 1880, and the latter impliedly so under articles 12 and 13 of that convention, which, by stating that they have to pay the agrarian and gate taxes, implies that they are not liable to other taxes. Usage, moreover, confirms this view, as protected persons have hitherto enjoyed the same privileges in regard to taxation as foreign subjects.

I have accordingly addressed a letter to Cid Aissa-ben-Omar protesting against the tax in question being levied on the goods of British subjects or protected persons, and requesting that the administrator at Fez be instructed to refund the amounts improperly levied, and to abstain for the future from demanding the payment of the tax in such cases. I beg leave to transmit herewith translation of this letter, together with copy of my despatch to His Majesty's consul on the subject.

Mr. MacLeod requests instructions as to the larger question whether goods of British origin should be exempted from the tax, even though they have passed out of British hands, and are in the possession of Moorish subjects. I fully concur in Mr. MacLeod's opinion that it would be in the interests of British trade that such goods should not be liable to arbitrary taxation, which might be carried so far in special cases as to prevent their importation. I cannot, however, find any provision in any treaty or convention in support of that view, for the articles quoted by Mr. MacLeod, viz., article 7 of the Commercial Convention, 1856, and article 66 of the Algeciras Act, can hardly, in my opinion, be considered to bear that interpretation. I have mentioned the matter to the French, Spanish, and German representatives, but they had not considered the point, and could offer no authoritative opinion on the subject.

In these circumstances I have informed Mr. MacLeod that I will submit the matter to you, and have suggested that he should not further press the point pending receipt of your instructions.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 380.

Consul MacLeod to Mr. White.

(No. 84.)

Sir, *Fez, October 20, 1909.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 79 of the 14th instant, I beg to report that Mr. Joseph Elhadad, commission agent of the British semsar, Mr. Isaac B. Cohen, of Tangier, has complained to me that he has had to pay 5 rvn. each on twenty sacks of sugar, = 5 dollars, and 5 rvn. each on nine cases candles = $2\frac{1}{4}$ dollars, sent by him from Fez for sale on Mr. Cohen's account at Sefroo.

Each sack of sugar is worth 14 dollars, and each case of candles 9 dollars. The sugar is French and the candles are British, and of course both have paid import duty at the port of entry.

I asked the amin to refund the $5 + 2\frac{1}{4}$ dollars, as by the treaties no tax beyond import duty was chargeable on goods imported by and owned by a foreigner or foreign-protected person.

The amin replied that the $5 + 2\frac{1}{4}$ dollars were levied by the Sultan's order, that they could not be refunded, and that he could not undertake in future not to levy this impost on the imported goods of foreigners or foreign-protected persons going to Berber districts from Fez, because everybody would evade this tax by asserting that the goods were being forwarded for sale on account of some foreigner or protected person.

It is manifest that if ordinary native owners of such goods pay this tax and if it be remitted to foreigners and foreign-protected persons, the former will be placed on an obviously unfair footing, and there will be an opening afforded for false representations. To levy the tax on foreigners and foreign-protected persons is, however, in contravention of article 7 of the British treaty of commerce and navigation of 1856 (10 per cent. import duty) and of paragraph 1, article 66 of the Act of Algeciras ($2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. special import duty).

I would submit that, although by the phraseology employed in the above article 7, the import duty is taxed "on all articles imported by British subjects," the general sense of this article and of similar articles in other foreign treaties with Morocco contemplates one import duty, and no more, being placed upon foreign goods.

It seems clear that, if the contrary be held, there is no limit to the Sultan's power in taxing imports, for, in the manner of the impost now complained of,

duties could be imposed at stage after stage of the journey of the goods to their consumer in the furthest interior, and in the same way special articles from some particular country could be singled out for special taxation to the injury of such country's trade.

The French consul has not yet called the meeting he contemplated of the consular body here to consider the matter.

As no more can be done in the present case without reference of the matter to the Sultan, I should be glad to have your instructions on the subject.

I have, &c.

J. M. MACLEOD.

Inclosure 2 in No. 380.

Mr. White to Consul MacLeod.

(No. 28.)

Sir, *Tangier, October* 27, 1909.

I HAVE had under my consideration your despatch No. 84 of the 20th instant, reporting that the tax on goods sent from Fez to Berber districts has been levied on goods belonging to a British-protected person, and that the amin has informed you that the tax having in this case been levied in accordance with instructions received from the Sultan, he could give no undertaking not to levy the tax in future on imported goods belonging to British subjects or protected persons.

Article 4 of the general treaty of 1856 clearly stipulates that British subjects shall not, under any pretence whatever, be obliged to pay any taxes or impositions. The only exceptions to this exemption that can be admitted are those taxes to the levy of which on British subjects His Majesty's Government have assented by treaty or otherwise, such as the customs, tonnage, and anchorage duties provided for in the commercial convention of 1856, agricultural and gate taxes in the Madrid Convention of 1880, and certain other taxes in the Algeciras Act. The tax referred to in your despatch under reply is not included in the above, for if it be regarded as a "gate" tax it is not leviable at Fez on imported goods, which must have already paid that tax on leaving the port at which they were landed, and the tax cannot be levied more than once on the same goods.

I transmit to you herewith, together with a translation thereof, for your information, a letter I have addressed to Cid Aissa-ben-Omar, protesting against the levy of this tax on British subjects or protected persons, and I request you, in delivering it, to impress upon his Excellency the necessity of orders being immediately given to the amin to refund the amounts he has improperly levied, and to be careful for the future to abstain from levying the tax on goods belonging to British subjects or protected persons.

With regard to the levy of the tax on goods of British origin belonging to Moorish subjects, the case does not appear to me clear. I am aware that it has been maintained that such goods are not liable to any tax or duties beyond the customs duties paid on entering the country, and the gate tax on leaving the port for the interior, and it would undoubtedly be in the interests of trade if this were so, but I can find no stipulation in any treaty or convention exempting such goods from taxation, for article 7 of the commercial convention of 1856 and article 66 of the Algeciras Act do not appear to me to bear this interpretation. I am, however, referring this point to His Majesty's Secretary of State, and pending receipt of instructions it would, I think, be advisable not to press the point further with the Moorish Government.

I have, &c.

HERBERT E. WHITE.

Inclosure 3 in No. 380.

Mr. White to Cid Aissa-ben-Omar.

(After compliments.) *Tangier, October* 27, 1909 (*Showal* 12, 1327).

HIS Majesty's consul at Fez has informed me that Mr. Joseph Elhadad, commission agent of the British semsar, Mr. Isaac Cohen, of Tangier, has been required to pay 5 rvn. per sack on twenty sacks of sugar, and the same amount per case on

nine cases of candles sent by him from Fez for sale on Mr. Cohen's account at Sefroo. His Majesty's consul pointed out to the amin that this tax is not leviable on imported goods owned by British subjects or protected persons and requested that the amount paid, viz., 7¼ dollars, be refunded to Mr. Joseph Elhadad. The amin, however, not only refused to refund the money, but also declined to undertake to abstain for the future from levying this tax on goods belonging to British subjects or protected persons.

I need hardly point out to your Excellency that the amin, in levying this tax on the goods in question, was guilty of a breach of treaty stipulations. There are various articles of different treaties which might be quoted, but I need only refer your Excellency to article 4 of the general treaty of 1856 between Great Britain and Morocco, which provides that British subjects shall not, under any pretence whatever, be obliged to pay any taxes or impositions. The modification of this stipulation in regard to certain specified taxes by the Madrid convention and the Algeciras Act does not affect the general principle that except where His Majesty's Government have given their assent to any special tax being levied on British subjects or protected persons they are absolutely exempt from all taxes or impositions whatsoever.

I have therefore to request your Excellency to instruct the amin in question to refund at once, through His Majesty's consul at Fez, the amounts he has improperly levied, and to abstain for the future from demanding the payment of any tax on British goods.

HERBERT E. WHITE.

[40715] No. 381.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 6.)

(No. 276.)

Sir, *Tangier, October* 30, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to report that, acting on instructions from his Government, the German chargé d'affaires called upon Cid Guebbas a few days ago, and expressed the hope that an arrangement would be come to in regard to the proposed loan, so that the Makhzen might be able to pay off its debts to German subjects without further delay.

I have, &c.

HERBERT E. WHITE.

[40716] No. 382.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 6.)

(No. 277.)

Sir, *Tangier, October* 31, 1909.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 265 of the 14th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch I have received from His Majesty's consul at Fez reporting that the Sultan had sent for him on the 25th instant and expressed uneasiness at not yet having received a reply from His Majesty's Government regarding the proposed Moorish mission to London.

My letter to Cid Aissa-ben-Omar was delivered to Cid Guebbas on the 14th instant; it would therefore have reached Fez on the 19th instant together with Cid Guebbas's report of the observations I made when delivering it. Mulai Hafid, therefore, when he sent for Mr. MacLeod, must have been well aware of the reasons which prompted His Majesty's Government to decline to receive the mission. It is difficult to fathom His Majesty's object in sending for His Majesty's consul and questioning him on the subject unless it was with a view to eliciting from him whether His Majesty's Government had other reasons than those stated by me to Cid Guebbas for the course they had adopted.

In the circumstances it is unfortunate that I did not at once acquaint Mr. Consul MacLeod with the action I had taken under your instructions. I did not, however, anticipate his being questioned on the subject by the Sultan, or his entering into explanations were the matter referred to. I am now transmitting to him, for his information and guidance should the matter be again referred to by the

Sultan or viziers, translation of my letter to Cid Aissa-ben-Omar and a memorandum of the language I held to Cid Guebbas on delivering it.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

Inclosure in No. 382.

Consul MacLeod to Mr. White.

(No. 86.)
Sir, *Fez, October* 26, 1909.

YESTERDAY afternoon the Sultan sent for me.

I found him alone in one of the Palace gateways. He seemed in excellent health, but in rather troubled, depressed spirits.

He said he wished to speak about the proposed Moorish mission to London. The last reply about it had been to the effect that it was not convenient to receive the mission there, but the British Government would inform him later on of the time when the mission might come. Several months had now elapsed, and no further reply had come. He was beginning to be seriously anxious about this, for he feared it betokened some change of feeling towards Morocco. This was a very grave matter.

The relations between Morocco and Great Britain were very ancient, and highly cherished by His Majesty, and he was feeling anxious on the subject. Was anything wrong? What was the reason of the delay about the mission?

I replied that I had no further instructions in the matter.

It was matter of common knowledge, however, that the British Government, and indeed the whole public, had been, and were, intensely preoccupied with House affairs, notably the Finance Bill, and latterly with the chances of a general election perhaps taking place before long.

It seemed to me that the Ferrer incident in Spain afforded a useful chance of impressing the Sultan with the necessity of taking European public opinion into account in his actions, which hitherto the Sultan has so largely failed to do.

I therefore remarked that the foreign affairs attracting most attention of late had been the trial and execution of M. Ferrer in Spain. Quite lately M. Ferrer really had been a traitor to the King of Spain, and deserved death, but I had no information on which to say for certain whether this was so.

No exception had been taken to the manner of his execution, for he was shot, but in consequence of his having been tried and condemned by summary court-martial instead of (the insurrection being over) by judges and jury, and with witnesses examined in public in the ordinary way. There had been explosions of public feeling in many European countries.* I detailed particularly what had occurred in France and Italy, and remarked that most people seemed to think that if the Spanish Government had fully realised beforehand the consequences of their action an ordinary trial would probably have been accorded to M. Ferrer.

The Powers could not, of course, take any official action over the affair, but it was clear each Government must be annoyed by the disorders caused by it in their respective countries, and such things made international relations much more difficult to conduct.

The Sultan seemed both interested and puzzled by all this, which, I expect, was rather a shock to his exaggerated ideas of the omnipotence and "independence" of each Power, and I trust he may now perhaps begin to have some notion of how much, in practice, their relations are interdependent rather than independent.

The rest of our talk was on general subjects, in the course of which the Sultan said things in Southern Morocco were going well, and that to the best of his knowledge the Taza tribes were not (though of course individuals or even small groups of those tribesmen might be taking part) assisting the Riff tribes against the Spaniards.

I felt strongly tempted to broach the subject of Bu Hamara's fate, but concluded it would be safer not to bring it up. The Sultan knows of the stories which are in circulation, and had I mentioned Bu Hamara His Majesty would very likely have surmised that this was the cause of delaying his mission to London. He might therefore have offered some explanation—even, perhaps, quite a good one—and he would then

* When speaking to the Sultan I had not yet heard of the pro-Ferrer demonstrations in London, but only of the meeting in Liverpool.—J. M. MacL.

either have felt further aggrieved if the mission were still deferred or I would have needed to bring up again the punishment of prisoners and so forth, while all the time feeling that, even had these barbarous punishments not been inflicted, His Britannic Majesty's Government might still perhaps have been undesirous of receiving a Moorish mission at present.

I concluded that neither the proposed Moorish mission nor the fate of Bu Hamara were of interest so pressing that they could not wait the few days necessary for instructions (if any) from you to reach me.

The Sultan ended by asking me to report his inquiry, and to call earnest attention to his anxiety in the matter, which of course I promised to do.

I have, &c.
J. M. MacLEOD.

[40799] No. 383.

Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received November 6.)

Sir, *Downing Street, November* 5, 1909.

I AM directed by the Earl of Crewe to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 2nd November, on the subject of the proposed visit of the ex-Sultan of Morocco to Gibraltar, and to request you to inform Secretary Sir Edward Grey that the Acting Governor of Gibraltar intimated on the 30th September last that the desired facilities would be afforded.

I am, &c.
H. BERTRAM COX.

[39852] No. 384.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. White.

(No. 157.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 6, 1909.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 273 of the 23rd ultimo, reporting the reappointment of El R'miki as Governor of Alcazar and his action in arresting and confiscating the property of various foreign-protected persons, including the semsar of Mr. Forde.

I request that you will ascertain the correctness of the latter report, and, if confirmed, that you will confer with your French colleague and ask what steps he proposes to take with a view to making an official protest and demanding reparation.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[40799] No. 385.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. White.

(No. 158)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 10, 1909.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 270 of the 19th ultimo, I transmit to you herewith a copy of a letter from the Colonial Office respecting the proposed visit of the ex-Sultan of Morocco to Gibraltar.

As far as this department is concerned, I see no objection to the visit.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[41617] No. 386.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 13.)

(No. 279.)
Sir, *Tangier, November* 6, 1909.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 274 of the 27th ultimo, I have the honour to report that the Spanish Minister came to see me to-day, and told me that he considered it very undesirable that the Makhzen should be allowed to place any charges on goods

of foreign origin beyond those agreed upon by the Powers, even though those goods may be in the hands of Moorish subjects, and that he was quite prepared to join in any representations we might make on the subject.

The French chargé d'affaires also told me that he would be willing to join in such representations, as in a country like Morocco, where the Makhzen frequently resorts to arbitrary and sometimes heavy imposts, it is necessary to protect goods of foreign origin. He was of opinion that the Moorish Government cannot impose any taxes on such goods without the consent of the foreign representatives.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

[41618] No. 387.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received November* 13.)

(No. 280.)
Sir, *Tangier, November* 6, 1909.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 268 of the 16th ultimo, I have the honour to report that a Shereefian letter has now been received, restoring the Fahs to the Government of Tangier. This step has given satisfaction to Europeans and Moors alike, with the exception of the unfortunate man who had been appointed Governor of the Fahs, and who had been put to considerable expense in the customary "presents" for his appointment and other ways, and had no opportunity to recoup himself during the few days during which he retained the post.

Count Saint-Aulaire addressed a letter to the doyen of the diplomatic body a few days ago, suggesting that a representation should be made to the Makhzen pointing out the grave inconveniences resulting from the separation of the Fahs from the government of the town. Count Saint-Aulaire in his letter observed that as a general principle he was opposed to interfering in the internal affairs of the country, but that this question was one which seriously affected the interests of foreigners, and would render it difficult to properly carry out the provisions of the Algeciras Act in regard to the police and the tax on town buildings.

The circular came first to me, and I expressed my concurrence in Count Saint-Aulaire's point of view. As, however, the Sultan has already restored the Fahs to the bashalik of Tangier, there is no necessity for any action to be taken in the matter by the diplomatic body.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

[41619] No. 388.

Mr White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received November* 15.)

(No. 281.)
Sir, *Tangier, November* 7, 1909.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 276 of the 30th ultimo, I have the honour to report that the Sultan's reply to the message delivered by the German Chargé d'Affaires, urging the acceptance of a loan, was delivered verbally to Dr. Rosen yesterday by Cid Guebbas.

I am informed by both Dr. Rosen and Cid Guebbas that, in his reply, Mulai Hafid expresses his thanks to the German Government for their message, which showed the interest taken by them in the financial situation, and assures the German Minister that the matter is one which occupies his attention before all others. His Majesty adds that some difficulties had arisen in the negotiations, but that he had sent stringent orders to Cid-el-Mokri to use his best endeavours to bring the negotiations to a satisfactory conclusion.

Dr. Rosen told me that he regarded the reply as fairly satisfactory. It was vague, but it could not well be otherwise; political questions had arisen in the negotiations, and the German Government had not, of course, referred to them in any way, nor, indeed, to any of the proposed terms of the loan, so it was not to be expected that the Sultan would make any definite allusion to the actual negotiations or the terms under discussion.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

[41620] No. 389.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received November* 13.)

(No. 282.)
Sir, *Tangier, November* 7, 1909.

RUMOURS have been current at Tangier for some days past that Mulai-el-Kebir had reached Taza and had been proclaimed there, whilst other reports were to the effect that he had given himself out to be acting on behalf of the ex-Sultan, and that it was Mulai Abdelaziz who had been proclaimed. Up to the present time no definite information has been received, and it is impossible to say which of the above reports is correct; there seems, however, to be no doubt that Mulai-el-Kebir was in Chiata last week, and from there it would have been easy for him to reach Taza.

This move on the part of Mulai-el-Kebir has caused some stir at the court, and the Sultan is said to be much put out. His Majesty has called in his forces from various districts, and ordered them to unite in Hiayna. If the tribes who formerly supported Bu Hamara now proclaim Mulai-el-Kebir, the situation will be more serious than before the capture of the Pretender, for Bu Hamara had been found out to be an impostor, whilst Mulai-el-Kebir enjoys prestige as a son of the late Sultan Mulai-el-Hassan.

It is believed by some of the court officials that Mulai-el-Kebir will follow the example of the Sultan and make a bid for popularity by proclaiming a holy war directed against the Spaniards. He would thus obtain many adherents, as all the Riff would probably rally to his cause, as well as the Taza district, and he would be in a position to cause considerable trouble to the Spanish forces at Melilla. I believe, however, that he would be more likely to direct his attention towards Fez, and would not be any more willing to attack the Spaniards at Melilla than Mulai Hafid was to march against the French in the Shawaia.

It is to be hoped that there is no truth in the report that Mulai-el-Kebir has given out, that he is working on behalf of Mulai Abdelaziz and that he has obtained the proclamation of the latter at Taza. A similar rumour was current when Mulai-el-Kebir was still in the Zemmour district, and it obtained some credence at the court, where it is asserted that the ex-Sultan is in correspondence with the Prince. Cid-el-Menebhi, who has received letters from Fez on the subject, has written to the Grand Vizier assuring him that there is no foundation whatever for the report, and declaring that Mulai Abdelaziz is not in any way intriguing for his restoration to the throne, which he has no desire to reoccupy.

Personally I am confident that the ex-Sultan is not in correspondence with his brother. I remember speaking to His Majesty about Mulai-el-Kebir at the time of the latter's flight from Rabat to the Zemmour, and he expressed himself in very disparaging terms regarding that Prince, giving him a bad character, and saying he would make a worse ruler even than Mulai Hafid. Should Mulai-el-Kebir be making use of the name of Abdelaziz it must be for his own ends, and without the consent of His Majesty.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

[27975] No. 390.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received November* 13.)

(No. 122.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, November* 13, 1909.

CID GUEBBAS has informed me in confidence that he has reason to believe that the Sultan has sent instructions to Cid-el-Mokri to accept the loan, the firm attitude adopted by the French Government in regard to the conditions Mulai Hafid had desired to impose having caused His Majesty to abandon them.

[41906] No. 391.

Consul MacLeod to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 15.)

(No. 39.)

Sir, *Fez, November 2, 1909.*

FOR the last fortnight it has been rumoured that Mulai Al Kebir, accompanied by the Berber Shereef Mahowsh (the continual enemy of the celebrated Hamu-u-Akka of Zayan, one of the Sultan's fathers-in-law), has made his way from Zemmur, through the remote Berber districts south of Fez, to Beni Warain and Chiata.

It will be remembered that the Chiata and other Taza tribes, although they have lost Bu Hamara, have not acknowledged Mulai Hafid as Sultan.

The general report here now is that they are disposed to proclaim Mulai Abdelaziz, and Mulai Al Kebir is said to have announced himself as only Mulai Abdelaziz's deputy.

So far, however, no person—not even the viziers—has any undoubtedly authentic or detailed information on the whole affair, which is due to the heavy rains of the last ten days or so having practically isolated these districts from Fez.

The Mehalla in Beni Mtir has now been brought back to Fez, and the large Mehalla recently operating against Bu Hamara in the hills between Fez and Wazzan has been ordered to move into Hiayna.

The Sultan has now (including these two Mehallas) at least 12,000 soldiers at or near Fez, and the tribes close to Fez remain perfectly quiet.

This, together with the season being now the beginning of winter when tribesmen are busy ploughing, and when the roads and weather make it unlikely that Mulai Al Kebir will be able to make any dangerous movement towards Fez within the ensuing four or five months at any rate.

But of course his presence near Taza (*i.e.*, between Fez and Melilla), and so near to the tribes who are fighting the Spaniards, cannot but be a source of anxiety to the Sultan, particularly in view of the bad terms on which His Majesty stands with the Powers—particularly France and Spain.

During the last fortnight the Sultan has been, to some degree, in one of his depressed moods, sometimes for two or three days doing no business at all—at any rate officially through his viziers. Last night the Vizier for Foreign Affairs assured me that it was now more than fifteen days since he had had an audience of His Majesty.

At such times anything urgent is sent in in writing to the Sultan by one of the Palace slaves, and is returned with a pencilled minute thereon of His Majesty's directions in the matter, and these are the occasions when he is most apt to issue one of the high-handed arbitrary, illegal orders, which give just offence to those concerned, as for instance, his various orders that foreign-protected persons pay extraordinary imposts not payable by treaty, and so forth.

I am unable, of course, to say to what, if any, extent, this feeling is shared by the French Government, but the feeling of all the French officials here against the Sultan is most bitter, and they make no secret of their wish that events may bring about a restoration of Mulai Abdelaziz. So far as I can judge the French officials here now seem to have ceased arguments and remonstrances, and to be inclined to leave the Sultan to his own devices which they believe will more than anything they themselves could do, bring about the end they wish to attain. The French here have been specially exasperated by the Sultan's appointments of agressively anti-French officials, particularly on the frontier (at Zenaga), and now at Alcazar, between Fez and Tangier, where Riniki has been reinstalled as governor, and is conducting a violent campaign against French-protected persons.

This attitude of the French here seems to me rather unfortunate, because, notwithstanding all his many faults, Mulai Hafid does keep his people in far better order than did Mulai Abdelaziz, and though in manner audacious, Mulai Hafid has not real courage enough to sustain him against genuinely masterful treatment by the French.

This method I think should be tried seriously before the other, which latter could hardly fail to cause a renewal of the languid, half-hearted, but ruinous civil war characteristic of Morocco, which could only be stopped permanently by the French, in effect, conquering the country in the name of Mulai Abdelaziz.

I have, &c.

J. M. MACLEOD.

[40713] No. 392.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. White.

(No. 163.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, November 18, 1909.*

THE recent actions of the Sultan, as reported in your despatches Nos. 273 and 274 of the 23rd and 27th ultimo, have been engaging my serious attention. Mulai Hafid appears to be determined to stretch the patience of the Powers to its utmost limit, and his attitude towards foreign-protected persons, as witnessed by his allowing the misdeeds of El R'miki as governor of Alcazar to go unpunished, and by his attempts to impose taxes on foreign goods which have already paid duty at the port of entry, calls for serious remonstrance. The matter is one which equally concerns all the Powers who have treaty rights in Morocco, and it is to their common interest to act together and check any aggression on the part of Mulai Hafid from the outset.

I fully agree with the view expressed in your despatch No. 274, that article 4 of the treaty of 1856 between Great Britain and Morocco covers the case of British-protected persons as well as British subjects, and I approve the note which you addressed to Cid Aissa-ben-Omar on the subject. As regards the larger question, whether goods of British origin should be exempted from any further tax, even though they have passed out of British hands and are in the possession of Moorish subjects, I am advised that any such taxation is contrary to the spirit and intention of both the commercial treaty of 1856 and the Algeciras Act. In ancient treaties, such as the capitulations, it was customary to provide for the safety and good treatment of the British merchant, and to secure as an element of such good treatment that the goods which he brought to the foreign country should not pay more than a certain fixed rate of duty. This stipulation has been preserved in British treaty arrangements with Morocco, probably on account of the primitive system of government which prevails in that country. Treaties on the modern model regard the nationality of the goods instead of that of the merchant who carries them; and that this is the view held by all the treaty Powers to be applicable in Morocco is clearly proved by the wording of article 66 of the Algeciras Act, which does not speak of goods in the hands of the merchant, but provides that as a temporary measure goods of foreign origin shall, on their entry into Morocco, pay a special tax of 2½ per cent. *ad valorem*. The intention of that provision clearly is that such goods should not be subject to any dues exceeding the treaty rates plus 2½ per cent., and its effect would be entirely nullified if additional taxes could be imposed on the same goods inland.

While still engaged in considering the bearing of British treaties on the position I received your despatch No. 279 of the 6th instant, from which I learn that both the French and Spanish diplomatic representatives agree that the Makhzen have no right to place any further charges on goods of foreign origin. In these circumstances I anticipate that you will have no difficulty in persuading your colleagues to join you in a joint protest to the Sultan, and I request that you will take action to this effect. The protest should set out clearly that the Powers absolutely refuse to allow either the taxation of foreign-protected persons or the imposition of dues on foreign goods over and above the rates sanctioned by treaty.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

[42652] No. 393.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 22.)

(No. 284. Confidential.)

Sir, *Tangier, November 12, 1909.*

I ENQUIRED of the German Minister to-day whether he could throw any light on the statement that had appeared in the German press to the effect that the Sultan had, in October 1908, promulgated a mining law under which certain concessions had been granted to M. Mannesmann, as I had never before heard of any such "dahir" or law.

Dr. Rosen replied that he could not disclose to me communications that had been made to him or to his Government by German subjects, and that all he could tell me was what had already been stated by M. Mannesmann to newspaper reporters. How

long silence could be kept by his Government and himself on this subject he did not know. So many communications had been recently made to the press by the brothers Mannesmann, and also by others, that the part played by the German Government and their officials in this country was open to misrepresentation; he therefore thought that, in order to clear up the situation and to allow their action to appear in the right light, his Government would have to break silence.

With regard to the mining law referred to by M. Mannesmann as having been made in October 1908, Dr. Rosen pointed out that it was not alleged that it had ever been promulgated or published, but merely that it had been decreed or made. He admitted that it had never been communicated to the German Legation by the Moorish Government, nor had he any knowledge of it from official sources. I gathered from what he said that he only knew of it from M. Mannesmann. He said the law had been drafted by M. Mannesmann, who submitted it to the Sultan, notwithstanding the advice of the legation that he should not do so. The Sultan accepted the law and signed—or rather, I presume, sealed—it, and immediately after issued under it a grant of mining concessions to M. Mannesmann.

In reply to my enquiry whether he could communicate to me a copy of this alleged mining law, Dr. Rosen said he could not do so, as he himself had no copy of it. He desired the legation to hold quite aloof and have no connection with the making of this law. The law was not recognised by the German Government as valid, but at the same time he could not say that they altogether rejected it; they had taken no definite decision in regard to it, but the very fact of their co-operating with the other Powers in the framing of the mining law to be promulgated under article 112 of the Algeciras Act showed that his Government attached no importance to the alleged law of 1908 on which M. Mannesmann bases his claim.

Dr. Rosen considered that the German Government had been weak over the question of the Mannesmann concessions, and had constantly changed their line of policy, partly owing to the changes at home—new men taking up new positions. They had been attacked alternately by M. Mannesmann and by the Krupp group, and this accounted for the contradictory instructions issued from time to time to the German consul at Fez.

It was held that M. Mannesmann was entitled to claim the support of his Government for any concessions to which he could prove his title, and in some respects his case was strong. As an instance Dr. Rosen quoted the Beni bou Ifror mines. M. Mannesmann had informed his legation long since that the Pretender had offered him these mines for a comparatively small sum, which he was prepared to pay. He was told, however, that the Pretender had no authority to grant mining concessions, and that he should apply to the Sultan. He did so, and obtained a concession for these mines from the Sultan, but in the meantime the Spanish company accepted the concession from the Pretender, which he had been prevented from taking, and commenced work on the mines.

The position taken up by M. Mannesmann is that article 112 of the Algeciras Act merely provides that a Shereefian firman shall lay down the conditions of the concession and of the working of mines, and that in drawing up this firman the Makhzen shall be guided by the laws governing the matter in foreign countries. There is no stipulation that the firman must be submitted to the foreign representatives, nor even that it should be published, and in Morocco there is no law or custom providing for the publication of firmans or stipulating any term after publication for their becoming operative; therefore, as all the necessary conditions are fulfilled by the firman of October 1908, which, as M. Mannesmann alleges, was confirmed in March 1909, after the recognition of Mulai Hafid by the Powers, the firman itself is valid, as is also the concession granted under it. Dr. Rosen pointed out to M. Mannesmann that Mulai Hafid, as a condition of his recognition by the Powers, had undertaken to respect and carry out all engagements entered into by Mulai Abdul Aziz, and consequently he was bound by the promise of the latter to submit the firman in question to the foreign representatives before promulgating it.

Dr. Rosen observed that, in his own personal opinion, until the firman referred to in article 112 of the Algeciras Act was promulgated, there was nothing to prevent the Sultan from granting mining concessions independently of it, for it could not be expected that the mining wealth of the country should be locked up until the firman was made. I replied that I could not in any way agree with this view, which was entirely contrary to the whole spirit of the Act. The mining wealth of the country had remained locked up for centuries, and it might well remain so a little longer to allow the firman to be drawn up.

Dr. Rosen said that the whole question of these alleged mining concessions was a very knotty one, and there would be great trouble and confusion in dealing with them. Numbers of claims in regard to various mines had been registered at the various legations, many of them in regard to the same mines. He was of opinion that the most satisfactory plan would be to appoint an International Commission, or some other body or person, to examine all the claims and to decide as to their validity. This, of course, could only be done after the mining law had been promulgated.

I have enquired at the French Legation on the subject of the alleged mining law of 1908, and was told that nothing whatever was known of it there; Count Sainte-Aulaire had not even heard that such a law was said to have been made by Mulai Hafid. It is curious, if Mulai Hafid has already promulgated a firman under article 112 of the Algeciras Act, that he should not have mentioned it to M. Regnault or M. Porché when discussing the terms of the firman the latter was engaged in drafting.

Mr. Irwin, at my request, made similar enquiries of Cid Guebbas, who said he had no official knowledge whatever of the alleged mining law, and had never heard of it until the recent statements appeared in the press.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

[42654] No. 394.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received November* 22.)

(No. 286.)

Sir, *Tangier, November* 13, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to report, with reference to my despatch No. 282 of the 7th instant, that His Majesty's consul at Fez informs me that the latest news current there was to the effect that Mulai-el-Kebir had not been to Taza or even to Ghiata, but was in the district of Ait Shokhman, some distance south of Fez, having fled there from the Zemmur on learning that some of the people of the latter tribe were in treaty with the Governor of Mequinez to seize him and send him prisoner to that town. This is to some extent confirmed by the French consul, who informed Mr. MacLeod that emissaries he had sent to Taza had returned, reporting that Mulai-el-Kebir had not been heard of at Taza or Ghiata. The emissary also reported that none of the Taza tribes had yet decided to proclaim anyone as successor to Bu Hamara, though they were not disposed to acknowledge Mulai Hafid.

Cid Guebbas informed Mr. Irwin to-day that the news he had received from Fez was also to the effect that Mulai-el-Kebir was at Ait Shokhman.

Unfortunately wild rumours are current at Fez to the effect that Mulai Abdel Aziz and Cid-el-Menebhi are intriguing with the Taza tribes for the proclamation of the former. I am convinced that these rumours are absolutely devoid of foundation, but it is possible that intriguers are making unauthorised use of the ex-Sultan's name for their own purposes.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

[42853] No. 395.

Mr. E. Grant Duff to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received November* 23.)

(No. 260.)

Sir, *Madrid, November* 20, 1909.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 215 of the 5th ultimo, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith translation of a note which I have received to-day from the Spanish Government in explanation of the action of their consul at Tetuan in facilitating the escape of the captors of Mr. Clark-Kennedy.

I have, &c.
EVELYN GRANT DUFF.

Inclosure in No. 395.

Señor Perez-Caballero to Mr. E. Grant Duff.

(Translation.)

Sir, *Ministry of State, Madrid, November* 17, 1909.

IN reply to your note of the 5th October last, regarding the Kuf tribesmen protected by the Spanish consul at Tetuan and claimed by the British vice-consul at the same place as the assumed authors of the kidnapping of Mr. Kennedy, I have the honour to inform you that His Catholic Majesty's Government, desiring to convince His Britannic Majesty's Government that in this matter there was not the very slightest intention of frustrating or hindering the action of the consular officer of a nation so closely bound to us by bonds of friendship and sympathy, transmitted urgently the text of your note to His Majesty's Minister at Tangier, instructing him to use the greatest care in investigating and clearing up the different phases of this incident.

From the statements made by our consul at Tetuan, through Señor Merry, which statements are more worthy of belief by reason of the character of the officer concerned than the assertions of the basha, an official only too much inclined to overstep himself in the exercise of his duties, as is clearly shown by various events of no distant date, in which the Spanish Legation at Tangier has been obliged to intervene, it appears that Señor Lopez Ferrer had no notice of the claims of his British colleague until after the Moors, whose capture the latter official desired, had left the city; and the statements attributed by the British consular agents to the basha are not sufficient to contradict this, inasmuch as they were not witness of the interviews between the Spanish consul and the Shereefian governor.

Nor, on the other hand, if this matter be dispassionately considered, can my Government be accused of negligence in satisfying the wishes of your Government, seeing that, at the latter's request, both the military governor of Ceuta and the Spanish consul at Tetuan took simultaneous action with the greatest zeal, which was crowned with success, for the liberation of Mr. Kennedy. And the circumstance must not be forgotten, as largely justifying the action of our consul, ignorant as he then was of the wishes of His Britannic Majesty's Government, that the rescue was able to be effected successfully under certain conditions which imposed on Señor Lopez Ferrer the moral duty of protecting those Kuf tribesmen, regarding whose capture the British vice-consul did not speak to him until after they had already left the town.

His Catholic Majesty's Government trusts that His Britannic Majesty's Government, after a careful consideration of the above facts, will realise the former's constant friendly attitude, and how far, in the present instance, its consul at Tetuan was from departing from the line of conduct inspired by the harmony and cordiality which so happily unites both countries.

I avail, &c.

J. PEREZ-CABALLERO.

[43069]

No. 396.

Sir Henry Cunynghame to Foreign Office.—(Received November 24.)

Sir, *Home Office, November* 22, 1909.

1. IN accordance with the instructions contained in your letter of the 30th October, 1909, I proceeded to Paris in time for the opening of the Conference, which took place at the office of Public Works, 246, Boulevard St. Germain, on Wednesday, the 3rd November. The delegates were—

For France.—M. Aguillon, Inspector-general of the Mines of France, 71, Rue du Faubourg Saint Honoré (Chairman).

For Germany.—M. E. Haber, Privy Councillor of the Colonial Office (Reichs-Kolonialamt, Berlin).

For Spain.—M. Fernando de las Villarez y Amor, Inspector-general of Mines in Spain, Madrid.

For Morocco.—Georges Porché-Banès, Inspector of Roads and Bridges, Tangier

Secretary.—M. Weiss, engineer of public works and inspector.

2. We took as a basis the text of a proposed règlement which had been prepared by M. Porché in collaboration with the French mining department, and which is

referred to in your letter of instructions, paragraph 4. It proved to be a good draft, but we suggested many improvements, which necessitated an almost complete revision of it, as will be apparent on comparing it with our new draft, a copy of which is enclosed. We usually sat twice a day, and completed our work on Saturday afternoon, the 20th November.

3. The general scheme is as follows: Anyone is free to prospect. If he wants an *exclusive* area of search, he must put a peg in the centre of the area he desires. He may then as of right obtain a search permit for three years over a circle not exceeding 3 kilom. radius with his peg as a centre. For this he must pay 20 centimes per hectare (2½ acres) per annum. Areas of search may overlap, but the first obtained has the preference so long as it remains in force. When, however, it comes to an end, either by the obtaining of a mine permit (which automatically terminates it) or by effluxion of time, or by failure to keep up the area tax, then the next person who has obtained a search permit over the area steps in. Thus you may have a number of search permits all existing over the same area at the same time, but the first in order of time is the effective one, and, till it lapses, the owner of the next search area in order of time cannot interfere with it.

4. When a mine is found, the owner of the prior existing search area in which it lies may obtain a working permit for it, and this permit may transcend his own search boundary, provided it does not interfere with anyone else. On his obtaining the working permit, the search permit then automatically ceases, and if he wants to go on searching he has to take out a new search permit, subject to the rights of anyone who may have been in before him. This system is in force in the French colonies, and has been found fair and satisfactory. It tends to check monopolisation and gives a chance to new comers. The working permit continues during the life of the mine, but an area tax must be paid increasing up to 3 fr. per hectare on the third year, after which it remains stationary. Failure to pay it after notice entails forfeiture of the mine.

5. As originally drawn, article 63 gave the Sultan unlimited right to put up any regions anywhere to auction—there was no limit as to size, nor to the right of alienation, nor to an unlimited area of mines being in the hands of one person. In addition, under article 64, the Sultan had an unlimited right of granting for nine years exclusive rights of search (carrying with them rights to obtain working permits) without any restraint as to size, numbers, or locality. Acting on your instructions (see paragraphs 5, 6, 7, 8), I represented that these wide provisions were very undesirable.

6. I cited not only the provisions of the Corean law, but also showed that the French colonial laws gave the power to governors of colonies to prevent such unions of mines as were contrary to the public interest, and I proposed a similar clause in our draft. This, however, was opposed by all the other members, who argued that it would give too arbitrary a power to the Sultan. They also objected to the leave of the Sultan being required for assignments, which they said would give rise to blackmail. Even M. Porché was against me, for he said my proposal would expose his department to charges of favouring individuals or nationalities. There was, I felt, some truth in these objections; for no native in power in Morocco can be trusted. Moreover, if the Sultan refused to exercise his power of checking monopolies, it would be difficult to force him to do so, for it could always be pretended, however great a concession had been, that there was still vast wealth unexplored. I first proposed a limitation of area for any one mine, and obtained the insertion of a maximum of 1,000 hectares (2,500 acres). This, however, still left the Sultan's right of sale under article 63 open, and also left open the total area of working permits that a person or company might acquire. It also afforded no guard against accumulation by alienation.

7. Finding difficulty here, and being confronted with a refusal from Berlin to agree to this clause (for M. Haber referred it to his Government), I tried the second method suggested in the instructions, viz., a limitation of area. I encountered considerable opposition at first, which led me think that the Germans contemplated the formation of some company on a very large scale. Eventually, however, M. Villarez came to my aid, and M. Aguillon appeared more favourable, and at last I obtained an agreement as to some form of monopoly restriction.

8. However in the end I got the suppression of article 63, and in its place a limitation of the area that could be held by any person or society, on whatever ground, to "—" hectares. I stood out for a maximum of 30,000 hectares. M. Haber wanted 50,000. On the last day I asked M. Haber if I might tell my Government

that if they would give him 50,000 hectares, the Germans would accept it. He hesitated a little, and then (rather naturally, I think) said that as some questions were to be reserved he would rather reserve it.

9. I do not, of course, know whether Germany will eventually consent to 50,000 hectares as a limit. I may, however, state that this area. 125,000 acres is a square of 500 sq. kilom., that is, a square with a side of 17·8 kilom., or about 11 miles. This is not a very large total working area. It is shown in grey on the rough pen-and-ink sketch appended to this letter. I am informed that the "Deutsche Tiefbau Gesellschaft" in Germany and several other companies in Germany and elsewhere have amounts as big or bigger than this. It would, however, be a fine property; for, of course, such an area if spread over the country, and the richest spots being selected, would afford a fine yield if the mines were worth working at all. The yearly tax payable for it (not counting the mineral royalties) would be 150,000 fr. (about 6,000*l.*).

10. My next object was to try and limit the powers of the Sultan under article 64, which permits him to grant search areas for nine years. This is obviously the article under which the Syndical Union of Mines of Morocco intends to do part of its work. Sir E. Grey had promised support to the syndicate, so I had to be careful to do nothing in breach of this promise. And it was necessary also to take note of his desire that such a grant should not interfere with the working of the mines in the Melilla district.

11. Fortunately, M. D'Arcy, the chairman of the Union Syndicale, of his own accord called upon me. I of course could give him no information whatever as to the draft law, but I asked him what his company hoped to do. He said that he hoped to obtain, by way of ordinary search and working permits, about 100 mines, in various parts of the coast. These he expected would be of copper, antimony, and perhaps silver, and of hæmatite at Casa Blanca. But he said that the syndicate had also been negotiating for an area of search, with rights for nine years, in one of the districts. I asked where, and he told me in and about Sûs. I had a map, on which he pointed out the locality. I asked the size, and he said that a square of 100 kilom. side would amply cover it. The size and position are roughly shown on the sketch in red, but it would probably extend down to the coast. Provided with this information, I proposed, at the next meeting of the commission, a limitation of article 64, as follows:—

(1.) To one company only.
(2.) To an area of 10,000 square kilom., *i.e.*, a square with a side of 100 kilom.
(3.) Such district to be south of the 31st parallel of latitude.

12. I told the commission of the interview with M. D'Arcy, and stated that these restrictions would, I believed, satisfy the syndicate. The area thus proposed is not large as compared with Morocco. It is only a *search* area, and lasts only nine years. If mines are found in it, permits for them would have to be taken out at 3 fr. a hectare as in ordinary cases, a price sufficiently high to prevent reckless accumulation. For, if the whole area were taken as a working area, the yearly tax alone would be 3,000,000 fr., or 120,000*l.* The latitude I proposed in order to keep the district well away from disputed regions. On these points I, however, found myself opposed by the French and German representatives, but gradually they came over in part, and I ultimately carried the point as to area of search, but they would not agree to a definite limit to one company, nor to restrict the grant to the 31st parallel nor to the Union Syndicale. M. Villarez of course supported me on account of the Melilla question, but thought that the latitude might go up to 34°; and I am not sure that this is not reasonable. I, however, stood out for all in the hope of getting something, and finally the French and Germans consented that such grants should only be made with the consent of a majority of the corps diplomatique. They said they thought I ought to be content with this, for such consent would not easily go to an *accaparement* of all Morocco. And as a further concession they struck out the concluding words of article 63, so as to restrict the total of working area in the areas of research to 10 hectares, the same amount as should be fixed for holders of working rights in general.

13. The attitude of the Germans leads me to think that they are sincere in not desiring a huge monopoly in the hands of one firm, but they wish, should minerals be found, to see the establishment of a number of wealthy companies, in which German shareholders should have a share. How far they desire to follow up their

commercial advantages by political actions, and whether they are scheming for a port in the Mediterranean, I was unable to discover.

14. The restrictions suggested in articles 63 and 64 may thus afford a basis for settlement, but I would suggest that it would be wise to secure that a grant is really kept for the syndicate, as, from what I hear, the Sultan is quite capable of black-mailing them or throwing them over.

15. I next turned attention to the railway question, and secured in the new draft of article 45 an explicit reference to articles 105 and 106 of the Treaty of Algeciras.

16. On the question of royalties, article 49, I pointed out that by article 9 of the Treaty of Morocco, 1856, an export duty was impossible on the exportation of minerals by British merchants. (I understood M. Porché to say that some such duty is now being levied, but he could not say what. As Mr. Lister then passed through Paris on his way to Morocco, I mentioned the point to him, and he said he would look into it.)

17. Of course, on this being raised, the French and Germans began to examine their treaties. The Germans produced a treaty of commerce with Morocco of the 1st June, 1890, printed in "Annales du Commerce externe, 1882–91," vol. iii. The wording shows that it has been founded on ours. It contains the clause (article 1), "Il est de plus convenu que les sujets des deux parties auront les mêmes droits et avantages que ceux qui existent ou pourront exister pour les sujets de la nation la plus favorisée." The French delegate cited a Shereefian letter of commercial agreement between Morocco and France, dated the 24th October, 1892, modifying the treaty of the 10th September, 1844, between France and Morocco. In this treaty there is a duty fixed for minerals ("Bibliothèque internationale et diplomatique," vol. xxxvi, 1898. Paris: Durand). He, however, said that there was a treaty between France and Morocco giving France the rights of the most-favoured nation, but I did not see it. In addition to this, I think they might cite the preamble of the Treaty of Algeciras, which poses as a principle, "economic liberty without any inequality," though I do not know how such vague phrases could be held to give to other nations the same rights as the British possess.

18. M. Porché was rather distressed at this turn of affairs, but we told him that he must make the Sultan understand that he could not expect to be free of the engagements of his predecessors; and I said that I had no powers to consent in any form to an abrogation of the treaty of 1856. (In this connection I may point out that the last article of the treaty does contemplate a rearrangement of the schedule to article 2, but I did not call attention to the point as it would only have started a new hare.)

19. The method of payment of the royalty next came under discussion. M. Porché urged with considerable force that there was no way of doing this except at the ports, and no officials capable of doing it but the custom-house officers. He said that some parts of Morocco are so wild that even the Sultan's troops hesitate to go there. No European is safe except he comes to an understanding with the local tribesmen. It would be far better, he thought, to have the royalty levied at the ports. It is probably better that disputes over royalties should be settled down near the coast, under shelter of our guns, than up the country. To meet the case of smelted ores, 2 per cent. on the *brut* was suggested. The re-exportation clause was of course abolished. As to the manufacture of rails, it does not seem very likely as there is no wood and probably no coal in Morocco.

20. In agreeing, however, to the 3 per cent. and 2 per cent. M. Porché hoped to get a little better terms, especially as he consented to the removal of the 63rd clause. The French and German deputies claimed exemption from all further export taxes and put their views into the protocol. M. Porché said he doubted whether the Sultan would be content with only 3 per cent. without any right to levy exportation duties, and asked for some concession. Finally, we provisionally consented to leave the Sultan 10 per cent. on gold and to give him precious stones. M. Aguillon says that he is certain there are none, but no one knows what may be found in the Atlas mountains. It appears that gold and precious stones have particularly struck the fancy of the Sultan. With regard to gold it is very usual, I believe, to give a higher *ad valorem* royalty than for the baser metals, because the product has a high value, relatively to the expense of getting it out of the mine.

21. As to precious stones many difficulties arise. If we levied the tax on cut stones, the officers at the ports would claim on all the ornaments of outgoing ladies. If we exclude them the stones would be cut by workmen at Tangier in a rough manner so as to escape duty, and in any case if there be a port duty the stones would probably

be carried on camels across the desert and sold in all sorts of places in Africa or Algeria or perhaps Egypt, and to prevent smuggling would be impossible, and the Sultan would get nothing.

22. The only mineralogical survey of the country was made by A. Brives in 1907-9, and is published. He also made a mining survey for the union, which is not published, and which was then private property.

23. To meet the objections as to the Morocco treaty, 1856, a different form was given to article 49, making it not an export duty, but a *redevance*. The only people who can levy it in practice are the "douaniers," unless the soldiers or police are to do it, which owing to their illiteracy, is, I believe, quite out of the question. I have reserved the whole question.

24. Under article 62 phosphates, nitrates, and rock-salt are left to the Sultan as in the original draft. The article has been considerably modified to make it more workable, and at my instance the words relating to a "monopole d'exploitation et du commerce du sel," were taken out as being contrary to article 2 of our treaty of 1856.

25. The next question that arose was as to articles 60 and 61 (of the original draft). This is rather a complicated affair. There are claims now on foot of three orders—first there are some old concessions of former Sultans. I could not get any list of them from M. Porché. Some of them are alleged to be to Spanish companies, the "Norte Africano" and the "Compañía Española de Minias del Rif." As to these the French deny that there was a concession; they say there was only occupation. There are also some other small ones based on working.

26. Then there is the "Affaire Mannesmann." As to this, M. Aguillon strongly holds that Mannesmann's pretended concession is worth noting, and wanted to get us to say so. But M. Haber objected that it was a diplomatic matter, and referred to Berlin, from which directions came to him not to discuss the affaire Mannesmann. On this M. Aguillon withdrew his demand for a discussion. I began to suspect that Mannesmann was acting as a cat's-paw for the German Government, but M. Haber assured me that the German Government did not want to support him, and only supported the Union syndicale, of which one-half the shares are French, one-quarter German, one-tenth English, and the rest other nationalities. The probability is, I think, that the German Government would support any sufficiently powerful German syndicate that would give them a commercial footing in Morocco.

27. A few days, however, elapsed, when I found that the French and German delegates were not in accord on questions 60 and 61. M. Haber wanted to provide that the Commission arbitrale, which was, in the phrase used, to "laver le passé," should have power to consider all claims of any kind, even arising after the Treaty of Algeciras. M. Aguillon insisted that claims arising after the treaty due to concessions or alleged concessions were "diplomatic," and beyond our powers. He tried privately to get me to take his view. I do not know why he was so persistent, unless it be that he is afraid of Mannesmann. I did not think it expedient to refer the question home, as we were nearly at the end of our work, and I should be able to explain it; and, besides, I thought such a reference might oblige our Government to take sides before they were prepared to do so, so I said that the question was diplomatic, which I at all events must reserve.

28. The question therefore under articles 60 and 60 A (of the revised draft) is whether you will decide to accept M. Haber's text and give the tribunal competence to decide the whole affair, or to take M. Aguillon's view, which is shared by the Spanish delegate, and set out in the protocol which accompanies the redrafted projet.

29. As to the constitution of the tribunal, I thought the original article 61 very objectionable and impossible. Finally, for want of a better proposal, we all thought it best to leave its nomination to the Federal Court of Lausanne, which, by article 46 of the Treaty of Algeciras, is the deciding authority on disputes as to the concession to the State bank.

30. In the fulfilment of paragraph 15 of my instructions I procured the addition of a paragraph to article 67.

31. With regard to rescission, M. Porché strongly urged that provision should not be made for rescission for non-working. He said he could not carry it out. It would be impossible for him or his assistants to keep the mines under observation. More than once he had been shot at when at mines. All the delegates agreed with him. Such provisions are now not put in French colonial mining codes, which usually only put upon unworked mines an additional taxation. I do not know whether you would wish to insist on this point, as to which the balance of opinion seemed against me.

32. The date of coming into operation of the firman has been altered, and is now as follows: As soon as the firman is published a period of two months is fixed for the lodgment of claims of right to search permits or mines anterior to the date of the firman, and a further period of three months for the hearing and determination of them by the tribunal. Within eight months of the publication of the firman claims based on working or appropriation of mines must be lodged. As soon as the tribunal has decided them, then, and not till then, areas of search may be granted. The process of pegging-out claims with a view to eventually getting search permits for them may go on, so that at least eight months will elapse between the publication of the firman and the commencement of search permits (prospective licences). This, I think, meets the point raised in paragraph 12 of my instructions.

33. The question of licence to alienate has been dealt with under monopolies, by which the accumulation ("accaparement") of large properties has been more or less prevented. There was a strong feeling against giving the Sultan a right of refusal in each case, on account of the fear of blackmail being levied on the transferor or transferee. The delegates argued that the restriction given in the new article 63 ought to cover the point. In fact it is difficult, if not impossible, to prevent transfers of mining rights in the hands of foreign companies, for if they are determined to assign their property or to amalgamate, they can always secretly manage to do so in effect, even though avoiding doing so in name. All that can be done is to render it dangerous for them to try and effectively monopolise a number of mines, and this seems done by article 63 and the other articles in which an attempt is made to restrain monopolies.

34. The above notes, I think, cover all the points of my instructions. I should add that M. Aguillon pressed for a speedy settlement, as he said his Minister was most anxious to settle it. M. Porché said privately that he had spoken to M. Pichon, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, who told him that there was no particular hurry and that the truth was that M. Aguillon was rather fussy. I do not know which is right. Possibly M. Porché wishes to get time to consult the Sultan. We separated Saturday, the 20th, all returning to our respective countries. I enclose the projet (new draft), by which it will be seen that signatures have not been affixed, nor are to be, till we have consulted our respective Governments. All we have undertaken to do is to recommend our text with a reservation as to questions of general policy. Some of the delegates have appended their arguments to a protocol. I contented myself with a general reservation of the whole.

35. I enclose—

(1.) Draft protocol.
(2.) Revised draft law.
(3.) A confidential memorandum on the Mannesmann question prepared for me by M. Aguillon, setting forth his views.
(4.) A German list of royalties in different parts of the world.*
(5.) A pen-and-ink sketch of Morocco.*
(6.) Original text of projet with marks at places of alteration.*
(7.) Copy of my instructions and correspondence and Treaty of Morocco, 1856.*
(8.) The Treaty of Algeciras.*
(9.) The mining law of Corea.*

I have, &c.
HENRY CUNYNGHAME.

W. Langley, Esq., C.B.,
Foreign Office.

Inclosure 1 in No. 396.

Projet de Protocole.

LES soussignés, délégués par leurs Gouvernements respectifs pour examiner en commun un projet de règlement minier pour le Maroc, qui a été communiqué à ces Gouvernements, à savoir :

MM.

* Not printed.

Estiment à l'unanimité que pour se conformer au mieux à l'article 112 de l'Acte d'Algésiras et tenir un compte suffisant des circonstances spéciales du Maroc, ce règlement pourrait être rédigé suivant le texte joint au présent protocole.

En l'adoptant, les délégués croient devoir faire observer que :—

1. Dans certaines dispositions, telles, notamment, que l'article 6, l'article 38, section 2, les articles 58 et 72, ils ont dû s'occuper de questions qui, par certains côtés, relèvent moins du droit minier que du droit international et des traités, ce qui rentrerait plutôt dans la compétence diplomatique que dans la leur; ils ont entendu, au surplus, que le firman chérifien sur les mines doit respecter toutes les stipulations de l'Acte d'Algésiras et, le cas échéant, les articles 30, 63, et 66, paragraphe 8.
2. Pour d'autres dispositions d'ordre spécialement minier, certains délégués ont cru devoir renoncer à des solutions qui, en d'autres pays, auraient eu leurs préférences personnelles, pour accepter des propositions qui ont paru plus appropriées aux conditions spéciales au Maroc.
3. En proposant les redevances minières mentionnées dans le firman (article 49), les délégués entendent que l'industrie des mines au Maroc ne sera pas assujettie à une autre redevance proportionnée, et n'aura pas, notamment, à supporter de droits de douane à l'exportation; de pareils droits, qui d'ailleurs n'existent pas actuellement, paraîtraient aux soussignés incompatibles avec la redevance proportionnée par eux proposée. Du reste, doit être libre l'exportation par les frontières de terre et de mer du Maroc des substances minérales qu'elles soient brutes au préparées. Les délégués signalent, d'ailleurs, que les taxes, tant superficiaire que proportionnée, proposées dans le firman sur les mines, et leurs modifications éventuelles dans l'avenir, peuvent soulever, au point de vue de leur application aux étrangers, des questions d'ordre diplomatique que les délégués n'ont pas eu la prétention de vouloir résoudre.
4. Il appartiendra au Service des Mines d'apprécier, avant que le firman entre en application, les mesures provisoires que pourraient présenter des cas spéciaux résultant de faits d'exploitation qui pourraient exister.
5. *M. Aguillon* et *M. Villarez* font observer que les "droits antérieurs au présent firman" dont traitent les articles 60 et 60A ne peuvent être que des droits antérieurs à l'Acte d'Algésiras, par le motif que de pareils droits ne peuvent pas avoir été acquis légalement après cet Acte. De pareils droits postérieurs à l'Acte d'Algésiras ne pourraient, en effet, dériver que d'un firman chérifien sur les mines rendu en conformité de l'article 112 de l'Acte d'Algésiras. Un pareil firman n'existe pas et ne pourrait pas exister. Il n'existe pas, parce qu'un pareil firman, pour satisfaire au dit article et se conformer à ce qui est de l'essence de toutes les législations étrangères sans exception, aurait dû, pour pouvoir être exécutoire et opérant, recevoir une publicité appropriée, c'est-à-dire, dans l'espèce, être communiqué dans la forme régulière au corps diplomatique de Tanger, ce qui, depuis l'Acte d'Algésiras, n'a eu lieu pour aucun firman sur les mines. Il ne peut pas exister, parce que, par lettre au corps diplomatique de Tanger du 23 juin, 1908, le Sultan Abd el-Aziz, alors Sultan incontesté du Maroc, a décidé que le firman chérifien prévu à l'article 112 de l'Acte d'Algésiras ne serait rendu qu'après avoir été préparé par l'Ingénieur des Travaux Publics de Tanger et qu'il a été entendu avec le corps diplomatique que le règlement ainsi préparé lui serait communiqué en même temps qu'il serait soumis au Maghzen. Cet engagement a lié et lie encore Mouley Hafid, parce que, lors de sa reconnaissance par les Puissances, il a pris expressément l'engagement de respecter toutes les décisions de son prédécesseur, ce qu'il a d'ailleurs rappelé spécialement pour le firman chérifien sur les mines par la note aux Puissances du 14 septembre, 1909, sur les événements du Riff.

M. le délégué allemand pense que la conférence n'a pas à exprimer d'opinion sur cette question, qui doit être réservée pour le tribunal arbitral prévu aux articles 60 et 61.

M. le délégué de l'Espagne fait observer que non seulement il adhère entièrement à l'avis de M. le délégué de la France pour les droits postérieurs à l'Acte d'Algésiras, mais il ne croit même pas à l'existence de droits antérieurs à cet Acte qui puissent être légalement invoqués.

M. le délégué de la Grande-Bretagne s'engage à soumettre le projet et ce protocole à la bienveillante considération de son Gouvernement sous réserve sur tous points.

Ainsi arrêté en quatre expéditions, dont une pour chacun des délégués.

À Paris, le novembre, 1909.

Inclosure 2 in No. 396.

Projet d'un Réglement sur les Mines au Maroc.

TITRE I^er^.—*Dispositions générales.*

ARTICLE 1^er^.

LE présent firman, édicté en conformité de l'article 112 de l'Acte d'Algésiras, a pour objet de déterminer les conditions de la recherche et de l'exploitation des mines dans l'Empire chérifien tant par les sujets marocains que par les étrangers.

ARTICLE 2.

Sont considérés comme mines pour l'application du présent firman les gîtes naturels des substances minérales et fossiles suivantes :—

Minerais d'où s'extraient tous métaux ou alliages métalliques; minerais de soufre ou d'arsenic; sels solubles ou associés à ces divers minerais.
Graphites et combustibles fossiles à l'exclusion de la tourbe; hydrocarbures libres ou incorporés à des gangues.
Terres rares, telles que celles de zirconium, thorium, cérium.
Nitrates, borates, et sels associés.
Phosphates.
Sels gemmes et de potasse, et autres sels associés.
Sources et eaux salées souterraines d'où l'on peut extraire du sel.

Le droit d'exploiter ces substances ne peut être acquis qu'en vertu d'un permis accordé dans les formes prévues ou Titre III du présent firman, après institution préalable d'un permis de recherche exclusif délimitant les droits de l'explorateur conformément aux dispositions du Titre II.

Les permis de recherche et d'exploitation donnent droit dans les limites de leurs périmètres et indéfiniment en profondeur, à toutes les substances classés dans les mines, sous réserve des dispositions relatives aux nitrates, phosphates, sources et eaux salées, sels gemmes et de potasse prévues à l'article 62 ci-après.

L'exploitation des pierres précieuses est réservée à Sa Majesté chérifienne; elle aura lieu dans les conditions prévues à l'article 57 ci-après.

ARTICLE 3.

Sont considérés comme carrières les gîtes de substances minérales non classées dans les mines, notamment les gîtes de matériaux de construction, d'empierrement, et d'amendements pour la culture des terres.

L'exploitation des carrières ainsi que des tourbières est laissée à la disposition des propriétaires du sol; elle est soumise à des règlements de police pour assurer la sécurité.

Le Maghzen aura le droit, pour l'exécution des travaux d'utilité publique, d'exploiter ou de faire exploiter les carrières appartenant à des particuliers en conformité des règlements sur les carrières et sur les occupations temporaires.

ARTICLE 4.

En cas de contestation sur la classification légale d'une substance ou d'un gîte, il est statué par un firman chérifien rendu sur avis conforme du Service des Mines.

ARTICLE 5.

Les permis de recherche et d'exploitation accordés en vertu du présent firman ne peuvent faire obstacle aux usages coutumiers dont bénéficieraient les indigènes pour l'extraction de certaines substances par travaux superficiels. Toutefois, les titulaires de permis d'exploitation peuvent être affranchis, pour tout ou partie de leur périmètre, des servitudes résultant de ces droits coutumiers moyennant le paiement aux intéressés d'une indemnité fixée, à défaut d'entente amiable, par le chef du Service des Mines.

ARTICLE 6.

Le présent firman établit les droits et obligations des explorateurs et exploitants envers le Maghzen et les tiers, notamment les propriétaires et possesseurs du sol.

Le Maghzen prêtera aux explorateurs et exploitants son appui dans toute la mesure du possible. Toutefois, et sous réserve des droits internationaux et des traités, il ne sera pas responsable des difficultés occasionnées par l'application du présent firman, sauf s'il y a faute ou négligence manifeste de la part des fonctionnaries chérifiens là où ils exercent une autorité effective. Dans le cas où il serait reconnu qu'une indemnité pût être accordée, la réparation des dommages causés aux personnes ainsi qu'aux biens engagés dans les entreprises minières sera réglée, à défaut d'entente amiable, par le tribunal arbitral prévu à l'article 60 ci après.

ARTICLE 7.

En cas de retard ou d'interruption dans l'exercice de leurs droits par suite de difficultés qui ne seraient pas de leur fait, les obligations des intéressés envers le Maghzen, après dues justifications fournies par eux en temps utile, seront suspendues pendant la durée de ce retard ou de cette interruption et les intéressés auront droit, s'ils le demandent, à une prorogation de leurs droits pour une durée égale à celle de ces retards ou interruptions.

ARTICLE 8.

La recherche et l'exploitation des mines peuvent être effectuées dans les conditions fixées au présent firman par tout individu ou par toute société régulièrement constituée.

Les demandes présentées au nom d'une société ne sont recevables que si elles sont accompagnées des pièces justifiant de la constitution légale de la société.

ARTICLE 9.

Tout individu ou le mandataire qu'il aurait régulièrement constitué pour agir en son lieu et place, ainsi que le représentant que toute société est tenue de désigner, doivent, pour l'application du présent firman, avoir fait et notifié au Service des Mines élection de domicile au Maroc dans l'une des villes suivantes, à savoir :—

Les ports ouverts au commerce extérieur et les villes de Fez, Marrakech, El Ksar, et Oudjda, ainsi que toutes autres villes qui seraient ultérieurement désignées par décision du Maghzen.

Toutes notifications relatives à l'application du présent firman seront valablement faites aux intéressés au domicile ainsi élu ; à défaut d'élection de domicile, notification sera valablement faite : pour les sujets marocains, au représentant du Maghzen à Tanger ; pour les sujets étrangers, à leur légation.

ARTICLE 10.

Les fonctionnaires du Gouvernement chérifien et les fonctionnaires de carrière des Puissances étrangères en fonctions au Maroc, à quelque classe qu'ils appartiennent, ainsi que leurs parents, ne peuvent, dans toute l'étendue de l'Empire, obtenir, directement ou indirectement, le droit de rechercher ou d'exploiter des mines ni devenir mandataires ou représentants des intéressés dans ces affaires.

Tous actes faits en opposition à cette disposition sont nuls et de nul effet.

TITRE II.—*Des Recherches.*

ARTICLE 11.

Les recherches de mines sont libres dans tout l'Empire chérifien sous l'observation des dispositions du présent règlement, sans que l'explorateur puisse disposer des substances classées dans les mines, abattues dans ses travaux, à moins d'avoir obtenu un permis exclusif de recherche dans les conditions prévues au présent titre.

ARTICLE 12.

Le droit exclusif de recherche en périmètre réservé, s'acquiert à la priorité de la demande régulière en la forme qui en a été remise au chef du Service des Mines.

ARTICLE 13.

Le périmètre réservé est un cercle dont le rayon, fixé par l'intéressé, ne peut dépasser 3 kilom.

ARTICLE 14.

Toute demande de permis de recherche doit, à peine de nullité, être précédée par la désignation matérielle sur le sol du centre du périmètre demandé.

A cet effet il doit être établi, au centre du cercle, un signal avec une inscription faisant connaître la date de la pose du poteau signal, le rayon du cercle et le nom du permissionnaire.

Le poteau signal doit être maintenu en bon état pendant toute la durée du permis.

ARTICLE 15.

Pour être recevable la demande doit faire connaître—

Les nom, prénoms, profession, et domicile du demandeur ainsi qu'éventuellement du représentant qu'il aura à ce spécialement mandaté ;

Et, pour une société, sa désignation et le domicile élu de son représentant ;

Une déclaration du demandeur certifiant la pose du signal et indiquant la date à laquelle il a été reposé ;

Toutes pièces justificatives devront être jointes pour établir l'identité et le domicile des individus intervenant comme demandeurs ou représentants et la validité du mandat pour ces derniers.

La demande fait en outre connaître—

Le rayon du cercle et la désignation précise de son centre par rapport à des points fixes de la surface avec les plans ou croquis nécessaires à cet effet. Ces plans et croquis seront dûment orientés et seront dressés à l'échelle de 1 : 20,000e.

A la demande doivent en outre être annexés—

Un récépissé constatant le versement à la Banque d'État d'une somme égale à la redevance superficiaire due pour la première année de recherches ;

Un exemplaire, dans la partie utile, d'une carte publiée au Maroc, au 250,000e au moins, ou à défaut la reproduction à cette échelle au moins d'une carte publiée à l'échelle de 500,000e au moins, avec la représentation sur cette carte du cercle sollicité et des lignes définissant son centre.

Pour chaque cercle sollicité, il doit être présenté une demande distincte.

ARTICLE 16.

La demande doit être déposée au bureau du Service des Mines et enregistrée immédiatement sur un registre spécial.

L'ordre de priorité est déterminé par l'ordre d'inscription sur ce registre.

Le Service des Mines peut faire compléter les demandes qui présenteraient, de simples lacunes de forme, sans que l'intéressé perde son droit de priorité s'il fournit les renseignements à lui demandés dans le délai qui lui est à ce imparti.

ARTICLE 17.

Le permis de recherche est délivré par le Service des Mines, ou celui-ci fait connaître à l'intéressé le motif légal qui ne permet pas de le lui délivrer.

Le Service des Mines est tenu de communiquer à tout requérant la liste des permis accordés et la carte sur laquelle ils doivent être figurés.

ARTICLE 18.

Le permis ne confère de droits à l'intéressé que dans la partie du cercle qui ne porte ni sur des permis d'exploitation, ni sur des cercles antérieurs légalement détenus tant que ces droits sont encore en vigueur.

A toute époque l'explorateur peut demander au Service des Mines de constater la partie du cercle sur lequel portent ses droits, à condition de supporter les frais de la vérification et d'en consigner le montant par avance.

ARTICLE 19.

L'explorateur à le droit de faire dans la zone qui lui est attribuée toutes les installations et tous les travaux qu'il juge utiles à la reconnaissance ou à l'étude du gîte. Il pourra disposer librement des produits concessibles provenant de ses travaux, moyennant paiement des redevances prévues à l'article 49, après qu'il en aura fait la déclaration au Service des Mines.

ARTICLE 20.

Le permis est valable pour trois années grégoriennes à compter de la date de sa délivrance.

A l'issue de ces trois ans, le même attributaire, s'il n'a pas demandé un permis d'exploitation, ne peut, pendant trois ans, se faire délivrer un nouveau permis sur les mêmes terrains.

ARTICLE 21.

L'attributaire doit payer par année et par avance une taxe fixe de 20 centimes par hectare de terrain compris dans son cercle de recherche.

En aucun cas, la redevance annuelle ne peut être inférieure à 300 fr. par permis ; il ne peut être accordé aucun dégrèvement, même si le permis ne donne pas de droits effectifs sur toute l'étendue du périmètre demandé.

ARTICLE 22.

La taxe doit être payée par année.

Faute par le permissionnaire en retard d'avoir payé le terme dû dans le mois de l'avis à lui signifié par le Service des Mines, le permis est annulé par le Service des Mines.

ARTICLE 23.

Le permis de recherche en périmètre réservé constitue un droit mobilier.

Il peut être cédé et transféré comme tous droits mobiliers.

Toute cession ou tout transfert doit être notifiés au Service des Mines et donnera lieu, outre les taxes ordinaires sur la cession des droits mobiliers, à une taxe spéciale de 300 fr., qui doit être versée à la Banque d'État. Le récépissé est joint à l'avis de transfert donné au Service des Mines.

La cession partielle d'un cercle est interdite.

ARTICLE 24.

A toute époque le permissionnaire peut renoncer à son permis sur simple déclaration notifiée au Service des Mines, sans avoir droit à aucun remboursement des taxes par lui payées.

L'effet de la renonciation part du dépôt de la demande de renonciation au Service des Mines.

Le permissionnaire doit, à la renonciation comme à la déchéance ou à l'expiration de son permis, faire disparaître le signal du centre.

ARTICLE 25.

Lors de l'abandon d'un permis, pour quelque cause que ce soit, l'intéressé peut retirer tous les objets lui ayant appartenu ; mais il ne peut ultérieurement réclamer aucun droit ni privilège pour les travaux par lui exécutés, sauf ce qui sera dit à l'article 62 pour l'inventeur d'un gîte de phosphate, de nitrate, ou de sel gemme.

TITRE III.—*De l'Exploitation.*

ARTICLE 26.

Le permis d'exploitation d'une mine est concédé par firman chérifien.

ARTICLE 27.

Le permis d'exploitation ne peut être demandé et obtenu que par le titulaire d'un permis de recherche en périmètre réservé non périmé au moment de la demande.

ARTICLE 28.

L'étendue du permis d'exploitation sera de 1,000 hectares au plus et de 100 hectares au moins.

Son périmètre aura la forme d'un rectangle dont les côtés seront orientés nord–sud et ouest–est, le petit côté n'étant pas inférieur au quart du grand.

Le rectangle devra être compris pour les trois quarts au moins dans les limites du périmètre de recherche ; il ne pourra, sans le consentement des intéressés, empiéter sur des terrains pour lesquels un tiers aurait des droits antérieurs.

Avec l'autorisation du Service des Mines, le périmètre du permis d'exploitation pourra recevoir une autre forme ou orientation.

ARTICLE 29.

La demande de permis d'exploitation doit être déposée au Service des Mines avec toutes les justifications nécessaires ; elle est accompagnée d'un plan au 10,000e portant l'indication du périmètre originaire de recherche et du périmètre d'exploitation sollicité avec toutes les données nécessaires à la reconnaissance et à l'identification des bornes qui ont dû être posées aux sommets du périmètre par les soins de l'impétrant.

ARTICLE 30.

La demande qui est tenue à la disposition du public dans les bureaux du Service des Mines est portée à la connaissance du public par des avis publiés dans les journaux dans les conditions prévues à l'article 55 ci-après.

Le public est avisé de même, un mois au moins à l'avance, de la date à laquelle le Service des Mines procédera sur place à une enquête pour reconnaître la régularité de la demande et vérifier ou faire rectifier le bornage du périmètre demandé.

Le caïd ou le pacha est directement averti par le Service des Mines.

Les frais de l'instruction sont à la charge du demandeur. Dans le délai de quinze jours à compter du dépôt de la demande, le demandeur consignera la somme nécessaire pour faire face à ces frais, faute de quoi il ne serait pas donné suite à la demande.

ARTICLE 31.

Sur le vu du dossier, il est définitivement statué par un firman chérifien, qui fixe la délimitation définitive du permis.

Si le permis doit être refusé pour des motifs légaux, notification en est donnée à l'intéressé. Celui-ci est également avisé des cas où, pour des motifs d'intérêt public, et notamment par application de l'article 58 ci-après, on ajourne l'octroi du permis.

ARTICLE 32.

Lorsqu'un permis d'exploitation est accordé ou définitivement refusé, le droit de recherche dans le périmètre réservé qui a permis d'acquérir le droit d'exploitation est annulé de plein droit.

Tant que le permis d'exploitation n'aura pas été institué, le permis de recherche en vertu duquel il est demandé sera prorogé de plein droit moyennant paiement des taxes prévues à l'article 21 ci-dessus.

ARTICLE 33.

Avant que lui soit délivré le titre instituant le permis d'exploitation, l'intéressé, sur l'avis qui lui en est donné par le Service des Mines, doit justifier du versement à la Banque d'État d'un droit fixe de 500 fr.

Faute par lui de justifier de ce versement dans le délai imparti, le firman d'institution sera annulé.

ARTICLE 34.

Le permis d'exploitation constitue un droit mobilier, cessible, et transmissible comme tous autres droits mobiliers.

Toute cession ou tout transfert doivent être notifiés au Service des Mines dans les conditions prévues à l'article 23; toutefois le droit spécial de mutation sera de 500 fr.

Tant que la cession ne sera pas devenue définitive, le titulaire actuel du permis d'exploitation restera seul responsable à l'égard du Maghzen de l'exécution des prescriptions du présent firman.

ARTICLE 35.

Le titulaire d'un permis d'exploitation doit payer par semestre, en janvier et juillet, une taxe fixe annuelle par hectare de 1 fr. la première année, 2 fr. la seconde année, et 3 fr. à partir de la troisième année.

La taxe sera due à partir du 1er janvier ou du 1er juillet qui suivra la remise du firman d'institution.

En cas de retard et deux mois après avis notifié par le Service des Mines, la déchéance sera prononcée par décision du Maghzen.

La mine déchue est, par les soins du Service des Mines, et après avis donné au public, vendue en adjudication publique avec toutes ses dépendances et installations, y compris les voies de communication qui y sont exclusivement rattachées, au profit de l'exploitant déchu ou des créanciers. La somme provenant de l'adjudication est consignée à la Banque d'État pour être répartie à qui de droit après déduction de tous les frais avancés par le Service des Mines pour arriver à l'adjudication.

En aucun cas l'adjudication ne peut avoir lieu au-dessus de la somme nécessaire pour couvrir ces frais.

Dès la signification de la déchéance il est interdit à l'exploitant de détourner ou enlever de la mine ou de ses dépendances tout objet placé à demeure ou non, en dehors des simples approvisionnements, à peine d'être poursuivi personnellement à la requête de l'adjudicataire pour tout détournement fait en opposition avec la présente disposition.

Le Service des Mines peut, dès la déchéance prononcée et notifié, faire placer à la mine un sequestre pour assurer l'exécution de la disposition qui précède.

Si après deux tentatives à un mois d'intervalle la mine n'a pas été adjugée, le permis est annulé par firman chérifien; le Service des Mines fait enlever les bornes, et les terrains deviennent libres comme si la mine n'avait pas été institutée, l'attributaire pouvant toutefois disposer de toutes les installations de surface par lui établies.

ARTICLE 36.

A toute époque le titulaire d'un permis d'exploitation peut, en adressant la demande au Service des Mines, obtenir par firman chérifien la renonciation partielle ou totale à son permis ou sa fusion avec un autre permis limitrophe ou sa division. Les nouveaux périmètres devront satisfaire aux conditions imposées par l'article 28.

Avis en sera donné au public.

Les bornes inutiles devront être déplacées, et il en sera placé de nouvelles aux frais de l'intéressé.

En cas de renonciation le permissionnaire ne peut enlever des travaux souterrains que les objets qui peuvent être retirés sans amener leur destruction; il peut disposer de toutes les installations de surface par lui établies. Les terrains compris dans le permis deviennent libres comme si la mine n'avait pas été instituée.

TITRE IV.— *Des Droits et Obligations des Explorateurs et des Exploitants.*

ARTICLE 37.

Aucun travail de recherche ou d'exploitation ne peut être entrepris à la surface dans une zone de 50 mètres à l'entour des propriétés closes, villages, groupes d'habitations, puits, édifices religieux, lieux de sépulture, ou considérés comme sacrés par le Gouvernement chérifien, ou à moins de 20 mètres des voies de communication, conduites d'eaux, et généralement de tous travaux d'utilité publique et ouvrages d'art, à moins du consentement du propriétaire pour les localités privées, ou du Maghzen pour le domaine public, les travaux d'utilité publique et les ouvrages d'art.

ARTICLE 38.

Un périmètre de protection peut être établi par firman chérifien autour d'une source, ainsi qu'autour des voies de communication ou immeubles énumérés à l'article précédent. Dans l'intérieur de ce périmètre, tout travail de recherche ou d'exploitation, ni souterrain ni superficiel, ne peut être entrepris ou poursuivi que dans les conditions fixées par le Service des Mines, et peut même être interdit, sans que l'explorateur ou l'exploitant puisse en aucun cas réclamer de ce chef aucune indemnité, sous réserve des dispositions concernant les travaux d'utilité publique prévus à l'article 39 ci-après.

Il en est de même pour des zones qui seraient créées en vue de la défense militaire; toutefois, en ce cas, l'explorateur ou l'exploitant peut avoir droit à une indemnité, qui sera fixée et réglée comme il est dit à l'article suivant.

ARTICLE 39.

Nul permis de recherche ou d'exploitation ne peut mettre obstacle à l'exécution de travaux d'utilité publique à l'intérieur de son périmètre, non plus qu'à l'ouverture et à l'exploitation de carrières à utiliser pour ces travaux.

L'explorateur ou l'exploitant n'a droit qu'au remboursement des dépenses par lui faites et rendues inutiles par l'exécution des dits travaux ou l'ouverture d'une carrière, compensation faite, s'il y a lieu, avec les avantages qu'il peut retirer du dit travail.

L'indemnité due sera réglée dans les conditions prévues au règlement sur l'expropriation.

ARTICLE 40.

L'explorateur ou l'exploitant peut utiliser pour le service exclusif de son entreprise, sans avoir de ce chef rien à payer aux propriétaires ou possesseurs du sol, les substances rentrant dans la classe des carrières telles qu'elles sont définies à l'article 3 ci-dessus, qu'il abat dans ses travaux de recherche ou d'exploitation.

ARTICLE 41.

L'explorateur ou l'exploitant n'a aucun droit, dans son périmètre, aux bois et autres produits végétaux du sol, ni aux eaux superficielles ou souterraines, sauf pour lui à pouvoir utiliser pour son service les eaux sortant de ses puits ou galeries.

Il n'a aucun droit aux monnaies, objets d'art ou d'antiquité que ces travaux mettraient au jour; il doit donner avis immédiat de ces découvertes au Service des Mines et, en attendant qu'il ait pu les lui remettre, les conserver à l'abri de toute détérioration.

ARTICLE 42.

L'explorateur ou l'exploitant a le droit d'occuper à l'intérieur de son périmètre les terrains nécessaires à ses installations et travaux et à leurs dépendances.

Cette occupation aura lieu sans formalités ni frais pour les terrains du Maghzen qui ne sont ni clos ni cultivés, sous réserve des droits des tiers.

Sur tous autres terrains, à defaut de consentement du propriétaire du sol ou de celui qui est présumé tel, et en dehors des zones prévues à l'article 37, l'occupation, après autorisation obtenue du Service des Mines, sera soumise aux conditions fixées par le règlement sur l'occupation temporaire.

ARTICLE 43.

L'exploitant peut, soit à l'intérieur, soit à l'extérieur de son périmètre, occuper les terrains nécessaires à l'établissement, et à l'exploitation des voies de communication ou ports d'embarquement nécessaires pour assurer la sortie de ses produits, la circulation de son personnel et l'apport de ses approvisonnements comme aussi des galeries nécessaires à l'aérage ou à l'épuisement des eaux.

A défaut du consentement des propriétaires des terrains ou de ceux qui sont présumés tels, il sera procédé, après approbation du plan par le Service des Mines, comme en matière d'expropriation pour cause d'utilité publique.

Il sera procédé de même, sous réserve de l'approbation du Service des Travaux publics, pour le captage et l'adduction des eaux nécessaires à la production de force motrice, ou à la préparation mécanique des minerais.

ARTICLE 44.

Les voies de communication et ouvrages maritimes ouverts en vertu de l'article précédent seront affectés au service exclusif de l'exploitant.

Toutefois, des exploitants limitrophes ou voisins peuvent, par un acte qui devra être transmis au Service des Mines, constituer un syndicat pour établir et exploiter en commun une voie ou un port destiné au service exclusif de leurs exploitations.

Le syndicat ainsi constitué pour l'établissement et l'exploitation de l'ouvrage aura les droits et obligations d'un exploitant de mine en ce qui concerne les occupations de terrains et les responsabilités prévues par les articles 47 et 48 ci-après.

Tout exploitant de mine limitrophe ou voisine peut demander à faire partie du syndicat. A défaut d'entente entre les intéressés, il est définitivement statué tant sur le principe que sur les conditions de la participation par trois arbitres, dont l'un est désigné par le syndicat, l'autre par le demandeur, et le troisième par le Maghzen, à défaut d'entente entre les deux premiers arbitres pour cette désignation.

L'acte syndical doit être communiqué au Service des Mines.

ARTICLE 45.

Les voies de communication et ouvrages maritimes établis en vertu des articles 43 et 44 peuvent, après avis conforme du Service des Travaux Publics, et suivant convention à intervenir entre le Maghzen et l'exploitant ou le syndicat, être affectés au service public dans les conditions que fixera un cahier des charges établi suivant les règles adoptées pour les autres ouvrages de même nature, et en conformité des articles 105 et 106 de l'Acte d'Algésiras.

A défaut du consentement de l'exploitant ou du syndicat, le Maghzen peut, en conformité des articles 113 et 114 de l'Acte d'Algésiras, exproprier les voies de communication ou ouvrages maritimes pour en donner l'exploitation par voie d'adjudication publique en conformité du règlement sur les adjudications.

En cas de rachat ainsi effectué, l'exploitant ou les exploitant syndiqués n'auront à payer les transports relatifs à leur entreprise qu'au prix de revient, frais de péage et de transport compris. Ce prix de revient sera fixé par le cahier des charges de l'entreprise, et à défaut d'entente à cet égard entre le Maghzen et les exploitants de mines, il sera statué par un arbitrage dans les conditions prévues à l'article 60 ci-après.

ARTICLE 46.

En cas de cession ou de transfert à un titre quelconque d'un droit de recherche ou d'exploitation, les installations à demeure établies pour l'exercice de ces droits les suivent, dans la cession, à moins qu'il n'en soit autrement stipulé dans l'acte.

Nul créancier ne peut saisir isolément ces installations et le droit pour l'exercice duquel elles sont établies.

ARTICLE 47.

L'explorateur ou l'exploitant sera tenu à réparer tous dommages que ces travaux pourraient occasionner aux propriétés de la surface ainsi qu'aux recherches ou exploitations voisines.

ARTICLE 48.

L'explorateur ou l'exploitant doit réparation pour les dommages résultant de sa faute qui atteignent les personnes.

ARTICLE 49.

L'exploitation des mines donne ouverture à une redevance proportionnée à l'extraction. Cette redevance sera recouvré par les agents douanes à la sortie des substances des mines comprises dans la classe, à toute frontière terrestre ou maritime du Maroc. Elle est réglée à 3 pour cent *ad valorem*, sauf pour les substances extraites au Maroc, qui y seront transformées en métaux bruts ou alliages, et pour lesquelles elle est réduite à 2 pour cent.

Pour l'or, la redevance est réglée à 10 pour cent *ad valorem*.

La valeur des substances sera évaluée au point de sortie, conformément à l'article 96 de l'Acte d'Algésiras.

Seront exempts de taxe les métaux ouvrés ainsi que toutes substances minérales ou métaux bruts lorsqu'il sera établi qu'ils ne sortent que par réexportation.

ARTICLE 50.

Les frais de déplacements et autres qui seront occasionnés au Service des Mines et qui sont mis à la charge des intéressés par le présent règlement seront dans chaque cas taxés par le Service des Mines d'après un tarif qui sera arrêté par le Directeur des Travaux Publics et sera publié. Les frais devront toujours être payés d'avance.

TITRE V.—*Du Service des Mines.*

ARTICLE 51.

Le Service Chérifien des Mines relève du Service des Travaux Publics de l'Empire, sous l'autorité du Ministre des Finances. Le siège du Service des Mines est à Tanger.

ARTICLE 52.

Le Service des Mines est chargé d'assurer l'exécution du présent firman.

Il exerce une surveillance de police sur les travaux de recherche et d'exploitation en vue d'assurer la sécurité de la surface et du personnel occupé dans les travaux.

ARTICLE 53.

Le Directeur des Travaux Publics édicte et fait publier les instructions nécessaires pour assurer l'application uniforme et complète du présent firman.

Le Service des Mines édicte les règlements de police nécessaires pour assurer la sécurité des exploitations et de leurs dépendances.

ARTICLE 54.

Les fonctionnaires et agents du Service des Mines ont à tout moment libre accès et parcours sur toutes les installations des travaux des explorateurs et exploitants.

Ceux-ci sont tenus de leur fournir toutes facilités pour l'accomplissement de leur mission, et de les faire accompagner dans leurs visites, s'ils en sont requis, par les préposes et surveillants dont le concours serait nécessaire.

Ils peuvent se faire représenter les plans des travaux ainsi que les registres d'extraction et de contrôle des ouvriers, qui doivent être tenus par les exploitants, et ils peuvent se faire donner ou envoyer copie de ces documents aux frais des exploitants.

ARTICLE 55.

Les firmans chérifiens ou decisions du Maghzen prévus par le présent règlement ne sont rendus qu'après avis conforme du Service des Travaux Publics.

Les décisions du Directeur des Travaux Publics sont prises après avis conforme du Service des Mines.

Ces firmans ou décisions sont insérés au " Journal officiel " de l'Empire, ou à son défaut dans les trois journaux désignés à l'article 3 du règlement relatif aux adjudications effectuées sur les fonds de la Caisse Spéciale.

Il en est de même pour les décisions du Service des Mines.

ARTICLE 56.

Toutes les taxes spéciales prévues dans le présent firman, telles que droits fixes, taxes par hectare et redevances d'extraction, sont versées à la Banque d'État. Cinquante pour cent du produit de ces taxes sont portés au compte courant du Maghzen; le reste est porté à un compte spécial pour être affecté au paiement des dépenses du Service des Mines et à l'exécution des travaux publics nécessaires à l'exploitation des mines; en cas d'insuffisance de ce compte spécial pour couvrir les dépenses du Service des Mines, il sera fait à ce compte, sur la part revenant au Maghzen, et jusqu'à due concurrence, des avances, remboursables au Maghzen aussitôt que possible. Les versements effectués en application de l'article 50 seront portés au compte du Service des Mines.

ARTICLE 57.

Les mines qui, par suite de l'application du présent firman, adviendraient au Maghzen, seront exploitées, soit par le Service des Mines, soit par des amodiataires qui ne pourront être choisis que par voie d'adjudication publique dans les conditions fixées par le règlement sur les adjudications. Le produit de ces exploitations sera réparti comme il est dit à l'article précédent.

TITRE VI.—*Dispositions spéciales et transitoires.*

ARTICLE 58.

A toute époque le Maghzen peut, pour une durée et pour les régions qu'il détermine, suspendre, par voie de mesure générale, et pour des motifs de sécurité, le droit de rechercher les mines, et celui d'acquérir des droits exclusifs de recherche ou d'exploitation, sans préjudice des droits régulièrement acquis auparavant, lesquels seuls continuent à pouvoir être exercés dans ces régions, aux risques et périls des intéressés.

ARTICLE 59.

Le présent firman entrera en vigueur dès sa publication. Toutefois son application, en ce qui concerne l'acquisition de périmètres de recherches en vertu du Titre II, sera suspendue jusqu'à la fin des travaux du tribunal arbitral prévu à l'article 60 ci-après. La date de la fin de ces travaux sera publiée par les soins du Service des Mines.

ARTICLE 60.

Il sera établi un tribunal arbitral à l'effet—

(1.) De reconnaître les droits antérieurs au présent firman qui auraient pu être constitués pour la recherche et l'exploitation des mines au Maroc en faveur de personnes ou de sociétés;

(2.) D'attribuer par voie de préférence, en conformité du présent firman, des périmètres exclusifs de recherche aux personnes ou sociétés qui, sans avoir des droits régulièrement constitués comme il est dit au paragraphe ci-dessus, établiraient qu'elles ont, avant la publication du présent firman pour bien assurer leur prise de possession, ou exécuté de bonne foi des travaux de recherche ou d'exploitation, ou effectué de bonne foi des paiements à des propriétaires du sol ou à des exploitants antérieurs, en vue de s'assurer des droits d'exploitation.

ARTICLE 60 A.

Toute personne ou société qui veut faire reconnaître un droit régulièrement constitué en sa faveur par application du paragraphe 1er ci-dessus doit, dans les deux mois de la publication du présent firman, à peine de forclusion, remettre sa demande au Service des Mines, en y joignant :—

(1.) L'acte officiel constitutif du droit revendiqué.

(2.) Un mémoire justificatif et toutes autres pièces ou documents que l'intéressé juge utile de produire.

(3.) Le récépissé d'un versement à la Banque d'État, calculé à raison de 20 centimes par hectare de terrains réclamés en vue de faire face aux frais de procédure devant le tribunal arbitral.

(4.) L'engagement de se soumettre sans appel à la décision du tribunal arbitral.

Le Service des Mines peut faire compléter la requête dans un délai par lui indiqué, et qui ne peut être dépassé à peine d'irrecevabilité de la demande.

Le tribunal arbitral statuera souverainement sur la réclamation. Sa décision doit être rendue dans les trois mois de la remise de la déclaration au Service des Mines.

Les périmètres qui seraient ainsi reconnus seront, pour l'avenir, assimilés, en ce qui concerne les droits et obligations qui en dérivent, aux permis d'exploitation définis par le Titre III du présent firman.

ARTICLE 60 B.

Toute personne ou société qui croit pouvoir réclamer l'application du paragraphe (2) de l'article 60 doit, à peine de forclusion, dans les huit mois de la publication du présent firman, présenter des demandes en permis exclusif de recherche pour les terrains par elle revendiqués, en se conformant à toutes les stipulations du Titre II du présent firman.

Elle doit, en outre, joindre à sa demande :—

(1.) Un mémoire justificatif établissant les faits sur lesquels se fonde la demande avec tous actes et toutes pièces à ce nécessaires.

(2.) Le récépissé d'un versement à la Banque d'État, calculé à raison de 20 centimes par hectare de terrains compris dans les cercles de recherche réclamés, en vue de faire face aux frais de procédure du tribunal arbitral.

(3.) L'engagement de se soumettre sans appel à la décision du tribunal arbitral.

Le Service des Mines peut faire compléter la requête dans un délai par lui indiqué, et qui ne peut être dépassé à peine d'irrecevabilité de la demande.

Le tribunal arbitral statue souverainement sur les attributions. Il les rejette s'il estime les justifications insuffisantes ou la procédure irrégulière.

En cas de concurrence entre plusieurs demandeurs pour les mêmes terrains, le tribunal arbitral décide de l'ordre de priorité d'après la priorité de la prise de possession.

Le tribunal arbitral peut allouer à un demandeur évincé une indemnité, dont il fixe le montant, et qui sera à la charge de l'attributaire.

Le Service des Mines délivre les permis de recherche en conformité des décisions du tribunal arbitral.

ARTICLE 60 C.

Les personnes ou société qui, sans se trouver dans les cas prévus par l'article 60, 1 et 2, justifieraient avoir de bonne foi effectué des paiements à Sa Majesté chérifienne pour acquérir des droits d'exploitation pourront recevoir du tribunal arbitral, statuant en équité, soit des périmètres de recherche, soit des indemnités à la charge du Maghzen.

Les périmètres de recherche prévus au paragraphe précédent ne peuvent être attribués que sous les conditions suivantes :—

1. Les demandes doivent, à peine de nullité, être introduites en se conformant strictement pour les délais, formes, et conditions aux clauses stipulées pour les demandes dont traite l'article 60 B.

2. Ces attributions ne pourront en aucun cas concurrencer celles à faire aux personnes ou sociétés désignées à l'article 60 B.

ARTICLE 61.

Le tribunal arbitral se composera de cinq personnes d'une compétence notoire en législation ou en mines qui seront désignées par la Cour fédérale de Lausanne.

Le tribunal arbitral règle sa procédure et son mode de fonctionnement.

Il peut provoquer les observations de tous intéressés et demander des renseignements à tous les Gouvernements représentés diplomatiquement à Tanger, réclamer tous concours utiles.

Les légations des pays représentés diplomatiquement à Tanger peuvent présenter au tribunal dans toute instance toutes observations qu'elles jugent utiles.

ARTICLE 61 A.

La Banque d'Etat tient un compte spécial des avances stipulées aux articles 60 A et 60 B. Ces avances serviront à payer tous les frais et honoraires de l'arbitrage sur mandats délivrés par le Service des Mines en conformité des décisions du tribunal.

Si les sommes portées à ce compte sont insuffisantes, le solde des frais et honoraires sera supporté par le Maghzen.

Le solde qui resterait serait réparti entre tous les intéressés au prorata de leurs sommes avancées.

En aucun cas les indemnités mises à la charge du Maghzen par les articles 60 A et 60 B ne peuvent être imputées sur le compte spécial ouvert en vertu de l'article 56 du présent firman.

ARTICLE 62.

Par exception aux dispositions du Titre III, les permis de recherche ne donnent pas droit à l'obtention de permis d'exploitation pour les phosphates et nitrates, ainsi que pour les sels gemmes ou autres sels associés dans les mêmes gisements et les sources et eaux souterraines salées. Ces substances ne pourront être exploitées qu'en vertu d'adjudications publiques, dans les périmètres et pour une durée définie par le cahier des charges de chaque adjudication.

L'adjudication portera sur la redevance à payer à la tonne de produit extrait.

Le cahier des charges peut astreindre l'adjudicataire à construire et à exploiter pendant la durée de son adjudication, des ouvrages de viabilité ou de navigation qui pourront être affectés au service public dans les conditions fixées au dit cahier des charges.

Les redevances provenant de ces adjudications recevront la même affectation que celle prévue à l'article 56 pour les impôts et redevances de mines.

Les explorateurs munis de permis de recherche en périmètre réservé qui auront découvert dans leur périmètre des gîtes de phosphates ou de nitrates nouveaux et démontré leur exploitabilité, auront droit à un cinquième des redevances payées par les adjudicataires, à charge par eux de revendiquer leurs droits d'invention avant l'expiration de leurs droits de recherche.

La reconnaissance du privilège d'invention aura lieu par décision du Service des Mines.

Les explorateurs n'auront droit à aucune indemnité, quelque soit le retard apporté à l'adjudication; ils ne pourront élever aucune réclamation sur la rédaction du cahier des charges. Leurs droits sur les produits de l'adjudication cessera, dans tous les cas, quinze ans après la notification de la décision qui leur aura reconnu la qualité d'inventeur.

Sauf les exceptions stipulées dans le présent article, l'adjudicataire est assimilé pour tous les droits et obligations, et notamment pour le paiement de la redevance fixe par hectare et de la redevance *ad valorem*, à l'exploitant de toute autre mine.

L'adjudication ne fait pas obstacle à la recherche et à l'exploitation, dans les périmètres adjugés, des substances autres que celles dénommées au présent article par toute personne ayant acquis des droits antérieurs à l'adjudication.

Sont interdits, postérieurement à l'adjudication, tous travaux de recherche et d'exploitation, dans les périmètres adjugés, par toute autre personne que l'adjudicataire.

Le Maghzen se réserve le droit d'exploiter les mines de sel en se conformant aux dispositions des Titres II et III du présent firman.

ARTICLE 63.

Une même personne ou une même société ne peut détenir simultanément au Maroc, pour quelque motif que ce soit, des droits d'exploitation sur plus de hectares, à peine d'encourir la déchéance de ses permis en conformité de l'article 35 du présent firman, à moins d'y avoir été autorisé par un firman rendu avec l'assentiment de la majorité du corps diplomatique.

Exception est faite pour les adjudications qui seraient passées en vertu de l'article 62.

ARTICLE 64.

Un firman chérifien peut à toute époque, sous réserve des droits antérieurement acquis, et avec l'assentiment de la majorité du corps diplomatique, attribuer par privilège à toute société, pour une période de trois ans, renouvelable, sur des demandes

successives, pour deux périodes de trois ans, le droit exclusif, en se conformant aux prescriptions du présent firman, de faire des recherches et d'obtenir des permis de recherche et d'exploitation dans une région déterminée par le dit firman, à charge par cette société, outre le paiement des redevances ou impôts stipulés par le présent firman pour ses périmètres de recherche ou ses permis d'exploitation, de s'engager, si elle demande et obtient une ou plusieurs concessions dans le délai de son privilège, à construire et exploiter des ouvrages de viabiiité ou de navigation, utiles à l'exploitation de ses mines, qu'indiquera le dit firman.

En aucun cas le privilège ne peut s'étendre sur plus de 10,000 kilom. carrés. Il ne peut être accordé que si la société demanderesse justifie, par un dépôt à la Banque du Maroc, qu'elle dispose des ressources financières suffisantes pour assurer la mise en valeur du territoire privilégié.

Le firman constituant le privilège peut, d'accord avec la société, stipuler un partage de ses bénéfices avec le Maghzen. Les sommes qui en proviendront, ainsi que celles résultant de l'application des autres taxes prévues au présent firman, seront réparties comme il est dit à l'article 56 entre le Maghzen et la société. Le cahier des charges sera arrêté par une commission arbitrale désignée conformément à l'article 71 ci-après.

A défaut de construire et d'exploiter les dits ouvrages la société encourrait, outre leur déchéance, la déchéance des concessions de mines acquises pendant la durée de son privilège. Cette déchéance serait poursuivie comme il est stipulé à l'article 35.

TITRE VII.—*Pénalités, Frais, Juridictions, Revision du Règlement.*

ARTICLE 65.

Est puni d'une amende de 500 à 1,000 fr., sans préjudice de la restitution en nature ou en valeurs des produits indûment extraits—

(1.) Quiconque exploite des mines sans en avoir le droit;
(2.) Quiconque détruit, déplace, ou modifie d'une façon illicite des signaux ou des bornes de périmètre.

ARTICLE 66.

Est puni d'une amende de 100 à 500 fr. quiconque apporte des entraves à la surveillance des agents du Service des Mines et quiconque n'entretient pas en bon état les signaux ou les bornes de son périmètre.

ARTICLE 67.

Est puni d'une amende de 20 fr. à 200 fr. quiconque contrevient aux règlements de police relatifs à la sécurité des mines, sans préjudice des mesures que le Maghzen pourrait prendre contre les indigènes.

ARTICLE 68.

Les personnes qui ont été condamnées pour l'une des infractions prévues à l'article 65 ci-dessus ne peuvent obtenir de permis exclusifs de recherches pendant un délai de cinq ans, à compter du jour où leur condamnation est devenue définitive.

En vue de l'application de la présente disposition, le chef du Service des Mines reçoit des extraits des jugements portant condamnation pour infractions.

ARTICLE 69.

Les amendes sont prononcées par les tribunaux de droit commun à la demande du Service des Mines.

ARTICLE 70.

Les explorateurs ou exploitants sont soumis, en ce qui concerne les matières non traitées par le présent firman, aux règlements intervenus ou à intervenir dans l'Empire chérifien, sous réserve des droits internationaux et des traités.

Ils sont soumis aux juridictions ordinaires pour le règlement de tous les conflits pouvant surgir entre eux ou avec des tiers; ces conflits sont portés devant les tribunaux ordinaires compétents.

ARTICLE 71.

Les litiges pouvant survenir entre le Gouvernement marocain et les tiers dans l'application du présent firman seront soumis, sans appel ni recours, à une commission arbitrale composée de trois arbitres, désignés l'un par le Maghzen, l'autre par les intéressés, et le troisième, à défaut d'entente entre les deux premiers, par le corps diplomatique de Tanger, statuant à la majorité, après avis du Service des Mines.

ARTICLE 72.

Lorsque, pour l'application du présent firman, il y aura lieu à expertise ou arbitrage, les frais et honoraires dus aux experts et aux arbitres seront fixés, par dérogation aux règles admises pour l'adjudication publique, d'après un tarif établi par une commission composée de deux fonctionnaires du Service des Travaux Publics et de deux membres désignés par le corps diplomatique.

Ces frais et honoraires sont, en cas d'expertise, à la charge du débiteur; en cas d'arbitrage, ils sont impartis aux intéressés dans les conditions fixées par les arbitres. Il peut être demandé aux débiteurs ou aux intéressés le versement à la Banque d'État d'une caution ou d'une avance.

ARTICLE 73.

Toutes les sommes à payer en vertu du présent firman sont calculées en or et sont payables en monnaie ayant cours légal au Maroc.

Inclosure 3 in No. 396.

Memorandum communicated by M. Aguillon.

Note personnelle et confidentielle pour Sir H. Cunynghame.

COMME suite à ma conversation avec Sir Henry Cunynghame, on résume dans la présente note les indications du dossier que MM. Mannesmann frères ont fait remettre au Gouvernement français.

MM. Mannesmann soutiennent qu'un règlement chérifien avait déjà été rendu régulièrement pour les mines au Maroc par le Sultan Mouley Hafid en vertu de l'article 112 de l'Acte d'Algésiras, et qu'en vertu de ce firman il leur aurait été fait attribution régulière de diverses mines dans un rayon de 5 kilom. pour chacune d'elles. Le dossier n'indique pas la situation et le nombre de ces mines. On dit, paraît-il, au Maroc, que ce nombre serait de 300 à 600.

MM. Mannesmann prétendent que ces attributions leur ont été faites en conformité de l'Acte d'Algésiras et, par suite, qu'elles leur sont légalement acquises et doivent être respectées par le nouveau règlement.

A l'appui de leurs prétentions au point de vue juridique MM. Mannesmann produisent les consultations de dix avocats renommés de divers pays, à savoir:—

Pour l'Allemagne: M. Philippe Zorn, professeur à l'Université de Bonn; M. Joseph Koehler, professeur à l'Université de Berlin.
Pour l'Espagne: Son Excellence Sigismond Moret; son Excellence Eduardo Dato.
Pour la France: M. Clunet, avocat à la Cour d'Appel de Paris; M. Lyon-Caen, doyen de la Faculté de Droit de Paris.
Pour la Grande-Bretagne: The Right Honourable Arthur Cohen, K.C.; J. Westlake, K.C.
Pour l'Italie: Son Excellence Guido Fusinato, Conseiller d'État.
Pour les Pays-Bas: M. I. van Bor, professeur de droit à Gœttingue.

A ces consultations sont jointes des copies des Actes chérifiens dont se prévalent MM. Mannesmann.

Les prétentions de MM. Mannesmann, que soutiennent les consultations précitées, peuvent se résumer ainsi:

A la date du 10 Ramadan, 1326 (6 octobre, 1908), Mouley Hafid aurait rendu un firman chérifien portant règlement sur les mines, qui satisferait aux

stipulations de l'article 112 de l'Acte d'Algésiras comme s'inspirant, dans son texte, des législations étrangères, ce qui était la condition nécessaire et suffisante.

Par application de ce firman et, par des Actes individuels intervenus entre le Maghzen et MM. Mannesmann, dont le premier à la même date du 6 octobre, 1908, et les autres en date du 16 décembre, 1908 (12 Kaada, 1326), et 20 mars, 1909 (27 Sefar, 1327), MM. Mannesmann avaient été reconnus attributaires dans une région de 5 kilom., pour chacune, de mines dont le nombre et la situation ne sont du reste pas indiqués, comme on l'a dit. Les deux Actes de décembre 1908 et mars 1909 constatent que MM. Mannesmann auraient versé successivement au Sultan à raison de ces attributions 200,000 fr. et 370,000 fr., soit en tout 570,000 fr. (23,000*l.*).

Au point de vue juridique, la base des prétentions de MM. Mannesmann et de leurs avocats est que le prétendu firman chérifien du 6 octobre, 1908, a été rendu en conformité de l'article 112 de l'Acte d'Algésiras et que par suite il est opérant juridiquement.

A cette prétention on a, d'autre part, opposé les observations suivantes:—

MM. Mannesmann et ses avocats se trompent en droit, parce que l'on n'a pas pris garde aux conditions de temps, et surtout de forme, dans lesquelles cet Acte a été rendu, et que l'on ne s'est occupé que de rechercher si, au fond, dans son texte, il s'était suffisamment inspiré des législations étrangères, comme le veut l'article 112 de l'Acte d'Algésiras.

Sans qu'il soit besoin d'examiner cette question au fond, et sans qu'il soit nécessaire de relever qu'en octobre 1908 Mouley Hafid n'était pas Sultan reconnu, mais simplement Prétendant, il y a lieu de faire observer que ce prétendu firman n'est connu que par la communication que MM. Mannesmann en a faite personnellement à la Légation d'Allemagne à Tanger. Il n'a jamais été régulièrement communiqué aux légations, et, par suite, il doit être de ce chef considéré comme inopérant; il n'a jamais reçu la publicité admise au Maroc pour de tels Actes; et cette publicité est de l'essence de toutes législations étrangères. Le prétendu firman du 6 octobre, 1908, ne satisfait donc pas, en tant que règlement minier à observer par toutes personnes, à l'article 112 de l'Acte d'Algésiras, et ne peut pas être reconnu ayant été à un moment quelconque rendu en conformité de cet Acte. Juridiquement, de ce chef, et à ce titre, il est sans valeur et sans portée; il n'a pu permettre d'acquérir des droits sur les mines.

En tant que Sultan reconnu, Mouley Hafid ne pouvait d'ailleurs rendre un firman chérifien sur les mines qu'en se conformant aux engagements qu'avait pris son prédécesseur, Abd-el-Aziz, au regard du corps diplomatique de Tanger, et c'est le second point non moins important qu'ont omis, pour les ignorer probablement, les avocats consultants; et cet oubli vicie non moins radicalement tous leurs raisonnements.

En effet, par lettre du 13 juillet, 1908, adressée au corps diplomatique de Tanger, Abd-el-Aziz a fait connaître qu'il ne rendrait le firman chérifien sur les mines prévu par l'article 112 de l'Acte d'Algésiras que lorsque cet Acte aurait été préparé par l'ingénieur des Travaux Publics de Tanger; et, dans la séance du 20 août, 1908, le corps diplomatique de Tanger décida à l'unanimité de donner dans ce sens les instructions nécessaires à M. Porché, en même temps qu'il prévenait le Sultan que ce règlement devrait être officieusement communiqué au corps diplomatique en même temps qu'il serait présenté au Sultan.

Ces engagements d'Abd-el-Aziz ont lié juridiquement Mouley Hafid dès son avènement, par la raison que, dans la note qui lui a été signifiée diplomatiquement après entente entre toutes les Puissances (voir Livre jaune français, "Affaires du Maroc, IV (1907–8)"), Mouley Hafid n'a été reconnu Sultan du Maroc qu'à la condition de respecter toutes les décisions du Gouvernement précédent, et, par suite, notamment l'engagement pris par celui-ci pour les conditions dans lesquelles pourrait être rendu le firman chérifien sur les mines pour être rendu légalement.

Par ce second motif également le prétendu firman du 6 octobre, 1908, doit être réputé comme n'existant pas juridiquement en tant que règlement minier de l'article 112 de l'Acte d'Algésiras.

Telles sont les deux thèses de droit en face desquelles on se trouve.

Si l'on estimait que les prétentions de MM. Mannesmann ne sont pas fondées en droit, et doivent être à ce titre écartées, il leur resterait, comme à toute autre personne, à se prévaloir de la situation de fait qu'ils ont pu acquérir au Maroc sur les mines, par des faits de possession effective, par des travaux, et par des achats, voire même par leurs versements au Sultan, pour que tous ces titres, ceux de MM. Mannesmann comme ceux de leurs concurrents éventuels, soient liquidés en équité d'après les principes et les règles que doit fixer à cet égard le règlement minier en préparation.

[42853] No. 397.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Grant Duff.

(No. 142.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 25, 1909.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 260 of the 20th instant, enclosing a translation of a note from the Spanish Government in explanation of the action of the Spanish Consul at Tetuan in facilitating the escape of the captors of Mr. Clark Kennedy.

The explanation offered seems to me totally inconclusive and inadequate, but no good would result from pursuing the matter further, and I propose therefore to let it drop.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[43325] No. 398.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 287. Confidential.)

Sir, *Tangier, November* 18, 1909.

THE German Minister enquired of me to-day as to the custom of this legation in regard to the grant of protection in various circumstances. Amongst other questions, he asked whether we granted protection to Moorish officials, saying that he had refused to do so, but had been told that the British and French legations granted such protections, and that therefore there was no reason why he should not adopt the same course.

I replied that so far as this legation was concerned he had certainly been misinformed, as we never granted protection to Moors in the Government service, the sole exception having been in the case of Cid-el-Menebhi, who had been given protection at the Sultan's request.

Dr. Rosen observed that I would be surprised if I heard the names of those who had sought German protection. I said probably some of them were amongst those who had applied to us, as during the last few years we had received a number of such applications, which we had invariably declined to entertain.

Dr. Rosen then informed me that for some time past the most persistent applicant for German protection had been Mulai Hafid himself; there was a thick *dossier* on the subject in the legation archives. His Government had been rather inclined to grant the protection, but he had opposed it, pointing out that if the protection were granted they must be prepared to face the serious situation that might arise therefrom, involving even the risk of war. He went on to observe that the French were in a different position in regard to the protection of prominent Moorish officials; they could give them efficient protection without making them actual French protégés. They possess so many means of marking their displeasure and exercising pressure on the Sultan and Makhzen that they can enforce due regard being paid to any representations they may make on behalf of any person. With the Germans and others it is different; they have no means of enforcing compliance with unofficial representations, and in order to render effective any assurances of immunity they may desire to give to Moorish officials it is necessary to give them formal protection, which would inevitably be contested by the Makhzen as contrary to the Madrid Convention, and might give rise to troublesome questions.

The language of Dr. Rosen is interesting in view of the rumours lately current

that German protection was being of late freely bestowed upon influential Moorish subjects, including prominent officials.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

[43327] No. 399.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 289.)

Sir, *Tangier, November* 20, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to report that the Italian Minister, M. Nerazzini, has made a representation to the Moorish Government similar to that recently made by the German chargé d'affaires, as reported in my despatch No. 276 of the 30th October. He called upon Cid Guebbas and informed him that his Government desired that the amounts owing to Italian subjects be paid without further delay, and urged the acceptance of a loan for that purpose.

The Italian claims, I understand, amount, roughly speaking, to about 34,000*l.*, and consists principally of arrears of salary owing to officers and non-commissioned officers employed in the arms factory, and balance due on machinery, &c., for the factory.

I am informed privately by a Moorish official that it is expected that the loan negotiations in Paris will be concluded within the next few days so far as the question of principle is concerned, and that Cid Mokri will at once return. There will remain merely the details of the contract to be settled, and this will be done at Tangier. He stated that the security to be given consists of 30 per cent. of the customs dues, the tobacco monopoly, and the Government share of the tax on Government buildings at some of the ports.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

[43328] No. 400.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 290.)

Sir, *Tangier, November* 20, 1909.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 273 of the 23rd October, I have the honour to report that orders have been sent to Kaïd R'miki to proceed at once to Fez. Some doubt is felt as to the significance of this summons; two other governors, who were similarly sent for, were cast into prison on their arrival, but it is believed that Kaïd R'miki will not share their fate. Complaints have reached the court in regard to his conduct on assuming the government, and it is probable that the Sultan has realised that he must put some check on such proceedings. It is thought, however, that Kaïd R'miki will escape with a warning and will receive explicit instructions as to his future treatment of foreigners and their employés.

I have, as yet, received no confirmation of the report that had reached me from various sources in regard to the arrest of Mr. Vice-Consul Forde's semsar, the consular agent at Alcazar not having yet sent a report as requested at the time. I have instructed him to inform me whether any semsars or agents of British subjects have been molested in addition to the agent of Cid-el-Menebhi, and I shall not fail to communicate to you the information I may obtain.

I made a representation to Cid Guebbas in regard to the seizure of the property of Cid-el-Menebhi, and Kaïd-el-R'miki has given assurances that all the property taken from him will be restored.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

[43329] No. 401.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 291.)

Sir, *Tangier, November 20, 1909.*

ZAKKY BEY, an Egyptian in the service of the Makhzen and in confidential relations with Cid Guebbas, Cid-el-Mokri, and other leading officials, assures me that the objectionable members on the Commission for Foreign Affairs, whose appointment was reported in my despatch No. 259 of the 9th October, will shortly be removed and will be replaced by Cid Benis and Cid-el-Oukili, who are much better fitted for the post. The latter was Minister for Foreign Affairs at the time of the fall of Mulai Abdelaziz, and the former was one of the Moorish secretaries who attended the Algeciras conference and was one of the delegates for the discussion of the various regulations framed under the Algeciras Act.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

[43610] No. 402.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 29.)

(No. 292.)

Sir, *Tangier, November 22, 1909.*

IN his despatch No. 46 of the 7th March Mr. Lister reported the appointment of a commission to sit at Tangier to examine direct claims against the ex-Sultan and his Government, for which Mulai Hafid had accepted liability, and later on, as reported in Mr. Lister's despatch No. 105 of the 11th May, the scope of the enquiry to be made by the commission was extended so as to include all claims of whatever kind against the Moorish Government. No term was fixed within which claims should be presented, and as there seemed no prospect of an immediate payment of the claims that might be passed there has been no great alacrity shown by merchants to submit their claims for examination by the commission.

Cid Guebbas has now addressed a letter to the doyen, for communication to the diplomatic body, giving notice that all claims against the Makhzen must be presented before the end of the year, together with documentary evidence in support thereof, and that all claims not presented within the term fixed will be estopped.

I beg leave to transmit herewith translation of Cid Guebbas's letter.

The doyen's circular covering this letter was sent first to the Spanish Minister and the French chargé d'affaires, who each merely annotated it with the word "Vu." It appeared to me that to take cognisance of the letter without making any observation would be tantamount to accepting the principle that persons who for any cause failed to present their claims before the end of the year would lose all the rights they might have in respect thereto, and that the matter deserved close consideration before coming to a decision, for the Makhzen might hereafter refuse to entertain any claim that may have arisen before the present date. Moreover, the term appears to me too short for a country like Morocco, where communications are slow, so that it may be difficult for persons living at a distance to put in their claims in time. I therefore in my annotation said that I could not accept Cid Guebbas's notice without instructions, and that in any case the term seemed to me too short. I observed that I could understand that claims not presented within the term should not be met out of the loan if made before they were presented, but not that they should be estopped altogether.

In the meantime I have addressed a circular despatch to the consular officers, communicating to them the substance of Cid Guebbas's letter, and requesting them to bring it to the notice of British subjects residing in their district.

I am not aware that any persons residing in England have claims against the Moorish Government, but it would, nevertheless, perhaps be as well to insert a paragraph in the "Board of Trade Journal."

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

Inclosure in No. 402.

Cid Guebbas to Doyen of Diplomatic Corps.

(Après les compliments d'usage.) 4 *Kaada*, 1327 (16 *novembre*, 1909).

J'AI l'honneur d'informer votre Excellence que la commission chargée de l'examen des créances invoquées à l'encontre de l'ancien Maghzen, ainsi que du soin d'enquêter sur les réclamations y afférant et se rapportant à des vols, &c., se voit dans l'obligation de limiter le laps de temps permettant d'arrêter définitivement la recevabilité des demandes relatives à ces créances et les réclamations que les intéressés n'ont pas encore présentées, de telle sorte que, passé ce laps de temps, quiconque présenterait une demande de ce genre serait considéré forclos.

C'est pourquoi cette nécessité dans laquelle se trouve la commission étant justifiée et conforme aux règles de l'équité, elle a fixé un délai à courir de ce jour à la fin de décembre prochain, délai pendant lequel elle recevra les dites demandes et tous documents à l'appui qui lui seront présentés par les ressortissants étrangers, soit directement, soit par l'entremise de chaque légation. La commission a également décidé de délivrer à chaque demandeur un certificat de présentation de sa demande dans le délai susfixé.

En conséquence, j'espère que votre Excellence voudra bien informer l'honorable corps diplomatique, dont vous faites partie, de cette décision, en attirant l'attention de chacun de ses membres sur son bien-fondé, et en les priant de prescrire aux intéressés parmi leurs ressortissants de présenter à cette commission les demandes qu'ils pourraient encore avoir à faire valoir dans le courant de ce délai; faute de quoi les demandes qui seraient présentées après son expiration seraient considérées comme nulles et non avenues.

MOHAMMED BEN MOHAMMED-EL-GUEBBAS.

[44742] No. 403.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Carnegie.

(No. 489.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, November 29, 1909.*

M. CAMBON told me to-day that M. Pichon was anxious, now that the claims upon the Government of Morocco had been formulated before a commission, that the claims there agreed to should close the account, so that when a loan was being arranged the claims which had to be paid would be definitely ascertained, and the door would be shut against the bringing forward of further claims. M. Cambon asked me my opinion with regard to this.

I said that it seemed to me quite right that a time should be fixed, as in the case of bankruptcy, after which no further claims were to be admitted.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[43069] No. 404.

Memorandum by Mr. Crowe respecting the proposed Moorish Mining Law.

THE revised text of the draft law submitted by Sir H. Cunynghame in his report of the 22nd November, 1909, is a very much more satisfactory document than the original scheme, and I think Sir Henry Cunynghame deserves great credit for the way in which he has secured recognition for the views which he was instructed to urge in opposition to some of the leading ideas of the first draft.

2. Our principal objection was to those provisions under which—or the lack of provisions failing which—a huge monopoly of mining rights and railway construction could have been built up in Morocco. We suggested, to meet this difficulty, (*a*) power to be reserved to the Sultan to prevent amalgamations of claims by sale or transfer; and (*b*) a limitation of the area of mining claims.

3. The first of these alternatives was strongly objected to, for the reasons explained in section 6 of the present report, for which, it must be admitted, there are some substantial grounds. Sir Henry Cunynghame was, however, more successful in

regard to the limitation of area. He secured the limitation of single claims 1,000 hectares (2,500 acres), and, further, the recognition of the principle that there should be a limit of the total areas to be held by one person or company, except with the approval of the Sultan and of the diplomatic body at Tangier. There was no agreement as to the exact figure. Sir H. Cunynghame suggested 30,000 hectares and, failing to obtain acceptance, tried for a "firm offer" of 50,000 hectares (square, with sides of 11 miles). He has since told me privately that he thought we could well accept 50,000 or even 60,000, and I see no reason to disagree.

4. Supposing a reasonable figure is conceded, I think His Majesty's Government may accept the provisions of article 63 as a fair solution of the question of a mining monopoly. As regards the danger of a railway monopoly Sir H. Cunynghame has obtained the further guarantee of a special clause, subjecting any concessions for the use of mining railways as a public service (for goods and passengers) to the provisions of the Algeciras Act respecting adjudication of public works by open tender.

5. The proposal for a Shereefian salt monopoly has been withdrawn in consequence of our objection.

6. Our objections have also been met as regards the proposed export duties, which would have been contrary to our treaty of 1856. No provision is, however, made to meet the case which, as we suggested, might in future arise, if the produce of the mines (iron especially) were worked locally. It was argued (see section 19) that the case was not likely to arise, as there was no coal or wood available in Morocco for such purpose. I am a little astonished at this, because I remember Sir E. Satow, who has a considerable knowledge of geology, expressing the opinion that Northern Morocco, especially the Riff district, would very likely be found to contain a good deal of coal. However, the point is perhaps not of sufficient importance for us to show ourselves obstinate about.

7. The same may be said concerning our suggestion that there ought to be provisions for rescision of concessions in case of non-working. The other Powers all objected to this as, in their experience, unnecessary, and Sir H. Cunynghame agrees that we need not insist.

8. The taxes fixed are moderate. The tax of 3 per cent. on the value of the yield of the mines is, if anything, too low, and Sir Henry Cunynghame is prepared (so he tells me) to recommend a higher rate, say 3½ per cent., should the Sultan insist on this. Gold is to pay 10 per cent., and precious stones (of which, however, there is little chance of any being found) are reserved to the Sultan.

9. In order to deal with rights acquired previously to the Algeciras Act, a tribunal of five arbitrators is to be set up, the arbitrators to be nominated by the Federal Court at Lausanne, which shall, before any prospecting claims are granted under the new law, award concessions to (1) those who had formerly obtained grants for prospecting; and (2) those who, without having secured definite rights, had *bonâ fide* embarked in prospecting and incurred expenditure for the purpose of mining. I pointed out to Sir H. Cunynghame that the constitution of this important tribunal had been left very vague, and that apparently the Lausanne Federal Court was to receive no guidance or indication as to what kind of person was to be appointed, and of what qualifications. Nor was it laid down where the tribunal was to sit, although I presumed it would be at Tangier. And who was to fix their salaries, which, under article 61 A, are to be a charge on the amounts payable by claimants on coming before the tribunal?

10. Sir H. Cunynghame agreed that it would be well to settle something more definite as regards these points. On my asking what kind of person he would consider as a suitable member of the court, and whether, for instance, a man like Mr. Thorne, our claims commissioner at Casa Blanca, would be the right kind of man, he said that that would probably be an excellent choice. I then suggested that it might be best that when the Sultan, in due course (or the Powers), enquire at Lausanne whether the Federal Court would be willing to undertake the duty which it was proposed to entrust to it, a list of suitable candidates might be presented, from which the court would pick five. Sir H. Cunynghame agreed that it would be desirable to arrange for something like this.

11. The draft law comprises provisions which, although stated in general terms, are clearly designed to meet a very particular case. Under article 64, special rights may be given for a limited number of years over a very extended area (10,000 square kilom.), on special conditions. This is to cover the demand of the international syndicate for such a grant in the Sûs country. The matter is fully explained in sections 10–14 of Sir H. Cunynghame's present report. The main objection to the Sultan's

having power to make such extensive grants is, again, the danger of a monopoly; and as this is guarded against, as in the case of large ordinary grants, by stipulating for the approval by the diplomatic body at Tangier (by a majority vote) of any such concession, we have no sufficient reason to withhold our assent. The sketch map attached to the report indicates the size and approximate situation of the syndicate's claim.

12. It appears from Sir H. Cunynghame's report that just as article 64 of the draft law has been so worded as specially to meet a particular claim of the International Syndicate, so the Germans have endeavoured to secure provisions under cover of which the famous Mannesmann concessions would be legalised. The two cases are not, however, strictly analogous. The International Syndicate wishes to have the Sultan invested with power to grant them a concession which they hope to persuade him to give. The Mannesmann group wants to establish that a concession which they have already, by irregular methods obtained, is, in fact, valid.

13. There can be little doubt that the concession is not valid, and I entirely agree with the arguments in this sense set out in the draft protocol, under No. 5 (p. 7), and, more fully, in M. d'Aguillon's note which forms Inclosure 3 to the report (p. 21). It seems impossible to ascribe the character of a firman fulfilling the conditions laid down in article 112 of the Algeciras Act to a secret document which Mulai Hafid apparently gave to the Mannesmanns at a time when he was not the recognised Sultan, and which nobody except Mannesmanns and the German Government have ever seen. In face of the specific agreement or understanding between Sultan Abdul Aziz and the diplomatic body at Tangier that the firman in question would not be issued except in consultation with them and on proposals to be worked out by M. Porché, the State engineer, even a published firman issued by Mulai Hafid subsequently to his recognition could not have been acknowledged by the Powers as in accordance with the agreement.

14. The French commissioner, M. d'Aguillon, takes the view that the Mining Law cannot cover any claims subsequent to the date of the Act of Algeciras, except they conform to the provisions of the law, because the Act expressly laid down (article 112) that mining claims should be regulated by such law, and therefore anyone desirous of securing concessions after the signature of the Act knew that valid grants could not be made until the law was issued. The draft law accordingly is to provide for two classes of claims: (1) those made in accordance with the law, and (2) those dating from before the Act of Algeciras. The wording, however, employed in article 60 of the draft law refers to the latter class of cases as dating not before the Act of Algeciras, but before "the present law" (firman). Now this, taken literally, would undoubtedly cover the Mannesmann concession, and in order to prevent such a construction of the provision M. d'Aguillon, supported by the Spanish commissioner, proposed to give in the protocol (to be signed by the four commissioners) a restrictive interpretation to those words, so as to make it quite clear that only concessions of older date than the Algeciras Act were contemplated (see No. 5 of the protocol, p. 7).

15. According to a private letter from M. d'Aguillon to Sir Henry Cunynghame of the 27th November (written since the commission separated), which will be found annexed hereto (in copy), he states that the German Government object to the terms of the protocol. He says that he must either maintain his reservation in the protocol or have the text of article 60 of the draft law altered, and he asks for the support of his British colleague. I think this support should be given. It seems now fairly clear that the German Government, when they, through their legation at Tangier, frequently informed us that they did not support Mannesmann, were not dealing straightforwardly, which we have suspected all along owing to the prevaricating behaviour of the German Minister at Tangier and the German vice-consul at Fez. They are evidently not content with their 25 per cent. interest in the International Syndicate, but want to secure the apparently very extensive Mannesmann concessions as well. I think we should hold them to their previous declarations, and otherwise support the French contention.

16. There is, however, one point on which the French position seems not altogether clear. In the concluding paragraph of his note of the 27th November M. d'Aguillon suggests that, whilst Mannesmann's claims ought to be rejected as invalid, it would remain open to them to seek an equitable settlement of their claim, having regard to the expenditure they may have incurred, &c., "in accordance with the principles and rules to be laid down to this effect in the draft law." Such rules seem to be contained in article 60 C. I pointed out to Sir H. Cunynghame that

practically Mannesmanns would appear to get all they want under this article, and that it seems rather difficult to reconcile this with the declared opposition of the French to the Mannesmann claims. Sir H. Cunynghame agreed, and told me it was his impression that article 60 c was drafted by the Germans or for the purpose of meeting the German view, but that M. d'Aguillon had declared he would not accept it. Sir Henry could not explain how the article had nevertheless got into the text; but the text as now printed is taken from the copy communicated by M. d'Aguillon himself. At my suggestion Sir Henry Cunynghame has written to M. d'Aguillon in order to clear up this point.

17. Another matter has formed the subject of correspondence between M. d'Aguillon and Sir H. Cunynghame (see the former's private letter of the 22nd November, also annexed hereto). It refers to the question of the limitation in size of grants that may be held by one owner without the special concurrence of the diplomatic body. The question has been explained in section 2 of the present memorandum. M. d'Aguillon now proposes that ordinary grants should be limited to 30,000 hectares, but the special grants under article 64 to 60,000 hectares. Sir H. Cunynghame, as I have already stated, sees no real objection to the accumulation up to even the higher of these figures. But he thinks no useful purpose would be served by having two standards of size. He has accordingly written to M. d'Aguillon that he objects to the differentiation, but will advise His Majesty's Government that 50,000 hectares may be accepted for either case. Should the French make a fresh proposal to the effect that the limit should in all cases be 60,000 hectares, we could agree.

E. A. C.

Foreign Office, December 2, 1909.

Annex 1.

M. d'Aguillon to Sir H. Cunynghame.

Cher Sir Henry, 71, *Faubourg Saint Honoré, le* 27 *novembre*, 1909.

MON Gouvernement a été informé de Berlin que M. Haber allait incessamment revenir ici en vue de causer sur le protocole et les dispositions du règlement relatives à la liquidation du passé et au tribunal arbitral. D'après ce qui nous revient de Berlin, le Gouvernement allemand ne voudrait pas accepter ce que M. Haber avait cependant paru accepter en ce qui le concernait. Le Gouvernement allemand accepterait très volontiers le règlement sur toutes ces questions, mais il ne voudrait pas voir figurer au protocole les réserves que nous avons demandées, MM. de Cas Villares et moi, d'y insérer à cet égard, et qui forment l'alinéa 1. Vous savez qu'il y avait eu là, entre M. Haber et moi, une véritable transaction. Si l'on ne veut pas de mes réserves au protocole, je suis obligé de demander que, dans le règlement, en parlant des "droits antérieurs au présent firman" on ajoute "antérieurs à l'Acte d'Algésiras." En présence des Actes officiels que nous avons dans toutes nos chancelleries, qui sont intervenus après l'Acte d'Algésiras, je ne puis pas admettre qu'il n'en soit pas tenu compte, soit dans le règlement, soit—ce qui paraissait plus pratique—dans le protocole. Je veux bien, si on le désire, et si on me donne une rédaction qui paraisse meilleure, modifier les termes de la déclaration que j'ai faite à l'alinéa 4 du protocole, mais je ne pourrais admettre comme je vous le disais, sa suppression qu'avec une modification appropriée du texte du règlement.

Je ne désespère pas que nous puissions arranger cet incident. J'ai tenu à vous en prévenir pour vous montrer l'utilité que nous aurions à nous réunir à nouveau le plus tôt possible; et en vous marquant ce désir j'y ajoute le vœu que vous puissiez être en mesure de me donner votre appui dans cette délicate et importante question. Elle doit vous préoccuper sur un point que vous avez traité avec une insistance qui m'a touché: celui de prendre des mesures pour éviter les accaparements. Si on n'y veille pas, les Mannesmann, "qui n'ont pas de droit légal," comme vous dites—c'est établi—les Mannesmann pourraient réaliser un accaparement formidable.

Votre, &c.
D'AGUILLON.

Annex 2.

M. d'Aguillon to Sir H. Cunynghame.

Cher Sir Henry, 71, *Faubourg Saint Honoré, le* 22 *novembre*, 1909.

LE seul article que nous n'ayons pas pu complètement rédiger est, vous le savez, l'article 63 sur la limitation des droits d'exploitation, parce que vous nous avez demandé de laisser "*x*" pour le chiffre d'hectares que vous désiriez de nous indiquer à votre retour de Londres.

Vous savez que je suis d'accord avec vous sur le principe de cette limitation, pourvu qu'elle soit assez large. J'acceptais et j'accepte encore le chiffre de 30,000 hectares pour les cas ordinaires. Vous avez bien voulu me dire que vous ne seriez pas éloigné d'accepter éventuellement un relèvement du chiffre pour avoir l'adhésion de M. Haber, qui, comme moi du reste, est assez disposé à favoriser les sociétés à privilège de l'article 64, sauf à en limiter les avantages comme nous l'avons du reste stipulé dans cet article 64.

Vous savez aussi qu'à votre demande nous avons supprimé de l'article 63 l'exception qui, par suite d'une confusion sur ce que vous aviez dit, avait été insérée à la fin du dit article 63 pour les sociétés à privilège.

Finalement, l'article 63 que vous avez emporté est rédigé comme suit:—

"Une même personne ou une même société ne peut détenir simultanément au Maroc, pour quelque motif que ce soit, des droits d'exploitation sur plus de "*x*" hectares, à peine d'encourir la déchéance de ses permis, en conformité de l'article 35 du présent firman, à moins d'y avoir été autorisée par un firman avec l'assentiment de la majorité du corps diplomatique.

Exception est faite pour les adjudications qui seraient passées en vertu de l'article 62."

Pour tenir compte de toutes les observations, je me permets de venir vous suggérer une modification qui pourrait être introduite dans cet article 63. Nous y fixerions deux maxima, l'un, "*x*," pour les cas ordinaires, et l'autre, "*y*," pour les sociétés à privilège, "*y*" étant plus grand que "*x*."

A cet effet, à la rédaction précédente, nous pourrions ajouter un troisième paragraphe ainsi conçu:—

"Exception est également faite pour les sociétés de l'article 64 qui pourront réunir, pendant la durée de leur privilège, et conserver (?) ensuite "*y*" hectares de permis d'exploitation sans avoir besoin de l'autorisation prévue à l'alinéa 1 du présent article."

Je serais disposé, pour ma part, à accepter 30,000 hectares pour "*x*" et 60,000 hectares pour "*y*."

Votre, &c.
D'AGUILLON.

[44186] No. 405.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received December* 4.)

(No. 294.)

Sir, *Tangier, November* 25, 1909.

SINCE receipt of your despatch No. 163 of the 18th instant regarding the tax levied on foreign goods at Fez I have seen the French, Spanish, German, and some of the other representatives, and they all concurred in the view therein expressed and agreed to join in a protest to the Makhzen in the terms suggested. I have accordingly addressed a letter on the subject to the doyen of the diplomatic body, and beg leave to transmit a copy of it herewith.

Last night I received a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Fez forwarding a letter from Cid Aissa-ben-Omar in reply to my note, translation of which was enclosed in my despatch No. 274 of the 27th ultimo. I have the honour to transmit herewith translation of this letter, which is satisfactory as far as the point raised in my above-mentioned note is concerned. The terms, however, of the Sultan's orders to the tax collector at Fez clearly indicate that the tax is to be levied on goods of British origin in the hands of Moorish subjects. I have thought it best to take up this point at once and not to allow it to stand over until the joint protest of the diplomatic body can be

dispatched; a separate letter from this legation and the joint protest will serve to strengthen each other, and will have more effect than either of them standing alone. I beg leave to transmit herewith translation of the further note I have accordingly addressed to Cid Aissa-ben-Omar acknowledging and thanking his Excellency for his reply—which, judged by the Moorish standard, is exceptionally prompt and satisfactory—and informing him that His Majesty's Government absolutely refuse to allow the imposition of any dues on British goods over and above the rates sanctioned by treaty, even when the goods have passed out of British hands.

I have, &c.

HERBERT E. WHITE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 405.

Mr. White to Count Martens Ferrão.

M. le Doyen, *Tanger, le 25 novembre*, 1909.

LE consul de Sa Majesté britannique à Fez m'ayant fait savoir que, par ordre du Sultan, on avait imposé une taxe sur les marchandises expédiées de cette ville aux tribus Berbères, et qu'on percevait cette taxe même sur les marchandises appartenant à des protégés étrangers, j'ai adressé une note à Cid Aissa-ben-Omar pour protester contre cette imposition illégale.

Je viens de recevoir la réponse de Cid Aissa, me faisant savoir que le Sultan a donné des ordres pour que la dite taxe ne soit plus perçue sur des marchandises de provenance étrangère quand il est constaté qu'elles appartiennent à des étrangers ou à des protégés, et non pas à des indigènes.

On ne peut pas regarder cette réponse comme satisfaisante, car il y est indiqué que la dite taxe sera perçue sur les marchandises de provenance étrangère appartenant à des indigènes ne jouissant pas de la protection; or, il ressort des traités que les marchandises de provenance étrangère ne sont soumises à d'autres taxes ou impositions que celles prévues par les traités.

Mon Gouvernement, à qui j'ai soumis cette question, m'a donné pour instruction de la soumettre à l'appréciation du corps diplomatique afin qu'une protestation soit adressée au Maghzen pour lui déclarer en termes précis que nous refusons absolument de permettre que des taxes soient perçues sur des protégés étrangers, ou que des droits soient imposés à des marchandises de provenance étrangère en sus de ceux autorisés par les traités, même quand les marchandises appartiennent à des sujets marocains.

HERBERT E. WHITE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 405.

Cid Aissa-ben-Omar to Mr. White.

(Translation.)

(After compliments.) 25 *Shual*, 1327 (*November* 9, 1909).

WE have received your letter acquainting us that your consul at Fez had written to you stating that the merchant Joseph-el-Haddad, who represents the English semsar Isaac Cohen of Tangier, had been compelled to pay 5 billions (1¼ pesetas) on each of twenty sacks of sugar and a like amount on each of nine boxes of candles which he had sent to Sefroo to be sold on account of the said Isaac Cohen, and that when your consul imformed the Amin that the tax was not leviable on foreign goods imported by British subjects or protected persons, and requested him to return the amount collected from El Haddad—being 7¼ dollars—he refused to do so, saying that he was under no obligation to refrain from levying the said tax, although he is not permitted by the treaties to do so.

When we acquainted Our Lord (comps) of what you had written, he issued a Shereefian order to the said Amin to return the above-mentioned sum which he had collected from the said Joseph-el-Haddad, and not to claim from him in future any tax upon such European goods sent out by him as shall be proved to belong to him and not to any Moorish subject—also instructing him not to claim the tax from any other British subjects or protected persons, in accordance with the treaties.

May you remain, &c.

AISSA-BEN-OMAR.

Inclosure 3 in No. 405.

Mr. White to Cid Aissa-ben-Omar.

(After compliments) *Tangier, November* 25, 1909 (11 *Kaada*, 1327).

I HAVE received your Excellency's letter of the 25th Shual (9th November), informing me that you had submitted to the Sultan my letter protesting against the levy of a tax on goods of foreign origin dispatched from Fez by the agent of the British-protected person Mr. Isaac Cohen, and that His Majesty had ordered the Amin to restore the amount collected and to refrain in future from claiming the tax upon such foreign goods sent out by the said agent as shall be proved to belong to him and not to any Moorish subject, and not to claim the tax from any other British subject or protected person.

Whilst thanking your Excellency for your prompt attention to the matter, and for the orders issued to the Amin to restore the amount improperly levied, as above stated, I must point out to your Excellency that it is not only goods of foreign origin belonging to British subjects that are exempted from the tax—they are equally exempted even if they should belong to Moorish subjects. It is clear from the wording of the treaties that no tax or impost whatever can be levied upon any goods of British origin other than the dues sanctioned by treaty, and the goods continue to be exempted even though they may have been purchased by Moorish subjects.

I am instructed by His Majesty's Government to point out this clearly, and to state that they refuse to allow either the taxation of persons under British protection or the imposition of dues on goods of British origin over and above the rates sanctioned by treaty, even though they have passed out of the hands of British subjects.

HERBERT E. WHITE.

[44187] No. 406.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 4.)

(No. 295.)

Sir, *Tangier, November* 26, 1909.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 157 of the 6th instant, I have the honour to report that I have now received a despatch from the British consular agent at Alcazar informing me that the British-protected person who had been arrested by Kaïd R'miki's brother was a semsar of Mrs. Imossi, widow of the late British vice-consul at Laraiche, and not a semsar of Mr. Vice-Consul Forde, as reported here. Mr. Carleton states that he himself was absent from Alcazar at the time, having been ill and gone to Laraiche to consult a doctor. He returned to his post shortly after, and demanded the release of the semsar. Kaïd R'miki's brother, who was acting governor pending the kaïd's arrival, at first refused to release the prisoner, alleging that he had been in the Government service as a sheikh and had appropriated public funds—a very common pretext for arresting protected persons. He finally gave way, however, before Mr. Carleton's insistence and set the semsar at liberty.

Mr. Carleton states that after Kaïd R'miki's arrival at Alcazar no British semsars or mokhalats were interfered with.

I have, &c.

HERBERT E. WHITE.

[44189] No. 407.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 4.)

(No. 297.)

Sir, *Tangier, November* 28, 1909.

ON the morning after my arrival I called on the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs.

After an interchange of compliments I asked Cid Guebbas how matters stood in the Riff. He told me in strict confidence that he had that morning received a letter which caused him considerable anxiety. He gathered from it that the Spaniards were negotiating direct with the Guelaya tribes and ignoring the delegates sent by the Sultan. The latter had of course come to know of the negotiations, but they had been kept studiously in the dark by General Marina. Guebbas said he had reason to

believe that the Spaniards were pressing the Guelaya and also the Kebdana tribes to throw off all allegiance to the Sultan and place themselves under the protection of Spain, or, as he expressed it, enter the Spanish sphere of influence. He had also heard from Madrid that the question of the Ceuta road had been reopened by the Spanish Government, and that their attitude generally had become very much stiffer towards the Moorish mission. They were making all sorts of claims, and he felt convinced that their intention was to heap up as large a debt as possible which Morocco would never be able to pay, and then insist on a cession of territory. The Moorish delegates had received instructions to yield on various small matters in the hopes of conciliating the Spanish Government, but he was far from sanguine as to the results of the negotiations.

He then asked me what I thought of the attitude and intentions of the French, and said that he had been somewhat alarmed by various expressions in M. Pichon's speech. I said that in my opinion the French Government were convinced of the necessity for the Makhzen of obtaining a loan; that they had done all in their power to make the conditions as light as possible, and that, if M. Pichon had spoken somewhat sharply, it must be remembered that the negotiations had been dragging on for more than six months, and that the patience of the French Government was not eternal. Cid Guebbas said that this was his view, but that unfortunately there were persons in the entourage of the Sultan who told him that the French Government were merely bluffing, that they would not dare to take the independent action threatened in M. Pichon's speech if His Majesty refused the loan, that they had been obliged by international considerations to make the conditions as light as possible, and that there was no real agreement amongst the Powers. I said it was unfortunate that the Sultan should be so misled, as there was no doubt that all the Powers were absolutely agreed as to the necessity for the loan.

The French chargé d'affaires told me on the day of my arrival that he looked on the loan as a certainty, though it might still be delayed for some time. A *sommation* had, he said, been sent to the Sultan on the 8th instant, asking him to state definitely whether or no he accepted the terms previously offered, as, in the opinion of the French Government, the discussions had lasted long enough. No definite answer had as yet been received, though a telegram had been sent to Mokri instructing him by no means to break off negotiations. M. Saint-Aulaire said that no doubt the French message came as a relief to the Sultan, who was expecting blows, not words!

Yesterday letters reached me from Fez to the effect that the Sultan was making fresh difficulties, but the latest news, received to-day by Menebhi from Fez, is that His Majesty has agreed to the French terms.

I am told that the Sultan is in a most difficult frame of mind, that Glawi, with whom he was hand in glove for a time, is once more out of favour, and that Aissa-ben-Omar has not seen him for seventeen days.

My impression is that the French here are inclined to think that the Sultan is hurrying on to his destruction, and that the moment is not far distant when the country will insist on his being got rid of. I cannot help thinking that they underrate his position and power. It is, I am told, many years since the tribes—at all events, those in the neighbourhood of Fez – have been so well in hand, and the troops and populace stand in real awe of him. He may be hated, but he is certainly feared, and experience has shown that in Morocco it is not oppression and extortions which occasion revolts, but leniency and kindness. He has succeeded in dividing up his viziers, who were formidable as long as they remained united; he is far abler than any one of them, and at present I do not see the man in Morocco who has the head or the nerve to carry through a successful rising against him.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

[44403] No. 408.

Consul MacLeod to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 6.)

(No. 10.)

Sir, *Fez, November 22, 1909.*

ALL accounts from Taza district during the past three weeks make it clear that the reports of Mulai Kebir having arrived there having begun an agitation against the Sultan are entirely unfounded. The viziers profess entire ignorance of his movements, and the general reports about him are conflicting to a degree most unusual even for

Moorish news, some locating him in Bijad, *i.e.*, between Zemmur and Southern Morocco, and others affirming that he is between Beni Warain and Tafilelt. There are now persistent reports of the arrival of letters amongst the Taza tribes from Sid Abdelmalek Mahideen exhorting these tribes not to submit to Mulai Hafid, and offering to lead them in making such resistance and restoring Mulai Abdul Aziz. This Abdelmalek Mahideen is a grandson of the famous opponent of the French in Algeria, Hadj Abdelkader Mahideen, and the commander of Mulai Abdul Aziz's Mehalla at Alcazar some sixteen months ago. His betrayal and arrest by his subordinates then and the ill-treatment he received subsequently from Mulai Hafid will be remembered. Mahideen is said to be at Ayun Sidi Meluk, some 20 miles west of Oujdah, with Sid Taib—son of the famous Bu Hamara—and, of course, the popular reports affirm he is acting under instigation of the French.

2. The bulk of the troops lately operating against Bu Hamara have been brought to Fez to be refitted before proceeding to Hiayna—whither, so far, only about 1,500 men have proceeded. Altogether the Sultan has now some 14,000 troops collected at Fez, and meantime the principal leaders of Western and Central Hiayna are here trying, but so far unsuccessfully, to come to terms with the Sultan. This neighbourhood being perfectly quiet the presence of so many troops is most distasteful to the public, particularly because of the increase it causes in the prices of necessaries of life, and the damage done by soldiers to olive groves, orchards, and the like.

3. All the reports received here recently direct from Melilla district confirm the press news of a general cessation of fighting, and of the Riffs beginning to show some desire to come to an understanding of some sort on the basis of a mutual holding of that district pending a final settlement being negotiated between the Sultan and the Spanish Government.

4. It is of course highly important for the Riffs to gain enough time just now to plough their lands and sow their grain—so it would be well not to attribute unlimited sincerity to such dispositions as these until some proofs of their genuineness are forthcoming.

5. So far as I can make out the Sultan has not of late, to any material extent, modified his anti-foreign attitude of late, and, naturally, these reports of Mahideen's alleged agitation at Taza, and rumours of constant additions arriving to the French troops in Shawia, do not tend to mollify him, while at the same time they are not alarming enough things to terrify him.

6. Complaints of foreign protégés of ill-treatment by kaïd — obviously at the Sultan's instigation—still are very frequent, and in scarcely any instance—by any consul—has redress been procurable of late. So long as the offending kaïds or tax-collectors pay well for their appointments, and send in the contributions which His Majesty asks, and (unlike his predecessor) appears mostly to get, the Sultan lets complaints against them go either unheeded, or checked only by the payment to himself (not to the injured party) of some further exaction.

7. As regards the loan, the French consul tells me that a few days ago he informed the Sultan, by instructions from Paris, that the French Government could not enter into fresh discussions of the principles they had laid down, though of course they would be willing to modify minute details.

Abdullah Al Fassi had come back to Fez to explain these to the Sultan, who, however, had not accepted them, and now put forward others. The Sultan must understand the latter could not be entertained, and if His Majesty did not wish to assent to the French Government's proposals, he should withdraw the Moorish mission from Paris at once. The Sultan then appeared to desire to open discussions with the French consul, but M. Caillard answered he could discuss nothing, as he had been instructed simply to deliver the above message.

8. The Sultan's position, all round, is stronger, I think, than is generally understood. However much the administration of the army leaves to be desired, the fact remains that he has a far stronger grip upon both officers and men than either his predecessor or the Grand Vizier, Regent Bu Hamad. The same is the case as regards the tribes hereabouts at any rate. Not only do the ordinary "Makhzen" tribes remain law-abiding and pay their contributions, but the Berber districts accessible to Fez, Beni M'Tir and Ait Yusi, have given levies of infantry soldiers for his army, as well as contributions in money and kind—their giving of soldiers being unprecedented in modern times.

9. As regards finance, no person has as yet been able to procure absolutely reliable information in detail of the revenue and expenditure either of the present Sultan or his predecessors; that is to say, of the finance at the seat of Government.

Some approximate conclusions may, however, be formed. At present 60 per cent. of the customs revenue is appropriated for the charges of the loan of 1904, and the remaining 40 per cent. appears likely to be appropriated, to a great extent at least, either for the charges of the loan now in negotiation, or, supposing the negotiations to fail, will be embargoed to meet the unpaid and long overdue claims of foreigners. The question then is whether the Sultan can carry on the Government in the interior without revenue from the ports?

10. His unavoidable expenses are estimated as, at the most, some 120,000 dollars per month. The local taxes of the interior towns (Fez, 12,000 dollars; Marakesh, 5,000 dollars; Mequinez, 3,000 dollars; Alcazar, 2,000 dollars; and Sefroo, 500 dollars) bring in some 36,500 dollars a-month, thus leaving some 83,500 dollars to be found elsewhere. Assuming, however, that the sums to be found amount to even 100,000 dollars, this would not seem to me to be beyond the Sultan's power to raise.

11. Towards it he gets the sums for sales of appointments of all sorts, the contributions exacted from tribes, and the rents of Makhzen properties in the interior, sums paid for the liberation of prisoners, presents ("tribute") at the three annual religious festivals, and the sums (always paid in gold) presented to him by functionaries, other than those of his immediate staff, whenever they have audiences of him. These latter are looked on as his personal perquisites, and should amount to 300*l.* or 400*l.* a-month. His own staff and their subordinates receive similar gifts on occasions of persons being given audiences or new appointments. As regards subordinate officials this is the only remuneration, and the chief functionaries are either also big kaïds, who live on the provinces they govern, or are, as a rule, men of large independent means.

12. Such estimates as these are often called optimistic, and it is answered that as they depend upon a system of squeezing, they cannot fail to produce such discontent as will infallibly upset the administration.

13. If carried to very gross excess this would probably be the case, but history and experience go to show that in Morocco revolution has never followed upon ordinary squeezing—which has for centuries been a normal condition of existence to the population as a whole, but that seditions and rebellions ensue very soon whenever (as latterly in the last reign, for instance) squeezing ceases, and the tribes become well-off, quarrelsome with each other, and defiant of the Makhzen.

14. It will not, of course, be inferred that I have the faintest sympathy with such a detestable system, or expect any permanent good from it. My only object is to call attention to its existence, and to show the general Moorish point of view.

15. It accounts, I think, to a most important extent, for the (to European minds) unreasonable attitude of the Sultan, and attention to it will, perhaps, prevent surprise should events develop rather differently to what Europeans in general seem inclined to expect. The point is that (to his mind) the only serious problem left is the settlement of European claims, and that can, at the worst, he supposes, be effected by parting with the remainder (40 per cent.) of the customs duties, though, of course, he is trying to preserve some portion of them for himself.

16. Without it the squeezing process cannot but be followed vigorously, and tend to raise continual complaints from the foreign protégés who are so apt to be included in it, and, once the port revenues are either seized or wholly appropriated for the new loan, there do not appear to be any means left of putting pressure on the Sultan except by further foreign occupation of Moorish territory.

17. Such occupations, unfortunately, may quite likely enable him to pose as a sort of champion of Islam against encroaching Christians, and thus facilitate collection of interior revenues and strengthen his position.

I have, &c.
J. M. MACLEOD.

[44539] No. 409.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received December* 7.)

(No. 266.)
(Extract.)

Madrid, December 3, 1909.

I HAD my first interview yesterday, on my return to Madrid, with Señor Pérez Caballero, the new Minister for Foreign Affairs. I was glad to be able to convey to him the friendly expressions contained in your despatch to Mr. Grant Duff No. 138

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of the 6th ultimo. His Excellency received them with evident pleasure, and said he attached great importance to maintaining that close understanding with England on which all Spanish statesmen desired that the foreign policy of the country should mainly repose. He hoped he might appeal, if occasion arose, to the good-will of His Majesty's Government in soothing over difficulties with the French in Morocco. Fortunately Spanish relations with the French Government were just now on the most satisfactory footing. Seldom had a French Minister spoken more encouraging words of friendship towards Spain than those which had fallen from M. Pichon's lips during the recent discussion in the Chamber of Deputies on the policy of France in Morocco. The French Foreign Minister's insistence on the necessity of perfect agreement between the two Governments in their action in Morocco, his sympathetic allusions to the achievements of the Spanish arms in the Riff, the whole tone of his speech of the 23rd November, had given great satisfaction to this Government. It was, nevertheless, inevitable that friction should occasionally arise in Morocco, and especially in Tangier, where France lost no opportunity of increasing her influence, to the detriment, whether intentionally or not, of the influence of Spain. Señor Pérez Caballero instanced the efforts which I understood him to say that the French were making to secure the quotation of prices for public works in Morocco in francs rather than in the Spanish currency, which mainly circulates at Tangier, and to designate the streets of the town in French. These matters had, it was true, only a sentimental importance, but the large Spanish population of the Morocco coast would be intensely annoyed if their feelings on such points were ignored. A friendly word from the British Minister at Tangier might easily turn the balance in favour of some compromise which should take account of those feelings without offending the French. He had had the advantage recently of a conversation with Mr. Reginald Lister, and thought he might conclude from it that Mr. Lister would continue to bear in mind the Spanish as well as the French aspect of such questions as they arose.

I said I did not doubt that his confidence was well placed, and that something might often be done in the direction indicated, provided the Spanish Minister at Morocco acted cordially in concert with his French and English colleagues. His Excellency seemed to understand that my remark implied a doubt as to the wholeheartedness of Señor Merry del Val's co-operation with M. Regnault on some occasions in the past. He said that the Spanish Minister had probably been too much on his guard during the first year of his mission; that he had been feeling his way carefully, fearing to commit himself to a course that might not be approved; but that he was now well in the saddle; no doubt could remain as to his frank acceptance of the understanding with France; he could be relied upon to carry out faithfully the policy founded upon it, to which the Spanish Government was fully committed.

[44186] No. 410.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Lister.

(No. 169.)

Foreign Office, December 8, 1909.

Sir,

I HAVE received Mr. White's despatch No. 294 of the 25th ultimo relative to the action of the Moorish Government in levying taxes on goods of British origin, and I approve the terms of the notes which he addressed to the doyen of the diplomatic body and to Sid Aissa-ben-Omar on the subject.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[43610] No. 411.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Carnegie.

(No. 490.)

Foreign Office, December 8, 1909.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 489 of the 29th ultimo, recording a conversation with the French Ambassador relative to the fixing of a date, after which no claim against the Moorish Government would be admitted by the commission now sitting at Tangier (see Mr. Lister's despatch No. 46 of the 10th March last), I transmit

to you herewith a copy of a despatch from Mr. White,* reporting the receipt of a note from Guebbas to the effect that all claims not presented before the end of the year will be stopped.

Although His Majesty's Government agree to the principle of a time-limit, they cannot acknowledge the right of the Moorish Government to fix the date without consultation with the Powers, and in the present instance they consider the date, *i.e.*, the 31st December, to be too early. They propose accordingly to instruct His Majesty's Minister at Tangier to communicate with his colleagues, with a view to the return of a collective reply in the sense of the above to the Moorish note. Before doing so, however, they would be glad to learn whether the French Government agree with their view, and what date that Government would consider suitable as a time-limit; and I request that you will approach the French Government with a view to ascertaining these particulars.

The circumstances seem to require an early decision.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[43069] No. 412.

Memorandum respecting Moorish Mining Law.—(Communicated to M. Cambon, December 10.)

HIS Majesty's Government are glad to recognise that the draft law, as revised by the four commissioners at Paris, goes some considerable way to meet the difficulties which had prevented them from assenting unreservedly to the original text.

2. The principal preoccupation of His Majesty's Government, when considering the terms of the proposed law, was that it should not be possible thereunder to create a practical mining and railway monopoly in Morocco. They would have preferred that the obligation on the Sultan not to permit such a monopoly should be explicitly laid down, and they regret that it has apparently been impossible to agree upon a satisfactory formula to this effect.

3. His Majesty's Government are, however, willing to waive this point, and to remain content with the provisions by which a maximum limit is to be fixed for the total areas which any one owner or group of owners is to be allowed to obtain without the special approval of the Sultan and of the diplomatic body at Tangier. The exact figure of that limit has remained open. His Majesty's Government, whilst preferring a limit of 30,000 hectares, will raise no objection to its being raised to 50,000, a figure which it is understood would probably prove acceptable also to the German and Spanish Governments.

4. His Majesty's Government are inclined to regret that it has been thought necessary to introduce a set of special conditions which, although stated in general terms, are clearly designed to meet the wishes and objects of particular interested parties. His Majesty's Government cannot but feel that provisions of law inspired by such considerations may give rise to legitimate criticism on the part of interests not so specially favoured. As, however, it appears that the French Government attach particular importance to this part of the draft law, and as, at their earnest request, His Majesty's Government have promised to lend their support to the International Syndicate which is to benefit by the privileges contemplated, they will not insist on their objection if the provisions as to the maximum limit of areas are made to apply in this case also.

5. M. d'Aguillon has, since the adjournment of the commission, suggested to Sir Henry Cunynghame, that whilst the limit of areas in the case of ordinary grants under the new law should be 30,000 hectares, the limit of the specially privileged concessions should be 60,000 hectares. It seems hardly desirable to introduce this further element of inequality between the two different classes of grants, and His Majesty's Government, therefore, hope that one figure may be adopted for both. A limit of 50,000 in either case would appear a reasonable compromise.

6. His Majesty's Government are happy to associate themselves entirely with the view as to the rights claimed by the Mannesmann Syndicate, expressed by M. d'Aguillon in the draft protocol and also in the private note which he addressed to

* No. 402.

Sir. H. Cunynghame on the subject. They have, however, some difficulty in reconciling that view with the provisions of article 60 c of the draft law, under which it would appear that Messrs. Mannesmann could practically obtain everything they have asked for. His Majesty's Government have judged it expedient to call attention to this point, but they are content to leave themselves, in regard to the matter, in the hands of the French Government, and will be prepared to support the latter's attitude.

7. There are a few minor points on which His Majesty's Government consider that the draft law is open to improvement. In offering, from this point of view, the following suggestions, they do not wish to insist unduly on their adoption, should the French Government entertain serious objections to any further modification of the articles.

8. The proposed taxes of 3 and 2 per cent. on the produce of the mines seem somewhat low, and it is not improbable that the Sultan may claim a more generous contribution. His Majesty's Government consider that it would be a matter for regret if an impression were to be created that the introduction of European capital and industries, however desirable in the interests of Morocco, were encouraged by the Powers on conditions which did not take into sufficient account the needs of the Shereefian revenue.

9. The arrangements proposed for collecting the tax solely on exportation would result in the exemption from its operation of all minerals that may hereafter be worked and consumed in the country itself. When Sir H. Cunynghame brought this consideration to the notice of the commission, it was declared that the contingency was not expected to arise because neither coal nor wood were available on the spot in sufficient quantities to make the local working up of minerals profitable. It would, however, be difficult to assert that coal-fields may not yet be discovered in Morocco, and it would in any case be prudent to provide for such an eventuality. It might, perhaps, be stipulated that, in the event of the produce of Moorish mines being worked and consumed in the country without being first exported, the Sultan reserves the right to collect the 3 per cent. tax on such produce otherwise than through the customs authorities.

10. It is to be feared that some difficulty may arise over the appointment by the Federal Court at Lausanne of the five members of the arbitration tribunal to be set up under article 60, unless that court is given some information and guidance as to the qualifications desired in the candidates. There is at present no indication as to whether the tribunal is to sit at Tangier or elsewhere, or whether it is to consist of jurists, or engineers, or merchants, or diplomatists, whether the members should be Europeans—perhaps Swiss—or Moors, officials or independent civilians, and what should be their rate of remuneration. Would it not be feasible, when the Sultan or the treaty Powers—this is another unsettled point—approach the Lausanne Court, to submit a statement of conditions or qualifications, or even a list of possible candidates from which a selection would have to be made? Failing such a procedure, there is a risk of the court finding itself so embarrassed as to the proper choice, that it may decline to discharge the function which it is desired to entrust to it.

11. His Majesty's Government do not desire at this stage to offer any more detailed suggestions on this point, but they feel that it merits further consideration.

E. A. C.

Foreign Office, December 10, 1909.

[43069] No. 413.

Foreign Office to Sir H. Cunynghame.

Foreign Office, December 10, 1909.

Sir,

YOUR report on the result of your mission to Paris as a member of the international commission appointed to consider the terms of a mining law for Morocco has been read with attention and interest, and I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to inform you that he highly appreciates the able manner in which you succeeded in gaining acceptance for the views of His Majesty's Government respecting the important questions of principle which you were instructed to urge, on their behalf, upon the commission.

2. The modifications which have now been introduced into the text of the proposed law mark, in their eyes, a very decided improvement, and, inasmuch as this appears to

be largely due to your efforts and skill, Sir Edward Grey desires me to express to you his thanks and approval.

3. Urgent requests have already been received from the French Government, through their Ambassador at this Court, that His Majesty's Government should, without delay, signify their assent to the mining law as agreed upon, and a memorandum has, in reply, been addressed to his Excellency, of which a copy is sent herewith for your information.*

4. You will observe that His Majesty's Government have intimated their readiness to approve the law as it stands, subject to a proper definition of the maximum area of mining grants to be held by any one owner. Suggestions have at the same time been offered on a number of points of minor importance. Concurrence has also been expressed in the view taken by the French Government of the claims of Messrs. Mannesmann.

5. It remains to be seen what attitude will on this point be adopted by the German Government. Should they consent to alter the wording of article 60 in accordance with the French reservation consigned to the draft protocol, and should an agreement be arrived at by correspondence as to the maximum limit of grants and other matters, the object for which the commission was appointed may be considered to have been fulfilled, without its being necessary to reassemble it for the purpose of signing a protocol.

6. Should, however, a fresh meeting of the commission be found to be desirable, Sir E. Grey trusts that you will be ready to return to Paris for the purpose, in which case further instructions will be addressed to you.

I am, &c.
W. LANGLEY.

[44987] No. 414.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received December* 11.)

(No. 299.)

Sir, *Tangier, December* 4, 1909.

WITH reference to my conversation with you on the subject of Menebhi's claim for the delivery of the properties restored to him by dahir of the ex-Sultan Mulai Abdul Aziz, I find that shortly before my return to Tangier Mr. White sent a verbal message to El Glawi through His Majesty's consul at Fez enquiring whether, in accordance with the promise given me before my departure from Fez, he had succeeded in inducing the Sultan to make the properties over to Menebhi. Mr. White reminded El Glawi of the statement I had made in my private letter of the 15th August (copy of which is enclosed) that, if on my return I found that the case had not been satisfactorily settled, I should be obliged to approach the Makhzen officially on the subject. He added that I should be back in a few days, and that he trusted that the matter might be settled before my return. At Glawi's request this message was delivered by Mr. MacLeod in writing, and the enclosed memorandum has been received by Mr. White in reply. As you will observe, it is most unsatisfactory, and it is evident that Glawi either would not or could not do anything on his friend's behalf. I have addressed another private letter to Glawi (copy of which is likewise enclosed) expressing to him my surprise and disappointment at his answer, and informing him that I am addressing a note on the subject to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Before doing so, however, I talked the whole matter over with the French chargé d'affaires, and have obtained from him a promise of the full support of the French Legation. I have the honour to enclose herewith a copy of my note to Cid Aissa-ben-Omar. I have purposely avoided expatiating on the great services rendered by Menebhi, &c. I did that at Fez, and I have now merely insisted on the justice of his claim and his absolute right to the properties. I shall hand a copy of my note to Cid Guebbas, and make him realise how serious the matter is. I shall also send a copy to Mr. MacLeod and request him to place himself in communication with his French colleague, who will by that time have received instructions from Count Saint-Aulaire to support my representations.

I consider it advisable that we should now take a strong line in the matter. It should not be forgotten that in 1904, when Menebhi was still in Egypt, on his return journey from Mecca, he caused enquiry to be made of Sir Arthur Nicolson through

* No. 412.

Lord Cromer (Sir A. Nicolson to Lord Lansdowne, No. 76, of the 24th May, 1904) whether, in the event of his returning to Morocco, he could rely on his personal safety and his property being safeguarded, and it was only on receiving an assurance that he could be at ease on both points that he returned. Almost immediately after his return his property was confiscated, he was himself at one moment in imminent danger of arrest, and the support given to him by His Majesty's Legation was most meagre. The chief reason for this was no doubt the nervousness of M. de Saint-René Taillandier, who opposed any strong action, but I fear that there is little doubt that our position in the eyes of the Moors suffered in consequence. This reason no longer applies: the French are quite ready to back us up, for they realise that Menebhi is important to them in the present and may become very much more so in the future should there be a restoration. I therefore think that the moment is a good one for us to insist on justice being done to our very distinguished protégé, and thus raise once more our prestige in Morocco.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 414.

Mr. Lister to El Glawi.

(After compliments.) *Tangier, August* 15, 1909.

I AM leaving Tangier to-morrow and shall not return till the autumn. The last letter that I write before leaving is to your Excellency, to urge you once more to fulfil the promise which you gave me before I left Fez that the case of Menebhi should be settled. He is, I know, your friend and relation. He is also my friend, but, above all, you must remember that he enjoys the protection of the King of England. I shall speak to His Majesty when I have the honour of seeing him in England, and also to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and if, on my return, I find that the case has not been settled satisfactorily, I shall be obliged to approach the Makhzen once more most seriously on the matter, as His Majesty's Government cannot allow a person enjoying their protection to continue to be the victim of such flagrant injustice.

I write this for your private information, that you may know how matters stand, and act accordingly as you think best.

I send greetings to yourself, Si Mohammed, and also to the little Gillali.

REGINALD LISTER.

Inclosure 2 in No. 414.

Memorandum by El Glawi.

(Translation.)

RE the memorandum handed in on the subject of the request for the conceding to Cid-el-Mehdi-el-Menebhi of the restoration of his properties to him, in conformity with the promise made by the Shereefian Government to that effect.

On reading this memorandum it is seen that it contains an urgent request for this to be done before the return of the Bashador to Tangier, as he will not wish to find that he has not yet retaken possession of them.

When the Bashador spoke on this matter he spoke as a kindness and as requesting a favour, and the promise of the Makhzen was given to him in the same manner, *i.e.*, as a favour.

But if the request is put forward in any other manner, then it is the contrary of a favour, which is the manner in which the request was made and the promise given, especially as the properties were taken over in the time of the late Makhzen and form part of the totality of Makhzen properties, they being entered in its register, and cannot consequently be considered as belonging to any other than the Makhzen for the past five years.

However, the Makhzen still observes the promises made by it in this matter, having due regard to the interests of the Makhzen—by the power of Allah—especially as the matter is one of agreements.

Inclosure 3 in No. 414.

Mr. Lister to El Glawi.

Tangier, December 4, 1909.

(After compliments.)

ON my return to Tangier last week I was informed by Mr. White that he had sent a verbal message to you, through His Majesty's consul at Fez, reminding you of the promises you had given me at the time of my departure from Fez, to the effect that you would do all in your power to induce the Sultan to deliver to Hadj-el-Mehdi El Menebhi the properties restored to him by the dahir of Mulai Abdul Aziz whilst still Sultan, and calling once more attention to the statement made in my private letter to you of the 15th August that, if on my return I found that the case had not been satisfactorily settled, I should be obliged to approach the Makhzen officially and very seriously on the subject. Mr. White added that I should be back in a few days, and that he trusted that the matter might be settled before my return. In accordance with your request, this message was delivered to you in writing by Mr. MacLeod.

Mr. White has now shown me the memorandum which you sent to him in reply to his message. I cannot conceal from you that the contents of this document have filled me with surprise and disappointment! I had left the matter in your hands, as I knew that you were not only a relation, but also a great personal friend of El Menebhi's, and I had hoped that on account of your high position at the court and your great influence with the Sultan you might be able to obtain justice for Menebhi without my being obliged to take further official action, which must necessarily exercise an unfavourable effect upon the relations between our two Governments.

I regret to find, on perusal of your memorandum, that this has not been possible, and I am therefore, in accordance with the instructions of His Majesty's Government, addressing a note to the Minister for Foreign Affairs pressing for the prompt restoration of the properties as a matter of justice, for there can be no question of favour in the case. The properties, which had been illegally confiscated by Abdul Aziz, were restored by him whilst still Sultan, and their continued detention is unjustifiable.

REGINALD LISTER.

Inclosure 4 in No. 414.

Mr. Lister to Cid Aissa-ben-Omar.

Tangier, December 3, 1909.

(After compliments.)

AS your Excellency is no doubt aware, when I was at Fez in the spring of this year I laid before the Sultan the case of Hadj-el-Mehdi-el-Menebhi and pressed upon His Majesty the necessity of repairing the injustice under which he had been suffering for so long. Before I left the capital His Majesty promised me that he would settle the matter when he went to Rabat, which at that time he expected to do in the course of the next few months, and added that I should be satisfied with the settlement. Circumstances have, however, altered the Sultan's plans. His Majesty is still at Fez, and the case of El Menebhi remains unsettled.

I have now received the instructions of my Government to call your Excellency's most serious attention once more to the case, and once more to press for a settlement.

In order to avoid any misunderstanding, I would briefly recapitulate the facts of the case, which speak for themselves.

In the year 1902, at the special request of the Sultan Mulai Abdul Aziz, British protection was granted to Hadj-el-Mehdi-el-Menebhi. In November 1903 he resigned his post as Minister for War and made the pilgrimage to Mecca. Shortly after his return all his properties, with the exception of those in Tangier, were confiscated. Strong representations were made to the Makhzen by His Majesty's Legation, and, after a considerable amount of discussion, Menebhi agreed to an arrangement according to which he was to retain all his properties at Tangier, all the private effects in his houses at Fez and Marrakesh were to be restored to him, he was to receive a sum of 10,000*l.*, and in return he was to leave the country. Effect was never given to this arrangement, owing to the failure on the part of the Moorish Government to carry out the clause stipulating the restoration to Menebhi of all the effects in his homes in Fez and Marrakesh. Moreover, the whole arrangement lapsed when on the 8th Jumad II, 1325, Mulai Abdul Aziz sealed and delivered to Menebhi a dahir restoring to him his confiscated properties. It is for the execution of this dahir that I am now instructed by my Government to press. The right of Menebhi to the properties is, in their

opinion, incontestable; by the dahir above referred to they had already legally been restored to him, and their continued detention is quite unjustifiable.

REGINALD LISTER.

[45106]

No. 415.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received December* 12.)

(No. 123.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tangier, December 12, 1909.

MOORISH mission.

Yesterday evening Mr. Irwin was sent for by Guebbas, who told him that the Sultan had sent him instructions to do all in his power towards securing the reception of the Moorish mission by His Majesty's Government. Mokri's hand, he said, would be greatly strengthened thereby. Guebbas added that it seemed to him, reading between the lines of the Sultan's instructions, that the latter desired, as a last expedient, to make an appeal to England to save him from the state of things which the acceptance of the conditions laid down by the French for the loan would inevitably bring about.

I have been informed by the correspondent of the "Times" that he knows for a certainty that last week Mannesmann went to the German Minister at the request of the Sultan, and begged him to obtain the support of his Government in opposing the proposed French loan. He informs me that the German Minister said, in reply, that a complete accord existed between the German and French Governments in connection with the loan, and that the only advice he could give Hafid was to accept it.

I have been requested by Guebbas to name a date on which he could see me with reference to the subject. It is my intention to reply in terms similar to those used by Dr. Rosen, drawing attention to the benefits which would accrue to Morocco by working harmoniously with France, and pointing out at the same time that, even did we not see matters in the same light as the French, His Majesty's Government would not feel inclined to intervene in favour of His Shereefian Majesty on account of his attitude generally, and towards us in particular.

In reply to his enquiry about the mission, I intend to recall to Guebbas's mind Mr. White's confidential communication, and at the same time to inform him that its reception would be impossible in any case before the expiration of some months owing to the general election.

It appears to me that it would be well not to definitely deprive the Makhzen of all hope of the mission's being received later on, subject to His Majesty's good conduct. British claims would thus stand more chance of settlement.

I await your instructions on the matter, but propose to acquaint the French chargé d'affaires of Guebbas's *démarche* and of my reply.

[45370]

No. 416.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received December* 14.)

(No. 300.)

Sir,

Tangier, December 8, 1909.

AS Mr. White reported in his despatch No. 282 of the 7th ultimo, the Sultan is sending a mehallah against the Hyaina.

His Majesty's consul at Fez says in a private letter that he imagines that Sergeant Balding will be required to accompany them. He had heard that the French instructors had declined to go on the ground that their advice was not taken, and that the troops committed excesses of all sorts, which excited the horror and repugnance of all civilised nations.

I asked the French chargé d'affaires about this report this morning, and he told me that instructions had been sent from Paris to the effect that the instructors were only to accompany the expedition on certain conditions:—

1. That the troops had to some extent been trained by them.
2. That all pillage was forbidden.
3. That prisoners of war were to be respected.
4. That all prisoners brought in to Fez were to be treated with humanity.

M. de Sainte-Aulaire was convinced that the Sultan would never accept these conditions, and it was practically a way of preventing the French officers from going. Should they be present at any engagement which was followed by the customary atrocities of Moorish warfare, France, he said, would have "une très mauvaise presse."

Under these circumstances I am rather in doubt as to what course should be followed with Sergeant Balding. It would be regrettable that he should accompany an expedition on which atrocities were committed, and from which the French military instructors had held aloof; at the same time his position is different from theirs, and should he refuse to go, the Sultan might dismiss him from his service, and it might be difficult for us to insist upon his services being retained. The French, of course, would never allow the Sultan to dismiss one of the men whom they had appointed.

Rumour had it that, on the difficulties made by the French Military Mission, the Sultan at once sent for the Turkish officers who had come up to Fez, engaged them to accompany the expedition, and gave orders that they should be furnished with the necessary equipment.

Should you think it advisable to stop Sergeant Balding from going, I would request that you would instruct me by telegraph, as I fancy the mehallah must be on the eve of departure.

I have, &c.,
REGINALD LISTER.

[45106] No. 417.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Lister.

(No. 58.)
(Telegraphic.) P *Foreign Office, December* 14, 1909.

MOORISH mission to London. Your telegram No. 123.

I approve reply which you propose to give to Guebbas. There can be no question, however, of the mission being received here even later on.

[45482] No. 418.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received December* 15.)

(No. 301.)
Sir, *Tangier, December* 9, 1909.

WITH reference to Mr. White's despatch No. 283 of the 7th ultimo and to my No. 300 of the 8th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch I have received from His Majesty's consul at Fez, reporting that Sergeant Balding has now been paid the greater portion of his salary and allowances hitherto in arrears.

Mr. MacLeod informs me that two Algerian instructors are accompanying the mehalla to Hiayna, as well as Sergeant Balding and Mr. Redman, who was originally engaged as interpreter to Kaïd Belton.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

Inclosure in No. 418.

Consul MacLeod to Mr. Lister.

(No. 98.)
Sir, *Fez, December* 2, 1909.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 88 of the 1st November, I have the honour to state that Sergeant Balding informs me he has now been paid his salary and rent allowance in full up to the end of Shual 1327 (equal to about the 14th November, 1909), and his horse allowance up till 10th Ramadan (equal to about the 24th September, 1909), with the exception of 20 dollars. This latter sum was not paid owing to a clerical error by Sergeant Balding's scribe in the receipt given for the balance due, but the hajib states it will be paid shortly.

With regard to the horse allowance, which, I understand, is payable in money or in kind, the hajib stated that the former rate of money allowance for horse food was

being reconsidered. Sergeant Balding answered that he was agreeable to let that matter stand over meantime until the Makhzen's decision was arrived at about it.

Sergeant Balding and Mr. Redman (who also has been paid his salary up till the end of Shual) have been ordered to accompany the mehalla which started to-day towards Hiayna, but will be in the near vicinity of Fez for two or three days yet.

Of the French military mission only two Algerian instructors accompany this mehalla.

I have, &c.
J. M. MACLEOD.

[45587] No. 419.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received December* 15.)

(No. 124.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, December* 15, 1909.

CLAIMS Commission.

M. de Sainte-Aulaire has asked me whether I thought that the last day of January would suit His Majesty's Government as the time limit for the presentation of claims, as if so, he proposed to suggest that day. I said that I thought so, but that it should be clearly explained to the Makhzen that the non-presentation of claims before that date would not render them invalid, but merely delay their settlement.

[45610] No. 420.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received December* 16.)

(No. 269.)
Sir, *Madrid, December* 11, 1909.

SINCE the embarkation of the reserve troops began at Melilla a few days ago, it has been generally assumed at Madrid that the Riff war is ended. It is said that some 20,000 troops will continue to occupy the conquered positions, but the hope prevails that no further active military operations will be required.

Señor Perez Caballero, Minister for Foreign Affairs, has thought the moment opportune for making a statement to a group of newspaper reporters at the Ministry of State, the report of which occupies several columns in yesterday's papers. The Foreign Minister informs me that though his address is not quite correctly rendered on some points, his views are stated fairly enough.

From the enclosed summary by Mr. Grant Duff you will see that his Excellency regards the Riff country as being now completely dominated by the Spanish forces. Throughout the war diplomatic relations have been kept up with the Sultan through the Moorish mission at Madrid. It had been explained to the Sultan that, as a result of the Spanish campaign, he was now placed in a position to send his kaids to govern regions in the Riff which had never before recognised the authority of Fez. It is intended that these Raids shall be assisted by Spanish officers, who will instruct and organise the native "goums" and see that they are regularly paid.

The question of an indemnity to Spain for the cost of the war will be allowed to stand over for the present. Spain must henceforth display a greater interest in Morocco than she has yet done. The loss of her colonies has strengthened her position in the world.

If Morocco breaks up, Spain, more than any other country, is entitled by her geographical position to step in and assert her historic rights. The Morocco coast is indeed the natural prolongation of Spain, in the same sense as Granada and Cordova in the days before the fall of the Moorish power in the Peninsula.

The chief interest of this pronouncement appears to me to lie in the evidence it affords of a continuity of the Morocco policy of Spain. Though Señor Maura was bitterly attacked in the Madrid press for allowing himself to be drawn into the Melilla campaign, and the utility of that enterprise was constantly denied by the body of opinion whose device is "not a man nor a peseta for Morocco," the new Government, if their policy is correctly interpreted by Señor Perez Caballero, would seem to have abated nothing from the pretentions put forward by the ex-Prime Minister, who asserted in the open Cortes that from the Muluya to the Atlantic Spain

would tolerate the intervention of no foreign Power. These pretensions are, of course, founded on the principle of spheres of influence, French, and Spanish, as defined in the secret agreement of October 1904.

I have, &c.
MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

Inclosure in No. 420.

Summary of Señor Perez Caballero's Interview with the Representatives of the Press.

SEÑOR PEREZ CABALLERO informed the representatives of the press that it was not yet opportune to publish the details of the negotiations still in progress between the Spanish Government and the envoys of the Sultan of Morocco now in Madrid. He could, however, say that he had, when handing to the Sultan's envoy his last note, laid stress on the advantages accruing to His Majesty through the occupation of the Riff by the Spanish troops. The Riff territory was now completely dominated. This was a result which no Sultan had yet been able to attain. The submission of the Kabyl tribes was equivalent to the introduction into those regions of a new order of things, and would prevent intertribal conflicts and claims. Our action, he said, has resulted in the emissaries of Mulai Hafid being received by the tribes and in the Sultan's letters recommending the cessation of hostilities against Spain being read in the Moorish villages.

It was well known, he continued, that the negotiations carried on by the Spanish Government in Morocco consisted of two parts. One of these was initiated when Señor Merry del Val was in Fez. His mission was not successful for reasons known to everyone. But the French and British missions to Fez were equally barren in result. All that was accomplished by these missions was the presentation to the Sultan of their letters of credence. Señor Merry del Val also discussed questions relating to the neighbourhood of Ceuta, to the Spanish rights over Santa Cruz de Mar Pequeña and the indemnities due to Spain. As was well known, the Sultan sent no mission to England, because that nation took no notice (*se desentio*) politically of the Morocco question. His Majesty sent missions to Paris and Madrid to set on foot the negotiations broken off at Fez. Both at Paris and in Madrid these negotiations continued in progress, slowly, no doubt, in the latter capital, because not only the questions initiated at Fez were being discussed, but also those resulting from the Riff campaign.

The former were under consideration when hostilities broke out, and the Moorish envoys then enquired what were the motives of Spain in going to war, and whether she wished to interfere with the integrity of the Shereefian Empire.

Both the Conservative and Liberal Governments here replied that their action was merely to supply the deficiencies of the Sultan in carrying out the treaties relating to the Riff territory. The Spanish Government had availed themselves of the presence of the Moorish envoys in Madrid to settle certain concrete questions. "You must not," he said, expect that these negotiations will be completed in two or three conferences. Time is required."

The editor of the "Imparcial" here inquired whether any definite agreement had been arrived at. The Minister of Foreign Affairs replied that, speaking in general terms the two Governments had agreed on certain points. For example, a Spanish officer would be told off to accompany each of the kaïds destined by the Sultan to govern the various Riff provinces. This officer would be required to recruit and instruct the native forces appointed to keep order in that region. The native levies in question would be paid through the intervention of Spain, which would not only serve as a guarantee for the Riffians, but would have a favourable moral effect. Señor Perez Caballero stated that he was now engaged in drawing up the contract for these officers. He could not refer to the other details of the negotiations as they were not yet completed. He went on to say that the present position of Spain in Morocco was stronger than it had ever been. Stronger even than in 1859, when their action had been rendered ineffective by foreign pressure. As the result of the present campaign Spain had occupied 400 to 500 square kilom. of North Africa without any international interference. The Sultan had protested in a note to the Powers, which had unanimously replied that the question at issue was a frontier one to be decided between Spain and His Majesty.

The Spanish Government had succeeded in convincing the Sultan that their

intentions were good and tended to preserve the integrity of his Empire. Spanish action at Melilla had assisted the Sherifian Government by restoring order in a region in revolt against authority.

The indemnity demanded by Spain for her exertions would be dealt with later. At present she would not press the Sultan, as His Majesty was not in a position to pay. Further, the Spanish Government must not force matters. The Sultan must continue to exercise his authority in his Empire, because if Morocco had any existence as a nation it was solely because she had a sovereign. If Morocco were to lose her independence, Spain had the first right from her geographical position to intervene. The Powers could change everything except geographical position.

The relations between the Spanish Government and the Sultan were excellent. The presence of the Moorish envoys at Madrid during the campaign proved this to be the case. Spain had never given African questions the attention they deserved. The civil and colonial wars, "pronunciamientos," and political struggles of Spanish history had prevented this; but now Spaniards understood where their interests lay, and Morocco received greater consideration. It was thought that the loss of her colonies would weaken Spain, but this was not the case—on the contrary, her position had improved from an international point of view. The colonies were a continual source of loss of energy to her.

Since 1830 France had perseveringly continued to carry out her policy in Algeria and Tunis. Bismarck had erred in supposing that colonial aggrandisement would weaken France. Precisely the contrary has been the fact.

At present it appeared that Spain had become interested in African affairs. She must be prepared for eventualities. Should the independence of Morocco be threatened she must insist on her rights and prevent any other nation acquiring that country. To abandon Morocco would be to relinquish the idea of the integrity of Spain. The north of Africa must be Spanish, as it was really a prolongation of their territory, as Granada and Cordova were before the conquest.

Spain must develop her influence through pacific penetration into the Riff territory imitating French action in Algeria. Scientific missions must be sent out, schools established, and commerce fostered. She must extend her dominion materially and morally with the thought that her future was in Africa.

[45370] No. 421.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Lister.

(No. 59.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, December* 16, 1909.

SERGEANT BALDING. Your despatches Nos. 300 and 301.

It appears that Balding has already started, and he must act on his own responsibility. His Majesty's Government could not indemnify him if he gave up his post, which seems to be the only alternative, and they cannot press this advice on him unless he asks for it.

[44987] No. 422.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Lister.

(No. 172.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 16, 1909.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 299 of the 4th instant, and I entirely approve your action in regard to Menebhi's claim for the restoration of his property.

His Majesty's Government take a serious view of the matter, and I concur in your opinion that a strong line should now be taken. I shall be glad to learn what action you would suggest in the event of the representations you have just made proving unsuccessful.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[45840] No. 423.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 18.)

(No. 302.)

Sir, *Tangier, December 11, 1909.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 301 of the 9th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a further despatch I have received from His Majesty's consul at Fez, reporting that not even the Algerian non-commissioned officers are to accompany the mehalla to Hiayna, and that the Sultan is said to have engaged the Turkish officers referred to in Mr. White's despatch No. 285 of the 12th instant, as instructors, and sent them with the mehalla.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

Inclosure in No. 423.

Consul MacLeod to Mr. Lister.

(No. 99.)

Sir, *Fez, December 4, 1909.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 98 of yesterday, I beg to state that no French instructors, either Algerian or others, have gone with the mehalla to Hiayna.

It was Sergeant Balding who informed me that two Algerian instructors were accompanying this mehalla, but the French consul tells me to-day that this is not correct. M. Caillard said also that in future French instructors will not go with mehallas, but will confine their services to reorganising and drilling troops present with the Sultan or in garrisons.

I understand that a number of ex-officers of the Turkish army have been engaged by the Sultan as instructors, and that they have gone with the mehalla to Hiayna.

I have, &c.
J. M. MACLEOD.

[45824] No. 424.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 18.)

(No. 125.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, December 17, 1909.*

WITH reference to your telegram No. 58 of the 15th instant in connection with the Moorish mission:

I asked the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs to come and see me yesterday. The language he held gave me the impression that Mulai Hafid had never been informed of Mr. White's confidential communication, or at any rate that it had been transmitted to him in an expurgated form.

I said that, for the reason with which he was already acquainted, I was unable to offer any hope of the mission's being received, adding, at the same time, that, apart from that reason, it would have been impossible for His Majesty's Government to receive the mission on account of the attitude which had been adopted by the Sultan. As to what he said about strengthening Mokri's position, the French and British Governments were entirely of accord with respect both to the loan and to all other Moroccan matters, and the sooner Mulai Hafid was brought to realise this the better; it was useless for him to expect us to lend him any support.

Guebbas replied that His Shereefian Majesty merely desired that the amicable relations between England and Morocco which had existed in the reign of his father, Mulai Hassan, should be renewed.

I told him, in reply, that, as I had informed Mulai Hafid when at the court, the matter rested in his hands, but that His Majesty would have to make a radical change in his line of conduct.

I was begged by Guebbas, who deeply laments the attitude assumed by his master, to prepare and transmit to him a memorandum setting forth the motives which prompted His Majesty's Government to refuse the mission, and painting the general situation in its true colours. Guebbas thinks that such a memorandum would probably produce a wholesome effect.

Fear of the Sultan prevents him passing on messages of a disagreeable nature or from saying anything himself.

Whilst awaiting your instructions in the matter, I would inform you that I have communicated the foregoing to M. de Saint-Aulaire, who is of opinion that a memorandum such as Guebbas suggests might prove of great utility at the present moment, and hopes that this course may be pursued.

[45824] No. 425.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Lister.

(No. 60.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, December 20, 1909.*

MOORISH Mission.

I approve action proposed in your telegram No. 125.

[46573] No. 426.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 24.)

(No. 272.)

Sir, *Madrid, December 11, 1909.*

I HAVE the the honour to forward to you herewith a despatch which has been addressed to me by Colonel Fairholme, military attaché to this embassy, respecting his audience with His Majesty the King of Spain.

I have, &c.
MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

Inclosure in No. 426.

Colonel Fairholme to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 1.) (Extract.) *Madrid, December 10, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to report to your Excellency that I was this day received in audience by His Majesty the King.

His Majesty informed me that it is his intention to visit Melilla in the early part of next year, and that he hopes that some of the military attachés will accompany him, but he asked me not to mention this to my colleagues, as there might be jealousies on the part of some of them.

[46580] No. 427.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 24.)

(No. 284.)

Sir, *Madrid, December 21, 1909.*

WITH reference to Mr. E. Grant Duff's despatch No. 262 of the 26th ultimo, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a further report by Sir Somerville Head on the progress and conclusion of the military operations round Melilla.

I have, &c.
M. DE BUNSEN.

Inclosure in No. 427.

Report by Sir Somerville Head on the Melilla Campaign from November 26 to its conclusion.

AFTER an absence of five months, the 3rd brigade returned to Barcelona on the 19th December. The Lanceres de la Reina arrived back in Madrid on the night of the 20th, and the Cazadores are expected to leave Melilla very shortly. The reservists had already been disbanded.

The campaign in the Riff is thus proved to have reached its termination. The final phase was entered on on the 26th November. General Marina, at the head of a force of over 17,000 men, occupied the heights of Atlaten without encountering any opposition. The Moors abandoned all idea they may have had of continuing the struggle in the face of the large numbers of the Spanish troops. The new position thus taken up dominates the whole district of the Beni-bu-fruor mines, and the immediate effect of its occupation was the surrender in large numbers of the neighbouring tribesmen. The Spanish army is now engaged in improving the roads and communications between the various posts. A series of works are to be constructed which will enable the Spanish army of occupation, which is to be maintained at about 25,000 men, to retain its hold on the surrounding country.

Meanwhile, the Moorish markets have been reopened, and though some disappointment is said to be felt in military circles over the operations, much is made in the press of the magnificent commercial results which are expected to ensue from the campaign.

[46870] No. 428.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received December* 28.)

(No. 285.)

Sir, *Madrid, December* 23, 1909.

I RECEIVED a visit this morning from Mr. Macpherson, a partner in the Spanish Riff Mining Syndicate, who has often before been good enough to give me information concerning the Beni-bu-fruor mines.

Mr. Macpherson states that rapid progress has lately been made with the railway from Melilla to the mines. The section from Melilla to Nador is practically completed already. Within a few months the remaining sections to the mines will also be ready, and the transport of iron ore to the coast in full operation.

The Spanish syndicate has no connection with either the Union des Mines marocaines or the Mannesmann syndicate. It desires, I understand, to remain outside both groups, and it hopes that the result of the conference on the Morocco Mining Regulations, which is about to resume its sittings at Paris, will be to establish the principle, at least in the northern portion of Morocco, that persons or companies that have actually spent money in prospecting and working a mining district shall be entitled to be confirmed in possession of that district for the purpose of extracting the mineral, and that they shall not be compelled to accept only such a share of the mining business of the country as some great international syndicate may be pleased to assign to them.

I told Mr. Macpherson that I had no information concerning the proceedings of the Paris conference.

As to the general position at Melilla, Mr. Macpherson, who has spent some months there, tells me the Spanish position is now very strong; that so long as they hold their fortified position near Atlaten it will be very difficult for the Riffians to renew their attacks; and that the Riffians are now in a mood to accept a virtual Spanish protectorate, provided there be no intervention from Fez, and no kaïds appointed other than chieftains of the Riff tribes themselves.

The Inland Sea, or Mar Chica, could easily be made a splendid port, but the Spanish engineers employed on making a passage across the sandy spit which divides it from the Mediterranean have proved thoroughly incompetent. The excavations made by their dredgers have all been allowed to silt up again, and no permanent passage will be made, in Mr. Macpherson's opinion, till a competent foreign engineer is employed to construct a long breakwater on the Mediterranean side.

I have, &c.
MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[47248] No. 429.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received December* 31.)

(No. 287.)

Sir, *Madrid, December* 27, 1909.

WITH reference to my despatches Nos. 285 and 286, and in view of the discussion which has arisen concerning the eventual distribution of mining property in

Morocco, I have the honour to report that, according to information kindly supplied by Mr. MacPherson, the Spanish Mining Company ("Compañía Espanola de Minas del Rif") consists of the following principal shareholders:—

The Transatlantic Company of Barcelona;
Señor Guell, the well-known Barcelona capitalist;
The Duke of Tovar, Conde de Romanones } brothers;
Conde de Zabiria, of the Altos Hornos, Bilbao;
Señor de Ibarra, of Bilbao and Seville;
Marquis de Casa Mendaro;
Mr. Henry MacPherson;
Mr. Levison, an Englishman living at Bilbao;

besides a number of persons who are less well known.

The capital of the company is 6,000,000 pesetas (240,000*l.* at par) of which all but 500,000 pesetas (20,000*l.*) has been paid up. I understand that the entire capital will just suffice to complete the construction of the railway from Melilla to the Spanish mines. A rich profit is expected from the ore, as soon as it can be conveyed to the sea.

I have, &c.
MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[47250] No. 430.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received December* 31.)

(No. 289.)

Sir, *Madrid, December* 28, 1909.

IN the course of conversation yesterday with the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs, I noticed that his Excellency displayed some nervousness with regard to the possible conditions of the proposed Morocco loan, which is at present the subject of negotiation between the French Government and the Makhzen. Señor Perez Caballero said that the French Government had not yet replied to his request for full information on the subject. It was a matter of considerable interest to Spain, for it was obvious that the Moorish customs revenue, which was already assigned, in a large proportion, to the service of previous loans, would not suffice to meet the additional annual sum which would now be required. Where would the French Government find the necessary guarantees to make up the deficiency? If some of the internal taxes of Morocco were selected to furnish the guarantee, the syndicate issuing the loan would probably insist on instituting a control over the collection of those taxes. But this might imply the presence of French financial agents—for such would necessarily be the character of the representatives of the syndicate—in the principal towns all over Morocco. Something like a French protectorate would thus be virtually established. Spain would regard such a result with indifference, perhaps, in that portion of Morocco which is regarded as the French sphere; but if French agents and tax collectors overflowed into the northern portion of the country the large Spanish population by which it is inhabited would take alarm, and the Spanish Government would be placed in a very awkward position.

His Excellency reiterated the desire of the Spanish Government to proceed in all matters in perfect harmony with France.

I have, &c.
MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

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